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It is not necessary a thesis to 
it here because it locates my 
as a researcher I also have 
these influence the way I 
the researcher. I chose to 
is to 
dispositions personal 
world. This is a story of I perceive about 
development and social changes Solomon Islands society. 
However, individually we are each a product our history, and therefore despite how 
objective a piece of research may be intended, there is always the possibility that our 
upbringing always influences our position towards a subject of interest. The intention 
here is to place my self in a particular context for the benefit of the reader. There are 
two types of histories which are important to me. One history is external history 
where, like many Solomon Islanders, we see ourselves in the light of history of a 
contact with European expansion. The other history is that of oral history. The latter 
history is a vital component of my experience of the world. The importance of oral 
history comes through my position in the thesis. That is, the significance placed on 
kin groups in this thesis. 
I am a highlander from a tribe known as the 'Are' Are in the Southern region of the 
island of Malaita in the Solomon Islands. As a member of a particular social group, 
my identity is defined by birth and by tradition in this part of the worldview. The 'Are' 
Are is the second largest linguistic group on the Island of Malaita. On the Island, there 
are nine other similar linguistic groups. These linguistic groupings are important for 
an individual for a number of reasons: for individuals, once socialised in the structures 
of the social groupings they serve as a basis for individuals to form associations. 
Apart from individuals forming associations, there is also the role of the social group 
as a basis to create familiarity for individuals in the group. Thus, as an individual, I 
learned the ways of kin groups from within the 'Are 'Are society. This society is 
learned through social exchange and participation in an exchange system as one 
gradually socialised into this participation process. The participation is legitimised on 
the basis of kinship in terms of family membership in the extended family; but also on 
the basis of a higher cause-that of respect and honour of kinship and ancestors. Thus 
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the 'Are' Are worldview, as a world based on human relationships and a higher cause 
of honour and respect for the dead, forms the basis from which I judge the new forms 
of socialisation based on modern schooling. 
In search for 'a'rete' good life' in Are' Are, my parents left the highlands for the 
coastal area. After several years at Hauhui, West Are' Are, my family found that, 
obtaining labour employment to gain some cash was not possible. At the coast, our 
coastal relatives were not different from those in the highland, except they were more 
persuaded in the Christian doctrines of 'sin and punishment,' rather than anything to 
do with 'good life' as such. I in retrospect, realised that good life at the coast meant 
'avoiding sin and punishment'. This was clearly different from the 'good life' among 
the highlanders, which was about finding ways to gain wealth in pig raising to 
participate and assist relatives in exchange, and to organise feasts to honour and 
respect the dead. 
In 1967, my family migrated to Western Province on the Island of Vella la Vella. 
There, on a plantation station known, as Vaso, owned by a Chinese merchant (Chan 
Apong), the family resided for four years. My family lived and worked on the 
plantation, especially my father who became the 'boss man' for Malaitans working in 
the plantation. Most labourers were from K waio and 'Are' Are on Malaita. The 
amount of money earned was not even enough to help any relatives and to instigate 
any exchange feast. About $A30 a month, for a family of five, was not enough to 
achieve the 'good life'. 
The family returned to Malaita by late 1970 after failing to obtain any 'good life' from 
plantation work. I was 12 years old by then, but was keen to begin school the next 
day. At the Tawaimare local school the teacher, who was one of the only female 
teachers in the whole tribe, asked if I had been to school before. I had no idea what 
'schooling' was about. However, as was common in many primary schools sitting 
arrangements at the time, I was allowed to share a desk in which two other cousins 
were sitting. One of the cousins suggested that I should simply suggest a number to 
the teacher when she asked if I had been to school before. Thus the number '2' was a 
good number as this meant that I could remain sitting with the cousins who were then 
in standard 2. This did not work out because I knew nothing about 'abc' or 
IV 
'handwriting'. Thus, I was moved to another class. This time it was in standard '0'. 
From the 1970s, I started the process of formal schooling. After attending primary 
school at Tawaimare from 1970 to 1974, I went to two other schools for standard five 
and six. By this time, the home village school was developing to standard seven 
levels, to which 1 returned in 1976. 
I did high schooling from 1977 to 1981 at Su'u National Secondary School, Malaita 
Island. As a Christian Mission School, Biblical studies became an important 
component of study. This involved the study of all the books of the Bible, hymns, and 
prayers. Schools such as these, while important agents for developing awareness 
about science and society, became a 'switch breaker' for students who may still have 
considered their social and cultural worldview as relevant. Since a 'good student' in 
this environment also meant a 'good Christian', the pressure to ignore culture and 
indigenous ways of this 'switch breaker' enhanced thinking. Other students formulated 
a new identity between 'custom' as symbolising 'heathen and uncivilised' and to 
'Christianity as civilised' and the 'right way of thinking' about oneself and the world in 
which one lives. Clearly, to think 'custom' is quite difficult if one is faced with 
Christian rhetoric that borrows a western valuation of society and socialises through 
the schooling system. 
In 1982, 1 was among only sixty students in the country chosen to carry on to senior 
high school, at the form six levels for the year. This meant that only fewer than 1 0% 
of all the Form five students in the country were to be provided the opportunity for 
further study. After a year in King George, the Sixth National Secondary School, and 
a Foundation science year at the University of the South Pacific, I went for 
undergraduate study at Otago University, in Dunedin in New Zealand. After 
completion of an undergraduate degree in 1986, I returned to the Solomon Islands. I 
joined the Public service as an assistant director of the National Archives of the 
Solomon Islands. The government thought this would be the most relevant area for 
me. I worked as Assistant Archivist for a year, and then in the following three years as 
Archivist. The archival policy was complete in 1989 after bureaucratic struggle 
because the Archives, as an institution, attracted limited government attention. I 
returned to Otago University after winning the Sir Paul Reeves Scholarship in 1990 
and obtained a Masters Degree in Social Anthropology by the end of 1992. 
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After returning to the Solomon Islands, I sought employment the Solomon 
College of as Head School of General Studies. 
After six months I shifted again to the public service. was following 
my as permanent secretary to establish a new Ministry Tourism. I 
was elected as the Chairman of of the South (TCSP) 
during the period of 993 to early 1 However, politics Solomons was 
volatile, and 1994 was posted as permanent secretary to the Ministry Forestry 
Conservation. The government changed that from the NCP (National Change 
for Progress) government of Hilly to the GNU (Government of National Unity) 
led by the late Solomon Mamaloni. 1994, Solomon Mamaloni as GNU leader took 
over the government. This was when I was again deployed as Government Consultant 
for National Heritage (GCNH) from 1994 to 1995. I was given the responsibility for 
the development of the National Gallery and Cultural Centre (NA&CC). This project 
became personally burdening in that there was no financial resources to do anything 
about it. My family and I worked voluntarily for while in trying to get the need of the 
project for financial assistance. My family, especially my wife and the children and 
relatives, volunteered to clean up the old Government House. The building had until 
then been left to deteriorate. These efforts made this project possible. 
Ross Mining NL and the state asked me to do a base line study in June 1995.The 
study was to identify social groupings and recommend how best the Gold Ridge 
Mining project should deal with customary landowners. The study emphasised the 
need to ensure that the customary landowners, known as the Gold Ridge Land Owners 
(GRLO), were 'organised' enough to ensure that their concerns were satisfactorily 
represented to the Government and the mining company. This study led to the 
formulation of the Gold Ridge Landowners Council and its constitution after 
consultation with private lawyers. Thus, the GRLO was seen as a legitimate 
representative of the landowners relevant to the Gold Ridge Mining project, as far as 
the State and Ross Mining NL were concerned. The above situation was the basis for 
negotiating deals between state, customary landowners and the mining company. 
The Prime Minister's Office appointed me to work as the permanent secretary to the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy in February 1996. The emphasis was on the 
implementation of the Gold Ridge Mining Project. Through the process of 
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establishing a government negotiating team, the Ministry of Mines and Energy as an 
agent of state pursued the implementation of the project. The Ministry then made 
regular contact with the landowners and the mining company. This was done through 
issues of concern to all parties brought before the negotiation table. These involved 
fiscal policies, involving taxation, benefit distribution, risk sharing, and compensation 
for displacement of customary landowners. This process took the period from early 
1996 to October 1997 when the parties signed all agreements. The issue of the Mining 
License from the government was eventually resolved on 12 March 1998. 
The relevance of all the above is twofold: first, that I had a strong traditional 
grounding before taking up formal schooling. This means that in some ways I attempt 
to reconstruct a worldview that has elements of tradition and elements of modernity. 
Secondly, just because indigenous Solomon Islanders now run the government, this 
does not mean it is run according to the desires of kin groups. Thus, while national 
development is desirable, kin identity remains an important feature of kin psyche. The 
thesis is informed from various perspectives: initially from the perspective as a kin 
group member, and as a student with some anthropological background. This includes 
kinship experiences as a tribesman, government official and social researcher trying to 
understand the forces that continue to influence kin groups in Solomon Islands. 
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Abstract 
In the world of increasing globalisation and nation state development, many 
traditional cultures are increasingly under pressure. This is to not only change their 
ways of life, but also even to surrender the natural environment in which they have 
lived for many generations. Natural resources development is one of the most 
important forces exerting major changes on traditional culture in Melanesia. The 
dilemma is in finding the balance, if there is any such thing between natural resources 
development for nation building and the survival of cultural groups that have always 
depended on those environmental areas accessed for commercial development. 
This thesis is about social groups and their relationship with natural resource 
development projects. It hopes to contribute to the understanding of the nature of that 
relationship. Further on, the idea is to improve understanding of how natural resource 
development relations are practised. The focus is on the sector of mineral resources 
development, in both Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. The investigation 
focuses on forms and practices of articulations in the context of mining project 
relations. The underlying assumption is that the nature of relationship in any scheme 
of things matters for the actors involved. 
The methodology used is that of case studies. The Gold Ridge Mining project in the 
Solomon Islands constitutes the major case research for this work. The selection of 
the Gold Ridge Mining project is important because of its relevance for understanding 
social group relations in mineral resources development. Apart from Gold Ridge case, 
four other major mining project cases in Papua New Guinea are also reviewed. These 
projects are the Panguna, Ok Tedi, Porgera, and Lihir Mining projects. Each case is 
examined in order to identify the forms and practices of articulation of social groups 
in mineral resources development. Apart from mining cases in PNG and the Gold 
Ridge Mining project in Solomon Islands, the research also reviews other natural 
resources development projects to locate the historical context of articulation of social 
groups. 
·Historically, the articulation of social groups began after contact in both Solomon 
Islands and Papua New Guinea. The articulation of social groups first occurs through 
material exchanges with social group members, and subsequently through the 
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introduction of state institutions. The introduced central state made unto itself the role 
of 'central ruler,' and in the process automatically made social groups 'the ruled'. 
This study finds that this instrumental form of articulation rooted in historical contact 
has also sustained in the postcolonial state in Solomon Islands and Papua New 
Guinea. 
The mmmg cases reviewed in Papua New Guinea show that despite gradual 
improvement in the nature of relations with social groups in each subsequent mining 
project, such improvement was characteristically of process forms. In other words, 
there have been improvements in attitude, actions and forms of interactions in 
relations to project development. However at the same time, the structures that govern 
these processes remain, and social groups could never be equals in their position of 
influence towards mining development projects. The Gold Ridge Mining project case 
also showed improvement in the processes of good public relations, reflected in 
government land offers and higher award of royalties and relatively reasonable 
compensation packages. However, at the same time, social groups find these 
processes to be a means of distracting the resource owners from the more important 
things about resource use. That is, the need for the state to surrender mineral rights to 
landowners so that they can take their rightful role as resource owners. Given the fact 
that the existing laws remain in favour of state ownership of mineral resources, at 
least for the mean time, the situation persists. 
In Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, natural resources development has its 
origin in the periods of colonisation, and therefore the rules, roles and values 
associated with the imposed state have carried forward into the post-colonial period. 
In other words, the problem of relations between kin groups and state is structural. 
The state persisted over time in maintaining control over the use of natural resources 
for national development. This served the interests of the state but marginalise kin 
groups. Therefore, despite a gradual improvement in the processes applied in 
accessing natural resources in PNG and Solomon Islands, the structural displacement 
of kin groups remains to undermine the use of such resources to meet kin groups' 
local goals. 
Xl 
List of Acronyms 
CBSI 
CDC 
DBSI 
GDA 
GNU 
GP 
GRAC 
GRLA 
GRLOC 
GRLO 
GRNC 
ICSI 
NAG&CC 
NBSI 
NCP 
NFDL 
NSO 
PSC 
RMSIL 
SEIC 
SICA 
SIDT 
SIEA 
SIG 
SIC HE 
SIPL 
SML 
SSEC 
STL 
TCSP 
VDS 
Central Bank of Solomon Islands 
Commonwealth Development corporation 
Development Bank of Solomon Islands 
Guadalcanal Development Authority 
Government ofNational Unity 
Guadalcanal Province 
Gold Ridge Advisory Committee 
Gold Ridge Landowners Association 
Gold Ridge Landowners Council 
Gold Ridge Landowners 
Gold Ridge Negotiation Committee 
Investment Corporation of Solomon Islands 
National Art Gallery and Cultural Centre 
National Bank of Solomon Islands 
National Change for Progress 
National Fisheries Development Limited 
National Statistics Office 
Public Service Commission 
Ross Mining Solomon Islands Limited 
Social and Environmental Impact Committee 
Solomon Islands Christian Association 
Solomon Islands Development Trust 
Solomon Islands Electricity Authority 
Solomon Islands Government 
Solomon Islands College of Higher Education 
Solomon Islands Plantation Limited 
Special Mining Lease 
South Sea Evangelical Church 
Solomon Taiyo Limited 
Tourism Council of the South Pacific 
Village Development Scheme 
Xll 
of 
Figure 1: Map showing 
Oceanic states 
(Source: Ross Mining 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0. 0 •• 0 0 0. 0 ••• 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 •• 0 ••• 0 0. 0. 0 •• 0 0. 0 0 0 0 
Map of Solomon Islands showing Islands 
Including Guadalcanal.. 0 0 0. 0. 0 0 ••••••• 0 •• 0 0 •••••••• 0 ••••••••• 0 • 0 •••••••••• 0 • 0 •• 19 
Figure 3: Map showing major linguistic divisions Guadalcanal Island ..... 0 •••• 0 •• 20 
Figure Map: showing major mining locations PNG in context 
the Pacific 'rim of fire' (Source: Ross Mining NL) .......................... 59 
Figure 5 : Map of proposed Tailings dam management plan 
with INCO plant.( Source Ross Mining NL) .... 0 •• 0 ••• 0. 0 0 ••• 0 •••• 0 ••••• 0. 0 •• 230 
Figure 6: Map of one of the Gold Ridge pits and plans for Roads, Haul 
road, Water infrastructure and plant site (Source: Ross Mining NL) .... 0 • .231 
Figure Picture showing the primary school building constructed 
for Gold Ridge community at relocation village ... 0 0. 0 0 •• 0. 0 •••••• 0 0 •••• 0 0 ••• .244 
List Tables 
Table 1 : The pattern of gradual improvement of the nature 
of relationship between kin groups and mines. 0 •••••••••••••••• 0 •••••••• 0 ••• 0. 98 
Table 2 : Features of Gold Ridge hamlets in 1995 company 
census 0 ••••••••• 0 •• 0 • 0 •••••••••• 0 • 0 0 ••••• 0 0 ••••• 0 0 •••• 0 ••••• 0 • 0 •• 0 ••••••••••••••••• 0 •••••••• 0 0 •• 190 
Table 3 : List of the descent groups identified as members 
of the two Moieties .............. 0 0 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0....... 194 
Table 4: Reserve & Resources Expansion (contained in 
Ounces) ............ 0 ••• 0 ••••••• 0 ••• 0 ••••••••••• 0 0 •••••• 0 •••••••••• 0 0 ••••••• 0 •••••••• 0 ........... 204 
Table 5: Summary of Compensation Package for landowners ........................ o241 
Xlll 
Declaration 
Dedication -----------------------------ii 
Biography:----:--------------------------- m 
Acknowledgments viii 
Abstract x 
List of xii 
---·--------~---------- xiii 
--------------------------~ xiii 
---------------------------- xiii 
Table of Contents xiv 
Chapterl _____________________________________________________ l 
UUUL.<U'U _____________________________________________________ l 
Conceptual background ---------------------------------6 
1.1.1 Origin of articulation concept 1 l 
1.1.2 Application of articulation in anthropology 12 
1.1.3 The concept of state I 4 
1 .2 The study area and scope 18 
1 .3 Why the Gold Ridge project and the Gold Ridge people? 21 
1.4 Research problem and proposal 24 
1.5 Methodology 26 
1.5.1 Theoretical perspective 28 
1.5.2 Case study 30 
1.5.3 Primary sources 31 
1.5.4 Secondary sources 32 
1.5.5 Research limitations 32 
1.6 Data analysis and presentation --------------------~32 
Chapter 2 34 
The concept of articulation 34 
2.1 Introduction 34 
2.2 The concept of articulation 34 
2.2.1 Giambattista Vico's articulation 34 
2.2.2 Ferdinand de Saussure's articulation 35 
2.2.3 Diachronic and synchronic dimensions. 37 
2.3 Articulation in anthropology 38 
2.3.1 Radcliffe-Brown's functional model 38 
2.3.2 Sahlins' structuralist model 40 
2.3.3 Torfing's hegemonic articulation 43 
2.5 Natural resource use models of articulation 45 
2.5.1 Discovery model 45 
2.5.2 Ratification model 50 
2.5.3 Development forum model 52 
2.5.4 Sustainable model 53 
2.6 Implications for study of relations (evaluation) 55 
2.6.1 Research questions 56 
Chapter3 _____________________________________________________ 57 
Kin groups and mines: PNG cases 57 
XlV 
3. 1 Introduction 57 
-------------------------------------------------------
3.2 Context of instrumental 
3 .2.1 Social in PNG ____________________________________ 59 
3.2.2 'Discovery' 61 
3.2.3 Legal articulation 66 
3.3 .0 Pan gun a case------------------------------------
3.3.1 Exploration 70 
3.3 .2 Ratification agreement of 1967 72 
3.4: Ok Tedi project 
3 .4.1 Wopkairnin people ____________________________ 74 
3.4.2 Early exploration --·· 75 
3.4.3 Ok Tedi agreement Act 75 
3.5: The porgera project case-------------------------
3.5.1 Porgera 77 
3.5.2 Porgera development forum 78 
3.5.3 Articulation issues 82 
3 .6. Lihir project case --------------------------86 
3.6.1 Lihir community 87 
3.6.2 Lihir development forum 88 
3.6.3 Integrated benefit package 89 
3.5.4 Articulation issues 90 
3.7. Summary of cases -------------------------------------------96 
3.8. Implications for this Work 101 
Chapter 4 104 
Kin groups and the state: natural resource development 104 
4.1 Introduction 104 
4.1.1 Kinship groups lOS 
4.1.2 The centralised state 106 
4. 2 The state and the plantation economy 107 
4.2.1 The 107 
4.2.2 The plantation economy 109 
4.2.3 Social resistance 110 
4.3 Forestry development _______________________ 113 
4.3.1 Vangunu 116 
4.3.2 The government proposal 1 J 7 
4.3 .3 Land sales and stumpage 120 
4.3 .4 Kolombangara 121 
4.3 .5 Kolombangara forest products limited 121 
4.3.6 Small holder project approach 123 
4.4 Mineral resources 124 
--------------------------4.4.1 Rennell bauxite development 124 
4.5 Fishery resource development 126 
4.5.1 Noro development 126 
4.6 Land for agriculture 128 
4.6.1 Guadalcanal plains 128 
4.7 Landowners' inequality 131 
4.8 Conclusion 134 
Chapter 5 137 
Kin groups and mineral exploration 137 
XV 
5.1 Introduction _________________________ 137 
5.2 Early exploration phase 138 
5.2.1 Mendana to woodford 139 
5.2.2 Austrian expedition: 1896 141 
5.2.3 The "wild-cat-schemes" period: 1920-1942 143 
5.3 Post war exploration phase 145 
5.3.1 Moro movement 146 
5.4.2 Mines and minerals Act 1990 152 
5.5 Gold Ridge development: 1994-1998 _______________ 156 
5.5.1 Exploration 157 
5.5.2 Construction and development 158 
5.5.3 Mining lease and mine operation 159 
5.5.4 Operations 161 
5.6 Gold Ridge litigation and benefit sharing 162 
5.6.1 Litigations 162 
5.6.2 Benefit sharing 165 
5.7 Conclusion 167 
The next chapters will look more in detail at the development of the Gold Ridge project in terms 
ofthe nature ofthe relationship with kin groups in the implementation of the project. But 
historically, the relationship between kin groups and the state was not consensual but rather 
tolerated by kin groups. The nature of benefits experienced in previous projects only brought 
confirmation that kin groups 167 
were not proportionately receiving their entitlements. What seems clear here was the recurrent 
justification of state and commercial activities for their sustained control of natural resources. 
This only led to the contrasting effect of increasing distrust on the state. 167 
Chapter 6 169 
Institutions and interest groups _____________________ 169 
6.1 Introduction 169 
6.2 The state 170 
6.2.1 Constitution 171 
6.2.2 Citizenship 175 
6.2.3 Administration 177 
6.2.4 Province 179 
6.2.5 Area councU 180 
6.2.6 Implementation 181 
6.2. 7 Gold Ridge negotiation committee 183 
6.2.8 Social and environmental impact committee 184 
6.3 Gold Ridge kin groups _____________________ 186 
6.3.1 Villages 186 
6.3.2 Village economy 188 
6.3.3 Matoba society 189 
6.3.4 The Matoba kin group system 190 
6.3.5 Matoba exchange systems 192 
6.3.6 Matoba Land ownership 194 
6.3. 7 Matoba position 195 
6.4 Ross Mining NL 198 
6.4.1 Ross Mining (Solomon Islands) Ltd 199 
6.4.2 Ross Mining and landowners 200 
6.4.3 The Gold Ridge resource 201 
6.4.4 Shareholders 202 
6.5 Other players 203 
6.5.1 Individuals 203 
6.5.2 Island hoppers 207 
XVI 
6.6 Conclusion 209 
-----------------------------------------------------
Chapter 7 211 
Interaction processes: the Gold Ridge project 211 
7.1 Introduction 211 
7.2 Organising gold ridge landowners 211 
7.2.1 Land trustees 213 
7.2.2 Gold Ridge landowners' association 216 
7.2.3 Local landowner politics 218 
7.3 Negotiation 221 
7.3.1 Fiscal terms 222 
7.3.2 Environmental Impacts 225 
7.3.3 Social impacts 230 
7.3.4 Power supply 231 
7.4 Agreements 235 
7.4.1 Benefits 236 
7.4.2 Social dislocation 237 
7.5 Disagreements 242 
7.5.1 Ratification 243 
7.5.2 Compensation 243 
7.5.3 Monitoring 244 
7.6 Conclusion 245 
Chapter 8 247 
Kin group articulation in mining projects 247 
8.1 Introduction 247 
8.2 Background and research findings 249 
8.2.1 Origin ofform and practices 251 
8.2.2 Articulation of kin groups in the Solomon Islands 253 
8.2.3 Articulation of kin groups in PNG 256 
8.2.4 Articulation of kin groups in the Gold Ridge project 259 
8.3 What is Learned from this Study? 263 
8.4 Improving mining relations in the future 266 
Appendices 268 
Appendix 1 :Terms of reference for the Gold Ridge project tender screening 268 
Appendix 2: Surface access rights agreement for mineral prospecting. 270 
Appendix 3: The Gold Ridge Mining agreement, Solomon Islands 282 
References 337 
xvn 
1 
IS the Gold Ridge Mining 
(GRMP) raised widespread hope among the people of Solomon Islands. Solomon 
Islanders are mostly rural dwellers, and mostly in villages located on customary 
land. Most Solomon Islanders have always thought of themselves as autonomous, 
both politically and economically. This changed since contact with the outside world, 
initially in the nineteenth century and more profoundly in the twentieth century. Ever 
since, Solomon Islanders have struggled to regain this sense of autonomy. Thus, when 
Solomon Islands gained political independence 1978, it gave a sense of hope (in a 
political sense) to kin groups. It raised the expectations of achieving the right to self-
determination. 
However, after twenty years of independence, people have become disappointed with 
the government. The central government has been unable to deliver on the promises 
of economic growth and development. Government leaders are also accused of 
corruption. Lack of follow-up to bring corrupt leaders to justice meant there is a 
general perception that politicians are corrupt. The twenty years of political rule by 
indigenous rulers have seen the disappearance of the country's natural resources, 
particularly in the forestry and fishery resources sectors. While all the resources are 
disappearing the majority of the Solomon Islands population remain in villages and 
only 20% live in the main townships. Many people lost hope in the state's ability to 
improve the lives of ordinary Solomon Islanders after their high expectations from 
political independence in 1978. 
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Figure 1: Map showing the location of Solomon Islands in relation to other Oceanic 
states (Source: Ross Mining NL). 
The development of the Gold Ridge project was a government objective for many 
years. However, it never quite made it to the final stage of mining development. This 
changed when the government suddenly granted the first hard rock mining license on 
March 12, 1997. There was renewed hope not only among government leaders but 
also among ordinary Solomon Islanders, especially landowners. Most Solomon 
Islanders consider themselves landowners. Individuals are members of social groups 
by kinship. Landownership is associated with kinship groupings and therefore 
individuals are landowners by being members of the group. Generally then, Solomon 
Islanders consider natural resources within the territory of a social group as belonging 
to them, and not any one else, including the state. Natural resources are usually seen 
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as the means to improve 
relation to others, including 
position, not only their society but also 
state resource developers. 
The Ridge project was a 'dream come the groups 
Matoba society 
also expecting 
social groups Solomon were 
be able to meet needs 
from this It was a general Matoba groups 
should show Solomon Islanders development at the village level is possible 
through resource development - especially gold. The sense economic hope 
was short-lived, because on the day the special mining lease for Ross Mining NL was 
to be signed, the Matoba landowners lodged a formal complaint against the project. 
The Melbourne Law Firm, Slator & Gordon acted on behalf of the landowners who 
were led by Willy Rone, one ofthe five principal landowners ofMatoba society. 
The litigation was important because it reminded many Solomon Islanders of an 
inherent fear they had of foreign companies and of the state itself. This common 
perception is rooted in the fact that, despite the efforts of indigenous community 
members, most Solomon Islanders have not benefited from the exploitation of their 
natural resources. Natural resource exploitation, as seen in Solomon Islands, includes 
commercial agriculture, forestry development, fishing and, most recently, mining 
development. Before political independence in 1978, indigenous Solomon Islanders 
tended to lay the blame for this phenomenon on the colonial administration that had 
ruled the nation up until then. However, after twenty-four years of political 
independence, where leadership of the country had been in the hands of local people, 
this situation had remained the same, or even deteriorated. Thus, if constructive use of 
the nation's natural resources is to be achieved, then there have to be questions as to 
why kin groups consistently believed that there is an inherent bias against them in 
natural resource use. The landowners' litigation against Gold Ridge raised an 
important question. Why do landowners feel marginalised in the Gold Ridge project 
after almost two years of negotiation with them? What is the nature of this 
marginalisation? This thesis explores the nature of relationship between kin groups 
and the Gold Ridge Mine. 
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This feeling of landowner marginalisation is not new in Solomon Islands. The history 
of contact with colonisers, and the subsequent establishment of colonies and 
among 
state-promoted 
the 
policy of 
was oppressive at 
projects, 
caused suspicion 
1 was as an end to 
adopted a 
attempted to address the 
revenue generation the protectorate. Nevertheless, Islanders this was 
seen as a way reducing foreign control of natural resources. It implied the 
prioritisation of foreign/ local relations over development The expectation 
of the postcolonial state was to represent the local community's interests when it 
entered a joint venture project with a foreign company. The rationale at the time was 
that if the interests of the owners of the natural resources could be effectively 
reconciled with those of the foreign investors, conflict would be avoided. The 
landowners would benefit, as would the foreign investors who had the technology and 
capital to convert the natural resources into a marketable product. The state's role as 
a mediator between investors and landowners was seen as relevant and useful. 
Solomon Islands has had this policy of 'joint-venture' relations over the last 24 years. 
However, the results of these commercial joint ventures were not very encouraging. 
By the 1990s, the government was beginning to have a different attitude towards these 
projects. The persistent lack of profit of the Solomon Taiyo joint venture project over 
twelve years was well known among the public. There were joint-venture projects 
such as the Sasape Marina Ltd in Tulagi and the Oil Palm plantation project in 
Guadalcanal. While these projects had contributed through taxation to the state 
budget, they were seen as having no direct beneficial impact in improving the status 
of the people whose land was used for these projects. The experience with Solomon 
Taiyo, which reported losses each year, did much to discredit this approach. Thus, 
when the Gold Ridge project was being developed, the state opted to stay out of the 
joint-venture and allowed Ross Mining NL, the parent company, one hundred per cent 
ownership. This did not mean that the state did not care about the project, but rather 
opted for a contract with the company to encourage economic growth. However, in 
contrast, landowners saw the relationship between the state and the mining company 
as dubious. This was because landowners saw themselves not just as beneficiaries, but 
also as resource owners who did not need state recognition. Landowners saw 
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themselves as equals the state the mining company. Thus, while state 
concentrated on 
concerned about 
process of development, 
to make changes to the 
landowners were more 
project itself. It was 
obvious the landowners' was not a simple matter of asking 
questioning 
were the delegated to 
It is through the study of this experience that this research attempts to understand the 
nature of the relationship between landowners and the Gold Ridge Mining Project. 
The purpose is therefore to examine the problems of power sharing implied in natural 
resource use. Is there an inherent problem in the relationship between kin groups and 
natural resource projects? If there is a problem, how has is it been manifested? 
Conceptually, the structure of relations is about the way actors pursue their interests 
and the way they relate to others. 
Sociologists' views about relationships are that they have the features of mutuality, 
expectations, and they involve social actions. According to Cohen (1968:13) social 
relations, 
... are fundamentally, sets of mutually adjusted expectations of reciprocal 
social actions. These expectations define rights and obligations. Sets of 
interrelated rights and obligations define social statuses and roles. But, these 
definitions must imply mutuality at the outset. One man's rights are 
simultaneously, another man's obligation. 
The concern here is with existing social status, roles, and expectations that are 
necessary for sustaining a particular form of social relations in the context of natural 
resource development. In other words, it is about the structure of social relations and 
not just about the process of relating. The concept of 'articulation' is a structural 
concept chosen to examine the nature of social relations in natural resource use. The 
word 'articulation,' according to the Merriam-Webster Thesaurus, is derived from the 
word 'articulate' which is a verb also used or associated with the word 'integrate'. 
Similarly, 'articulate' is also associated with verbs such as 'connect', join', 'order', and 
'systematise' (Merriam-Webster Thesaurus 1989:39). 'Articulation' in terms of 
'systematisation' is defined as the act of creating a system. In other words, a system is 
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articulated when its diverse parts have 'meaningful' relationships to each other and to 
the whole (Merriam-Webster Thesaurus 1989:563). Put simply, 'articulation' is about 
the structure of social relations. 
In analysing the problem of articulation of relations in natural resource development 
in Solomon Islands, this work examines natural resource development projects, and in 
particular the mineral resource development sector. While the focus of this analysis is 
primarily on the relations surrounding the Gold Ridge Mining Project, other natural 
resource development projects are also discussed in the thesis. Earlier examples of 
natural resource development relations in Solomon Islands have also been included. 
In addition, mineral cases from Papua New Guinea (PNG) have also been analysed to 
provide further examples to highlight the nature of relationship between kin groups 
and commercial projects. Four mining development projects in Papua New Guinea are 
included. They are the Panguna, Ok Tedi, Porgera, and Lihir mine projects. The 
objective of extending the study to include cases apart from the Gold Ridge project is 
to demonstrate experiences in a context other than the Solomon Islands. 
The analysis of the idea of articulation of kin groups and project relations aims to 
contribute some knowledge towards understanding the forms and practice of relations 
in natural resource development in Solomon Islands. In addition, the study aims to 
analyse specifically the structures and processes influencing kin group and mine 
project relations. Therefore, this work expects to increase the awareness of the 
position of kin groups in natural resource development projects. 
Conceptual background 
The core argument of this thesis is that while there have been improvements in the 
relationship between kin groups and natural resource development projects in both the 
Solomon Islands and PNG, such improvements are process-related. What remain to 
be improved are the structures that underlie these processes, in other words, this refers 
to those processes that are applied in natural resource development projects. The 
thesis argues that through the history of natural resource development there is a 
continuity of a specific form of relationship. This form is that of 'instrumental 
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articulation'. The elements of this particular form of relationship can be recognised in 
terms of structures that predominate in the relationship over natural resource use. 
There are three major processes identified as criteria to recognise instrumental forms 
of articulation. These include: forms of actions taken in carrying out the natural 
resource development project; the types of interactions promoted to achieve project 
development; and the kind of attitudes displayed towards the project goals. These 
structures and processes guided the research to recognise instrumental articulation. 
Instrumental articulation has persisted through the history of natural resource 
developments in Solomon Islands and PNG that involved kin groups. This is 
indicative through the type of structures and processes imposed by the state. The 
imposition of the colonial state in Melanesia led to material enticement as well as the 
use of legal codes as instruments to sustain this form of instrumental articulation. 
Once established, this form of relationship was able to reproduce itself over time. 
Instrumental articulation was not only endemic to the colonial period alone, but also 
to the post colonial Solomon Islands because it remained after political independence. 
One factor is that, during the postcolonial era, this form of relationship served the 
interests of a new indigenous elite and their external associates, the state. The 
acceptance of the state as an international regime, without due considerations to the 
social environment in which such institutions are rooted, meant local demands were 
easily ignored. Thus, external values dictate relationships over internal issues. The 
locally based new elites, who are familiar with external values, sustain the 
instrumental articulation of kin groups. 
The second factor supporting the continuities of state methods of instrumental 
articulation is the imposed doctrine of the paramount role of the state. It leaves little 
formal room for reciprocal forms of relationship. While the state is a necessary 
overarching institution in Solomon Islands, it is not the only institution of importance 
to the Islanders. In addition, the state is an imported institution and often does not 
recognise institutions such as kin groups that existed before its introduction. Thus, kin 
groups, in terms of their traditional values, norms and roles, remain in opposition to 
the state's methods that are applied in natural development projects. Therefore, this 
study is concerned with the form of articulation and the practices that sustain the 
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resource owners development relations Solomon 
The of to state's 
objectives as an actor appropriated resources 
of resource development is to gain """'J"'-""''"' 
benefit by influence "'~"''-'""" extraction 
profit from the resource. Thus, the position players, values used to justify the 
ends, and norms promoted, are structures that are vital to the the actors perceive 
them. In addition, there are processes involving the type of actions taken to meet the 
goals of the project. The forms of interactions promoted in project development and 
attitudes towards the project goals are also vitaL In a sense, it is the competition 
between past kin group traditions on one hand and the imposed state on the other that 
accounts for the tension between kin groups and natural resource development 
projects. This tension is analysed throughout this text by describing the historical 
context of kin group experiences in natural resource (mineral) development relations. 
The cue for identifying evidence involved the norms, roles and values that influence 
such relations, and the processes used in establishing relations with kin groups over 
mining development projects. 
After political independence in 1978, many indigenous communities m Solomon 
Islands had hoped that the indigenous 'brothers' in government would be different. 
The new indigenous leaders that took over leadership from the colonial administration 
were then expected to have immediately recognised the perceived discrepancies 
between indigenous communities and the former colonial government. The perceived 
discrepancies had much to do with the status of indigenous communities, their natural 
resource rights, and their cultural identity. The colonial land laws that appropriated 
customary land for plantations and subsequent policies on use of natural resources 
were the basis for the long-term grievances with the colonial state. Thus, kin group 
expectations of the benefits of political independence were high. For example, one of 
the expectations was that there would be allowed a full indigenous institutional 
participation. The fathers of the Solomon Islands political independence movement 
tried to recognise these expectations through symbolism such as the Preamble of the 
National Constitution, where it states: 
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. . . We the people of Solomon Islands, proud of the wisdom and the worthy 
customs of our ancestors, mindful of our common and diverse heritage and 
conscious of our common destiny, do now, under the guiding hand of God, 
establish the sovereign democratic state of Solomon Islands; As a basis of our 
united nation DECLARE that: 
(a) all power in Solomon Islands belongs to its people and is exercised on their 
behalf by legislature, the executive and the judiciary established by this 
Constitution; 
(b) the natural resources of our country are vested in the people and the 
government of Solomon Islands ... (Leigh N.E, 1978:145). 
However, even this pledge did not specifically give any special privileges to kin 
groups in Solomon Islands, although implication for political participation was 
suggested in section 114(2) of the National Constitution where it provided that, 
Parliament shall make provlSlon for the government of the provinces 
established under this section and consider the role of traditional chiefs therein 
(Leigh N.E 1978: 195). 
Issues of land tenure and political autonomy are important to kin groups. Kin groups 
want a state that recognises them as equal partners in management of Solomon 
Islands. Where state dictates the terms of change to kin groups, this is not partnership 
in development. However, priorities for the state in Solomon Islands were the issues 
of material wealth rather than the development of a sound internal relationship. 
In recent years, the government's way of explaining and resolving the ever-increasing 
economic gap between 'haves' and 'have nots' has been through structural reform. 
The wisdom of this economic thinking is that the improvement of the state machinery 
is necessarily beneficial to the people at large. The assumption is that the state is the 
patron of development of Solomon Islands, and thus development becomes state-
centred in approach. The fact that the majority of the population is illiterate also 
facilitated the state-centred approach, through the 'conventional wisdom' that 
indigenous people, by being illiterate, are ignorant. While kin groups are ignorant 
about many aspects of the imposed state, they are not so ignorant about what 
constitutes a good long-term relationship. A state that only serves the interests of a 
small minority in the community is inadequate in meeting its obligations to the 
community at large. The recent crisis in Solomon Islands, known as the 'ethnic 
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tension,' arose from many issues including state and kin relationship over resource 
distribution as well as kin group political identity. 
This pattern of marginalisation of kin groups seems widely shared in Melanesia. For 
example, despite the fact that much exploitation of natural resources has taken place 
in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Solomon Islands, there remains the concern that 
this development has not met the goals of indigenous groups at all. Connell and 
Hewitt have observed a similar pattern in the Australasian region when they asserted 
that: 
.. .In the Australasian region, even at sites such as Vatukoula (Fiji) and 
Panguna (Papua New Guinea), where mines are established when colonial 
governments had little concern with indigenous land rights, social and regional 
equity, environmental management or sustainable development, some 
individuals and groups have benefited from access to new services and 
resources. Such benefits, however, have been far from unequivocal. 
Dispossession, displacement, marginalisation, and alienation in periods of 
rapid change precipitated by mineral-based industrialisation have produced, 
and continue to produce; a legacy of sometimes-tragic dimensions for many 
previously isolated indigenous groups (Connell and Howitt, 1991: 196) 
This research recognises this line of argument but extends this view to argue that 
much of the negative effects of development affecting kin groups relate to the existing 
forms of articulation, in other words, the thesis is a study of the nature of articulation 
of kin groups as demonstrated in the selected cases of natural resource development 
projects in both PNG and Solomon Islands. This Study is the first of its kind in the 
context of Solomon Islands. This is not because the issue of articulation of relations 
has not been important in the past. The reason is due to two central factors. The first is 
the general assumption that the state has the right to use natural resources for the 
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development of all citizens. This entailed a passive attitude towards the critical 
assessment of the state's role. It also meant that the kin groups' roles within the state 
in a new political environment received little political attention. Secondly, and more 
importantly, there has not been any actual mining development taking place in the 
country, despite limited attempts in the past. Thus, research about mining in Solomon 
Islands was limited. Finally, there are very few students from kin groups with the 
opportunity to do this particular study. These are some of the reasons for carrying out 
a study to try to understand the issues of social relations and the implications these 
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forms of relations have for kin groups m Solomon Islands through Social 
Anthropology. 
The idea of articulation is the guiding concept for this research with the aim of trying 
to understand the nature of relationships between kin groups and natural resource 
development projects in Solomon Islands. The choice of this concept as a framework 
to explain natural resource development relations in Solomon Islands derives from 
anthropology and is based on the assumption that the nature of human relationships 
matters in the development processes. In other words, the form of relationship applied 
in practice over natural resource use dictates the results of natural resource 
development processes. Thus, the concept of articulation is selected to guide this 
work. 
1.1.1 Origin of articulation concept 
Conceptually, the origin of the idea of articulation can be traced to the early works of 
philosophers such Vico and Saussure (Hawkes 1977:11-29). Vico, in his study of 
'primitive' society, tried to establish the logics behind mythology. He claimed that 
myths are in effect histories of the 'Primitive man'. The idea is that myths are the 
result of human experience of the physical environment and that it is man's attempts 
to make sense out of the complexity of the environment. Humans are, by nature, 
structuralists. Hence, primitive man is able to articulate his experience with the world 
around him and make sense of it. Mythology therefore serves the articulation or 
nexus of making meaningful human experience of the physical environment. In 
essence, articulation is a relational concept. 
This relational concept has, since Vico, been developed and applied by Saussure. 
Saussure, as a linguist, had the view that instead of observing phenomena in the world 
as discrete entities, suggest the world should be seen in relational terms. It is in the 
relationship between objects that their features emerge. Saussure demonstrated that in 
the study of language, meaning is created because of the relationship between a 'sign' 
and what the 'sign' stood for. The sign he called the "signifier" and what the sign 
stood for as the "signified". This relationship between signifier and signified is a 
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sequential form of relation and its characteristic is that it occurs through time. 
Semioticians have called this form of relations as first articulation. 
On the other hand, meaning can also be created when a sign relates to other signs. 
This is a vertical form of relation, and the structure is one of differentials. The fact we 
can select one sign among other existing potential signs makes us recognise the 
features of our selected sign because of its contrast to other signs. The structure of 
these relations is considered a second articulation. Where there is no relationship, 
either vertical or sequential, such form is a nonarticulated relation. 
This form of analysis has become the root of contemporary structural analysis. The 
relevance of the concept of articulation for this study is based on the two forms of 
articulation referred to as 'first articulation' and 'second articulation'. This is because 
sequential forms and differential forms of articulation matter in creating social 
meanmg. Signs in the social world mean different things for different actors and 
differ in their importance. In the context of this work, when describing the nature of 
the relationship between different actors in the context of natural resource 
development, it is assumed that historically specific forms of articulation have been 
predominant. Simply stated, articulated relations can either be 'sequential' or 
'differential' in nature, but once a form is selected the outcome differs for actors 
involved. 
1.1.2 Application of articulation in anthropology 
In the field of Social Anthropology, structural analysis has been applied to understand 
social systems as kin society. Early anthropologists applied this method of analysis in 
kin societies to explain cultural persistence. For example, structural-functionalists 
like Radcliffe-Brown argued that such persistence could be explained through 
functionalism. The idea is that elements of a social system serve specific roles for the 
reproduction of that system. Thus, social systems persist because the structure and the 
processes that reproduce that structure are mutually reinforcing. However, even 
within a context of a simple social system, such as that of a kin group, structure 
undergoes social transformation, as do the processes that produce the structures. One 
example that demonstrates that structure can undergo transformation beyond its 
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action. Each actor in a social situation selects or chooses a line of action based on the 
signs of its worldview. Hence, choosing a particular sign or code over other possible 
signs in essence subordinates others. This selection process closely resembles the 
form of relations that Saussure denoted as synchronic or differential relations. On the 
other hand, where an actor chooses a sign or code, it is because it makes a d?fference 
to that subject or serves that subject's interests. This resembles diachronic relations or 
sequential relations. 
The relevance of both concepts of diachronic and synchronic relations in social 
situation is that actors act according to signs by 'selection' and by the 'interests' that 
such actions serve. Here the goal of the actor, and the signs selected against other 
signs because they serve to meet their intended goals, are relevant factors in social 
relations. In other words, historical processes unfold in a dynamic fashion between the 
'practice of structure and the structure of the practice' (Sahlins 1981:72). 
The focus of this work in using the concept of articulation is to suggest that actors, 
who act as agents of the state, select signs and interests that serve their own goals at 
the cost of actors representing kin groups. One example of this relates to the 
formation and establishment of the state itself. Declaration of Solomon Islands as a 
Protectorate in 1893 made the idea of state significant. However, this significance did 
not mean the same thing for both the agents of state and those ruled under such a 
state. The state as an imposed institution had rules, roles, and values that differ to kin 
groups' own institutions under the state's rule. In other words, the state's structures 
served its own agents and goals rather than the goals of the kin groups. Equally, in 
practice the attitude, actions, and forms of interactions that agents of state apply in 
relations to kin groups also served itself. Therefore, this thesis argues that the 
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persistent undermining of kin groups in contemporary natural resource development 
relations is a systemic problem. The state is serving its own purpose and goals at the 
cost of the collective goals of kin groups. 
1.1.3 The concept of state 
The idea of state is a form of purposive social order. According to Larmour, the state 
can be conceptualised in four ways: organisational, functional, ethical and 
international (Larmour 1996:3). Organisationally, there is the ability to influence local 
resistance, or external forces. Functionally, the state is seen in terms of its primary 
duties such as defence, police and infrastructure, which benefit society. Ethically, the 
state is seen as having the legitimate authority to use violence. Internationally, the 
state is recognised as a regime (Larmour 1996: 4). Each ofthe perspective of the state 
reflects the emphasis placed on the role the state plays in society. In other words, all 
these different perspectives of the state have the common feature of 'control'. For 
instance, organisationally, the state is characterised in terms of control of internal 
resistance and external forces. Functionally, it is also characterised in terms of control 
through defence and infrastructure development. This function is also justified in 
terms of legitimising the use of force. The international perspective of the state is also 
characteristic of control because it allows international values to permeate through the 
state, even when such values exploit the internal elements of the state. Thus, although 
the state is based on control, it is the forms of control used and justified in the name of 
state that matter to members of kin groups. This is particularly the case where the 
state defines the goals of social development, and the parochial goals of kin groups 
tend to be excluded. For the purpose of this work, the concern here is with the way the 
state formulates relationships with kin groups over natural resource development. 
There are different ways of interpreting what the state is supposed to be, even as an 
organisation. For example, according to Scott (1992: 22-25), the state as an 
organisation has three different perspectives. These are the Rational, Natural and 
Open System perspectives. 
The Rational perspective defines organisation as conscious, deliberate and purposeful 
cooperation (Barnard 1938:4, in Scott 1992:22). The state is a central coordinative 
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system, with a specific internal structure and coordination (March and Simon 1958:4, 
in Scott 1992). Thus, the state is a "formal organisation" that has been established to 
achieve certain goals (Blau and Scott 1962, Etzioni 1964:3). Thus, the rational 
perspective conceives organisation as collectivist, with specific structures designed to 
achieve certain specific goals. However, while the state has specific goals, such goals 
may not be shared goals in some specific social situations. For instance, in Solomon 
Islands, the state's control of mineral resources is not a shared goal. Kin groups with 
specific customary land territory seemed to consider the state as a mediating 
organisation between kin groups and foreign actors. This was particularly the case in 
terms of mediating access to local natural resources from outside. Thus, if the state is 
to be considered as having specific structures with specific goals, then the state in 
Solomon Islands needs to revise its goals and structures with kin groups. 
Apart from interpreting state organisation as rational, the state can also be interpreted 
as an organic system. The Natural systems perspective views organisation as an 
organic system that struggles to survive and maintain itself as a system. According to 
Scott, the Natural system sees organisation as: 
... collectivities whose participants share a common interest in the survival of 
the system and who are engaged in the collective activities, informally 
structured, to secure this end (Scott, 1992:24). 
The state as an organisation may reflect the features of being organic, struggling to 
survive and to maintain itself as a system, but if the state, as an organisation, is not 
organic in the first place, the system is dysfunctional. In a situation where the 
collectivities, in this case kin groups, do not share the goal of making the system 
survive, the state is at odds with its collectivities. Thus, the state in an ethnically 
diverse society has to justify the reasons for its survival. In other words, in some 
situations, the state is not the rule but the exception, and therefore the problem is one 
of making the state meaningful for the diversity of kin groups. 
Apart from the state being interpreted as either a rational or organic 
organisation, it can also be interpreted as an open system. The Open System 
perspective sees the organisation, not as a closed system, but subject to 
external influence. Thus, according to Scott, the Open System perspective sees 
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an organisation not as a formal structure or an organic entity, but as a system 
of interdependent activities (Scott 1992:25). 
Yet, while the environment in which it is located affects the state, such an 
environment could also be reinforcing existing forms of structures. 
The state, as found in the Solomon Islands, has features that are reflected in all three 
perspectives of organisation. These include purposeful behaviour (Rationalist), self-
maintenance (Naturalist), and being influenced by the environment (Open System). 
State organisations that have their roots in a colonial heritage, within the environment 
of diverse kin group societies, are also inherently hegemonic. Such states create an 
environment of tension between the state as an introduced system, and kin group 
systems. State/ kin group tension is different from commonly known tensions within 
the state as an organisation itself as alluded to by structuralist such as Etzioni, whose 
view of state organisation characterises it as the 'Organisational dilemma': 
.. the inevitable strains which can be reduced but not eliminated between 
organisational needs and personal needs; between rationality and non-
rationality; between discipline and autonomy; between formal and informal 
relations; between management and workers, or more generically, between 
ranks and divisions (Etzioni, 1964: 41,quoted in Scott, 1992: 97). 
State/kin group tension is a structural tension rather than a process tension, as outlined 
above. It is a tension of signification, to use Sahlins' terminology. It matters to kin 
groups that the state selectively pursued goals and interests in the name of nation 
building in appropriating the use of natural resources. Yet, it seems that kin groups 
are undermined persistently over time. 
In the context of Solomon Islands, the tension between the state and the kin groups 
resurfaced more strongly after political independence. Independence meant, for some 
of the kin groups the restoration of what they had lost since colonisation. This 
included land and leadership roles. Nevertheless, following independence, the new 
state appeared to reconsolidate and sustain itself. It maintained the state system 
inherited at independence, and continued to operate as usual. The only changes were 
to replace expatriates with local government agents. The result was that kin groups 
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with pre- colonial social systems began the demand for a meaningful relationship with 
the "imposed" state. 
The problem then was the need to reconcile existing tribal communities, which have 
some degree of autonomy. This problem is not unique to Solomon Islands, but is a 
widely shared phenomenon in many postcolonial states. For example, in post colonial 
Africa, this idea of "reconciliation" has been debated in terms of integration, that is 
the idea that the nation-state should reconcile the existing post-colonial society with 
the newly formed state institutions. For example, Oyovbaire, writing on national 
integration in Africa, argued that the idea of national integration is often ambiguous. 
It tends to assume that state apparatuses, such as bureaucracies, actually function to 
integrate or disintegrate. It also assumes that a "nationally integrated political 
community" would necessarily serve the interests of the citizen (Oyovbaire, 1984:1 ). 
In this respect, Oyovbaire's experience in Nigeria suggested that national integration 
manifest itself in the dominant structure, in the values of production, and through re-
distributive activities (Oyovbaire 1984:1 ). National integration perceived in the light 
of colonial history of a developing country poses problems. Instead of integration, 
Oyovbaire argued that the concept of national cohesion is a better basis for estimating 
the ways in which the dominant classes view and articulate politics and political 
events in Nigeria (Oyovbaire 1984:2). 
Cohen (1968:132) defines cohesion as resistance to division or secession. He argues 
that the condition of cohesion might be achieved through mutual interests, intersection 
of ties, allegiance to a larger unit, and the quality and strength of ties. The state is one 
of the most effective means for common allegiance, if it is recognised as a 
coordinating agency (Cohen 1968: 132). Hence, the state could achieve cohesion 
through provision of facilities to members, providing means to sustain continued 
allegiance, and providing symbols for the identification for the units making up the 
allegiance. 
In Solomon Islands, while the state is useful in bringing relative cohesion to society, it 
has also been the basis for kin group resistance. Kin groups in Solomon Islands have a 
long history of association with land and resources, so that unilateral control by the 
state is perceived as unacceptable. This is particularly the case when the state is 
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involved in coordinating natural resource development. It is the problem of 
articulating the rights of kin groups with national interests that remains the issue. The 
analysis of the forms and practices of articulation of relations among kin groups and 
natural resource projects forms the basis of this work. 
1.2 The study area and scope 
In examining the form and the practice of development relations in natural 
resource development, the main primary case study area is the Guadalcanal 
Province among the Matoba people. The traditionally known Matoba have, 
over the years, also been referred to as the 'Gold Ridge people'. This refers 
to the Matoba land area where many mineral explorations have occurred 
over the last decades or centuries. Guadalcanal is the largest Island in the 
Solomon Islands archipelago, and is well known among the Americans and 
its allies from the World War Two campaign against the Japanese during 
1942-43. Today the Island hosts the administrative headquarters of the state 
of Solomon Islands. 
Tikopia .,. wTI: 
Figure 2: Detail Map of Solomon Islands showing Major Islands including 
Guadalcanal. 
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The population of the island, like other islands in Solomon Islands, has rapidly 
increased over the years. It was reported that in 197 6 the population was about 
31,677. This had changed by 1986, when the population grew to 49,831, which is 
about 4.3 % annual growth rate (Statistics Office 1988:2). According to the 1999 
Population Census, the population has now increased to 63,000. Culturally, people of 
Guadalcanal Island are divided into seven major cultural groups. These are as 
indicated in figure 2 below: 
1. Marau, 
2. Longgu, 
3. Lengo, 
4. West Guadalcanal, 
5. Talise, Mbirao, 
6. Malanga, and 
7. Mbirao. 
Some of these seven linguistic groups have dialects. The focus of this study is on the 
Malanga linguistic groups in central Guadalcanal. 
d 
' 
·4 
FIGURE 3: Map showing the major linguistic divisions in Guadalcanal Island. 
19 
The focus of this study is on the Matoba people who are a sub-tribal group within the 
Malango social group. The Malango people, as a cultural group, numbered about 
4,052 people in the 1999 Census (Statistics Office 1999). However, within the 
Malango linguistic divisions there are dialects, of which one is the Bahomea dialect. It 
is the Bahomea people, or traditionally Matoba people, who are now also referred to 
as 'Gold Ridge people'. The Gold Ridge Mining Project development used for this 
case study directly concerns these people. The landowners directly affected by the 
project had a population of 1,200 women, men, and children in 1995. This was about 
a fifth of the population of the Malan go social group. 
The Matoba people or Gold Ridge people are members of two major clan groups that 
are further subdivided into sub-clans. The two major clans are the Manugaravu and 
the Manukiki. The cosmology of this people claimed that the origin of their people 
came from two primordial 'sisters' who are referred to as the big and small 'sisters'. 
They were named 'Manugaravu' and 'Manukiki 'respectively. The two cosmic sisters 
are also symbolised by the totems of 'eagle' and 'hawk' respectively. Each cosmic 
sister is then responsible for the sub-clan members of the Matoba society. The 
eighteen sub-clans ofthe two moieties made up the population of 1,200 individuals of 
the Matoba society directly affected by the Gold Ridge project. The word 'Matoba' 
refers to a 'reclining stomach' and depicts an ancient event where the land that is now 
called 'Matoba' had reclined into the earth. The social structure of the Matoba people 
is based on the reciprocal relationship between the two moieties. Marriage is 
exogamous in that members of each clan can not marry within their own clan but do 
so in the other corresponding moiety. 
The Matoba people lived mostly in the interior of the Island. Their location between 
the Chovohio and Charivuna streams is ideal for their self-subsistence needs. The 
merging of these two streams with other small stream systems from the Balande River 
allowed the flow of minerals to the coast. This led to the discovery of gold traces that 
resulted in exploration of the area. The Spanish explorer Mendana in 16th Century 
created the mythology about land with great abundance of gold, although they could 
only find a trace of gold at the Balande river mouth. Some two centuries passed 
before such mythology attracted further exploration. In 1896, an Austrian expedition 
set out to the Malango territory that ended in perhaps the first clash with gold seekers 
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on the Island. Comprehensive gold search of the areas was done in the 1920s. In 193 7 
Solomon Islands Gold Development Ltd was then insured with a mining license. 
Gold found in the 1950s on the Valebeabea land, led to the name Gold Ridge. This is 
in the heart of the Matoba area between the Chovohio and Charivunga streams. This 
period was important because the demand for carriers and helpers for the explorers 
attracted attention among the scattered hamlets of the Matoba people in the 
surrounding area. This meant more Matoba people came to settle around the area 
where exploration activities were being carried out. Thus villages in the conventional 
sense only formed in the late 1950s after more people moved and congregated in the 
area of exploration activity. Alluvial gold was essential to the Matoba people during 
this period. 
1.3 Why the Gold Ridge project and the Gold Ridge people? 
The articulation of the relationship between the goals of the modern nation state and 
that of the local community, with whom most of the nation's natural resources remain 
within their jurisdiction, has been problematic. Major natural resource projects in the 
country have, ever since political independence, attracted controversies and, in some 
cases, descended into political instability. Despite the increasing tension between kin 
groups and the state, the state rhetoric on national development has persisted. As the 
nation-state pursues nation-building, pre-colonial kin groups, remain marginalised, 
which in turn creates more suspicions about state activities in the name of 
development. Thus, there is a general knowledge that resource-owning communities 
in the Solomon Islands believe the state has marginalised them in natural resource 
development. 
The perception of kin groups being marginalised is a new phenomenon that emerged 
after the establishment of the state. Some of the examples of joint venture projects in 
Solomon Islands are, the Solomon Taiyo Limited and the Solomon Islands Plantation 
Limited (SIPL). The latter project is a joint venture project between the Solomon 
Islands Government and Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) on oil 
palm development. This perception of landowner marginalisation is still in existence 
and witnessed in the Gold Ridge Mining Project on the Island of Guadalcanal. The 
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initial 'great hope' and the subsequent 'great disappointment' that followed the 
development of Gold Ridge project, are the important reasons for this research. 
My interest in the problem of articulation of relations, in natural resource 
development, stems from two levels of experiences. The first is from my academic 
interest in the field of the Social Anthropology of Development, and secondly from 
the perspective of an indigenous person. As a kin group member, I recognise, through 
working for the state, the many difficulties facing indigenous communities in 
representing the entitlements of their people. It has been an uphill battle for 
indigenous communities against the forces of the state in the wider society. The 
failure of natural resource development to improve the lives of indigenous people 
highlights the disarticulation between the state as a coordinator of development and 
the tribal community as a beneficiary. This situation results in the tribal community 
perception of themselves as not only an unequal partner with the state, but also that 
their status as a community with its own legitimacy remains outside the framework of 
governance. Such perceptions and activities do not necessarily occur in empty space, 
but rather have social causes. However, whatever these social causes may be, they are 
often obscured. A central aspect of this obscurity is the 'acceptance' of the state as 
inherited from its colonial past, the basis by which it justifies the norms and processes 
that govern extractions of natural resources. The understanding of the nature of these 
norms and processes is vital to understanding relationships over natural resource 
development. 
Despite the importance and the 'obscurity' of such social causes, this concern has not 
been an important part of Social Anthropology that traditionally deals with indigenous 
people, especially in Solomon Islands. It is my background in anthropology and my 
personal experience with heritage of kin society that influence the emphasis placed on 
this problem: why is it that the articulation of kin groups with the state and natural 
resource development, like the Gold Ridge Mining Project, is a problem? 
In trying to examine this articulation problem, it must first be noted that this study 
does not apply any specific hypothesis, because it is not trying to test any specific 
theory. However, the study is guided by a view of structure, especially the concept of 
structure and processes or normative structures and behavioural structures. In other 
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words, the study is concerned with the nature of social relations, which are governed 
by mutual expectations, but where some expectations are more significant than others 
are. It is in the identification of the significant forms of social relations over natural 
resource use in both Solomon Islands and the PNG context that the problem of 
articulation is to be explored. 
This study has faced some obstacles, especially during the process of planning the 
study of the Matoba community and the nature of their relations with other actors in 
the context of mining development. The first is that the case study approach has not 
been followed by intense fieldwork because of the untimely occurrence of the ethnic 
conflict in the Solomon Islands. The ethnic conflict, which lasted for almost two and a 
half years, directly affected the follow-up fieldwork of the Gold Ridge Mining case 
study. This conflict was between the Guale and Malaitans, of whom I am an ethnic 
member. In conflicts in Melanesia, social group membership is seen as more 
important than individual involvement. Therefore, not being involved with the 
conflict did not guarantee fieldwork safety for a researcher who is a member of one of 
the ethnic groups involved in the conflict. 
However, I was fortunate in having been involved in the Project directly as a both a 
social researcher and a government agent between 1995-97. As a social researcher, I 
was engaged in the social mapping of the Project area in 1995. Following this, I was 
appointed as a Secretary of Mines in 1996-97, for the whole period of negotiation and 
development of the project. Much of the information used in the analysis was gained 
during this time. During the period of active conflict in Solomon Islands, further 
information such as government reports and other project documents were obtained in 
Honiara. This has been done to supplement my direct involvement in the project, and 
thus assisted the study in the difficult circumstances that made visits to the mine 
impossible. 
An additional measure taken to provide more empirical data has been the extension of 
the study to consider other mining cases in another Melanesian country. The inclusion 
of PNG mining cases helps to provide supplementary data to demonstrate the basis of 
the thesis. Thus, this thesis begins by tracing the predominant form of articulation at 
two levels. The first level is aimed at providing a general perspective about the notion 
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of articulation. An historical approach is employed to enlighten the forms it takes and 
its effects on the rights of indigenous communities in relation to natural resource use. 
It attempts to ground the roots of existing forms of relationships between kin groups 
and the state within historical development. At the specific level, the research 
describes mining development projects to show the nature of relationships, as played 
out in actual events. 
While not all the forms of structures that influence kin group behaviour are covered, 
the importance placed on both normative structures and behavioural structures inform 
the conclusion reached in this thesis. In other words, while the relationship among kin 
groups and state in the context of natural resource development projects may have 
improved over the years, participatory processes alone are not satisfactory unless 
normative structures that govern relations are included in development configuration. 
This claim is made only for the Gold Ridge case with limited extensions to other 
cases examined in PNG. 
The thesis attempts to demonstrate in the subsequent chapters that existing 
marginalisation of kin groups is historically rooted in the persistence of cultural 
dominance of kin groups for purpose of natural resource exploitation. While 
participatory processes carried out during the formulation of mining projects are 
highlighted, these were superficial because the structure of relations continues to be 
asymmetric. The significance of this study is that to understand indigenous 
community behaviour one must understand its position and the structures that sustain 
such a position in the scheme of things. 
1.4 Research problem and proposal 
At the general level, the issue in this study is about the method or the practices that 
govern and are used in the interaction between kin groups, the state, and transnational 
corporations as expressed in natural resource development projects. Hence in the case 
of the Matoba people, the key questions that concern this study are: 
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• why is articulation of kin groups and natural resource development projects 
such as the Gold Ridge Mine in Solomon Islands a problem? 
• What method or practice predominates in mining development project 
relations? 
• What are the elements of this practice? 
• What makes this practice marginalising to kin groups? 
• What lessons can be learned from the existing relational practices? 
In trying to answer these questions, the study relies on broad historical trends and 
selected natural resource development cases in two countries. In Solomon Islands, 
natural resource development projects apart from mineral resources are also outlined 
to demonstrate the patterns of articulation applied in resource development relations. 
This includes forestry, fisheries, and agriculture, which constitute the previously 
important national income generating projects until the opening of the Gold Ridge 
Mine in 1998. 
In PNG, four of the most important mining development projects in PNG are outlined 
to demonstrate the patterns of relationships over time. This includes the Panguna 
mine, Ok Tedi, Porgera and Lihir projects. By examining the patterns of articulation 
used in resource development, the study expects to shed light on the structure of 
relations in kin groups and state sponsored project relations. Thus, the selection of the 
Gold Ridge project as a major case for this study, supplemented with PNG examples, 
forms the empirical grounding for this work. These cases in PNG and Solomon 
Islands are the basis for justifying my argument about the continuity of the imposed 
state's methods or specific form of articulation of relations over natural resource 
development goals. 
The proposition to be considered in answering the problems stated above is that 
articulating kin groups or landowners in mining development projects will remain a 
major problem in Solomon Islands and PNG. There will always be difficulty with kin 
groups unless the position of kin groups and the structures that underlie natural 
resource development relations are redefined and accommodated in the relationship 
over resource use. It is argued here that, as at present, landowners' participation is 
25 
based mainly on situational processes, to the exclusion of the norms that govern 
processes in mining development. In other words, landowners are simply being 
"persuaded on site" and contain their expected discontent. This thesis attempts to 
question the norms and behaviours that govern relationships for natural resource 
development activities. I argue that persuading landowners on site, without addressing 
the norms and rules that govern mining development activities, is destined to fail in 
sustaining landowner support for a project on a long-term basis. 
1.5 Methodology 
The research examines what is known and perceived about articulation of relations at 
two levels of analysis. The first is at the broader level, where the historical forms of 
articulation of relations between kin groups and project developments are assessed. At 
the second level, and more specifically, are the forms and practices of articulation of 
relations as played out in the case of the Gold Ridge Mine Project. 
The extension of the study to include PNG provided other instances where forms and 
practices of articulation have occurred both at a general level as well as in specific 
project cases. Since the study focus is on the forms of articulation of relations, it is 
based on the structuralist approach that recognises social systems as having mutual 
interdependence of structure and process. The focus on analysing methods of 
articulating of relations assumes that the process approach alone cannot explain 
adequately the nature of social relations without taking into account the structures that 
underpin such process. Hence, the study describes selected project cases in terms of 
historical context, structures imposed by the state and the process applied to meet the 
demands of the state in the context of natural resource use. 
The major event of analysis is the mining development case. A mining project is a 
complex event that passes through major stages in its development process. Mining 
consists of exploration, development, operation, and mine closure. Relationships 
change as the project progresses through these stages. This study goes beyond these 
specific events in mining development to analyse their overarching structures. These 
are the rules, roles, and values that underlie the processes for articulating relations in a 
specific project. Thus, the thesis chapters are organised to show the meaning and 
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application of the notion of articulation. They describe forms and practices of 
articulation in natural resource development, especially mining project cases as they 
evolve over time. Simply, the study describes the persistent conventions used in 
mineral resource development relations that sustain the gap between the goals of kin 
groups and those ofthe mining project itself. 
What must be made clear at the outset is that any choice to research the nature of 
articulation in the mining sector must first acknowledge that mining development 
project relations are complex. For minerals, like many other natural resources, the 
process of converting such raw material into tangible benefits requires the formation 
of various complex relations. It involves major stakeholders. For example, the state's 
interest is in the development of such resources for purposes of creating economic 
growth, employment and taxation revenue for the state. The mining company's 
interests, on the other hand, are to maximise profit. The kin groups, whose livelihood 
depends on the environment, take a gamble based on their expectations for positive 
change to their existing lives. While these expectations are often mixed, they are not 
as unreasonable as some might have us believe. Such expectations culminate from a 
long history of contact. A history of contact with the outside world created a desire for 
external goods within the kin group society. It is the kin group's desires for external 
goods and the search to meet this desire that makes kin group members take 
development promises seriously. These promises are those that the state and mining 
company promote among landowners during the exploration and development phase 
of a project. Kin groups directly affected by natural resource development expect that 
if there are to be benefits, they should go first to those groups directly affected by the 
project. In simple terms, if kin groups are willing to sacrifice the land upon which 
they depend for survival then, unlike the state and the transnational corporations for 
whom such a project is usually one of many, the goals of the kin groups involved 
have to be clear. The study does not focus on kin group leaders and their relationship 
with their kin group. That would amount to a study of the effect of mining. On the 
other hand, a study that focused on the processes of interactions alone would amount 
to a description of the events leading to establishing relations without seeking to 
explicate the structures through which such processes are enacted. Such a study would 
focus on the historical process of establishing relations alone. The basic concern of 
this study is to describe the forms of articulation, identify the predominant forms that 
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persist in natural resource development relations in Solomon Islands and PNG, and 
how such forms of articulation marginalise kin group expectations. 
Firstly, on the historical front, the study outlines the historical context in which 
colonisation and kin groups formed relations, and how relationships persisted over 
time. Secondly, apart from the historical context, the study examines specific forms of 
articulation within mineral resource development projects. This is done through 
personal experience in the development of the Gold Ridge Mining project. The use of 
self-reflection, assisted through the analysis of project documents, is carried out on 
the structures and the processes that form a part of the development of the Gold Ridge 
project. For example, the focus is on normative structures, such as roles, rules, and 
values that are used for the project as well as the behavioural structures such as 
actions, interactions, and attitudes that are made manifest with the aim of achieving 
the state's and the company's perceived goals. Recollection and documentation 
describe the existing practices of the mining development project. As government's 
chief negotiator in the Gold Ridge project, with the company and the landowners, the 
focus is on the government's position, and the positions represented by landowners. 
But, as found in any relatively large natural resource project, while the state, the 
company, and landowners are major players, they are not the only players in such 
projects. There are also other views and interests that arise through the course of a 
project. This includes downstream groups, lawyers, and business groups. The 
description of the different phases of mining projects is very important, as it is 
through these phases of development that structures and processes emerge and 
decisions are taken based on those premises. 
1.5.1 Theoretical perspective 
In the attempt to analyse articulation forms and practices, the study examines the 
structure of relations. This is in contrast to, say, a researcher examining impacts of 
relationships, which concentrate on outcomes of projects. Such a study would place 
emphasis on the consequences of natural resource use, such as environmental and 
social costs of natural resource projects. Similarly, a study that places emphasis on kin 
groups and their perceptions alone would require ethnographic work among kin 
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groups. This type of study would simply examine kin groups in isolation. The same 
could also be said of a study that investigates the role of the state or the mining 
company. Such a study could have investigated the role that the state plays in trying to 
achieve its development goals. The choice of this study to investigate the structure of 
relations is motivated by the view that there is an articulation problem in Solomon 
Islands and PNG, which involves indigenous people and projects. 
There are two dimensions of articulation that are considered relevant for analysis. The 
first is that of vertical relations of actors to the goal of the actions. For example, in the 
case of natural resource development, the issue is what the goal of natural resource 
development means to the actors. The second is that of horizontal relations, which 
refer to whose interests the goal of natural resource development serves. A situation 
where at least two actors interact to achieve certain goals, and the form of interactions 
favours one actor over the other consistently, is presumed to be instrumental. To show 
that an existing form of articulation is instrumental, one has to focus on the elements 
of articulation and show how such elements function instrumentally. For example, in 
terms of vertical relations of actors to goals of actions, to what extent are the rules 
used in governing the project, the values used to justify the goals of a project, and the 
roles played by each actor instrumental? Equally, in terms of horizontal relations, how 
are actions, interactions and attitudes towards the goal of project development 
instrumental towards certain actors? These elements of articulation are analysed to 
show the form of articulation and the practices persistent in natural resource use. 
The major actors in the Gold Ridge project are the Solomon Islands Government, 
Ross Mining NL, and the Matoba Community (also known as Gold Ridge 
landowners). The description of the historical context leading to the development of 
the project during 1995-97 constitutes an important part of this thesis. The Gold Ridge 
project has another important role in its selection as a case study. It is not only the 
first commercial mining project in Solomon Islands, but also it has been thought that 
by learning from PNG mining experiences that this project should be the model 
project for Melanesia. In a sense, it is the disappointment that followed in the attempt 
to achieve this goal that prompted this research work. This study therefore tries to 
analyse existing forms and practices of relations and in so doing explain the reasons 
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for disappointment among landowners. The examination of the PNG and Solomon 
Islands cases centres on the following research questions: 
• what are the forms of articulation found in PNG and Solomon Islands mining 
development projects? 
• are there reasons to believe that landowners have been inadequately articulated 
in mine projects? 
• what are the possible causes for instrumental articulation of resource owners? 
• what evidence is there to show that some forms of articulation are conducive 
to a stable working environment and some forms are not? 
The type of questions asked above demands an examination of the structure of 
relations in mining development projects. Using structural analysis, the study aims to 
show the forms of relationships and practices that exist between landowners and the 
mine. The study explores the historical roots and expressions of forms of articulation 
that are involved in natural resource development. Apart from the form and the root of 
articulation that is predominantly applied in natural resource use, the study also 
describes how such forms of articulation have persisted. Through the analysis of the 
Gold Ridge project, the study aims to show that many of the landowners' demands 
remain outside socially acceptable practices as defined by existing forms of 
articulation in the mining sector. 
1.5.2 Case study 
The Gold Ridge project in the Solomon Islands was the first of its kind in the entire 
country. As the Secretary to Mines, the project was directly under my responsibility 
for its implementation on behalf of the state. This experience with the project was an 
important basis for carrying out further research on this project. The Gold Ridge 
project was subsequently closed in June 2000. It had operated only since June 1998. 
The closure was a result of what was propagated by both the local and the 
international media as "ethnic tension". It seems it would have been more appropriate 
to call it "resource conflict". This event was important in that it prevented further field 
research at the Gold Ridge project. I retained the Gold Ridge project as a case study, 
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to use pnmary and secondary source materials available and my personal 
recollections. To supplement the available material, I have selected additional cases in 
Papua New Guinea. This was one of the contexts for a case study approach. 
1.5.3 Primary sources 
The focus on the Gold Ridge project case meant that much of my primary data is 
based on information obtained during 1995-97. In addition, many of the experiences 
witnessed during the implementation of the project have been first hand, although in 
writing this has been viewed in the light of self-reflection. It is impossible to cover 
every aspect of the project. Given the small size of Solomon Islands' economy, the 
project became very significant as an investment project. The use of my own personal 
records, diaries and various manuscripts used during the whole processes of the Gold 
Ridge mining development form the guidance for the reconstruction of the Gold 
Ridge project in terms of analysing the relationship between kin groups and the 
project. Much of my recollection as a social researcher in 1995 and government chief 
negotiator between 1996 and 1997, forms the central focus of this interpretation. As a 
researcher in 1995, I visited most of the villages of Matoba, held meetings and 
investigated the social structure of the Matoba people. This research was part of the 
government-mining company approach to finding means to establish the Matoba 
community association known as the Gold Ridge landowners' association. Much of 
the information collected during this time was relevant to the government at that time, 
but is also relevant now for self-reflection about the project. In my role as government 
employee and chief negotiator, my presence at negotiation processes with landowners, 
provincial government, Ross Mining NL and other departments of the Solomon 
Islands government provided me with the opportunity to interact with different 
interest groups in the course of the project development. 
Despite this close involvement with the project, I revisited the project only once in 
September 1998. The following year, the country descended into ethnic conflict after 
the Guadalcanal militants forcefully removed Malaitan labourers and settlers on the 
Island. The Gold Ridge and other major projects were directly affected by the ethnic 
tension as reflected in their closure during 2000. For this reason, the study has 
extended its data collection to involve secondary data not only on the Gold Ridge 
project and other natural resource projects in Solomon Islands, but also by providing 
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descriptions and analyses of mining project cases in the neighbouring country of 
PNG. 
1.5.4 Secondary sources 
The use of secondary data involved archive records, government records, media 
prints, consultant reports, and published works on natural resource development, 
especially in the area of mining. Literature on the PNG mining industry is much more 
available, as expected, than for Solomon Islands. Apart from the Gold Ridge Mining 
Project, and attempts to mine bauxite in the 1970s (Fitch 1971: 1) mining is not an 
industry in Solomon Islands as yet. Hence, other natural resource projects such as 
forestry, fishery and agriculture have been briefly described to give a sense of the 
forms and practices of articulations or relations in the Solomon Islands context. 
1.5.5 Research limitations 
The major limitation that placed significant constraint on this research project was the 
unpredictable effect of ethnic tension in the Solomon Islands that occurred during 
1999 and 2000. Since the choice of the study was to document and analyse the Gold 
Ridge Mining Project on the Island of Guadalcanal, the ethnic tension that arose on 
the island prevented any return to the project site. Apart from my previous direct 
involvement in the project between 1995 and 1997, there were only three other visits 
to the Solomon Islands during the period of this research. The first was in August 
1998 during the opening of the mine, and the other three visits mainly to the capital 
Honiara in 1999, 2000, and mid 2002, but with no further access to the Gold Ridge 
site. The project, which only commenced operation in June 1998, had closed at the 
height of the conflict on June 5th 2000. 
The ethnic tension was between Guadalcanal people on whose island the project was 
located and the immigrant population from neighbouring island of Malaita, of which I 
am an ethnic member. The Gold Ridge project remains an important historical project 
for the Solomon Islands and thus the study retains it as a case study focus. 
1.6 Data analysis and presentation 
The data analysis and presentation of research findings has two components. The first 
component is that of theoretical analysis of articulation literature and also 
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presentations of some historical models of articulation in natural resource 
development relations. Chapter 2 provided this theoretical component. The second 
component of the study deals with mining projects in PNG and natural resource 
projects in Solomon Islands, including the Gold Ridge project. The focus on PNG and 
Solomon Islands experience relies heavily on previous works by other researchers 
showing forms and practices of articulation over resource use. Chapter 3 discusses the 
PNG mining cases and demonstrates the application of some of the forms of 
articulation models applied. Chapter 4 focuses on other natural resource development 
instances in Solomon Islands other than mineral. The following three chapters on the 
Gold Ridge Mining project case show how the relationship plays itself out and show 
that it was inevitable that the landowners should be disappointed. The conclusions in 
Chapter 8 outline the findings and implications for natural resource development in 
Solomon Islands and Melanesia at large. In other words, this entails conclusions about 
the articulation problem in Gold Ridge Mining project. 
The Gold Ridge Mining Project case will be presented in three chapters. Chapter 5 
provides a historical analysis of mining development in Solomon Islands. This uses 
mainly historical data from secondary sources as well as government documents. 
Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the process of Gold Ridge development to provide details 
of the how relations play themselves out in this particular case. 
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1 
This chapter begins the argument 
the notion of articulation and how it 
in Chapter 1, the roots of the 
2 
of 
thesis origin and the use of 
be used as a As briefly 
of articulation are found in the philosophy of 
relational thinking. As be described later in this chapter, the idea of articulating is 
about structure. In other words, it is about the way two or more things are joined 
together. This chapter initially define the idea of articulation. From there it 
go on to show its application anthropology in general and how its elements are 
reflected in the 'joining' of kin groups in natural resource development. The concept 
of articulation is useful as a framework to explain forms of relationship between kin 
groups and natural resource development projects. However, the conclusion of this 
chapter is to argue that in the history of natural resource development in Melanesia, 
the dominant form of articulation is characterised as controlling and biased against kin 
groups. It also serves the interests of the state and operating company more than it 
does for kin groups. This form of articulation is defined as an instrumental form of 
articulation. But firstly, what is the idea of articulation itself? 
2.2 The concept of articulation 
This section traces the origin of the idea of articulation and outlines some of its 
applications in linguistics and anthropology. Particular emphasis is placed on Sahlins' 
application to highlight the form of articulation relevant for this work. 
2.2.1 Giambattista Vico's articulation 
The origin of the concept of articulation 1s associated with the early eighteenth 
century thinker, Giambattista Vico. In his study of mythology among the 'primitive' 
human he asserted that in fact these people, who were considered primitive, were in 
essence natural poets (Hawkes 1977: 12). According to this idea, human experience 
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2.2.2 Ferdinand de Saussure's articulation 
Since the time of Vico, Ferdinand de Saussure, a Swiss linguist, was one of the most 
important expounders of the realisation that humans were structuralist. It was from 
Saussure that most modern structuralists derive their heritage (Hawkes 1977: 19). 
This way of thinking was new in his time, when the conventional view was that the 
world consisted of independently existing objects. The independently existing objects 
were in turn observed and classified. In other words, social phenomena or entities 
exist as separate wholes within a diachronic or historical process. This could be 
observed and its laws of change could be recorded. Saussure rejected this view for a 
relational perspective (Hawkes 1977: 19). A relational perspective is an alternative 
approach to study social phenomena in terms of their individual parts (that is 
diachronically). The relational approach studies social phenomena in terms of the 
relationship between parts (Hawkes 1977: 20). This means synchronically, as opposed 
to diachronically, researching social entities. 
The relevance of Saussure is that in his study of language, he was able to distinguish 
two fundamental dimensions of articulation. These are the synchronic and diachronic 
dimensions of the study of language. This distinction was important in that it 
recognised the importance of both the current structural properties of language 
(synchronic dimension) as much as its historical dimension (diachronic) (Hawkes 
1977: 20). 
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In the field of linguistics, semiotic study applies Saussurian concepts to understand 
the application and the roles of diachronic and synchronic dimensions. In semiotics, 
the concept of articulation refers to the relations in the study of "signs". In this 
context, the idea of articulation referred to the structure of code (Chandler 1999: 1 ). 
According to Chandler, codes are conventions, which in text signs are organised into 
meaningful systems (Chandler 1999: 2). For semioticians, or those who study signs, 
codes provided a framework on which signs depend to make sense. For example, 
"words" in language are complete meaningful units or signs. Each sign such as a 
"word" consists of a "signifier" and a "signified", signifier being the "sign", for 
example a "word" and "signified" being what the "sign" or such "word" stands for. 
When a code occurs as a recurrent meaningful unit or the relations between the 
"signifier" and "signified" are meaningful, this is the first "articulation." (Chandler 
1999: 2) In other words, a semiotic code as system achieved a level of first 
articulation when its smallest meaningful units are available. For example, a "word" 
as a complete meaningful unit is a complete sign and thus has a first articulation. To 
further demonstrate this form of relationship, Chandler suggests that, given a sign 
such as the word "tree", the signifier is the letters "t-r-e-e" and the signified concept is 
the category "tree". Thus, the meaning of the sign is meaningful through the relations 
of the sign (Chandler 1999: 2). Language therefore has two inherent dimensions in 
which meaning is created-namely syntagmatic relations and associative relations 
(Hawkes 1977: 26). Let us consider more closely these two dimensions of the idea of 
articulation. 
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In contrast to the diachronic aspects of language, there is also the synchronic aspect. 
This is the associative or 'vertical' relation. This form of relations identifies difference 
between signs or 'words'. Hawkes explains that each, 
. word will have relationships with other words in the language that do not 
occur at this point in time, but are capable of doing so. The word, that is, has 
'formulaic' associations with those other words from among which it has, so to 
speak, been chosen. This means these other words, part of the inner storehouse 
that makes up the language of each speaker (Hawkes 1977: 27). 
What this means is that in any language we humans recognise meaning because of 
contrasts that exist between possible words. The fact that these other words are there, 
help creates meaning by not being chosen, thus defining the word. This is the 
associative aspect of language. This relationship of differentials between signs is a 
second articulation. This form of articulation or 'vertical articulation' is meaningful by 
difference. The important feature here is that it allows selection of, say, a sign from 
other alternative available signs. 
Clearly, what we begin to see about the idea of structure in language is that it refers to 
meaningful relationship. In language, there are two forms of meaningful relationship. 
The first way to achieve meaningful relationship is through sequential relations or 
first articulation. That is the relationship between a 'signifier' and the 'signified'. The 
second meaningful relationship is through 'difference'. This form of relation is a 
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vertical relation. Actors recognise meaning by contrasting between, say, two possible 
signs or words. This form of relationship is a second articulation. In other words, 
meaning is created in language through the above two forms of articulation. 
Accordingly, linguists argue that the above two dimensions of language or forms of 
articulation are self-regulating in language. On this assumption, it is argued that if 
language is self-regulating in form then it follows that it provides researchers with the 
means to deal with other worlds beyond their own. In other words, diachronic and 
synchronic forms of articulation make up the human structure as our inherent 
characteristics (Hawkes 1977: 28). Language is also a feature of the structure of 
human reality. This means that these structural concepts are applicable to 
understanding the world around us. 
However, while one could agree that in language meanmg IS created by both 
associative as well as sequential relations in signs, to create sense it requires an 
interpreter (Chandler 1999: 3). This process of interpretation is important because it 
allows for creating signification. This means, in other words, the role of the sign in 
social action. This will be discussed further in the next section in Sahlins' application 
of structural analysis. For now it is sufficient to say that the role of actors in the 
interpretation of signs is relevant. 
2.3 Articulation in anthropology 
Anthropologists borrowed from linguists, using structural analysis in the study of 
tribal societies. For the purpose of this work, there are two anthropological works 
cited to demonstrate the relevance of the concept of structure as an important 
framework for understanding social relations. The first is that of Radcliffe-Brown's 
functional model, and the second is Sahlins' structural anthropology. Both 
anthropologists attempted to understand structures of relations in kinship society, 
although which is applicable to other social situations. 
2.3.1 Radcliffe-Brown's functional model 
For Radcliffe-Brown, a social unit has basic needs that must be fulfilled if it is to 
survive. Therefore each part of the social unit functions in a way that maintains the 
unit as a whole (Radcliffe-Brown 1968:5). For Radcliffe-Brown structures assume 
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both continuity in forms of social life and the processes of change in those forms. In 
other words, particular structures found in society, for example rules, roles, and 
values, serve a function. Structure exists because it has a role in meeting the need of 
the whole. this sense, continuity or change structure is explained in terms of 
function. For example, since anthropologists were studying kin group societies, such a 
model was used to explain kinship systems and behaviours of members of such 
systems. Kinship systems were structured and perpetuated through marriage and the 
subsequent reciprocal exchanges that were involved. Exchange relations in kinship-
based society are elements performing the function of maintaining kinship structure. 
Thus, the behaviour of the members of such a society in terms of their attitude, 
actions, and interactions have a mutual interdependent relationship with the structure 
of kinship. Scott suggested that the existence of the elements, or the process of such 
structure is explainable in terms of the function they perform in the maintenance of 
the structure (Scott 1992: 54). 
The important dimension about structure, as alluded to by the functional model is self-
perpetuation, the idea is that elements of a structure function for the persistence of 
that particular whole_ Thus, change and continuity are the functions that processes 
play in the maintenance of structure. 
What is important here is that structure and process are mutually related. In other 
words, kinship systems are dependent on the behaviour of actors as much as the 
actors' behaviour depends on the kinship system. As social actors, according to this 
functional model, an actor's behaviour reproduces the structure and hence such 
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structure persists in society. Functionalists therefore argued that such interdependence 
of structure and process is self-reinforcing because the process serves a function, 
which is the continuity of the structure. This self-maintenance of a social system is 
therefore a reproductive process. 
The reproductive process is an important factor in the continuity of the social system. 
In the context of a kinship-based society that exists in isolation, functional 
explanations are quite useful and enlightening. However, how does social 
reproduction take place in a situation of cross-cultural interaction? This brings us back 
to the idea of articulation as a kind of 'joining' between two or more actors. In a 
situation of cross-cultural contact, the relationship between the encountering social 
systems undergoes a state of flux. Sahlins' work is useful in this context in showing 
how the social system transforms and reproduces the new structures uf the 
transformed social system (Sahlins 1981: 67). 
2.3.2 Sahlins' structuralist model 
Sahlins has explored structure, process, functions and reproduction in a situation of 
cross-cultural contact, and found that in such a situation a social system may not 
reproduce itself, but instead be transformed (Sahlins 1981: 67). In explaining cross-
cultural contact in Hawaii, Sahlins tried to explain that people act upon circumstances 
as a result of their own cultural presuppositions, that is, the socially prescribed 
categories of persons and things that influence human actions. In some sense, the 
world exists to people in the way they socially construct it. This means that each 
person or groups of people, do not necessarily share the same worldview. Hence, 
according to Sahlins (1981 :67), human actions do not necessarily conform to 
particular categories of perception of the world. Where people encounter new 
categories of perception and decide not to comply, they in turn revalue and 
functionally redefine such perceptions. 
Simply, this means a given society or culture, when it receives a new category in its 
cultural system, as it has existed and where its own interests have been affected, will 
itself change. Thus, according to Sahlins, what started as a reproduction of the system 
then becomes in effect a transformation of that system. According to this view, all 
structural transformation in any social system involves structural reproduction. 
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Apart from people's criticism of each other, Sahlins explains that there is also the role 
of the 'sign' in action (Sahlins 1981: 68). This is due to different interpretations of 
events, what Chandler referred to as the process of interpretation (1999: 3). The sign 
here is used in the same way as codes are used in semiotics, where "signifier" is the 
sign and the "signified" is what the sign stands for. In applying this idea, Sahlins 
suggests that action is intentional, which means actors act with purpose and in line 
with their social lives in the world. Thus actors, in living their lives, use signs or 
codes in carrying out actions. Codes are brought into referential relations to the 
objects of their actions (signified) and thus create 'contextual meanings' for the 
'conceptual values'. Clearly, as human actors, we use signs to carry out actions 
towards attaining certain goals. 
Sahlins' notion of 'conceptual values' and 'contextual meanings' implies the notions 
of 'associative relations' and 'sequential relations' respectively. Sahlins pointed out 
that the distinction drawn between 'contextual meaning' and 'conceptual values' is 
due to the codes people enact and the purpose of such action. It is the fact that signs 
are different which allows actors to distinguish a sign from other signs, in the 
collective symbolic scheme. This is the conceptual value of sign or the associative 
relations of signs. However, sign or code can also represent a 'differential interests' to 
various subjects according to the position of such 'signs' in their general lives. This is 
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the contextual meanings or sequential relations or articulation. For Sahlins, " 
interests" and "sense" (or "meaning") are two sides of the same coin (1981: 69), 
where 'interests' relate to persons and 'sense' relates to other signs. In other words, 
there is the difference between actors enacting signs and signs existing or constituted 
in society. Though signs have multiple meanings as 'conceptual value', actors in 
practice make selections of the meaning they make. Thus, signs could be 
instrumentally rearranged in human action. Since human action takes place through 
time, the value of a sign enacted takes an instrumental value for the subject (Sahlins 
1981: 71). 
The arranging and rearranging of signs in creating an instrumental relation in human 
actions is due to the characteristics of the sign itself. Signs have the characteristic that 
Lacau called "floating" signifiers (Kuo 1999:2). Lacau's conception is important in 
pointing out that social reality is constructed. Lacau argues that these signifiers are 
characters that are not fixed. The signifiers are in fact "floating signifiers". For 
example, the term "Democracy" is a signifier, but like other signifiers is a "floating 
signifier". In other words, the signifier's meaning is subject to ambiguity. Thus, 
society is the result of discourse or forms of argument upon which people construct 
their own identity. The fact that signs are "floating" means actors can rearrange them, 
thus creating new meanings for such signs or their semantic value (Sahlins 1981: 68). 
In summary, Sahlins concluded that, 
... The dialectics of history, then, are structural throughout. Powered by 
disconformities between conventional values and intentional values, between 
inter-subjective meanings and subjective interests, between symbolic sense 
and symbolic reference, the historical process unfolds as a continuous and 
reciprocal movement between the practice of the structure and the structure of 
the practice ( Sahlins 1981 :72). 
Clearly, the important contribution from Sahlins' work is the emphasis on the role of 
'signs' in human action. Actors select signs in relation to their goals to give them 
'sense' and 'interests'. Thus, 'sense' and 'interests' are forms of relations or articulations 
in human action. The creation of instrumental relations is therefore the result of actors 
making selections of signs and giving them conceptual values and contextual 
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such transformation affects subject's interests. Secondly, it follows that in any 
such structural transformation, there is structural reproduction. Thus, change and 
reproduction of social systems are important elements of articulation. The third 
important element of articulation is that actors re-arrange 'signs' by revaluation, and 
functionally redefine categories of perception. These elements the notion 
articulation help us to apply it to situations of landowners and mine relations, which is 
the core subject of this research. 
2.3.3 Torfing's hegemonic articulation 
The articulation concept, in the context of international relations, involves inter-state 
actors in the world stage. However, like any individual actor, states too have their 
own interests in relationships they form at this level. For example, inter-state relations 
are not always reciprocal, and instead the interests of one state may be served more 
than that of the corresponding state. This form of relationship is a hegemonic 
articulation. 
According to Torfing, where the instrumental value of one state subordinates other 
instrumental values of other subjects there is a hegemonic relationship (Torfing 1999: 
101). Torfing (1999: 101) suggests that where a form of articulation favours a 
privileged position of a subject, say a nation-state, it also favours the social 
construction of such a relationship. Thus, the two important elements of a structure of 
relations are the position of a subject, and the nature of the processes that construct 
the positions in that existing relationship. Hence, at the level of social relations, it is 
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the structures and the processes that construct relationships that are the important 
influential factors that determine the nature of outcomes in that relationship. 
By tracing the ongm and the applications of the concept of articulation several 
relevant features have emerged. Since the time of Vico and Saussure, the concept of 
articulation is clearly a relational concept. Saussure's study of language finds that 
meaning is created as a result of two forms of relationship. The diachronic relation is 
the sequential relationship between a 'signifier' and the 'signified'. This is a first 
articulation or a complete meaningful relationship. The second form of relationship 
that Saussure identifies is that of a synchronic form of relationship in language. This 
form of relationship is vertical in that meaning is created as a result of difference. The 
fact that signs are distinguishable from other possible signs also creates meaning for 
an actor by virtue of difference. In short, the structure of codes could either be 
meaningful or not meaningful. Similarly, in a social system the relationship between 
its elements could either be meaningful or not meaningful. Equally for Radcliffe-
Brown, a social system is a functioning whole with elements that function to maintain 
the system. As in a kinship system, elements such as social exchange rituals serve the 
purpose of maintaining the structure of kinship systems. In other words, social 
systems are self-regulating where the structure of a social system is mutually 
independent of the processes that function to serve the whole. Thus, in a social system 
the nature of relationship between the parts is functional if it is self -regulating and if 
it is able to reproduce itself. 
However, a social system may be meaningful to actors and may also regulate itself 
through reproduction but, as Sahlins showed in the context of cross-cultural contact, 
social transformations occur and structural reproduction takes place. The social 
constructions that follow depend on actors acting out signs that reflect their goals or 
preferences in life. Thus, new forms of social relationship are formed as a result of 
revaluation and redefinition of new social categories. It is in this process of 
revaluation and redefinition that norms, values, and roles are redefined. The 
revaluation and redefinition also takes place at the level of processes in terms of forms 
of actions, interactions and attitude towards goals in the scheme of things. Thus, the 
role of signs in human action is relevant as a basis for explaining why certain signs 
are preferred over other possible signs. 
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While features of structures such as wholeness, transformation, and self regulation are 
important, it is equally important to recognise the role of signs in human actions. 
Hence, in a given social situation, the structure of relations depends largely on whose 
social construct dominates the form of relationship currently at stake. Some social 
positions have more significance than others and over time may be reproduced or 
even transformed. Where social transformation occurs, it is also expected that a 
structural reproduction may also occur. In the final analysis, a form of relations that 
allows the instrumental value of one subject to take precedence over another subject is 
an instrumental articulation. An instrumental articulation is then a form of structure 
that privileged one subject or more over and above the position of other subject or 
subjects involved in a given situation. 
2.5 Natural resource use models of articulation 
Historically, a form of instrumental articulation has been predominant in Melanesia. 
This is particularly the case in the context of kin groups and their relationship over 
natural resources use in PNG and Solomon Islands. The examination of the historical 
experiences in PNG and Solomon Islands reveals that there are varying models of 
instrumental articulation. These include the Discovery, Ratification, Development 
Forum, and Sustainable models. In varying degrees, they all have the features of 
control and subordination of kin groups' roles in natural resource use. These models 
are forms of instrumental articulation that are used to join kin groups in the context of 
natural resources development. 
2.5.1 Discovery model 
Prior to the arrival of European explorers, traders, missionaries, gold seekers, and 
planters, most groups in Melanesia lived within the framework of social groups. Such 
social groups have distinct languages and varied ways of social organisation. In 
Solomon Islands, the present 61 cultural groups not only inherited much of their 
distinct cultural forms from pre-colonial times but also preserve the diversity that 
existed then. In PNG, the number of social groups is much more substantial and 
complex. There are at least 800 ethnic groups in PNG. This diversity of cultures and 
social groups are often referred to as "chaotic" or "acephalous" societies. Missionaries 
saw this as a reason to proselytise, while others saw it as the reason for introduction of 
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a new "Social Order". This attitude is what Burton has described in the context of 
PNG experience as the "discovery model" (Burton 1997: 28). 
The discovery model is a form of relationship recognised between coloniser, on one 
hand, and the colonised people on the other. The argument about the 'discovery' 
model is that it is a way of thinking about the environment and other people in that 
environment. The Discovery Paradigm or model has specific features, according to 
Burton (1997: 28). These are the ideas of discovery and Terra Nugas. 
The first idea is that of discovery (Burton 1997: 28). Burton saw this idea of 
'discovery' in the recurrent representation of the landowners in Papua New Guinea as 
isolated. For example, this attitude is manifested in the representation of the 
Wopkaimin people as 'isolated', and 'being discovered'. In addition, the discovery 
attitude is shown by the repetition of the gold seekers' conquest of the trackless 
wilderness. Burton argues that this attitude of discovery promoted gold seekers' 
interests and remained unchallenged in the 1960 and 1970s (Burton 1997:28). Thus 
the gold seekers represent themselves as 'cultural heroes' who went through a hostile 
environment to achieve their goal. The locals, those who called such an area home, on 
the other hand, were left out of the equation of representation. For Burton, the use of 
words like 'remote', 'conquest' and 'trackless wilderness' misrepresent the area and is 
a feature of this 'discovery paradigm'. Another example is the discussion of the 
introduction of technology into an area, to create wealth, as being directly linked to 
progress for the surrounding area. The negative implication of this attitude was the 
misrepresentation of the existing human uses of the land designated under an 
exploration license 'as having no use or lacking usefulness' in purpose for those living 
in the area. The reason for this misrepresentation was, according to Burton, the setting 
of existing human uses in contrast to western industrialisation (1997: 29). 
Burton argues that the concept of Terra Nugas was central to this discovery paradigm. 
Terra Nugas was a corollary of the idea of exploration in areas considered remote 
from civilisation. The Ok Tedi area would in this instance be considered remote. 
Nugas means "worthless, trifling of no consequence", implying land was seen as such 
and therefore was best utilised for industrial use through mineral resource extraction 
(Woolford 1976: 29). This attitude would have significant implications for the state 
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and the mining company's attitude to the compliance with social and physical 
environmental standards. The remnants of the Terra Nugas mentality persisted after 
PNG's independence. This refers to the Papuan 1908 Mining Ordinance, which 
stipulated that Crown land included all native lands. The implication here is that 
despite the fact that such ordinances may be obsolete, elements of discovery model 
remains. Burton cites the example of Ok Tedi's Kiuga-Tabubil road corridor. The land 
was considered Crown land and therefore any compensation for economic distress 
was excluded, as it was seen in the context ofNugas (Burton 1997: 30). In addition, 
Burton argues that it is not only the effect of Terra Nugas which devalues existing 
resources such as gardens, forests, and game animals that is of concern, but also the 
fact that the post colonial state also perceives land in the same way. 
The discovery model of relationship outlined by Burton raises a number of important 
issues. The first is the perception of landowners as being 'isolated' and thus justifying 
their 'inclusion' through mineral resource exploitation. This isolation is an 'outsider' 
perspective that takes limited account of the existing inhabitants' views. The second 
issue arising through this model is that the attitude of Terra Nugas is a constricting 
factor on the rights of the landowners. The related issue is that such perception 
undermines both government and the mining company's responsibility for compliance 
to social and environmental expectations (Burton 1997: 3 0). The relevance here is that 
this form of attitude supports instrumental articulation of kin groups in natural 
resource development by sustaining beliefs of the state and company rights to 
intervention in kin group territory. The roots of discovery paradigm can be located in 
the history of colonisation. For example, the attitude of the Dutch to declare the area 
west of the 141 degrees east on the Island of New Guinea as their territory in 1828 
without the consent of the people concerned, is another example of the discovery 
model (Woolford 1976: 2). 
Features of the discovery model can also be seen in the Fiji experience during early 
mining development. The imposed state policies were expropriative (Emberson-Bain 
1994: 24). Emberson-Bain argues that during the development phase of Emperor gold 
in Vatukoula, kinship group families were removed, along with their associated rights 
to the land. This was done as a result of the declaration of indigenous Fijian villagers 
living in the area as illegal in the 1930s (Emberson-Bain 1994: 25). This practice was 
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In Solomon Islands, this discovery model is reflected reform process 
took place following its declaration as a Protectorate 1893. During the colonial 
period, land laws passed greatest This was especially so when the 
islands were declared a protectorate of Great Britain. The British declared the 
Solomon Islands a Protectorate of the Empire in 1893, and posted a Resident 
Commissioner 1896 (Allan 1957: 36). The first Resident Commissioner, Charles 
Woodford, chose Tulagi, among the Central Islands between Guadalcanal and 
Malaita, for residency, and pursued a policy of commercial development in the 
Solomon Islands (Naitoro 1993: 56). This led to a large-scale alienation of customary 
land for imperial investment. The first major company created was the Pacific Islands 
Company, which obtained all its concessions through its strong connections with the 
Colonial Office (Naitoro 1993: 56). These land concessions were sold in 1906 to 
Levers' Pacific Plantations, which was a company formed by the soap manufacturer, 
Sir William Levers, to supply raw material for his factories. The demand for 
commercial expansion enabled the colonial administration to introduces regulation for 
land "confiscation" through the Queen's Regulation No.4 of 1896. Native Land was 
defined as 'land owned by a native'. Section 10 of the Regulation mentions vacant 
land, being defined as "being vacant by reason of the extinction of the original native 
owners and their descendants" (Allan 1957; Naitoro 1993). This legal process of land 
"acquisition" continued in later years. The Queen's Regulation No. 3 of 1900 amended 
by No.1 of 1901 and by No.2 of 1904, continued to lay down the idea of "waste" land 
defined as "land which is not owned, cultivated or occupied by any native or non-
native person" (Allan 1957: 3 7). The colonial administration secured customary land 
for plantation capital and Church buildings and properties under this legal framework. 
This land reform had significant implications for the present conflict in Solomon 
Islands. 
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In 1906, Levers Pacific Plantation Limited was in control of most fertile land in the 
country, 200,000 acres in all(Lasaqa 1972: 33). In 1956, 90% of the coastal fertile 
land was appropriated under foreign control. This land reform had affected only about 
6% oftotalland in the country (Allan 1957: 60). The Second World War put a brake 
on many of the plantation activities. But by this time, much of the fertile land had 
already been appropriated for plantation activities. The island of Guadalcanal was 
heavily affected. Between 1886 and 1920, the colonial government and traders were 
in possession of 22,720 acres of land on the plains of Guadalcanal (Lasaqa 1972: 34). 
This is the most fertile area in the whole of the Solomon Islands. For example, T.G. 
Kelly of Sydney acquired all the land between Mata Nikau and Tenaru rivers (20,444 
acres in total) with trade goods (Lasaqa 1972). This practice continued until the 
Second World War. 
The effects of the discovery attitude towards kin groups in PNG and Solomon Islands 
was very much the same. It created a sense of resistance and distrust towards the state 
and company. In the case of colonial land laws in Solomon Islands, it led to cultural 
resistance. In particular, after World War II, natives realised they had been cheated 
through the land acquisitions (Lasaqa 1972), which became instrumental in the 
resentment against traders and eventually the colonial government. This resentment 
took different forms starting from the realisation that there was an inherent inequality 
between Whites and Blacks. Such a perception of inequality, and especially in the 
context of natural resource use, was an important contributing factor towards attempts 
at reform through resistance to the state. In the case of the Solomon Islands, this was 
expressed through the Maasina Rum movement in the post Second World war period. 
The change in attitude in Europe itself after the First and the Second World Wars 
were important in creating the environment for the process of decolonisation that 
followed. This was an awareness of the need for self-determination. This led to 
modifications in the attitude towards kinship groups and was reflected in the 
expectations of political independence. In the context of natural resource use, this 
meant a modification in the form of relationship governing resource use. This change 
of attitude, or a modified form of instrumental articulation, is reflected in early post 
war natural resource projects. This was the idea of ratification in natural resource 
development projects. 
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2.5.2 Ratification model 
To ratify something is to make it legally valid (Merriam-Webster 1989: 455). It is a 
form of formalising relations or agreements. But it is the context of ratification that is 
of interest because formalisation of natural resource project agreements implies 
isolation. Ratification is therefore more than just an agreement in the situation of 
natural resource development projects, because in practice it also legally isolates such 
projects from other legal demands in that territory or the state. For example, where 
ratification is put in place, many conditional clauses that protect the project from any 
change can also be included, for example increases in taxation or royalties, or 
demands for review arising from nearby communities. In the case of the Gold Ridge 
Mining Project, one of the early strategies of the Ross Mining NL in the negotiation 
process was their demand for ratification. The government refused to accept this 
proposal because of the legal implications of isolating the project from the normal 
legal changes enacted by the state from time to time. It is from this perspective that 
ratification is seen as a form of instrumental articulation. 
The ratification model as applied to the Bougainville Mine was restrictive. In terms of 
landowners, it was restricted only to those landowners 'directly' affected by the mine 
construction and its associated facilities. Ogan observed that compensation was one 
Australian Pound per acre per year (Ogan 1999: 5). Compensation for other property 
was left to the Mining Warden Court. In terms of political representation, there was 
no Nasioi in the House of Assembly, although there was one Bougainvillean (Ogan 
1999: 5). The formula involved in the payment of royalties was not clear to the 
Nasioi. As they found out later, the value of 5% royalty meant a 5% of the 
government's royalty of 1.25%. Organ expressed this in terms of 6 cents per A$1 00 
for the value of the minerals taken from their land. The mining agreement was ratified 
in August 1967 (Ogan 1999: 5). 
The project development began in 1968 and continues until its commercial operation 
in 1972. The effect of this process of development and operation on the Nasioi was 
substantial. Ogan (1999: 5) observed that at the time the total population of 
Bougainville would have been about 80,000, with the Nasioi making only 14,000 
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people. The mining development brought some 10,000 construction workers from all 
over the world, including mainland PNG. This new invasion was associated with 
significant social problems such as drunkenness, violence and prostitution. There was 
loss of land for mine facilities and villages were relocated. The project was seen as 
oppressive (Ogan 1999: 6). There were also irreversible environmental damages, such 
as to the entire Jaba!Kawerong river system. Yet in 1974, when the original mining 
agreement was renegotiated to increase revenue for the emerging independent the 
state ofPNG, the Nasioi did not receive any additional revenue for the price they paid 
in terms of social and environmental damage. The company (BCL), however, realised 
that it had to deal with the landowners more directly, and some new forms of 
compensation arrangement to benefit landowners indirectly were developed. But 
divisions among the Nasioi were also beginning to emerge among the generations 
affected by the mine. 
In summary, the Bougainville case is a characteristic form of relationship between 
landowners and mineral developers. The project was operated on the basis of a 
ratification that the Nasioi had little to do with in terms of its definitions and 
objectives. In hindsight, if there were to be any lessons to be learned from the 
Bougainville experience, then according to a commentary by Professor Donald 
Denoon, it is important for: 
• the state to identify and deal directly with landowners 
• the landowners to benefit equally or more than the state 
• the rules that govern resource development to take into account meanings of those 
directly dependent on the area designated for exploitation (Denoon 2000: 1) 
The Bougainville crisis that terminated the project in 1989 was a genuine reason to 
consider other options for dealing with natural resource development issues. The 
crisis forced governments and mining project interest groups to see that kinship 
groups have enough influence to stop the project altogether if their concerns are 
ignored. For the purpose of this work, ratification of the Bougainville mining project 
is a modified form of the discovery paradigm. Ratification remains an instrumental 
form of articulation because of its isolating features. It was out of the context of the 
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Bougainville crisis in PNG, which led to a new phase of relationship development 
known as the 'Development Forum'. 
2.5.3 Development forum model 
Filer described the 'Development Forum' as a policy instrument devised by the PNG 
government during the process of development of Porgera (Filer 1995: 67). The 
'Development Forum' was in effect a process of tripartite consultations between the 
central government, provincial government and the landowners. According to Filer, 
the relevance ofthe 'Development Forum' was to secure landowner's endorsement of 
the government's mining development conditions and also obligate each of the three 
'stakeholders' through a set of agreements (Filer 1995: 68). It was through this set of 
agreements that the distributions of costs, rights, benefits and obligations were 
defined. 
In PNG, the Lihir project was the first to be processed and approved under the Mining 
Act of 1992. The supporters of the Development Forum had, by this time, the 
advantage of learning from Porgera and other mining experiences. Consultations 
between landowners and the officials of provincial and central governments were held 
in advance, well before the official Development Forum. In Lihir, representation of 
the people was made up of two groups: first, the Lihir Mining Area landowners 
Association who were directly affected by the project; and second, the Nimamar 
Development Authority, the local level government on the Island (Hancock & 
Omundsen 1998: 6). The creation of a Development Forum has been welcomed in 
Papua New Guinea as a success. The forum was also used for two other major 
projects, namely the Kutubu and Go be Oil projects. 
Despite the low level of conflict in the Porgera and Lihir projects as a result of the 
Development Forum process, Filer noted in the social impact mitigation report for 
Lihir, that there remained some concerns regarding the indecisiveness of the 
landowning community and the provincial government in relation to various policy 
issues (Filer 1992: 37). Filer also noted that gauging local opinion was difficult in a 
local situation and that the problem of securing maximum participation of landowners 
concerned with their belief that natural resources, in this case mineral resources, had 
been stolen from them by the state and developers (Filer 1992: 37). In other words, 
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landowners' reluctance to participate fully in the project related to their distrust of 
both the state and the mining company. Lihir will be discussed in detail later in 
Chapter 3, but for now it suffices to say that even with the Development Forum, the 
state ownership of mineral resources has not changed. While it can be argued that the 
Development Forum is an improvement in the process of establishing relations with 
kin groups, the existing mineral policy remains structurally intact. The development 
Forum is therefore a more sophisticated form of instrumental articulation that 
conceals the state controls of natural resources against the consent of kin groups. 
2.5.4 Sustainable model 
The latest in the search for a meaningful relationship between important stalceholders 
in mining development projects is the idea of a sustainable model. This form of 
relationship has come to be known as the Triad model. The Triad model has been 
applied in studies involving governance and resource development relations. Banks 
applied this model in the study of the Porgera mining project in PNG (Banks 1995: 
38). 
This framework argues that each of the players (the state, community and 
corporation) is not discrete, consistent, coherent or homogenous (Banks 1995: 38). In 
unravelling each of the layers of these entities, diversity and complexity are revealed. 
The argument of this model is that the characteristics of these players shape the nature 
of relationships between these players. One of the conclusions of Banks' argument is 
the important role of the state in ensuring the security of relationships in resource 
development in Melanesia (Banks, 1995: 330). Clearly, the role of the state is an 
important factor influencing the nature of the relationship of resource development in 
Melanesia. The characteristics of each stakeholder shape the nature of the 
relationship and the role of the state in mediating is significant. Yet, this model 
requires the state to take a neutral role, which is not possible where the state itself is a 
stakeholder with its own interests. 
In a paper presented at a conference in Madang in 1998, Chris Ballard argued that 
there need not be a fixed set of roles for each of the partners in a mining relationship. 
However, social sustainability could be achieved adopting general principles and 
practical measures (Ballard 1998: 5). This refers to principles of engagements, which 
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include participation, flexibility, and transparency. Ballard argues that the key lies in a 
clear commitment by each partner to identifying the expected outcomes for each stage 
of the mining project (Ballard 1998: 5). In his observation of mineral development 
relations over the last fifteen years, the three-way "mining relationship" was seen as 
complex and challenging (Ballard 1998: 329). Ballard observed that during the 
periods of 1960s and 1970s, communities were left out of consultation, as in the cases 
of Soroako or Ertsberg in Indonesia or Panguna in Bougainville. In the 1980s and 
1990s, relative inclusion of the community with the state and company was forced. 
Ballard argued that such change has resulted, not due to the state's initiative, but due 
to circumstance and challenges by the community to the legitimacy of the state 
(Ballard 1998: 329). An important outcome of such a change was that the increasing 
role of the state was achieved at its own expense. For example, a trend in PNG was 
the increasing redistribution of benefits from the state to the mining communities 
(Filer 1997a.). This occurs where there is increasing competition between the state 
and the community in each successive project. In addition as the community claimed 
more rights, other stakeholders emerged. This included NGOs, lawyers, 
entrepreneurs, and even academics. Thus the idea of stakeholder has also increased in 
definition (Kirsch 1996). According to Ballard, these developments resulted in 
communities becoming quite sophisticated, increasingly aware of their rights under 
national and international law, and willing to challenge the sovereign claim of the 
state and authority of the company (Ballard 1998: 2). The case of the Ok Tedi 
environmental litigation against the BHP mining company was an example. 
Clearly what supporters of the sustainable model have shown is that relationships can 
be improved if the mediating role of the state is bettered (Banks 1995). In other 
words, the state's role was to mediate relations between the company and the 
communities, promote respect, support justifiable entitlements, consensus and 
information dissemination (Ballard 1998: 329 & Garnaut 1995: 65). The relationship 
could be made more sustainable if there are genuine commitments to ideals such as 
participation, flexibility and transparency (Ballard 1998: 5). The community should 
play an important role as it represents real people (Filer 1996: 66). The price the 
community paid in the mining initiative involves loss of land, livelihoods and cultural 
identity (Ballard 1998: 329). There is also the effect of the assimilation of the 
relocated community into the surrounding wider community (O'Faircheallaigh 1991). 
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However, this acknowledgment of the contribution of community has not so far been 
readily accepted and is a real issue for further improvement. 
While sustainable models for the mineral resources development relationship 
described above are essential, and there should be an improved role of the state, so far 
the current emphasis is placed on processes of engagements rather than the structures 
that govern those processes. What is argued at the start of this chapter is that despite 
improvements in processes of relating over natural resource use, the structures that 
govern these processes make kin groups remain vulnerable. The norms, the roles, and 
the values that dictate relationships with kin groups remain instrumentally biased 
against them. 
2.6 Implications for study of relations (evaluation) 
The idea of instrumental articulation is about a type of relationship that structurally 
favours one subject over another in a given situation. At the start of this chapter, the 
meaning of articulation is defined. Features of articulation such as vertical and 
horizontal forms of articulation are outlined to show how human actors create and 
interpret meanings. The work of Saussure and earlier Structuralists suggest that 
structures change and self-regulate in social life. Sahlins' work shows that signs take 
on different meanings and roles for different actors because actors make choices over 
other possible alternatives. In a situation of cross-cultural contact, new social 
categories enter a new cultural environment and lead to cultural transformation. In the 
context of natural resource development in Melanesia, this cultural transformation has 
occurred and resulted in a structural reproduction of roles, norms, and values that 
instrumentally serves the interests of the state and developers more than kin groups. It 
is this form of relationship that is defined as instrumental articulation. 
The relevance of the concept of articulation for this study is the ability to apply it to 
understand the nature of the relationship between kin groups and natural resource 
development projects, and why such relationships sustained the perception of the 
marginalisation of kin groups in PNG and Solomon Islands. The concept of 
articulation enables us to recognise that there are two dimensions of articulation. 
These are the diachronic and synchronic dimensions of articulation. These forms of 
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articulation are also self-regulating. Actors in society behave according to certain 
prescribed conventions and in so doing create meaning. The role of signs becomes 
important because actors act out signs that are meaningful and have particular 
interests for their goals in life. 
Since Western contact with kin groups in PNG and Solomon Islands, there were 
forms of relationships between the colonial power and the colonised. The assumption 
guiding this research is that the relationship between kin groups and actors involved 
in natural resource development has taken a particular form. This is a form that 
reflects the significance of the project developments rather than the kin groups' 
interests. This form has persisted well after independence. In other words, the past 
forms of relationships were social constructs that reproduced certain forms of 
relationship that were instrumentally eschewed towards the state and the natural 
resource projects. 
2.6.1 Research questions 
The assumption of this research is that there exists an instrumental form of 
articulation of kin groups in natural resource development in Solomon Islands and 
PNG. By using the literature that defines the notion of articulation, the instrumental 
form of articulation is identifiable in all of the natural resource development projects 
selected for this study. Indications for the existence of this form of relationship should 
be evident in: 
• kin group attitudes towards projects, in terms of being more disputant 
• actual instrumental articulation to support the claims in terms of norms, roles, 
values, actions, interactions and attitudes of actors in the project 
• kinship groups with lowest instrumental articulation are expected to be least 
disputant, and those who are perceived to be instrumentally articulated are 
expected to be the most disputant 
These sources of evidence should show that there is indeed a problem 
with the articulation of relations between kinship-based communities, 
the state, and transnational corporations. 
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Chapter 3 
Kin groups and mines: PNG cases 
3 .1 Introduction 
This chapter describes natural resource development relations in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG). It examines the nature of the relationships between kin groups and external 
institutions and agents in PNG. It attempts to trace not only the form of relationships 
prevalent over natural resources in time, but also the origins and implications for the 
PNG development context. 
PNG was previously a colony, until it gained political independence from Australia in 
1975. The post-colonial PNG state, like its neighbouring Pacific Island nations, 
emerged into nation status politically, but with little economic foundation. The 
thinking at the time was that nation-building was the key, because a new nation was 
just like a 'child'. Through time and with the appropriate inputs the 'child' will grow 
into an adult. Nation-building was expected to follow the same sequence as human 
growth. It was to be based on the exploitation of natural resources for the 
development of the newly emerged nation. In PNG, the presence of vast natural 
resources such as forests, fisheries, and minerals, gave the impression that 
exploitation of these resources was the formula for nation-building success. The PNG 
mining industry remains the largest in the Pacific Island countries and currently 
operates some of the largest gold-mining projects in the world. Some of these gold-
mining projects are considered in this chapter. 
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PACIFIC OCEAN 
FIGURE 4: Map: showing major mining locations in PNG in the context of the 
Pacific 'rim of fire' (Source: Ross Mining NL) 
John Connell commented on mining development in the Australasian region, that, 
despite injections of mining capital and infrastructure resources in previously isolated 
areas, indigenous goals have so far not successfully linked to those of the mining 
developers (Connell 1991 : 1). 
This thesis takes such observations as a starting point for its argument. The line of 
argument followed here is that most of the improvement in relationship between kin 
groups and mines in PNG are process improvements rather than structural. In other 
words, much of the improvement was an evolutionary improvement in the processes 
applied in interactions with kin groups for natural resource development. But the 
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same cannot be said of the normative structures that govern such processes. While 
there were improvements in the interactions with kin groups for achieving 
development goals, normative structures remained because they serve particular 
interests. In essence, these normative structures expressed through existing rules, 
roles, and values, persist over time because they serve preferential interests of certain 
actors in the relationships surrounding natural resource exploitation. The persistent 
failure of the newly emerged state of PNG in meeting kin group goals is strongly 
related to the permanence of a particular form of relationship that is defined as the 
instrumental articulation of kin groups. 
In order to demonstrate this argument, the chapter is divided into three major sections. 
The first section describes the historical context of instrumental articulation. The 
second section outlines four major natural resource development projects in the 
mining sector in PNG to show the extent of instrumental articulation characteristic of 
each project. The third section outlines the implications of instrumental articulation 
for PNG and the lessons that should have been learned in the development of the Gold 
Ridge project in Solomon Islands. 
3.2 Context of instrumental articulation 
Instrumental articulation, in simple terms, is about a certain way of doing things 
between different actors. It is a method of social practice in which certain subjects 
impose certain forms and practices of relationship on other actors for the purposes of 
carrying out operations to meet their goals. This section outlines forms, practices, and 
origins of forms of instrumental articulation of kin groups in PNG since contact with 
the West. 
3.2.1 Social organisation in PNG 
PNG had prior complex forms of social organisation based on kinship before the 
arrival of Europeans. Kin groups in PNG were isolated for thousands of years before 
the contact with the outside world. Archaeological studies have dated the first 
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settlement of the major islands about 40 000 years ago, as in the case of the Huon 
Peninsula in the Morobe province (Filer and Sekhran 1998: 25). The long periods of 
cultural isolation allowed the Melanesians in PNG to develop their own cultural and 
social systems. The complexity of social systems in PNG is also the result of cultural 
interactions in the past. In particular with reference to the Austronesian population 
migration away from South East Asia to PNG and the Pacific. This Austronesian 
migration made contacts with a non-Austronesian population or Papuans with 
distinctively different cultures. This allowed forms of diversity specific to 
Melanesians. Today, the state of Papua New Guinea occupies the eastern half of the 
Island of New Guinea, with the other half as West Papua later to be named as Irian 
Jaya when annexed by Indonesia. The state of PNG also includes other islands, 
entailing some 600 islands in all with a land area of 464,000 square kilometres. There 
are at least 800 language-based groups in Papua New Guinea (Garap 2000: 162). 
These include some 1000 ethnic groups totalling a population of at least 4.3 million 
people (Dorney 1999: 18). Most community groups in PNG are largely kin-based. 
Although there are variations, kinship-based relations are largely a dominant feature 
ofPNG society. Anthropological studies of the highlands characterised these forms of 
social relations as 'bigmen' practices. The idea entailed establishing hierarchical 
relations through reciprocal relations (Godelier 1977, Gregory 1982, Josephides 1985, 
Modjeska 1982, Strathern 1982). Reciprocity was the main feature of kin group 
relations in social, political and economic terms. In PNG, understanding reciprocal 
relations was vital. This was because of its implications for the way in which 
communities perceive relations and the expectations of such relationships. 
Researchers in PNG have defined reciprocal relations as a condition of inalienability 
of wealth and persons from the relations that made them (Mauss 1990, Strathern 
1988, Weiner 1992). 
According to Strathern, there is a major difference between capitalist exploitation and 
relations of reciprocal exchange (Strathem 1988:162). In the latter there is no 
alienation of persons from each other, or from the products of their labour, while in 
the former, exchange controls relations of productions. In this sense, control of the 
relations of production resembles instrumental articulation (Strathem 1988: 162). 
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Anthropologists argue that one way reciprocal relations are maintained, and alienation 
of members restricted, is through the practice of consumption, both symbolic and 
physical (Sykes 1999: 161). An example is the practice of mortuary feasts known as 
Malaggan in New Ireland (Sykes 1999). A similar mortuary feast system, known as 
Segaiaya, is practised in Trobriands (Sykes 1999). A kinship system of reciprocal 
relations shaped by the notions of "honour" and "shame" broke down following 
European contact. Strathern suggests capitalist exploitation was different from 
relations of reciprocal exchange because in the former there was control over relations 
of production (Strathern 1988: 162). The various forms of control exercise over 
relations of production sharply contradicted reciprocal exchange systems in PNG. 
While reciprocal exchange was the form of articulation and practice in the PNG 
cultural context, colonisation partially transformed this form of traditional 
relationship. This was particularly the case for resources, as colonisation was integral 
to capitalist forms of ownership. The introduction of the state and capitalist forms of 
relations account for the origin of a new form of relationship termed here as the 
instrumental articulation of kin groups. 
3.2.2 'Discovery' 
PNG existed independently outside of Europe until the Spanish made the first contact 
in 1525. This was the beginning of the 'discovery' attitude in PNG. While for the 
explorers, they were discovering new land, for the kin groups the explorers were 
visitors. What the PNG kin groups perhaps did not realise at the time was that the 
visitors were part of a larger movement that was to transform their society forever. 
Important and equally unknown to kin groups was that one of the motives of these 
visitors was the search for wealth, especially gold. While gold was of little practical 
importance to kin groups, it was the preoccupation of the visitors. Bernstein 
demonstrated that gold was in fact an obsession in human history: 
.... People have become intoxicated, obsessed, haunted, humbled, and exalted 
over pieces of metal called gold. Gold has motivated entire societies, torn 
economies to shreds, determined the fate of kings and emperors, inspired the 
most beautiful works of art, provoked horrible acts by one people against 
another, and driven men to endure intense hardship in the hope of finding 
instant wealth and annihilating uncertainty (Bernstein 2000: 1 ). 
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Bernstein was referring to a long human legacy that extended through many epochs of 
human civilisations. From the ancient Egyptian civilisation in Africa in about 4000BC 
to the Lydian in Europe about 700BC, gold played a significant role in human 
activities. This role continued throughout the ages among ancient civilisations until 
the gold rushes of the nineteenth century that resulted from European colonisation of 
the World (Bernstein, 2000: 475). Gold and silver extraction from the Americas by 
the Spaniards has had significant impact upon Europe as more explorers travelled the 
world in search of gold. This process that began after the contact with the indigenous 
people of the Americas subsequently led to the discovery of gold in the New World 
and soon after in Australia (Bernstein 2000). 
Bernstein's observation was applicable even in the context of PNG. In 'Black White 
& Gold' Hank Nelson wrote: 
... Most of the men who came hungry for the gold were from Australia. They 
carried with them the skills to obtain it and the beliefs then common among 
Australian working men about foreigners and blacks. Most diggers believed 
that their guns and their brains made them superior to any 'coloured' men. 
Some also thought that they were physically superior, although that was harder 
to believe after 1902 when the first black American won a world boxing title. 
They did not doubt that they had a right to take the gold, and many thought 
that it was only a matter of time before an Australian possessed the land 
(Nelson 1976: v). 
The relationship between miners and kin groups in PNG was of course more complex 
and varied, but the observation by Nelson was a good indication of the 'discovery' 
attitude predominant at the time towards kin groups. It showed not only racism, which 
was prevalent, but also and more importantly the attitude that miners had the right to 
take the gold. Such attitude had its origin in the notions of 'discovery', according to 
Burton (1997:28) in his work among the Ok Tedi People. The idea of 'discovery' was 
part of the colonial attitude of 'taking possession' of land found for establishing 
colonies and exploitation of natural resources. 
In Papua New Guinea, John MacGillivray was a British government sponsored 
expedition naturalist who first found gold traces in native pottery in Redscar Bay 
located west of Port Moresby in 1848. His finding was the earliest evidence of 
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reported traces of gold. This kind of discovery, as in the case of the naturalist 
Woodford who discovered traces of copper mineral in Guadalcanal Solomon Islands 
in 1893, gave rise to mineral prospecting later on throughout Melanesia. In PNG, a 
further gold find by Captain Moresby near Fairfax led to arrivals of gold prospectors 
from Australia, so that by 1880 there were about 700 prospectors on Tagula Island, 
Milne Bay Province. As in the case of the 1851 declaration by Leutenant Governor La 
Trobe in the Victorian Gold Rush, it led to the appointment of a state agent in 1881 to 
regulate prospecting. But this first gold rush could not be sustained and prospecting 
subsided until the year of the Australian federation in 1901. By 1906, British New 
Guinea became the territory of Papua (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1998: 4 ). Further mineral 
exploration led to further gold finds at Y odda and Koranga Creek in 1922. These 
finds led to the discovery of Eddie Creek, Wau-Bulolo in 1926, which lead to alluvial 
dredging on a huge scale which was considered the largest in the world, until 1965 
(Banks and McShane 1998: 3). 
The Eddie Creek alluvial mine was important in a number of ways. The first was that 
it was the most important mineral find in colonial Papua New Guinea. It led to the 
promotion of interest in mineral prospecting in PNG. Secondly, it also demonstrated 
how important Government officers were as part of the process of mineral 
prospecting. This can be seen in the case of a former Kiap, C. J. Levien, who was able 
to acquire the Bulolo River flats which he later sold to C.A. Banks of the Vancouver-
based Pacer Development Limited. C.J. Banks was the first serious miner in PNG 
with the establishment of his company Bulolo Dredging Ltd. This company carried 
out dredging operations in the 1930s, until the Second World War. Operations 
resumed after the War, and continued until1965. 
The period between 1848, when the first trace of gold was first found, and the 1940s, 
when mining activities almost stopped, spans almost a century. This period was a 
period of extreme instrumental articulation rooted in the 'discovery attitude' towards 
kin groups in PNG. European material goods were a significant catalyst for the 
perpetuation of instrumental articulation of kin groups. These material goods were 
desired by kin groups, but also were able to perpetuate, instrumental articulation. 
These physical materials, such as iron implements and beads used for early exchange 
with the natives, were the major basis for forming relationships with the new arrivals. 
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This 'material articulation' was widespread during the early part of the nineteenth 
century. In the case ofPNG's neighbouring Solomon Islands, the early accounts of the 
early traders give some insight into the process. One of these early traders was 
Andrew Cheyne. Leaving England in 1840, he sailed to the Pacific and based himself 
in Sydney (Shineberg 1971). European traders brought iron implements at the time, 
which the Islanders desired. Green's quotation of a trader's manual by Cheyne 
published in 1852 provided some ideas oftraders' strategy: 
.. The goods most suitable for this Island are tomahawks, axes, adzes, chisels, 
saws, gimlets, scissors, good iron hoop, small iron pots, red cloth, gouges, 
files, fishhooks, assorted empty bottles and red, white, blue, green, black and 
yellow glass beads, large and small, and small boxes with locks and hinges 
(Green 1976:32) 
Another account by Woodford in 1890, suggested that the Melanesians demanded 
specific goods when exchanging with traders, and he recommended that traders take 
with them goods demanded for exchanges (Green 1976:32). This practice was 
prevalent throughout the 1850s as well as in the 1880s. The traders were making 
exchanges for the Chinese trade in sandalwood, coral, sharks' fins and beche-de-mer 
and were trading with Melanesian. Similar trade was being carried out in Vanuatu 
(then the New Hebrides) in the 1830s. Shineberg makes the following point: 
. . . Whereas the islanders did not understand European religion or social 
institutions and in any case had no desire to change their own beliefs, they 
understood European trade goods immediately. They knew a good tool when 
they saw one-there was no need to preach the superiority of steel to stone. 
They were excited by cloth and beads of textures and colours that they could 
not make themselves {Shineberg 1966: 129). 
The Melanesian desires for these material things were significant, as they could not 
make them themselves. This form of 'material articulation' was found only when there 
was a sense of reciprocal exchange. At the same time, the Melanesians appeared to 
have very little knowledge of why the traders wanted sandalwood. There was 
inevitably an information gap. Such attitudes were reflected in traders implying that 
natives knew little about the use and the value of the sandalwood (Shineberg 1966: 
130). This knowledge gap was perhaps the most important difference that shaped the 
subsequent Melanesian relationship with traders, followed by the state and miners. 
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Melanesians were first articulated through commodities brought in by traders. The 
foreign materials, though simple but effective technology created more desires for 
them. This form of 'material articulation' rooted the desire for more external goods 
and created the conditions necessary for the subsequent exploitation of natural 
resources. But historians of Melanesia have different perspectives about the nature of 
what has been labelled 'material articulation' as a form of relationship. Researchers 
like Shineberg (1966:129) give the impression that these trading relations were of 
relative equal relations, that the trading was done from each party's stand point, in 
addition, sandalwood was not used for anything by the natives. However, some 
historians held that there was a strong tendency not to put human relationships into 
the equations of historical interpretations of early trading relations (Corris 1970; 
Maude 1968; Parnaby 1972; Shineberg 1971; Ward 1972). In other words, the 
omission of the Melanesian part of the story made it appear that whatever had 
happened was for the good of the Melanesians. 
Thus whether it was early trading (Ward 1972: 394; Shineberg 1966: 416) or the 
subsequent labour trade (Corris 1971: 420; Parnaby 1972: 419) the nature of this 
material articulation was largely influenced by a capitalist form of relationship. While 
the Melanesian community had acquired experience over the years and their 
bargaining may have improved (Shineberg 1966: 416), in the end capitalist relations 
persisted and were reified as the state became more established. 
The Capitalist form of relations consolidated after initial material articulation through 
trade, when colonies were established. Solomon Islands was colonised and divided 
between Britain and Germany in 1886 and moved in 1899 to its present site(Sack 
1973: 78). Colonial possession of the island was done by declaration, as for example, 
the S.M.S. Adler's declaration of sovereignty over northern Solomons on 28 October 
1886 by Germany (Sack 1973: 78). The colonial territorial acquisitions were for 
imperial interests, included trade. Gold as a commodity for trade was an important 
interest to the colonial powers at the time. The declaration of a territory made it a 
colony of the colonial power, which then was subjected to its control. This is the 
beginning of the process of not only material articulation but more importantly the 
establishment of 'legal articulation'. 
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3 .2.3 Legal articulation 
Material articulation opened the way for the introduction of legal articulation. Legal 
articulation began when a colonial power made declarations of possession of a 
territory and demarcated it. For example, in 1828, Holland divided the western part of 
the Island ofNew Guinea at the 141st meridian. The northern portion ofNew Guinea 
was occupied by Germany, while the south-eastern part was subject to British 
interests (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1998: 4). Prior to the 1880s, Australian interests were 
largely economic, in labour trade and sea trades and mineral prospecting. As 
settlement intensified and the centralised state began to be set in place, the growth of 
legal articulation as another form of integration of kin groups became more prevalent. 
For analytical purposes, legal articulation can be considered to have started when the 
state was introduced as the new central authority among Melanesians. For the island 
of New Guinea, its division between Britain and Germany in 1884 would be marked 
as the new phase in its legal articulation (Sack 1973: 78). In the case of the Solomon 
Islands, this would equate to 1893 when Britain declared the islands under its 
protectorate (Allan 1957:36). The declaration of possession of colonies justified use 
of force to enforce the colonial power's position of control. This was generally 
labelled "pacification". Such examples as the first punitive expeditions of 1878 by the 
German settlers among the natives of the Gazelle Peninsula in New Britain (Sack 
1973) are a case in point. 
What is important in understanding the relationship over natural resources here is that, 
instead of the use of material articulation as seen during early trading period, what 
followed was the use of appropriation to enable access to natural resources by 
capitalists. With the state now having "possessive" rights over the colony, it prepared 
the legal form of articulation for the purpose of trade. It was also during this later part 
of the nineteenth century that minerals had been found, and it was under the legal 
tutelage of the state that this resource was articulated between the settlers and the 
Melanesians. Following the colonial declarations of sovereignty over Melanesian 
communities, a major legal instrument was the policy of the state ownership of 
mineral resources. Establishment of a colony meant mineral resources could be 
automatically rendered to the state. State control was sustained and only in some cases 
'native' landowners were given some protection as in the Papuan Ordinance of 1907. 
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rights, and any other rights that obstructed the state's right were either circumvented 
or not recognised. For example, there was the case of the declaration in the 1930s 
which stated that the residence of indigenous villagers the area of mineral 
interests was illegal. Such practices were legitimated through previous legal 
instruments such as the 1908 Mining Ordinance to circumvent the rights of the 
indigenous people in (Emberson-Bain 1994). This Ordinance entailed the 
dispossession of indigenous landownership rights. 'Emberson-Bain argues that these 
policies were the basis for guiding mineral policies in subsequent years, including 
post- political independence, and have effectively shaped attitudes, mineral resource 
ownership rights, policies and subsequent legislative frameworks ('Emberson- Baine 
1994). 
In PNG, Bulolo project, was only the substantial mining developments during the 
early post-war period. By this time, there were significant changes in the world stage 
and the demand for decolonisation. In this context, the present the state of New 
Guinea inherited its status from a process that started in 1962. According to Sack 
(1973), a UN visiting Mission advised Australia to establish a House of Assembly in 
PNG with most members elected. In June 1964, the Assembly convened its first 
meeting. Here the elected members served as quasi-ministers, parties were formed, 
and pushed by Minister for Territories Andrew Peacock and the leader of the 
Opposition and later Prime Minister Gough Whitlam political independence was 
speedily achieved in 1975. The Panguna Project was, in some sense, conceived and 
developed just before political independence. 
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(Denoon 2000:62). April year prospecting began and after a long process of 
exploration and dealings with the local people, Ore was looking good by the end of 
the year (Denoon 2000:62). Some eight years later Panguna commenced operation in 
1972 (Hancock et al 1998:2). It was located in South Bougainville, within the North 
Solomon Province of New Guinea. The area where the project was located 
belongs to an indigenous group of people known as the N asioi. 
The Nasioi people settled the southern part of the Island of Bougainville. Eugene 
Ogan (1999: 1) claims that the name Nasioi was a term given to these people by the 
Germans at the beginning of twentieth century. The Nasioi are closely related to three 
other groups in the southern part of the island. Archaeologists suggest that the 
N asioi' s ancestors were earlier arrivals than other unrelated settlers in the north of the 
island (Spriggs 1997). The Nasioi, like many other Melanesians, depend upon the 
environment for everything they need for their livelihood. Ogan (1999) observed that 
the Nasioi had access to sago palms and products of the sea and settled different parts 
of their region. The coastal Nasioi in the south had contacts with the neighbouring 
descent groups on the Islands, particularly in the neighbouring Shortland Islands of 
the Solomon. Similarly, the highland settlers of Kongara area made contacts, as well 
as intermarried, with those of the Nagovisi groups. The scattered hamlets dotted 
throughout their territory characterise their traditional settlement pattern. According to 
Ogan (1999: 2) the Nasioi people never joined to form one political structure. This is 
reflected in the lack of defined chiefs. Instead, leadership was usually earned through 
hard work. This form of achieved leadership was dependent on individual success and 
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the ability to exert influence through distribution of wealth. The kinship system of the 
Nasioi was a moiety system where certain rights were passed through the female line. 
During the late nineteenth century, imperial Germany and Great Britain had declared 
dominance throughout the Pacific. Germany's declared areas of dominance included 
Bougainville in what was called German New Guinea (Ogan 1999). This artificial 
political boundary was a root cause for modern secessionist unrest on the island. The 
attractive features of Kieta harbour were a factor of influence in the choice of colonial 
Germany to set up their administrative headquarters there in 1905. N asioi lands were 
appropriated for the establishment of coconut plantations. The missionaries entered 
the area in 1902 as Catholics to proselytise the natives. Ogan (1999) argues that 
missionaries, planters and administrative officers enjoyed a standard of living higher 
than Nasioi people, and expressed racist attitudes towards them. The status of women 
among the Nasioi suffered as a result of the introduction of ideas of male dominance. 
Trade was the main focus of the prospective planters that came to Bougainville. Land 
was acquired cheaply from the Nasioi (Ogan 1999: 3). The establishment of coconut 
plantations as a cash crop was motivated by the limited skill needed and the casual 
manner in which labour could be organised to do most of the tasks. This was an 
advantage to the planters as they did not have to do much training. But it worked 
against the Nasioi, as there was no provision of skill training. Ogan (1999:3) argues 
that this plantation colonialism did not educate the Nasioi, but raised many issues and 
confused them about the actual political, economic and social positions of the 
planters. 
Relationships between the Nasioi and the plantation colonialists were predominantly 
characterised by instrumental articulation until the Second World War. There were no 
major mining activities at the time on the island. The exceptions were sporadic 
activities and explorations, which provided rudimentary knowledge of copper 
presence around South Bougainville in the 1930s (Bedford et al. 1977). The Japanese 
invasion of Bougainville, and the subsequent American intervention, halted 
development activities on the island. Following the war, Australian administration 
was restored in 1946 (Ogan 1999). The Nasioi's experience with colonialism, and the 
subsequent war, caused them to become dissatisfied with these interventions in their 
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lives. These effects, as well as their sense of close cultural affinity with the Solomon 
group rather than PNG, were an important basis for defining their relationships and 
identity. 
Bougainville Island was administered as part of the Territory of PNG. As was the 
practice of the colonial administration at the time, the state or its agency regulated 
resource development for 'public interests'. Minerals were administered under the 
Mining Ordinances of 1907, 1922 and 1928-1940 (Bedford and Mamak 1977; Burton 
1997; Nelson 1976: 265). In PNG, this mining legislation was the basis for the 
development ofthe PNG postcolonial Mining Act of 1977 and a later revision in 1992 
(Burton, 1997). According to Bedford and Mamak, issues at the time were focussed 
on the state and company, and excluded landowners (Bedford and Mamak 1977). 
Until the 1960s, there was limited mineral resource exploration. Although it was 
known that copper was present around South Bougainville in the 1930s, it was not 
until the 1960s that copper deposits were established (Bedford 1977: 1 ). The 
Bougainville Copper Mine project development came at the time when there was little 
trust on the part of the Nasioi towards the state and private companies. 
The kin groups in Bougainville, like others in Melanesia, experienced forms of 
relationships with planters which were far from reciprocal. Such experiences were 
generally the basis for opinions regarding later developments, including subsequent 
mineral resource development. In other words, instrumental articulation was 
becoming evidently unacceptable. 
3.3.1 Exploration 
From the start of the exploration, when Conzinc Riotinto (Australia) Exploration Pty 
Ltd (CRAE) obtained authority to explore some 630 square kilometres in South 
Bougainville in 1963, landowners heavily opposed the Panguna exploration work. 
Throughout the subsequent period until the signing of the Special Mining Lease 
(SML) in 1967, local opposition was consistent. The 1967 Agreement was 
particularly important because of the introduction of the Bougainville Copper 
Production statute which became the first such ratification of a mining project in 
PNG(Hancock et al 1998: 2). Thus, while the project began operation in 1972, 
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landowner resistance against the project had been consistent through the development 
of the project, well into the post- political independence period ofPNG. 
There have been a number of instances reflecting the direct application of state 
measures against the Nasioi people of Bougainville. The first instance was that 
despite the persistent reported opposition to the project, the state and the mining 
project went ahead. As Bedford reported prior to 1972 to 1974, there was strong 
landowner opposition (Bedford 1977: 4). The reason for this was that while Conzinc 
Riotinto (Australia) Exploration Pty Ltd (CRAE) was given authorisation by the state 
to prospect, landowners had little part in it. This situation was clearly demonstrated by 
Bedford when reported that: 
These authorities required the company to pay an annual rent to the 
Administration, but the Ordinance at this stage did not contain any provisions 
for payment of an occupation fee to the landowners. The only compensation 
the latter were entitled to was some recompense for destruction of their 
personal property by the prospectors. Access to native land could be granted 
by the Administration without reference to the owners under the terms of the 
mining Ordinance (Bedford, 1977: 7). 
This form of relationship articulated by the state dominated throughout the 1960s and 
1970s. The persistence of government officials who accompanied geologists to 
"explain" mining interests by reminding the landowners of the law of ownership of 
minerals by the state was just an example of behaviour characteristic of instrumental 
articulation (Bedford 1977). Such attitudes towards kin groups in Bougainville gave 
them a sense of complete of loss of control of their environment, people, and culture. 
This sense of loss was clearly indicative of the concerns of the Nasioi. For the Nasioi 
people, the project was not sensitive towards their concerns, which were far beyond 
the economic parameters contained in the mining agreements. For the 
Bougainvillians, their concerns were more social and cultural, as Kokare stated: 
. . . a soft, quite world of green bounded by the bush and the mountains and 
the sky ... populated exclusively by people who observed the same rules ... 
OUR world, where we were the absolute, ultimate and final authority (Kokare, 
1972, quoted in Bedford and Mamak 1977: 4). 
Gaikovina Kula, writing on the subject of consultation with local communities during 
the stages of mining projects warned that: 
71 
... The bond between traditional land ownership and the processes for 
resources access and sustainable resource use can occur, but accountability for 
benefit sharing and resource use must build upon an appreciation of the deep, 
ecological, economic and social bond between land and the people across the 
Pacific island cultures ... .If mutual benefit is to occur (Gaikovina Kula: 
1998:1, quoted in Bedford and Mamak1977). 
The early resistance to the development of Panguna suggests that the Nasioi kin 
groups were not impressed with the nature of relations involved in the development of 
the project. In a sense, it was a direct resistance to instrumental articulation in mineral 
resources development. 
3.3.2 Ratification agreement of 1967 
The important feature of Panguna in terms of relationships with landowners was the 
ratification of the agreement between the state and the mining company (CRAE) in 
1967. Ratification was the idea of making an agreement for the development of 
Panguna under a 'special' Act of Parliament, which was in effect a 'ratification' 
process. It was a form of instrumental articulation because of the implied aim of legal 
self-containment of the project. Early attempts by Ross Mining NL for the ratification 
of the Gold Ridge project in Solomon Islands made me aware of this strategy. While 
ratification was refused for Gold Ridge, it was applied in the case of Panguna. In the 
case ofPanguna, the imminent political independence ofPNG was a likely motive for 
ratification adopted by the project. The problem with such a form of ratification was 
its ability to operate the project in a legally confined form, separate from the wider 
community in which it was located. In this case, the community refers to the PNG 
nation as whole. This meant if there were to be any legal changes within the normal 
process of the territory's legislative process or even the eventuality of gaining political 
independence, then the project would remain secure under the arranged ratification. 
Ratification was consistent with existing mining ordinances. In other words, while 
existing mining ordinances had contained provisions for compensation since 1907, 
such ordinances restricted any compensation merely to personal properties (Burton 
1997). The practice of legal control of sub-surface minerals was carried out through 
such legal instruments such as the 1908 Mining Ordinance. This act, in effect, 
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circumvents the rights of the indigenous people as her study reported (Emberson-Bain 
1994) in gold mining in Fiji. The 1907 Mining Ordinance in PNG simply declares 
'national interests' over the rights of the specific groups of people directly affected by 
such mining ventures. Clearly landowners' disputes over Panguna could never have 
been resolved under the existing policies governing land and mineral resources in 
such a tribal community. In the case of Panguna Project, ratification was therefore an 
extreme form of instrumental articulation of kin groups. 
In hindsight, there was the tendency to think that perhaps there should be more 
negotiation with landowners, minimisation of environmental damage, and tougher 
government action (Denoon, 2000:1-1 0). But on the other hand, perhaps even further 
negotiations could not have made any difference since the existing legal instruments 
already structured the basis for relationship over the resources at the time. 
In summary, the Panguna mine project was not a project supported by the Nasioi 
people. It was a project planned and implemented by the state and the mining 
company with landowners seen as a "mere" inconvenience to the project. The reliance 
on the existing legal framework presumed the state right over landowners, which was 
a fundamental basis for the subsequent relationship with the Nasioi community. While 
Panguna was able to operate for more than fifteen years, before the crisis that led to 
its closure in 1989, such operation was only sustained by the knowledge that the state 
had the presumed legitimacy of use of force against any resistance to the project. The 
Panguna project was a case of instrumental articulation at one end of the scale of 
possible forms of articulation of relationships. 
3.4: The Ok Tedi project case 
The kin group resistance to the Panguna Mine Project came as a lesson to the 
government and the mining company in relation to the need to reconsider their 
approach to landowners. However, the newly independent state of PNG appeared to 
follow the same models of mine arrangements in the Panguna mine project that had 
processed during colonial administration. The Ok Tedi project was ratified to legally 
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Burton (1997: 31) this view of a recent discovery of the Star Mountain people was 
incorrect. Incorrect it may be, but such portrayal of kin groups was part of the 
'discovery psyche' prevalent over many years. It was an important attitude 
characteristic of instrumental articulation. 
On the story of the first contact with the Ok Tedi people, it was suggested that the 
earliest visitor to these people was an Assistant Resident Magistrate Daru by the 
name of Leo Austen in 1922, who called them the 'Western Tedi' and the 'Eastern 
Tedi' peoples. These were the Yonggom and Awin villages respectively. Hyndman 
(1994: 71) made the same observation that the Wopkaimin did encounter Austen in 
1922 in the Iralim Parish. The Iralim were the principal landowners of the Ok Tedi 
Mine land area. Hyndman also suggested that between the period of 1952 to 1961 
there were nine government patrols to the area. In other words, the Ok Tedi people 
had made contact with other people outside of their immediate environment much 
earlier. The recent emphasis on their recent 'discovery' was more likely to be an 
instrumental strategy by the prospecting company rather than a genuine historical 
account of cross-cultural contact. 
The Wopkaimin people were horticulturalists and were observed by Des Fitzer as 
having large gardens and an abundance of food. Hyndman (1982: 21) suggested that 
traditional Wopkaimin diet had the highest proportion of meat seen in any PNG 
population. Like many other Melanesian traditional societies, the Wopkaimin also 
possessed cultural mythology about their land area, as in the case of the culture 
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heroine Afek (Brumbaugh 1990). Their cultural system links their societies to each 
other through myth, ritual and oral history, and therefore there were more links to the 
other Min groups than often acknowledged. They were a functioning social 
community. 
3 .4.2 Early exploration 
The Kennecott mining company was the first to prospect in the Ok Tedi area, but the 
company withdrew after hearing that there was a re-negotiation of the Panguna 
Agreement in 1974. The PNG government responded by forming the Ok Tedi 
Development Company (ODC) in 1975. But at this stage, the knowledge about the 
prospect suggested a marginal deposit, and no individual company was prepared to 
take the risk individually. BHP showed an interest, although this was conditional on 
reducing their risk, and therefore a consortium was promoted. This included the 
German company Kupferexplorationsgesellschaft, Amoco Minerals, and the PNG 
Government who formed the Ok-Tedi Development Company in 1975 (King 1975). 
The project faced a number of problems, one of which was the geological instability 
of the area, including the site selected for a tailing dam. The Ridge behind the tailing 
area called the Vancouver Ridge collapsed in 1989, and the company then argued that 
a tailing dam was not feasible. This situation was made worse with the world price for 
gold fall, and over-runs the construction costs between 1982-84. Later on, there was 
also the ever-rising Panguna crisis which closed the mine in 1989. The subsequent 
withdrawal of some of the members of the consortium, namely Amoco selling to 
BHP, made the PNG government support increased production, and shortcut 
environmental requirements. 
3.4.3 Ok Tedi agreement Act 
OK Tedi Mine soon followed with gold and copper extraction in 1984 and 1987 
respectively (Hancock et a 1.1998:1). The landowners played little part in the 
decisions leading to mineral development of the mine. Like Panguna, it was 
administered under its own legislation in Parliament known as the Ok Tedi 
Agreement Act (Hancock 1998: 128). Burton (1997) provides one explanation for the 
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exclusion of landowners in the Ok Tedi case. Burton argues that mining developments 
have always been associated with an attitude of 'discovery' of natives. The idea of 
discovery by miners gives the impression of miners taking the trouble to enter these 
difficult environments for the discovery of minerals and the subsequent development 
which implies a 'coming to an area' to rescue people from isolation. Burton suggests 
that this form of attitude is important in understanding the way the state and miners 
deal with landowners and define their responsibility. In a way, this attitude of 
patronisation of landowners also contributes to the state and company attitudes 
towards landowner issues. 
What Ok Tedi does show is that the independent state of PNG had followed the same 
instrumental logic as the prior colonial government. Like the Panguna project, the Ok 
Tedi project was administered under an 'Act of Parliament'. An 'Act of Parliament' 
was a ratification form of agreement. The PNG state was also prepared to ignore its 
environmental responsibility to the Wopkaimin people, to whom the environment was 
more than a simple mineral resource deposit. As with the Naisoi kin groups in 
Panguna, the Wopkaimin kin groups experienced the same attitude from the state and 
the mining company. In summary, the Ok Tedi Project was yet another example of 
instrumental relations. It placed landowners' interests at the lower level of 
significance than their expectations. However, after the Panguna crisis and the 
increasing public knowledge about environmental disaster in Ok Tedi, there were 
signs of change in attitudes towards kin groups in PNG mining development. This 
was the desire to 'consult' more closely with the kin groups directly affected by 
mining projects. The next two cases of mining projects in PNG will examine this 
change in attitude and evaluate the form of articulation. 
3.5: The porgera project case 
The Porgera Joint Venture project was, from the perspective of interaction process, 
the first sign of improvement in terms of relationships with kin groups over natural 
resource use. It had to take the experiences of the Panguna crisis and then the 
emerging knowledge about environmental threats of the Ok Tedi mine before some 
changes in process were envisaged in terms of relationships with kin groups in PNG. 
Porgera was, in this sense, the first stage in the change of attitude in terms of process. 
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There were shifts in the processes of opinion about kin groups; there were shifts in the 
nature of interaction with kin groups; and also there were changes in actions towards 
some of the demands of kin groups. But at the same time, unlike other previous 
projects, in Porgera the normative features that govern these processes persisted. Such 
features include roles played by each stakeholder, the rules governing natural resource 
use, and the goal of the project. 
3.5.1 Porgera community 
The Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) project was located among the area of the Ipili 
cultural and language group of Porgera. The I pili speak the lpili-Paiela language and 
numbered some 3000 in the mid-1950s (Burton 1991: 5). Burton suggests that the 
earliest patrol contact with the I pili was in 1934 by the Fox brothers, and later in 193 8 
by the Hagen-Sepik expedition (ibid 1991: 5). Porgera remained largely outside the 
cash economy until large scale gold prospecting in the 1980s and the construction of 
an all-weather road to Wabag. Burton suggests that after the 1980s there was 
increased social change as the result of two major events. These were the Mt Kare 
Gold Rush during 1988 and the signing of the SML Lease agreements for the Porgera 
Gold Mine during 1989 (Burton, 1991: 5). 
landowners in the Porgera gold mine project were often referred to as 'clans' by the 
PNG media and the local elite. Thus the following landowner 'clans', Tieni, Tuanda, 
Waiwa, Angalaini, Pulumaini, Maimai for example were used, according to Burton 
(Burton 1991: 8). But these names were names of lineage founders and lines of 
descent rather than category names or segmentation names. Burton explained that 
membership is much wider than often presumed on the basis of 'clans' that were 
supposed to reside in a specific locality. Rather, landowners were more like members 
of a parish, and both agnate and non-agnate cognates can have equal rights in land 
(Burton 1991: 9). At the same time, such rights are subject to the individual behaviour 
of each member. For example, a member's absenteeism from duties and roles within 
the Parish was usually discouraged. However, the mining project also attracted a large 
immigrant population, and the Porgerans found it difficult to send these people away. 
The Porgera Joint Venture Project, like other previous mining projects, had similar 
effects on the society of the kin groups directly involved. This meant the effects of 
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pulling kin groups into a cash economy and the expansion of the local population as a 
result of immigrants seeking jobs or brought in by the company's presence. But the 
Porgera project was the first to seek wider consultation that would include kin groups. 
Following the exclusion of landowners in Panguna and Ok Tedi Projects and the 
subsequent Bougainville Crisis, the case for the inclusion of landowners was 
emerging. This process of inclusion was better known as a 'Development Forum', 
which was applied in 1988. In the Forum, issues discussed included equity 
participation by landowners and the provincial government, infrastructure, and 
business development and environmental impacts. This process of a 'Development 
Forum' was the basis for negotiating the Porgera Joint Venture Project. 
3.5.2 Porgera development forum 
The application of a 'Development Forum' was an important change in the way 
relationship were been conducted with indigenous Papua New Guineans. The 
'Development Forum' process for Porgera was completed in April 1989. Three 
Memoranda of Agreement were signed the following month. The Porgera 
'Development Forum' was also important in setting new precedents, such as the 
provision that landowners receive royalties of at least 20% levied on the gross export 
value of the mine. There was also the use of Porgera forum agreements as the model 
for future tripartite negations. Finally, there was the assumption that in each such 
Development Forum for a particular project, the provincial government will receive a 
'Special Support Grant' from the central government, valued at 1% of estimated value 
ofthe mine's annual export. 
The 'Development Forum' was, in the sense of including kin groups, a significant 
improvement compared to the previous projects. At least kin groups were given 
attention by the government in seeking their endorsement of government conditions 
for mineral resource development. Apart from the government's willingness to seek 
kin group endorsement, there was also the right of kin groups to be part of decision 
making, and this was achieved through memoranda of agreement. In other words, 
there was a significant change of opinion or attitude to kin groups in relation to 
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natural resource use: the idea that kin groups were a genuine threat to the project if 
their concerns were not taken into account. The 'Development Forum' was not only a 
reflection of attitude changes, but it also reflected changes in the nature of interaction. 
Kin groups were now allowed to be part of the discussion from which they were 
excluded in previous projects. Further on, the Development Forum process also 
reflected changes in activities in that kin groups were also entitled to some form of 
benefit from the project. 
But being part of a consultation process itself is no guarantee that there is 
automatically fairness between the 'stakeholders'. Similarly, just because kin groups 
were able to sign the dotted line in the memoranda of agreement did not necessarily 
show that the right decisions had been agreed upon, or that all 'stakeholders" interests 
were equally protected. Also, just because kin groups had endorsed government 
conditions, and had also signed agreements, this was no measure of a success of a 
project, at least for kin groups. This situation points to the concern raised by Ballard 
in his observation of mining projects that success cannot be fully determined until the 
stage of mine closure (Ballard 1998). In other words, a full accounting ofthe pros and 
cons of a project can only be fully recognised once the mine has closed and its effect 
fully accounted for. But one does not have to wait until the closure of a mine to 
recognise periodic performance of a mining project. In the case of Porgera, annual 
reports provide some indications about the nature of the project and its performance in 
relations to the expectations of kin groups. Glenn Banks and Susanne Bonnell jointly 
produced one such report in 1997 (Banks & Bonnell 1997). The report was a snapshot 
of the social, economic and cultural changes occurring in the PJV project area. This 
report shows that even in the case of Porgera, where wider consultation was 
encouraged, landowner issues appeared to remain. Banks and Bonnell report on social 
monitoring outlines four major areas, administration, social, infrastructure, and 
economy. Apart from these four major areas of social monitoring, there were also 
issues relating to SML and concerns to the community. 
First, the report outlines government functions expressed through the Public Service, 
the Porgera Development Authority, and the Local Government Council. The report 
suggests that government functions in terms of services in Porgera declined in 1996. 
This was due to the usual problems of funds, logistical support and office equipment. 
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This government service situation was contrasted with the better resource conditions 
of the Porgera Development Authority. Funds and technical support for public service 
was not the only problem, there was also a geographical demarcation problem. That 
was the issue of whether it would be administered under Lagaip district or Laiagam 
District. These administrative problems also included the status of the Porgera 
Development Authority. Initially, the problem was of government funding the 
operation of the Development Authority in 1996. A more serious problem was the 
legal status of the Development Authority under the government's initiative in 
reforming local government. This was the Organic Law on Provincial Governments 
and Local Level Governments (OLP&LLG). Apart from the legal confusions 
associated with the OLP&LLG, the existing local government did not have funds to 
run its affairs. The administrative reform envisaged devolving the responsibility of 
primary health, elementary education, women and youth programs, village court, and 
infrastructure. Infrastructure responsibility would involve developing and maintaining 
rural airstrips, feeder roads, bridges and small ship wharves. 
Clearly the performance of Government duties in Porgera had been hampered by lack 
of funds and general logistics, but also the relative difference of capacity between the 
existing government and the mining project. One of the recommendations of the 
report was for the Porgera Local Government Council to request assistance in terms 
of expertise to provide advice on an organisational framework for the Council. 
The above administrative situation in Porgera implies a number of important 
considerations. The first is that the state machinery was not functioning properly. In a 
situation where the government lacks funds and general logistical equipment for 
operations, this administrative handicap gives clear indication of the inability to 
monitor the project in the first place. This was not a good position to negotiate on 
equal terms in a project involving the state and company, and equally involving the 
company and local community. The second consideration is that because local 
governments not only lack funds and equipment, but also necessary knowledge for 
management and administration of their own affairs, they also become dependent on 
hired experts. This situation denies strategic capability and responsibility on the part 
of the local government to guide development in the area. This administrative 
weakness makes the government dependent on the generosity of the project. This is a 
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situation of instrumental articulation where one party is in a strong position of control 
ofthe environment in which the project takes place. 
Apart from the state being dependent on the mine for some of its administrative 
responsibility, social conditions in Porgera did not meet the general expectations of 
kin groups. Instead there was population explosion creating an environment of social 
uncertainty. There was an increasing need to have knowledge about the population so 
that the limited resources could be directed to priority community development issues. 
Banks (1996) observed that the issue of law and order remained a central problem in 
Porgera. The issue of prevalence of law and order problems meant there was further 
demand for law enforcement agents, especially increasing the number of police and 
reservists. The problem of law and order was further compounded because the village 
courts were also less effective as a result of lack of training, management and finance. 
Discrimination against women and the issue of delays by bureaucrats in gazetting 
passed laws were also problematic. It was suggested that institutional strengthening 
should be pursued where the Village Courts should pursue a joint venture between the 
provincial government and the PJV. Under such an arrangement, the PJV would 
provide an officer to work with a village court inspector to set up the system. Any 
improvement in the institutions of court was considered essential, as cases of tribal 
fighting, crime and civil disturbances were reported as common occurrences. Some of 
the civil disturbances involved landowners' refusal to allow the project to clear roads 
and some involved compensation payment grievances leading to damage to company 
property. There were also rises in other social crimes and issues such as domestic 
violence, use of drugs, prostitution, gambling and unemployment. There were 
numerous suggestions to deal with these increasing social problems in Porgera, one of 
which was for the Porgera Local Government to establish Peace and Good Order 
Committees in all Council wards. Clearly law and order remained a central issue in 
Porgera. 
The above social problems only demonstrate that a mining project may help the 
community in providing employment, but it may also provide new social conditions 
that give rise to new sets of social problems. The immigrant population, violence, 
drugs, prostitution are some examples. 
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On the face of it, the Porgera Joint Venture project was a success for the PNG mining 
industry. As described earlier, such success could not be denied in relation to changes 
in attitude by both the state and mining company to the kin groups' right to decision 
making affecting the project. The state's change of approach through the use of the 
instrument of the 'Development Forum' was the main characteristic showing the 
changes in mining development processes PNG. But beneath the veneer of changes 
in attitude to kin group relationships, there remained the instrumental objectives of 
those attitudes. In other words, the change of attitude to kin groups did not 
significantly change the fundamental goal of project development. Kin groups were 
once again materially articulated instead of making kin group development goals one 
of the major purposes of natural resource development. 
There are a number of examples to demonstrate that despite changes in opinion and 
the forms of interaction, many of these activities may not be sustained for the long 
term development of kin group communities. For example, first of all, the company 
acts instrumentally in terms of health. The state's incapacity to provide health services 
meant that the company, in providing a relatively self-sufficient clinic, undermined 
the state's position as the main health provider. In Porgera, the mine clinic provided 
primary curative health care. The PJV operated Medical Centre and the Porgera 
Health Centre operated by the government appeared to work closely together. 
However, it was clear that the PJV health operated centre was well equipped and had 
greater resources, in financial and technical terms, than the Porgera Health Centre. 
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was expressed through attitudes towards education, for example the problems of lack 
of curriculum materials, teacher absenteeism, student absenteeism, parental attitude 
and lack of community support. 
Thirdly, since the mining project was about financial profitability for the company 
and material acquisition for kin groups, social norms within the society in which the 
mining takes place were also marginalised. For example, there was a disruptive effect 
of alcohol use by family members and an increase in polygamy. There was also the 
effect of gambling. An important concern by women whose land was used under the 
SML was the shortage of land for subsistence use. The women were not the only ones 
with these concerns. The youth too had concerns ranging from the increasing number 
of young people engaging prostitution, use of marijuana, lack of education, 
employment and discontent with traditional lifestyle in favour of cash lifestyles. In 
other words, kin group society's disintegration was significantly contributed to by the 
mining project. Physical relocation of kin groups was part of this disintegration. 
From the point of view of the state and the company, this social disintegration was an 
acceptable cost for the greater good of economic development. In other words, kin 
group social and cultural disintegration was of little significance in relation to 
profitability and expected economic growth. This is a clear indication of instrumental 
articulation, because the company and the state take advantage of their position of 
influence in developing projects that directly and heavily impact on all aspects of kin 
group society. The only reason that mining projects did not seem to fall into the 
'cultural genocide' category is because this is defined on the basis of development for 
the benefit of all. 
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K400,000, and the Mungalep-Yuyan road including a bridge over Kaiya River worth 
K286,000. The other two projects were a teacher's house at Paiam Community School 
worth K35,000 and a double classroom at Kolombi Community, Paiela worth 
K55,000. 
The instrumental aspects of the above Tax Credit Scheme are obvious in two ways. 
First of all, while road infrastructures were essential for the development of kin 
groups the area, the intensive use of such infrastructure was largely significant for 
the state and the company to facilitate commercial activities during the life of the 
project. Infrastructure development should be justified on the basis of its further 
maintenance and use after mine closure. This means that such infrastructure projects 
cannot be exclusively justified on the basis of kin groups' priority demands and needs 
so that the credit scheme arrangement was applied. The Tax Credit Scheme 
arrangement was based on the logic that the company was willing to construct 
projects for the community as long as the community decided that such an identified 
project was important. After the completion of such a project, the costs were usually 
reimbursed to the company through tax deductions. The problem with such an 
arrangement was that in the case of road projects not only were they meant to be the 
state's responsibility, but they also took up most of the resources. In the Porgera case, 
it became obvious from the Banks' report that 80% of the money under the scheme 
was spent on roads. 
The instrumental aspect of this Tax Credit Scheme, apart from financial bias to roads 
rather than projects that benefited kin groups directly, was in the sense of company 
participation in development. While the company was involved in the construction of 
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projects under the Tax Credit Scheme, in effect it received the recognition for its 
involvement. However, in essence such projects were government funded projects 
through the tax credit provision. In other words, the company built a good reputation 
at the cost of the state and the kin groups. This would also qualify as an instrumental 
form of articulation of kin group relations. 
Finally, the Porgeran economy, as suggested by Banks' report, became increasing 
reliant on the cash economy in the area (Banks 1997: 39). This follows from money 
received into the community through wages, business contracts, and compensation 
payments. Banks calculated that the compensation payment between 1993-96 
amounted to a total of K10,985,000. In terms of wages earned, some K5,565 million 
dollars were paid to some 886 employees in 1996. Banks also reported that royalty 
payments were paid by PJV at the rate of 1.25% of the value of production. This was 
distributed between several groups, with the Enga Provincial Government taking 50% 
and the Porgera Development Authority 5%. The remaining 45% of the 1.25% royalty 
was distributed between SML landowners (15%), SML landowners Children's Trust 
(1 0% ), Porgera Landowners Association (12% ), and SML Young Adults (8% ). The 
royalty rate was revised in 1997 from 1.25% of gross value of production to 2% 
(Banks 1997:41). In other words, the result of the development of the Porgera Mine is 
the increasing integration into the cash economy. While in the short term this appears 
attractive, one of the difficulties of assessing a relative worth of the project to 
landowners is the lack of a common definition of entitlements for major stakeholders. 
In other words, in a complex event such as a mining project, how does one quantify 
and justify that what the company and the state received as benefits were actually 
their rightful entitlements? While there are risks to be shared among players, for the 
kin groups there is the long-term environmental concern and the social consequences 
of the project's development. This is particularly the case with problems associated 
with social and cultural disintegration related to the inception and development of the 
project in societies such as that the Ipili. 
In summary, this project was successful compared to what happened in the previous 
cases of the Panguna and Ok Tedi Mines. While the first two projects' relationship 
was one of limited engagement with landowners, wider consultations with landowners 
were made at Porgera. This allowed for the establishment of various komitis dealing 
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with landowner problems and concerns. The Porgera Project was in a sense the first 
mining project where a Development Forum was used. In the Forum, issues discussed 
included equity participation by landowners and provincial government, 
infrastructure, business development and environmental impacts. These were essential 
changes not known in PNG's history of development with kin groups. 
While this wider consultation process was successful, it did not resolve fundamental 
issues concerning landowners but rather allowed for cooptation of landowners in 
dealing with the project. The issues of appropriate compensation, improvement of 
social services, and reproduction of a dynamic developing community remain illusive. 
It does suggest that reducing active conflict by improvement in the processes of 
interaction is only part of the problem or concern of landowners. The other part is the 
need to identify how mining development can directly be part of creating the long-
term dynamism necessary for active community development. Thus, while the 
Porgera mining project has helped in creating a cash economy, sustaining this new 
form of economy remains problematic. In the final analysis, the question of what 
constitutes a successful mining project for Ipili society remains a debatable issue. In a 
sense, if mining projects remain a means for accessing materials for kin groups, then 
material articulation remains. Therefore the goals of making a mining project the 
basis for developing a dynamic society among the kin groups directly affected 
remains distant. 
3.6. Lihir project case 
The use of 'Development Forums' as a method for securing landowners' endorsement 
of government conditions was first applied in the Porgera mining development 
project. It was this model that was also applied in the Lihir mining project. Before 
describing the Lihir Development Forum, I will first describe the Lihir Community. 
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3.6.1 Lihir community 
Lihir comprises one large island, namely Niolam and four small islands or Ihot ('stony 
places') (Filer 1988: 2). Niolam is the major island with an area of 200 square 
kilometres, while the three small islands make up less than 20 square kilometres. The 
Lihir mining project operation takes place in the Luise Caldera, which is half way 
down the eastern part ofNiolam Island. The major infrastructure, apart from the mine, 
consisted of a ring road around Niolam island, which connected other facilities such 
as, the mining township, the airstrip, the mission station, and some twenty coastal 
villages (Filer 1998: 2). 
The majority of Lihirians live on the main island of Niolam, while a third live on the 
other small islands. The population of Lihir at the 1990 census was 6,805 (Filer, 
1998:2). It was ascertained that the growth rate was 2.5% per annum. The population 
by 1998, would have been about 8,291 Lihirians. Most of this population was 
comprised of members of some organised religion. For instance, 80% were Catholics, 
with the remaining members of the other denominations such as the United Church 
and Pentecostals. Outside of the church affiliation, most Lihirians consider themselves 
members of 'clans' with some degree of membership in the mine area. The mine lease 
areas that fall inside the customary land jurisdiction were about 2, 700 hectares, which 
Filer suggests represent 15% of Niolam land area. The actual population directly 
affected in terms of geographical village location or lease area villages was 
approximately 20% of the population. Some of these are not involved in the mine 
lease areas. 
The important feature of Lihir in terms of location has to do with its island status. 
Unlike mainland PNG, mining in an island environment implicates many other issues 
beside environmental concerns. The story of Lihir is also seen as a success story for 
PNG, as was the case of Porgera. This perception was due largely to the method of 
establishing relationship with kin groups through the Development Forum process. 
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Development Forum. The issue was that the provincial government was to have a 
third of this equity and the remaining two thirds of the equity entitlement were to be 
given to the Lihir Community. One suggestion by the government was for the Lihir 
community to acquire a further 20% equity right, which would mean the provincial 
government and Lihir community would be entitled to 50% equity. But any 
endorsement of such concessions would implicate changes previous project 
agreements and PNG politicians were not prepared to go that far. Instead as reported 
by Filer, leaders such as John Giheno opted for precedents set in previous agreements 
(Filer 1996: 68) which entailed the granting of a 15% stake in the Joint Venture to the 
Lihir community on the condition that the provincial government give up its demands. 
The 'Development Forum' was resumed at the Malangan Lodge in Kavieng on 27 
February 1994. According to Filer, most issues were resolved during a two day 
meeting involving distribution of royalties and expenditure of the Special Support 
Grant (Filer 1996: 69). At this stage, apart from the equity issue, most other demands 
were relatively settled. This included 20% of royalties to be paid in cash to project 
landowners, while 30% was to be paid to the Nimamar Development Authority 
(NDA). The NDA would also receive 30% of the Special Support Grant made 
available for 'community projects' in Lihir District. 
The equity issue and the K500,000 government cheque to be used as initial capital for 
Lihirian companies were the last concerns dealt with before an agreement was signed. 
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representative organisations of various interests the project. This organisation 
involved the Lihir Management Company (LMC), the government (in the forms of 
PW A, DMR, DNIP and NDA) Mining Area Landowner Association 
(LMALA). The government here refers to the Development Management Resources 
(DMR), Department of New Ireland Province (DNIP), Provincial Women's 
Association (PW A) and the local government expressed as Nimamar Development 
Authority (NDA) (Filer 1998:7). Through these representative agencies the 
Development Forum process for Lihir was legitimised. The result of the 
organisational arrangements the negotiation of project was the agreement on 
the Integrated Benefit Package (IBP). 
3.6.3 Integrated benefit package 
The Integrated Benefit Package included compensation payments for damages, 
equity, royalties and a relocation scheme for those directly affected by the project. In 
terms of royalties, the SML landowners were given 20%, while the local community 
as a whole, through NDA, was given a 30% share for project development (Filer 
1998: 15). In some sense, it can be argued that the 'Development Forum' that allowed 
the signing of the project for development by all stakeholders has been successful. As 
Filer has argued, the Lihir project has not been subject to the degree of verbal and 
serious confrontations that had characterised other projects in PNG (Filer 1998). 
However, as Filer observed, even at the early stage of the Lihir project, it seemed on 
the face of it that the community had made a good deal (Filer 1996: 69). In effect, 
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more of the 140 blocks, whether disputed or undisputed. There were 58 block 
executives who had claims over the 1250 hectares of customary land within SML, and 
the remaining 32 block executive made claims over blocks in other lease area. The 
importance of the SML landowners was right to a share of 20% of the mining 
royalties, including compensation for damages and destruction. total, there were 
about 75 of these individuals who were expected to earn about K 20,000 from 
royalties per annum. But, as Filer has observed, these incomes did not lead to 
formation of a business class, but rather were wasted through other means. 
The Lihirian experience has shown that despite the Development Forum process, the 
deals reached were made mainly by men and confined to a small percentage of the 
Lihirian population. In a society where members of the community were dependent 
on the environment, any benefit confined to a small percentage of Lihirian 'big men' 
only demonstrates that goals of the kin group society were equally marginalised. 
Therefore, despite any relative gains in material goods through the cash provided by 
the project, benefit-sharing at the level of the community remains a problem. 
3.5.4 Articulation issues 
The Lihir Development Forum engaged with the kin groups of Lihir to a greater 
extent. On the face of it, as Filer himself suggested, it appears as if the kin groups 
have been successful. In other words, the Development Forum appears to be the 
model method for development of natural resources in PNG. Following the Panguna 
crisis and Ok Tedi environmental disasters, this forum method seems to secure the 
basis for future development in PNG. 
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But success in mining development depends very much on the question of whose 
success has been considered. In relation to the state, the signing of the agreements 
would be considered a success, because economic activities were expected to follow. 
Similarly, the company would see signing ofthe mining lease as success as well. For 
kin groups too, they would consider some degree of success because the 
'Development Forum' process allowed for their participation through consultation. 
But while the company may have secured profits for its shareholders and the 
government expected the taxation system to raise revenue for the national budget, the 
attainment of kin group goals remains illusive. In other words, although there is 
mining development, there is no kin group development. 
Filer also recognised that benefits from the Lihir project never led to 'formation of a 
business class' among the kin groups. Instead, their benefits were wasted through 
other means. One way to interpret this kind of observation is to say that it was the 
fault of the kin groups that they could not develop themselves after the establishment 
of such a mining project. On the face of it, this seems quite a legitimate argument and 
often it has been the argument for many other projects in other areas of natural 
resources, such as forestry development in Melanesia. 
But what has not often been asked is the role of structural transformation in society. 
There is an inherent assumption that there is only one way to go about natural 
resource development. This means that the state controls ownership of natural 
resources and that kin groups are to be merely compensated for the inconvenience 
caused by the state and miners. But natural resource use is also about the survival of 
kin groups whose environment and world is severely displaced in the name of 
economic growth. 
While it could be argued that there has been social transformation of kin group society 
since contact, it must also be pointed out that such transformations have been uneven 
in PNG and in other Melanesian countries. It is also important to note that, while 
transformations have occurred, it is the reproduction of structures that resulted from 
such transformations that concern kin groups. In other words, since outside contact 
with Melanesia, the relationships between Melanesians and the imposed state were 
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largely instrumental. They began with instrumental articulation based on materials 
that did not exist in Melanesia and were desired by Melanesians. They could only be 
obtained by giving away resources. This process was firmly established due to the 
establishment of colonies on the basis of legal articulation with kin groups. The legal 
aims of the state were largely to access kin group resources for the purposes of 
sustaining itself. Companies were, in some sense, agents of the state because the state 
depended on their functions for its revenue. The commercial companies in turn 
required natural resources not only to sustain their own growth but also the growth of 
the state. The implication of this situation is consistent with John Connell's 
observation that while mining development may benefit national economic 
development, a situation where the goals of kin groups have been successfully linked 
to those of mining corporations has yet to be seen (Connell and Howitt 1991: 1 ). 
In the context of Lihir, Filer listed seven categories of impacts which included: 
resource scarcity, influx of aliens, law and order problems, unequal income 
distribution, subordination of women, power struggles within the community, and 
project dependency syndrome (Filer 1998: 5). In terms of resource scarcity, this 
involves scarcity in subsistence resources such as bamboo for traditional huts. There 
was also a shortage of land for gardening and even coconut fruits to feed their pigs. 
Immigrant populations became an important issue because immigrants begin to 
populate the lease area villages. Some immigrants were found to occupy houses 
constructed for Lihirians under the Project's Village Development Scheme. Apart 
from resource scarcity and the immigrant problem, there was also a law and order 
problem as a result of drunken behaviour among the lease area villages or relocated 
villagers. There was an issue of 'haves' and 'have nots' among the villagers. Those to 
whom the mining had made cash available were seen by the others as lazy and greedy, 
whose property should be damaged. Thus violence was justified under these social 
differences. Clearly, for Filer, although the mine has brought benefits, it has not 
compensated for their social and economic problems. Instead, it has created what he 
called the 'project dependency syndrome' where the local communities associate all 
their problems with the company. 
Clearly, even the Lihir Project from the view of the Lihirians could still be improved. 
Filer (1998) outlined a number of issues: 
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(a) leadership behaviour 
(b) perceptions of the mine 
(c) disappointment with the project 
(d) unpreparedness for mine closure. 
Leadership Behaviour Despite the existence of local institutions that were set up for 
the negotiation and distribution of mine benefits among those entitled, leadership per 
se does not involve a democratic process. This is reflected in the finding that most 
Lihirians do not question or offer any public comment on the actions and words of 
those purporting to act on their behalf. The 'emerged leaders' seem to continue to act 
on behalf of the majority as if they were given a unilateral right to do so. While the 
members of the community may express disagreement with actions and words of 
leaders, there seems to be no way to show dissatisfaction with these leaders (Filer 
1998: 9). The people seem to ignore the issues at hand or discussed at the time. Filer 
argues that this behaviour may be caused by a lack of communication. At same time, 
there is also the question of whether the people are actually willing to be involved in 
the issues at hand. Filer argues that this behaviour could be described as either passive 
resistance or active disengagement. This kind of behaviour allows the persistent 
actions of the minority actors to continue without knowing exactly whether they are 
given the authority to do so. This pattern of behaviour observed by Filer is important 
because not only does it allow a sense of minority rule, but also it shows that often the 
community may allow things although members are not happy with them. Thus, wider 
consultation alluded to in the 'Development Forum' may only be a reflection of self-
chosen 'leaders' participation, and not necessarily the participation of the community. 
The behaviour described above is consistent with community attitudes to activities 
where they do not have direct ownership. 
Perceptions of the Mine Apart from concerns about leadership behaviour, the 
Development Forum did not prevent a perception of the mine as being a 'traitor'. Filer 
identified the perception that Lihirians saw LMC's practices as inappropriate. This 
included concerns about its employment practices, local training and business 
development programs, and the distribution of other project benefits within the 
community. The community's response to this perceived 'slap in the face' by the 
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Disappointment Apart from gnevances, Filer also noted a general 
disappointment with the Project. This relates to the expectation of the Lihirian 
community in generaL According to Filer (1998: 13), most Lihirians' expectations 
from the mine were to accumulate wealth and a material surrounding no 
different from a moderately affluent Australian working class family living in 
suburban areas of Brisbane or Cairns. These expectations for a modern house, 
vehicles, and other commodities were central to the expectations of Lihirian 
community members. In fact, it may be argued, why should this not be expected? But 
as Filer observed, the LMC was alarmed at what they considered unrealistic 
expectations (Filer 1998: 14 ). They were baffled and puzzled that people wanted to 
suburbanise their villages. For the company, there was not enough money under the 
Village Development Scheme (VDS) to meet the expectations. For the landowners, 
the VDS was not just a housing scheme, while the company expected the villagers to 
simply improve the existing housing conditions and environment. 
This is one of the mam paradoxes of so-called development, including mmmg 
development. This disappointment is an important indication not only of the 
difference in the goals of the company on one hand and landowners on the other, but a 
crucial basis for why mining development will never meet landowner goals in this 
respect. This matches the point made by Connell, who argued that there had been 
hardly any evidence to suggest that indigenous development outcomes have been met 
as result of these mining development projects in Melanesia in general (Connell 1991: 
70). 
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The Lihirian community is the most well-placed community a mining project in 
PNG. It is expected that this will be perceived as a success story judged against other 
mining projects. First of all, they had the chance to learn from previous mining 
experiences in PNG, and in particular in relation to the practice of Development 
Forums as a mechanism for establishing a sound relationship between kin groups and 
the mine operators. They were small terms of population, although is not a 
unique feature to Lihir. The mining project itself is also a world class mine with the 
potential to have a great economic development impact. The opportunity of 
employment provision and the isolation of the islands from mainland PNG also 
allowed for the control of aliens. Therefore the forum could be more focussed on the 
decisions involving the community. But as we have seen from the observations 
described above, the Lihir project may well be another disappointment in the quest for 
development among Melanesian indigenous communities. 
What seems clear is that although the Lihir project was one of the largest projects 
constructed and developed among a relatively small community, it has not 
successfully brought about development as envisaged by the local community. In a 
sense, it clearly indicates that many of the justifications for mining projects may be 
questionable in the first instance. In other words, there may be no relationship 
between the development of mining projects and the development of the local 
community. While the question of whether the local community should develop may 
be construed as not the responsibility of the project and the state, it leaves one to 
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TABLE 1: The pattern of gradual improvement of the relationship between kin groups 
and mine developers. 
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What the four major mining projects described in PNG suggest is that there is a 
consistency the form of articulation predominant in natural resource development. 
The nature of relations over natural resource use has its roots in a social environment 
of cross-cultural contact in the early nineteenth century. Before the arrival of the 
Europeans, groups in PNG lived within the confines of their territorial area. There 
were of course social conflicts, which were common features of many human 
societies around the world, but even those conflicts were undertaken in the context of 
reciprocal relations. In other words, there was always the chance to reciprocate and 
restore social balance, even temporarily. This reciprocal form of relationship was not 
only expressed in conflicts but also in the non-conflict social environment. In PNG, 
kin group societies expressed reciprocal relations through mortuary feasts and 
marriages. These social institutions were based on a reciprocal exchange system, and 
as a form of relationship for human interactions, the benefits and the costs of such 
forms of interactions were within the reach of each player. 
Forms of relationship had transformed for Melanesians when colonial states made 
contact and established itself in the nineteenth century. That is the relationship 
between kin groups and the colonial states. Following traders, explorers and the 
introduction of the state, kin groups were persistently engaged a form of relationship 
that marginalised kin groups and remains to the present day. 
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between kin groups and Europeans, both parties saw the role of natural resources 
differently. On one hand, the European traders and settlers saw natural resources as 
important for exporting natural resources for the world market. This was the basis for 
wealth creation, not only for themselves as individuals, but also collectively for the 
home country of origin. The kin groups on the other hand, interested in the technology 
brought with traders. Thus the process of material exchange with kin groups in PNG, 
and later the imposition of the state, was a significant means for the achievement of 
desired goals. These goals of capital accumulation and economic growth were the 
basis for the relationship of Europeans with kin groups. The belief in the doctrine that 
use of force by the state was legitimate was an essential ingredient for the 
subordination of kin groups and their understanding of the relationship as based on 
reciprocity. 
The state as an institution was a significant factor in the transformation of kin group 
relationships in their society. The state created instruments of law that set the rules, 
roles and values for relationship over natural resources. The state is therefore the basis 
for an instrumental relationship, and remained persistently so after political 
independence. The state became the structure that has self perpetuated itself over time 
and a major reason for kin group subordination in natural resource use. 
This work argues that the material articulation of kin groups persisted in PNG since 
its inception in the eighteenth century until the present. The development of natural 
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resources in PNG. The use of 
police and government officials to justify the actions of the company points to a 
stronger concern about the project, rather than the issues affecting landowners. The 
process of negotiation was also not completely supported. The use ratification as 
the basis to operate the mine makes the Panguna Mine the most extreme case of 
landowners' interests being virtually ignored. While the landowners were paid 
compensation for damages some nominal payment for lost properties, essentially 
the state and the mining company had their way. This situation can be glossed over 
with financial compensations and revised consultation with landowners, but the fact 
remains that the form of relationship is basically one of instrumental articulation at its 
extreme. The promotion of the laws of the state to landowners, the direct involvement 
of government officials, and ratification of the agreements, are the major indicators of 
this form of approach to relationship formation in developing the Panguna project. 
The development of Ok Tedi mine was again to take the same form of relationship. 
The state and company were more interested in the commercial interests of the project 
than, say, the impact such activity would have on the people who live in the area. The 
Ok Tedi project was ratified and the state and the mining company justified decisions 
made about environmental issues as they saw fit. Both the Panguna and Ok Tedi 
Mining Projects were extreme examples of relationships where landowners had little 
influence on the issues that directly affected them. Both projects were disasters in 
terms ofboth social and environmental impacts on the local communities. 
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The result ofthe Panguna conflict, which resulted in the closure of the mine in 1989, 
was an evident demonstration that kin group issues were at odds with the goals of the 
mines. It has not been learned to this day that Melanesian customary land tenure will 
not accept, although may tolerate, the idea of the state ownership of natural resources. 
What seems to characterise the state approach to this issue of mineral rights has been 
to manage the tension over this issue. But this issue has surfaced consistently with the 
development of subsequent projects. The case of Porgera demonstrates the first time 
that the state and mine project were willing to discuss community concerns about the 
project. While such consultation mechanisms, which later became known as the 
Development Forum, progressed well, such progress has largely been process related. 
In other words, the major rules governing the project remain, and it was the processes 
that were now taken into consideration. Such incentives came in the form of carrying 
out certain actions, interactions and attitudes to the project that kin groups may see as 
including their concerns. But consultation with landowners is not a guarantee that 
landowners were an equal partner. This is because, as Duncan (1997) has pointed out, 
the company know-how about this particular industry was far greater than the 
subsistence landowners'. This asymmetrical relation in terms of knowledge about the 
mining industry makes landowner consultation far more an act of legitimising goals of 
the project that are already set. It is not a consultation to modify the goal of the 
mining project. Consultation with landowners then becomes a latent form of co-
option. The lack of modifications in the goals of the mining project to benefit 
landowners meant that there would be a continuance of indirect ways of trying to 
modify the project on the part of the landowners. While this may not be expressed 
consciously, the underlying perception that the resource belongs to the landowners 
allows this persistent strife. The co-option of landowners into the scheme of mining 
project goals meant that projects tend to exclude the goals of the landowner 
community. The change in strategy on the part of the state and the mining company to 
consult with landowners, although useful, is not sufficient to change the direction of 
mining projects towards long-term improvement and development of the landowner 
community. There is the argument that kin group communities wanted a material 
focus which was a short term rather than long term goal. The argument that kin 
groups were more interested in short term material goods is valid, but only because 
this behaviour was promoted earlier as part of material articulation. There have been 
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3.8. Implications for this Work 
The chapter suggested that while the overall trend has been one of improvement of 
relationships, beginning with the most marginalised form to gradual inclusion of kin 
groups in mine developments, such improvements have been largely terms of 
process. Structurally, the norms that govern resource relations, the roles defined for 
kin groups and the values used to justify the relations remain intact. 
What is learned from PNG is that legal articulation of mineral resources formed the 
basis for justifying how that resource should be accessed. This legal articulation 
defined mineral resources as owned by the state, which dispossessed Papua New 
Guineans. This instrument was sustained through the use of force over the years for 
promotion of exploration, mining and exports of gold including other resources. This 
form of relationship is defined here as instrumental articulation, because indigenous 
communities were coerced as well as coopted into accepting the instrument of the 
state. Most mining development in PNG was sheltered from indigenous interference 
by legal instruments enforced by the use of force. After the Second World War, 
changes in international politics led to the notion of decolonisation and subsequent 
political independence of states, including PNG. 
Since independence in 1975 there have been attempts to mould the PNG state to 
accommodate indigenous Melanesians' dignity, rights, and self-determination. In 
mining development, the legal instrument that was put in place by the former state 
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consultation, compensation, and other appeasement processes. The application of 
consultation process was a gain for the state and company, while it was simply an 
overdue process for any human relationship. effect, the Development Forum 
process is the beginning step for developing improved relations kin groups and 
not the end in itself for natural resource use. This is because there are issues that may 
further require consultation processes such as the instrumental law that defines 
ownership of mineral resources and the role of such projects in terms of meeting the 
collective development goals of kin groups. 
The need to secure the collective goals of kin groups is vital for the nation building 
process. This is because the state intervention in kin group territories can reduce their 
ability to survive in the long term as a result of environmental and other social 
impacts brought about by such intervention. It requires a change in attitude, not only 
in the processes of engaging landowners for project development goals, but also 
changes in attitude towards the role of such projects for the long term development of 
kin group communities. 
The companies emphasised ideas like the isolation of the local community, which 
meant that only mining projects could really help communities by investment. There 
was also the emphasis on the difficulty of investing in the area because of political 
insecurity. There was further emphasis on economic opportunities that the project will 
create, and most of all the national economy, which the state wishes to hear. While the 
reasons promoted by the state and company as to why natural resources should be 
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landowners directly affected, such an activity meets the goals of the state and 
company more than it directly helps landowners. The case of the Porgera credit 
scheme demonstrates this, as more than 90% of the credit fund went to roads and 
bridges while the remainder went to schools, which would contrast directly help 
landowners and their future generations. 
Clearly, up until the present, mineral resource development in PNG has embarked on 
processes that support the goals of mining companies and the state. What it has 
neglected to include are the fundamental structures that underlie these processes. This 
includes, for example, the rules that were introduced to govern mineral resources and 
which define roles for players and values used in justifying the goals of mining 
projects. In the case of rules, the mineral laws that dispossessed landowners are at the 
root of relations in mining development in PNG. The notion of ownership of mineral 
rights must be accommodated within the Melanesian worldview so that the benefits of 
mineral resources can also be justified as necessarily for the good of the Melanesians. 
The importance of changing rules that govern mineral resource ownership rights is 
that this changes the configuration of benefit distribution from a compensation and 
appeasement mentality to one of development and benefit, which includes 
responsibility on the part of landowners. 
Essentially the PNG cases confirm the susp1c1on m Solomon Islands that natural 
resource exploitation has so far not meet the expectations of kin groups. While 
processes in mine relations have improved over the years, the structural problems of 
articulation remain. 
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mine projects PNG has reflected a form of relationship that is instrumentally 
articulated towards the goals of state and mining companies more than for kin 
groups. 
What Chapter 4 aims to show is a similar experience in the case of Solomon 
Islands. It is about the form and practices of articulation that were used to engage kin 
groups the Solomon Islands in the development of natural resources other than 
minerals. It describes the early forms of relationship in resources development 
experiences in Solomon Islands. Mineral resources development will be considered in 
the next three chapters. This chapter's focus is on the nature of forces that influenced 
the forms of relationship with kin groups over natural resource use other than mineral. 
There were two important elements of historical change that influenced the 
subsequent nature of relationships with kin groups. First was the establishment of the 
state, which was a centralised authority that partially displaced the authority of local 
kin groups (Alasia 1997, Belshaw and Royal Institute of International Affairs 1950, 
Bennett 1979, Burt 1994, Coppet 1977, Crocombe and Tuza 1992, Elota and Keesing 
1978, Hviding 1996a, Keesing 1992, Larmour and Tarua 1983). The second was the 
introduction of the ideology of tenure by the state for the purpose of accessing natural 
resources for the plantation economy (Allan 1957, Chapman 1963, Lakau 1996, 
Larmour 1987, Lasaqa 1972). These historical structures influenced the nature of 
relationships kin groups have had with the state and commercial developers in 
subsequent years. This work argues that relationships with kin groups in Solomon 
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Before colonial powers were present Solomon Islands, kin groups functioned as a 
social whole. Kin groups developed structures and practices that were necessary 
for them to live and function as units. In Solomon Islands, linguistically there are 
about 61 major kin groups (Tryon and Hackman 1983). However, these social groups 
shared many things, including physical features as Melanesians and a shared linguistic 
ancestry like Austronesian or Papuan. They even shared land and marine tenure 
systems (Allan 1957, Bennett 1979, Burt 1994, de Cop pet 1982, Hviding 1996b ). At 
the social group level, language and culture are shared. However, within the social 
group there are further subdivisions defined largely in terms of kinship in relation to a 
specific territory. A recent work by the anthropologist Hviding showed that among 
the Marovo Islanders, land known as puava was under the custody of kin group units 
known as butubutu (Hviding 1996b ). The importance of the association of kin groups 
with a specific territory is widely shared throughout the Solomon Islands. For 
example, even in the distant eastern part of Solomon Islands among the Are' Are of 
Malaita, these territories are also recognised and known as arata (De Coppet 1982). 
The same is found among the Guadalcanal people of the Central Highlands among the 
matoba, where land territories were under the kin group unit within the larger unit of 
moiety (Naitoro 2000; Roe 1990). Although each social group varies in the way that 
land is organised, they all share the common feature that each territory is associated 
with a specific social group. The assumption then was that such social group has the 
general rights of decision making over the particular area. Generally, it is now 
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in society. That was the idea of reciprocity not between individuals but also 
between groups. Kinship ideology was the basis for social relations that guide 
exchange systems in society (De Coppet 1982). The moiety systems of matoba 
society in Guadalcanal were an example the reciprocal expectations between the 
two moieties of a society. The idea was that society was divided half and each half 
reciprocates with the other half based on 'small sister' /'big sister' relationship 
(Naitoro 2000; Naitoro 1993). In other social groups, such relationships were 
reciprocated between different alliances that may have been formed as a result of the 
exogamous marriage system. Thus kin groups, prior to the introduction of the 
centralised state, were largely operated on kinship ideology. 
This kinship ideology was soon to undergo a process of transformation that resulted in 
the formation of new forms of relationship with kin groups over their previously held 
territory. 
4.1.2 The centralised state 
A centralised state was a new idea to kin groups because they largely confined their 
interests to a specific territory. This is in contrast to the idea of a centralised state, 
which encompassed a larger territorial area. The centralised state was not formed in a 
vacuum. It was a part of a larger process that became dominant in the twentieth 
century (Bernstein 2000). The process had come to include many nations (Wallerstein 
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4. 2 The state and the plantation economy 
1 The state 
The state was not an end itself. Its formation was in conjunction the need for 
commerce and world trade. Firstly, the state became an important basis for which 
commerce was then introduced and facilitated. The colonial land reforms that 
followed the declaration of Solomon Islands as a protectorate was a case in hand 
(Allan 1957, Belshaw 1950, Bennett 1979). 
The origin of the state in Solomon Islands can be traced to 1893 when the Solomon 
Islands was declared a protectorate. This declaration made an area into a 'property' of 
the colonial power. Onward from the fourteenth century, many of the explorers were 
in search of new land for the expansion of European commerce and trade. Gold was 
especially central to these world explorations. In the sixteenth century the Spanish 
explorer Mendana was the first such explorer to 'discover' the islands, and had also 
renamed them (Allan 1957, Jack-Hinton 1962). But these explorers had a limited 
effect on the islands, apart from giving names. The central basis of the transformation 
of the relationship began in 1893, when the islands were given the status of a British 
Protectorate. It was soon after, in 1896, that the first resident commissioner Woodford 
was appointed by the British Government to administer the territory (Allan 1957). 
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had begun for the introduction of capitalism and capitalist enterprises which set the 
process of interaction on course with indigenous community ever since. For the 
colonial government, it was the process of civilising the natives and the development 
of commerce (Bennett 1979, Bodley 1990, Coppet 1977, Naitoro 1993, Scarr 1979). 
This was the notion of modernity, which spread throughout the world through the 
colonisation process (Bodley 1990). For indigenous community, lack of unity 
the first place meant varied experiences modernity. But at the same time, some 
indigenous experiences were shared to a relative extent. For example, the 
establishment of the colony's administration in 1893 had two significant general 
outcomes. First, was the displacement of indigenous leadership structures through the 
establishment of the state administration (Naitoro 1993). Second, land policies 
weakened indigenous control of land and resources (Larmour et al.l979, Lasaqa 
1972). In the case of the displacement of indigenous structures, many traditional 
leadership structures declined or were outlawed. 
The introduction of a system of indirect rule in the 1920s, known also as the 
'headmen' system, became the significant basis for displacement of kin group 
leadership structures. The colonial government was able to set up the administrative 
framework for indirect rule which divided the islands into four geographical regional 
areas known as districts. These were the Eastern district, Malaita district, Central 
district and the Western district. Each of these districts was further divided into sub-
districts and thus the framework for the state control was put in place. In each sub-
district, there were headmen as well as 'village headmen' for each village. In this 
or~anisational structure, the Resident Commissioner was at the apex of the pyramid 
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with four District Commissioners and District Officers. Non-kin group members 
occupied these higher levels of decision making while the district 'headman' and 
'village headman' were mainly kin group individuals who had some exposure either 
as church members or former labourers in plantations (Allan 1957, Elota and Keesing 
1978, Naitoro 1993). It was through this system that the administration was able to 
operate government policies in Solomon Islands from the 1920s until the Second 
World War in 1942. 
The above system of government not only displaced kin group leadership but was also 
the major instrument used to establish relations with kin groups for the purpose of 
implementing government policies. On one hand, this was useful for bringing law and 
order into the colony, but on the other it displaced the kin group sense of identity and 
purpose. One of these important policies was the introduction of the doctrine of tenure 
for land use at the time for the plantation economy (Allan 1957, Lakau 1996, Larmour 
1987, Larmour and University of Papua New Guinea Land Studies Centre 1986, 
Lasaqa 1972). 
4.2.2 The plantation economy 
Apart from the resulting displacement of leadership, the second outcome was the 
displacement of land ownership rights from the indigenous community (Larmour 
1987, Lasaqa 1972). The economy was a central aspect of the state, which depended 
on it for its revenue. Thus the introduction of the doctrine of tenure in the early 
twentieth century was important for the state. The ideas of freehold and leasehold 
were used to allow much of the fertile land in Solomon Islands to be acquired for 
plantation agriculture (Allan 1957, Larmour 1986). Thus, while the administration 
introduced policies that were seen as necessary for the development of the new state, 
the same actions were seen by kin groups as a circumvention of their rights of 
landownership through an introduced concept of "waste" land policy (Allan 1957, 
Lasaqa 1972). For example, as a result of this policy, it was reported that by 1906, 
Levers Pacific Plantation Ltd was in control of most fertile land throughout the 
country, constituting 200,000 acres in all (Lasaqa 1972: 33). By 1956, 90% of the 
coastal fertile land was appropriated by planters and the administration. This 
amounted to about 6% of total land in the country (Allan 1957:60). Much plantation 
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4.2.3 Social resistance 
Following the Second World War, there was some resistance Solomon Islanders 
about, the loss of political control and loss land on which kin groups were largely 
dependent. Two of the most generally known examples of resistance were the 
Maasina Ruru and Moro movements (Allan 1957, Davenport and Coker 1967, Elota 
and Keesing 1978, Keesing 1992, Laracy 1983, Naitoro 1993). The two occurred in 
sequence. The Maasina Ruru Movement started in 1943 and was subdued by 1951. 
The second was the Moro Movement, which started in 1957 and has remained active 
until the present. This movement will be dealt with later in the thesis. But the story of 
Maasina Ruru had features of what is often described as a 'Cargo Cult' (Crocombe 
and Tuza 1992, Laracy 1983). An important goal of the movement was about self-
determination and re-exertion of kin group independence (De Coppet 1982, Naitoro 
1993). For the state, this was a rebellious movement that had to be subdued. 
From the perspective of many indigenous Maasina Ruru followers, it was a counter 
'philosophy' to what they conceived as an asymmetrically existing form of 
relationship under the colonial administration. The Founder of the Maasina Ruru, 
Joseph Nori, became a founder, not because he developed the idea, but rather the idea 
was already around and he was the instrument for its expression. He had not 
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intentionally decided in 1943 that he was going to start a movement. The idea had 
already been around the Are' Are people, due to what they saw as an unfair 
relationship between indigenous members, the government, and the plantation 
owners. 'Maasina Ruru' in Are' Are dialect referred to a form of relationship seen then 
as an alternative to the existing master/servant form of relationship perceived as 
predominant at the time. 'Maasina' in Are' denoted a kinship relationship as 'cousin' 
brothers. Implicit in this concept Maasina was the mutuality of expectations between 
cousins, the reciprocity expectations which the Are' Are society claimed as the ideal 
form of social relationship in their society. The second word 'Ruru' has two meanings 
in the Are' Are dialect. The first is that of 'ruru' in the sense of 'collective purpose'. 
The word 'ruru' in this sense was used in other contexts as 'ruru manu', which refers to 
hunting birds for collective purposes, and is also used in the context of 'ruru hanua', 
which refers to collective destruction of the land. The same term is used in collecting 
insects as in 'ruru napo'. Therefore 'Maasina Ruru' meant in this sense 'cousins in 
collective purpose'. The most commonly used meaning by many social scientists was 
'ruru' as corruption of the English term 'rule' (Allan 1957, Laracy 1983). In the Are' 
Are dialect there are words which seem familiar and tend to indicate shared meaning, 
yet have no direct linguistic linkage. For example, in English, the word 'Man' is 
phonetically close to the Are' Are word for man as 'mane'. Similarly, the Are' Are 
word 'Arete' which means good, resembles the Greek word for good life 'Arete'. The 
point is that Maasina Ruru was a counter perspective of an ideal relationship, which 
they believed was absent in the existing context of the relationship between kin 
groups, the state, or plantation owners at the time (Naitoro 1993). 
The notable figures in the Maasina Ruru movement were Joseph Nori and Alick 
Nono'ohimae. They were both experienced in working for the former planters, 
although they did not share the same kind of job. Alick Nono'ohimae had worked as a 
labourer. Nori also worked as labourer, but in addition he was a cook. He started as a 
young man, living with an English couple in Tulagi. He cooked, child sat, and learned 
about European culture. Nori was one of those Islanders who observed European 
culture from a point of view of their daily family life in the Solomon Islands. Being 
young also meant that Nori was also able to learn the English language better than 
many Islanders of his time. Joseph Nori's experience shaped his views of the Maasina 
Ruru movement, when he spoke of the need for local lawyers, economists, and 
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relations through reciprocity. The Maasina movement was the ultimate 
demonstration of dissatisfaction the existing structure of the relationship between 
Islanders on the one hand, and the state and capitalists on the other. During the 1950s, 
when the movement subsided and the Malaita Council was established in 1951, there 
was clear indication that conditions on relationships over land and working conditions 
in the Solomon Islands were unsatisfactory. 
Although the movement had subdued, the internally promoted idea of documenting 
customary land persisted until the present, based on the idea of the 'collective purpose 
of cousins' land must be collectively owned and shared, and both males and females 
should have equal rights. The result of this idea of documentation of communal land 
led to emphasis on documenting kinship and genealogy in Are' Are. The Maasina 
Ruru leaders in Are' Are defined major areas of development that were desired. This 
included rights to the sea, rivers, space, land, medicinal plants, religion, knowledge, 
laws, economics, political leadership, women's rights, and kinship systems. These 
twelve categories of social development were known as 'taraewa' among Maasina 
Ruru followers. For the Are' Are, their views were that there must be a better form of 
interactions between people. These 'taraewa' were counter-ideals against those desired 
from the state, but were seen as impossible to acquire under their existing 
relationships. The central idea behind the Are' Are view about land was to show the 
importance that exists between man and his land in Are' Are (De Coppet 1982). 
The implications of such a resistance movement were rooted in the culture of the 
people and indigenous notions of rights. These were clearly perceived inequalities in 
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the relationship between the indigenous community and the state and corporations. 
This form of movement was not confined to Malaita and Guadalcanal, but there were 
similar, though less visible, movements in the Solomon Islands. The result of these 
movements, was greater consciousness about indigenous rights during the post world 
war development activities. 
The effect of the war and the new social movements were contributing factors to the 
subsequent sluggish development of natural resources after World War II. While the 
administration attempted to set up resource development projects that would sustain 
an emerging independent state, such attempts were restricted because these projects 
were quite marginal, and attracting investors was difficult. The second reason for a 
sluggish return of development was that kin groups were not in a position to support 
further projects because of their experiences in the previous years. They saw the state 
activities as acting against them rather than for them, because of the way leadership 
and land use were administered. The result ofthe post-war condition was different for 
both the state and kin groups. For the state, managing the resources was the key for 
the future development of Solomon Islands. For the landowners, it was about the 
relationship over natural resources rather than the exclusive goals of the state. 
The development attempts described in the next sections demonstrate some of the 
features of the relationship between kin groups and the state over non-mining natural 
resource development during the post-war period. 
4.3 Forestry development 
Following the war, entrepreneurs who had left during the occupation of the Japanese 
returned. But there was a shortage of mineral explorers (Grover 1958) and plantation 
labourers. This labour shortage lasted only for a short period, and then labour 
recruitment started to flow again to plantation areas, especially outside Malaita Island. 
This was after the Maasina Ruru was subdued and the first Malaita District Council 
was established. Then reality in the Solomon Islands began to be perceived. The 
administration still had to run the territory with a limited financial subsidy from the 
UK. This put pressure on the territory's administration to find means to secure income 
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The idea was that forestry resources of the protectorate should be harvested properly 
and not 'mined'. It was expected the protectorate forest should be 'scientifically 
managed'. It was argued that any alternative approach to scientific management for 
short-term gain could easily follow those procedures normally followed by mining. 
This included the process of encouraging private prospectors, granting of rights 
to exploit the resource as speedily exhaustively as possible. 
However, the establishment of a forest estate necessitated the creation of a forestry 
department. The importance of this approach for the British Solomon Islands 
Protectorate was reflected in the appointment of the first Chief Forestry Officer (Mr. 
J.W.P. Logie) in 1962 (Trenaman 1962). There were two concepts that were promoted 
at the time. These were the ideas of productive forests and protective areas. The latter 
was to declare areas identified as protective forest areas, while the former was for the 
development of productive estate. The idea was that of harvesting the forest to 
contribute to the economic development of the protectorate. Thus, by 1957 the major 
concern was the need to secure forestry estate so that it could be exploited. 
The notion of forestry estate refers to an area of land dedicated legally and for a long-
term purpose of forestry use. By 1960, the government implemented the policy after 
the Government House meeting on 15 July 1960, where the agreement stipulated the 
following: 
e the preservation of forest cover in important catchment areas; 
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• assistance in conservational use of land not under continuous forest cover; 
• conservation and sustained yield management of forests; 
• to provide for internal requirements; 
• for export production- primarily if use of land in this way can be economically 
justified; 
• controlled timber exploitation of tracts not destined for inclusion m the 
eventual forest estate (Trenaman 1962). 
Having the above policy put in place, the government was convinced, as a matter of 
course, that the state would be in control of the forest estate. In other words the 
question of ownership was irrelevant in so far as the government was concerned. It 
was generally accepted as a standard practice in less developed tropical territories of 
the British Commonwealth that the state would naturally own and control the forestry 
resource. This was largely the basis for interaction with indigenous landowners on 
forestry issues in the Solomon Islands. 
The other dimension of the policy on forestry development concerned the land policy. 
The review of land policy in 1957 meant that any forestry estate creation had to wait 
until this review was completed. The Lands Commission report on customary land 
tenure in the territory, done by the then administrative Officer Colin H. Allan (Allan 
1957), recommended options for legislative arrangements: 
• to devise a customary land code that will be based on reconstruction of custom as 
it existed in 1893; 
• to devise a policy to extinguish customary system of tenure; 
• to do nothing about it. 
A fourth option was favoured over the above three, which recommended that a 
legislative arrangement be carried out 
to devise a policy which takes into account the present continuing need for the 
customary system, but which at the same time guides it along progressive lines 
towards the emergence of a modern tenure system based on adjudication and 
registration of individual title (Allan 1957: 277). 
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Following the land review study, the land and titles regulation was enacted in 1959 
based on adjudication and registration of individual titles. The process was largely a 
strategic policy for the state ownership of land and individualisation of customary 
land tenure. The legislative framework on land allowed the subsequent enactment of 
the Forestry Regulation in the middle of 1960 (Trenaman 1962). The land regulation 
provided the basis for government establishment of forest estate in the protectorate. 
4.3.1 Vangunu 
The first indication of the implementation of the forestry policy was in 1963, in 
correspondence from the Chief Forestry officer Trenaman to the Commissioner of 
Land regarding the land acquisition of V angunu Island in the Western District of the 
territory. The memorandum written to the Commissioner of Lands regarding 
negotiating the acquisition of Vangunu, authorised the Field Forest Officer 
(Chapman) to talk to the indigenous community at V angunu about the government's 
intention. He was given instructions and guidance as to how he should approach the 
indigenous landowners in explaining why the government sought public title of 
Vangunu Island. The state in this case proposed to acquire 120 sq miles of the Island, 
and had used the churches, both the SDA and Methodist Missions in Marovo to break 
the 'ice' with the local people. Preliminary talk was done with Pastor Holmes of the 
SDA Mission Batuna and Rev. A.N. Vula of the Methodist Mission, Segi, before 
preliminary talks were opened with the Vangunu people (Chapman 1963). Clearly, in 
these land deals the church was an important part of rationalising government policies 
among kin groups. The headman too was an important local player as headmen were 
usually expected to be at those land negotiation meetings. As in the V angunu case, 
Chapman reported that efforts were made to contact the Marovo Council but members 
were scattered and not able to attend, though the district Headman was present in 
meetings held between 10-15th February and 20-2lst February in 1963. 
In Vangunu, there were three major landowning groups. One category of landowners 
affected were the Bopo, Saira and Nineveh communities. The second category was 
that of Viru-Chakope Kin eo (of Chakope) and Kuku (of Vura) who were another set 
of landowners. The third category was of individuals such as Monambusu (Rende and 
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The government's proposal was paternalistic. This behaviour was also observed by 
other commentators on resource development the Solomon Islands (Larmour 
1989). For example, a report by the Forestry Field Officer, Chapman reported that 
assurances were given that the acquisition of forest estate was for the interests of the 
V angunu people. It would have no effect on their community and land would be made 
available to them elsewhere in the future (Chapman 1963). In addition, their hunting 
lifestyle would be allowed to continue. The government was not only paternalistic but 
also devious and manipulative appropriating the Lands and Titles Ordinance of 
1958 and the Land and Titles Regulation of 1959 to facilitate public ownership of 
land in particular, knowing that customary land was collective and that such major 
land policy changes required consent. 
In the case of the Vangunu forestry development incentives, the government had 
made its own policy and conditions, which were then carried out by getting 
landowners to understand and participate. For example, the state had already put 
forward the following conditions. 
1. a forest estate should be created on public land and that freehold title be secured; 
2. areas of considerable stands of timber should be declared Forest Reserve; 
3. that desired total area of forest estate should be identified within the g1ven 
Islands: 
• Baga Island 
• Rob Roy Island 
e W agina Island 
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5. the idea was that landowners should be persuaded to agree to compulsory 
acquisition of their land or alternatively to a fixed term lease of 99 years; 
6. that after the government acquired freehold to land for forestry, there would 
be no sale price negotiation; instead the government would pay them a percentage 
of the royalty that the government obtained from exploiting as ex-gratia payment. 
This was 1 0% of the royalty negotiated with the exploiting company. 
7. the price to be offered for improved land was to be rated at 6d. per acre; 
8. that the above conditions would apply to subsequent land acquisition for forest 
estate in the protectorate. 
Given the conditions listed above, landowners were not always happy with the deals. 
This was reflected in a letter from Jim Kinio, one of the Vangunu landowners, writing 
to the District Commissioner in July 1964. Kinio wrote: 
On behalf of the owner at the land of V angunu which was taken by the 
Forestry department, mainly the land between the Sagivi river and Gevala 
river. I would like to ask this question. What is the purpose of all the 
departments under the control of the Government here at Solomon Island? 
Answering of that question we believed that you are here to help us. And if so 
why is the Forestry Department appointed to pay our land at less amount? 
(Kinio 1964) 
It was in response to the above letter that the Senior Secretary to the District 
Commissioner, (Western) Tony Hughes wrote to the Commissioner of Land (Hughes 
1964). In his letter, he suggested that the people in Vangunu (Vendors) were not 
happy about the sale. This was because of what they considered to be the loss of their 
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wrote: 
' . .I am very much the purchase money into 
coffers the next few Chinese to visit the area. None of vendors 
appeared to have ideas mind for the banking or investment funds, 
establishment of a co-operative, or other venture .... As be seen from 
my adjudication proceedings they are completed the disputed area 
land is clearly vacant land the terms of Cap. 56. I am fairly certain that 
this applies to at least 80-90% total area of the acquisition. Even if the 
vacant land provisions did not exist, I do not consider that the vendors could, 
on any reasonable basis, establish a claim to ownership of any but small parts 
ofthe land (Cross 1964). 
Thus the issue of the Vangunu land purchase was put to rest by the authorities. There 
was a number issues considered relevant in trying to understand the relationship 
between indigenous people and the state. The first issue was that of a lack of 
information on the part of the landowners. In the case of the Vangunu landowners, 
this showed that there were differences information held by the older generation 
and the new generation, as indicated by Hughes' account (1964). There was also a 
sense of coercion implied by Hughes' observation about why the landowners, though 
unhappy about the deal, were letting it go anyway (Hughes 1964). The state's 
overbearing presence in this deal has shown that the state had its way in most deals 
with kin groups and this was largely out of fear of the state's use of force rather than 
on the basis of rational justification. The account by Mr Cross implies degrees of 
prejudice against the landowners in his suggestion about their behaviour and use of 
money and overt attempt to justify non ownership of land on the part of the 
community. Thus it is obviously that form of articulation was coercive and 
instrumentally biased against kin groups in forestry deals. 
Yet for the state, in terms of forestry development in the Solomon Islands, V angunu 
was considered the model for dealing with community in acquisition for land for 
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Natural resource development in the Solomon Islands after the Second World War 
was not confined to Forestry. There were other development approaches. These 
involved mining, fisheries, agricultural further forestry development. 
Problems in this area were first manifested the early coconut plantation 
developments in the beginning of the twentieth century. After the Second World War, 
exploitation of forests became the focus for which natural resource 
development relations became significant, in particular in the process of governments' 
land acquisition policy for the exploitation and establishment of forest estate. The 
emphasis on forestry was apparent in the post war period and more so after 
independence. However, in the late 1960s, and subsequent decades after political 
independence, more natural resource development was carried out. These experiences 
are outlined in the following sections to establish the nature of resource development 
relations and to show how indigenous communities continue to perceive their role as 
marginal, and their interests as unaccounted for. The natural resource development 
projects considered here include Kolombangara Forestry Products, Rennell Bauxite 
development, Nora's Fishery's development, North New Georgia Forest development, 
and Guadalcanal Plains development. 
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acquisition forestry exploitations 1960s, island was heavily logged 
during 1968-78 by Levers Pacific Timbers (LPT). Most the revenue from the 
logging never went to Kolombangara people. By the middle of the 1980s, the 
island's 13,000 ha logged land were considered as appropriate for the development 
of a forestry plantation. The idea this time was for the newly independent state of the 
Solomon Islands to establish a joint-venture project with a foreign investor, namely 
the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC). Thus, there was the 
establishment of Kolombangara Forest Products Limited (KFPL). 
Landowners in the western side of the island refused Levers Pacific Timber logging in 
the 1970s, and were also sceptical about the proposed joint venture project (KFPL). 
4.3.5 Kolombangara forest products limited 
Kolombangara is a volcanic island among the New Georgia group in the Western 
Province. The island is circular in form and has a land area of 685 sq km. The top of 
the crater is 1,760 m above sea level. The island is one of the more fertile land 
systems in the Solomon Islands (Wall and Hansell, 1975). This includes the 
Patupaele, Ringgi, Londumoe, Serambuni and Lamousa land systems considered 
relevant for development. The establishment of the Kolombangara Forestry Products 
Limited (KFPL) joint venture project was for reforestation on 13,000 ha of logged 
land. The idea was to carry out reforestation by introducing fast-growing hardwoods 
on the land. It was possible for the post-colonial government to establish an operating 
company (KFPL) as a joint venture between the Solomon Islands government and 
CDC on the Land. This was because 77% of Kolombagara (52,746 ha) was alienated 
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In 1986, Levers Pacific Timbers withdrew from its logging operation. The Solomon 
Islands government and CDC became engaged in the formation of joint venture 
company KFPL reafforestation project would produce hard tropical woods on 
government-held land. The idea was to plant 25% of the land with Gmelina arborea 
and the remainder with Eucalyptus deglupta for hardwood chip and hardwood sawn 
timber. In this proposed development, it was expected an integrated sawmill and 
wood chip plant was to be constructed at Ringgi Cove by 1997/1998. The planned 
processing plant was not built. The reasons given were that despite the planting of 
13,000 ha of forest and an additional forestry estate inheritance of 9,000 ha, these 
were considered insufficient to support the plant (interview with Gordon Darcy Lilo ). 
There was also further demand for forestry acquisition of Viru estate, which the 
Government decided to give to a Korean logging company, Eargon Resources 
Limited. Thus KFPL now effectively functions as a logging company in exporting 
logs from these plantation estate. The joint venture company had been expected to 
operate commercially, with collaboration from the central government and the 
provincial government, but with limited public intervention. It was expected to 
employ 800 employees, both skilled and unskilled. The company would have reached 
peak financing costs of SBD$ 284.3 m in 1998. It was expected that the project's 
financial internal rate of return (FIRR) would be 9% in constant 1988 terms. The 
economic internal rate of return (EIRR), in which the financial flow is adjusted for the 
economic costs and benefits, was 14%. The project had expected to gain foreign 
exchange inflows in excess of SBD$30m per annum from the year 2000 onward. 
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But with the woodchip plant no longer in place and the result of the current social 
conflict in the country, the KFPL project may also be forced to fulfil the suspicion of 
the Kolombangara people as another failed government project. Clearly, the future of 
KFPL on Kolombagara remained insecure. For the Kolombangara people, now 
numbering more than 5000, some of their expectations remain to be seen. They had 
held expectations for the benefit for their families, employment, market outlets for 
local food, roads, schools, clinics and water supplies for the whole island. These 
benefits were expected on the basis of the success of the project. These expectations 
too may now remain unfulfilled. 
The Kolombangara case was one of forestry exploitation, which spans many years. 
Starting in the beginning of the twentieth century, land was acquired for coconut 
plantations against the wishes of the people. Then the subsequent interests in forestry 
resource development after the Second World War further exploited forest resources 
until the 1980s. The independent state of Solomon Islands maintained the use of the 
land in commercial activities until the present. But the landowners' grievances about 
the land remained and this issue has yet to be resolved. In the meantime, benefits for 
landowners had shown little on the ground among the Kolombangara population. This 
situation had made landowners like Gordon Darcy Lilo suspect that perhaps the KFPL 
venture's motive was more of an environmental project than a commercial 
development project, that is, a reforestation project rather than commercial forestation 
project. Therefore, resource development relations in the context of Kolombangara 
remain the domain of the state and the forest companies involved, and landowners 
were expectant beneficiaries rather than active participants. 
4.3.6 Small holder project approach 
In contemporary forest resource development, the improvement of relationships over 
benefits was justified on the traditional grounds of employment, and provision of 
services for the local community, but now included ideas of small holder project 
development. This was seen in the case of Kolombangara as a means for greater 
participation in the cash economy. But ideas and practice did not always go hand in 
hand. Small holders' projects, if they were to be successful, required both human and 
financial resources. This condition could not be met locally and required external 
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4.4 Mineral resources 
4.4. 1 Rennell bauxite development 
Mineral resource development in Solomon Islands be described in more detail in 
the next chapter. It suffices to mention here despite numerous explorations for 
minerals, there was not any active mining until the Gold Ridge Mining Project The 
closest to any mining in Solomon Islands was in the case of Rennell Bauxite trial 
mining. This trial took place after the Second World War when the state attitude 
towards mining was simple. The role of the state in mining was generally to 
encourage investors, give them the license, and expect them to exploit the mineral as 
speedily as possible. An early example of this policy was the issuance of the 193 7 
mining license for Gold Ridge, which did not eventuate as the result of the war 
(Grover 1955). 
In the case of Rennell Island, the bauxite deposit was found in the 1960s on an 
upraised coral atolL The prospecting license was issued to Mitsui & Smelting 
Company Limited of Tokyo m 1969 (Larmour 1989:56). Mitsui & Smelting 
submitted a mining proposal m 1970 (Fitch 1971: 1 ). The Solomon Islands 
government gave it favourable consideration, but the first approval was for a trial 
operation and additional technological investigations. This was to ascertain economic 
viability and the possibility for infrastructure development, in the way of establishing 
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practice. Instead, the emphasis of the government was largely on 
negotiating the surface rights and Islanders' relocation away from the mine areas 
(Fitch 1 1: para.l.Ol 6.08). The rights of groups in terms of land were 
marginalised to obtain surface access to the mine. Larmour observed the deficiency in 
the approach to indigenous communities, that when the project was aborted it at least 
taught administration that landowners should have been consulted more (Larmour 
1989). 
Rennell Island has been a Polynesian outlier of the Solomon Islands, settled less than 
1000 years ago. In the late 1970s, the population was about 1,300 (Larmour 1989). 
This population has now increased to at least 6,000 individuals. The bauxite deposits 
were distributed over the central plains of the Island in 1200 shallow 'puddles' 
(Larmour 1989). This was also where the people planted their garden, especially taro 
tubers as the main staple. As in the case of land acquisition for forestry, compulsory 
acquisition of land for mineral development was also used in this project. Trial 
Mining of 80ha was carried out in 1971 and 1972. Thus, the prospective benefit was 
calculated on the basis of the loss of fruit trees. The potential benefit to the 
landowners, had this project gone ahead, would have been 5% of whatever royalties 
the government received from the mining company. The land would be returned after 
use and new amenities consisting of a land, house and water supply elsewhere on 
public land would be provided for their resettlement (Larmour 1989). 
However, the underlying discontent with government actions was the problem of 
reconciling mineral resources belonging to the state and not landowners. This was 
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Solomon Taiyo Limited, established a base and cannery in Tulagi. Tulagi was 
the former capital of the Solomon Islands in the Central Solomon Islands. In 1974, the 
expansion of the joint venture was proposed, establishing a second base at Noro, 
on New Georgia Island the Western Solomon Islands. A government-
commissioned feasibility was completed about three months after political 
independence. The Floyd Report was commissioned to investigate the potential of 
Noro as a 'new growth' zone (Floyd 1978). It had the potential for overseas ports, and 
for serving as the administrative and commercial centre for Western Solomon Islands. 
The Solomon Taiyo Development was one of the developments envisaged in the 
development potential of Noro. The report recommended the master plan 
development for Noro and the restriction of residential uses for the Noro land area. 
The Floyd Report also listed the rationale for the decision to expand fishery 
development in Noro, which included proximity to untapped fishing grounds, bait 
fishing availability, good harbour, and land availability for infrastructure 
development. At first, a wharf, freezers, an arabushi plant, and housing were 
developed. The development of Noro increased over the years until the late 1980s 
when the Noro Cannery became fully operational and replaced the original cannery in 
Tulagi. 
Maruha Ltd of Japan owned Solomon Taiyo Ltd with a 49% share, while the 
Investment Corporation of Solomon Islands (ICSI) held the remaining 51% on behalf 
of the government. The joint venture company operated originally 15 catcher boats 
operating from Noro (Solomon Islands Government, 1979 #9), using the pole and line 
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Solomon Islands. Expert advice to commit the government to loan Purse-Seiner boats 
began the process of reselling the company due to inability to repay the loan. NFD 
was sold to a Canadian Company, British Columbia Packers Ltd. It was further sold 
again to Trimarine. the recent social conflict in the Solomon Islands, the future of 
the fishery industry became questionable. The closure of Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (CDC) Oil Palm Plantation and the Gold Ridge Mining 
Project in 2000 severely affected the national economy and natural resource 
development in generaL The company Solomon Taiyo Limited was also in the 
process of closure after its parent company Maruha decided to withdraw from the 
project. The government's response was to take 100% ownership through a new 
company called Sol Tai Ltd. The Western Province and Noro people challenged the 
central government as to why the provincial government could not share ownership of 
the new company. The debate that resulted was eventually settled with Western 
province taking 45% ownership of the new company. 
Many instances of natural resource development in the Solomon Islands usually start 
with the government and a foreign party. In the case of Solomon Taiyo, Maruha was 
the foreign partner. The government usually maintained the attitude of representation 
of the nation's interest as whole, as well as the specific resource owners' interests. The 
issue here is that the resource owners persistently ill equipped to satisfactorily 
represent interest of the kin groups in the project. It was only in the context of the 
recent conflict that the central government, began to take seriously demands of 
resource owners or those who claim to represent their interests as the provincial 
government. 
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While the importance of inflation of the international market and other important 
economic factors cannot be denied, the persistence in marginalisation of resource 
owners remains an obstacle in resource development relations in Solomon Islands. As 
described in the case of forestry, mineral resources, and now fisheries development, 
resource owners have been relegated to the status of mere observers. The government 
and foreign interest groups establish the terms for relationship and development of 
resources in Solomon Islands. This only reflects the persistence of the instrumental 
articulation of kin groups in natural resource use in the Islands. 
4.6 Land for agriculture 
4.6.1 Guadalcanal plains 
The Guadalcanal Plains is the only substantial flat land area in the Solomon Islands. 
Apart from the early coconut plantation on the fringes of the plains prior to the 
Second World War, the plains had been generally unutilised for commercial crops. 
These grassland plains became important when, prior to independence in 1978, an oil 
palm plantation project was proposed. Like other projects of national importance, a 
joint-venture company was established to operate this oil palm plantation project. The 
Solomon Islands Plantation Limited (SIPL) was then established. Through the process 
of compulsory land acquisition, an initial land area of 14 78 ha was leased to the joint 
venture company (Larmour 1989: 20). This initial area was between Ngalimbiu and 
Metapona Rivers. This estate was commonly known as CDC 1 or estate one. The 
SIPL project, from its inception in 1974 to its recent closure in June 2000, was 
considered successful. From the view of the state and the joint venture company, this 
success was reflected in its consistent expansion over the years. By the time the 
project had closed, it had six estates and covered at least 6000 ha of land, and was in 
the process of negotiating a further 1 000 ha when it was forced to close. 
Like many similar projects, people's views about the success of the project varied. 
The project was considered successful for those who were dependent on employment. 
This was particularly the case for Malaitan labourers who worked in all the 
production stages of the oil palm project. The oil palm production process involves 
palm nursery, planting, maintenance, pollination, harvesting, and mill operation for 
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for the Honiara market while with relatives working and living the Solomon 
Islands Plantation Limited (SIPL) labour lines. This led to other related social 
problems, such as issues of a sexual nature. Initially there was much conflict among 
different social groups have different methods of solving such issues of theft, 
adultery, and defilement. The SIPL management response was the formulation of 
committees to resolve these issues. The increase of Malaitan immigrant population 
over the years contributed to an increased use of Malaitan system of conflict 
resolution that was unfamiliar to others on the plantation. This led to numerous 
disagreements and, in particular, for the Guadalcanal Plains people, apparent 
resentment. The social tensions that emerged as a result of the immigrant population 
were exploited by project management in the case of SIPL. That is the practice of 
having too many labourers organised to live in one location for the benefit of export 
based projects. 
Politically, the election process was also affected because many of these labourers 
were also voters, not necessarily for the constituencies of origin, say in Malaita or 
Temotu, but for the Guadalcanal Plains area. In other words, it was not only social 
issues that emerged as a result of the immigrant labour force for the commercial 
development of oil palm. The immigrant labour population began to change the power 
relations in areas where the projects were located. This is done because under the 
current national election laws potential candidates could be chosen from anywhere in 
the Solomons, especially from the islands of immigrant origins such as Malaita or 
Temotu and not necessarily from the indigenous population from the area. The 
difference in this new political landscape is that because most of the population in the 
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give some indication of the early benefit arrangement landowners from SIPL, 
in 1974, 1,478 ha of customary land were compulsorily acquired from landowners. In 
return, landowners were to benefit financially. This was done through capitalising 
anticipated income. Through this capitalisation process, part of the rental 
capitalised as a $SI 48,035 share the project was invested at 8% per annum. The 
other half of the was paid rent at $5 per hectare per annum which was 
equivalent to $A 3,843 or about $SI 15 000. While there been concerns among 
landowners, the issue did not come into the open until the development of the Gold 
Ridge project. 
The development of the Gold Ridge project made Guadalcanal landowners uneasy 
with their deals in SIPL. It appears that royalty payments from Gold Ridge project 
were much higher than what the Guadalcanal Plains landowners had obtained from 
the SIPL project. This was particularly evident from the share ratio of 4%, 25% and 
71% for landowners, the state, and CDC respectively. These issues have not been 
resolved from the view of Guadalcanal landowners. The recent social conflict in the 
Solomon Islands, as concerned the Guadalcanal people, was as much about a conflict 
about the distribution of benefits as a desire for political autonomy. Political 
autonomy was seen as a means of redressing economic inequality over benefit 
distribution from natural resource development. 
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many of the coastal land areas, as these were required for the plantation economy. 
Through the doctrine of tenure, land acquired was given as freehold or leasehold for a 
fixed period of time. doctrine which allowed the state to control much of the land 
that was previously under customary tenure became the basis for discontent on the 
part of kin groups. It also created a sense of distrust and suspicion because of the 
uncertainty that developed over time in terms of relative benefit from the land lost to 
planters. It was this process of loss that transformed previous relations an 
instrumental articulation with kin groups. The control of land by planters, the state, 
and churches were seen as loss to kin groups. This was not only because of the land 
itself, but because kin groups now saw what the planters were using the land for. 
Economic activity reflected masses of wealth. The loss of land and subsequent 
perceived economic wealth created by planters, conflated with the attitude of planters 
as hostile and heartless in use of their weapons, created a sense that the relationship 
between kin groups and planters was unsatisfactory. The planters' control of land, 
after acquisition, through the use of force, for which they were sometimes not held 
accountable, was an extreme form of instrumental articulation. 
It was not only the land reform that introduced the doctrine of tenure that caused 
distrust and a sense of loss of entitlements, but also the introduction of state 
machineries in the 1920s which saw the introduction of a 'headman' system. This new 
administrative system then displaced older leaders because the selection process for 
representatives was carried out at the behest of the state. For example, there was the 
use of church members or old plantation workers. Through this headman system of 
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policies were heavily enforced and kin group consent was obtained under pressure. 
The goals of the state to develop commercial activities were then seen as more 
significant for the goals of kin groups whose expectations were to obtain 
'entitlements'. other words, maximising the means to access those 
European material goods which were seen as useful. But as knowledge about the 
exchange increased especially when other sympathetic Europeans were saying they 
were getting less than they should, it became the basis for discontent and strife for 
redress. 
The Second World War put an end to the plantation economy, as planters and 
government officials fled to their home countries. The Japanese invasion destroyed 
much of the infrastructure and, following the war, attempts to rebuild the plantation 
economy became extremely difficult. The collapse of the plantation economy was 
thought by many Solomon Islanders to be a 'good' thing because these plantations 
were risky areas for workers. While such collapse meant reduced access to labour to 
obtain European goods, it was not missed for other reasons. The previous experiences 
with the state and commerce by kin group members in relations to land, labour 
conditions, and the war, made post-war natural resource development more sluggish. 
This sluggish attitude was reflected in the way that kin groups started responding and 
asking questions of the state representatives on proposed natural resource 
development. For example, there was the case of Gold Ridge landowners who refused 
to accept exploration because they thought it was a time for self-reflection after the 
war in 1945. The kin groups' attitude of general suspicion persisted during the process 
132 
forest estate development 
war, 
among colonies. 
1 
1 
state 
to state. state's response to this situation was 
the 
resource management the managing 
forest for exploitation a sustainable manner. of these forest areas 
were under kin groups and the process was to access these areas and defined as forest 
'Estate'. The processing of V angunu as the first forest estate showed that 
people were quite uncertain about this new idea. The dissatisfaction of V angunu 
landowners was expressed in letters to the government complaining about the 
arrangement for acquiring the land area. 
Despite the general scepticism expressed by groups about existing government 
policy, the state was able to persist in establishing a forest estate policy. Through the 
use of the District Commissioner, District Officer, District Headman and Village 
Headman, the state continued to acquire land for the forest estate and it was 
persistently pursued and established anyway. The need for land review that arose in 
the 1950s was motivated by the need to identify what form of tenure would be most 
appropriate for forest estate development. The acquisition of V angunu in 1962 was an 
example of the process applied in forest estate development. The idea of establishing 
these forest estates was to meet the goals of revenue for the state and stimulate 
economic development. But for the landowners, these forest areas were not just 
commercially potential resources, they were also medicine, a food source, building 
materials, sacred sites and specific territories with specific groups of people. Thus the 
national goal of economic development was brought directly in confrontation with kin 
goals which, though undefined, exist with multiple purposes that such areas hold for 
the survival of the people. Thus, the kin groups were faced with the same dilemma 
when faced with the state proposals. That was the need to balance the desire to obtain 
material goods valued in society and that of retaining their environment for survival. 
The chance to acquire European goods was limited and, apart from selling personal 
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4.8 Conclusion 
The process of establishing the state the a new doctrine of tenure 
has influenced general thinking that the state was self-serving. It was because of the 
policy on natural resource use that groups continued to see issues of land and 
resources as threatening. This was also the basis for the emerging thinking just before 
independence that perhaps if the colonial state was removed, then acquisition of 
European goods may be easier and fairer because of the assumption that a locally-
based state would understand that natural resources belong to the kin groups and not 
the state. The state would of course be given shares, but not the other way round. This 
would apply for all natural resources. 
The few Solomon Islanders who were exposed to the colonial administration prior to 
political independence were even convinced that if they had achieved non-colonial 
status, the new state would automatically return all the land lost by kin groups, as well 
as allowing greater political engagement. The development of fishery projects, in the 
years running up to independence, was influenced by such thinking, at least on the 
part of Solomon Islanders. That was the idea of joint venture projects, which assumed 
that the independent state would ensure that in natural resource development there 
would be 'partnership'. The partnership in any commercial development was justified 
by the perception that, on one hand, the state which represented the people who had 
the resources, and the company that had the capital and technology, on the other hand, 
were mutually independent. This approach was also evident in the simultaneous 
development of another joint venture project in Guadalcanal under the joint venture 
company SIPL. 
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From the of view landowners, no stakeholder is more 
than groups who have the resource in the first place. Both the company and the 
state were necessary guests but their share in the resource should not be more than the 
owner's rights. This is obviously a point of contention since the state and company 
saw entitlements of kin groups as no more a beneficiary to be paid 'doing 
nothing'. The landowners saw the state and company as parasites: without resources 
they were nothing. In other words, the relationship over natural resource use was seen 
as not reciprocal. At least this was so from the perspective of kin groups. 
For landowners, the new situation was one of dilemma. How far should land owners 
push for their 'entitlements'. What magnitude of entitlements is fair, and at what point 
would it be impossible to interest companies in maintaining commitment to a 
proposed project? While the state sustained its goals for economic growth and 
employment opportunity, and the company persisted with its goals of maximising 
profit, the kin groups' goals remained undefined and multi-faceted. The kin groups' 
undefined entitlements remain a significant issue in Solomon Islands. This is because, 
in the past, kin groups were seen largely as an 'economic inconvenience'. This is 
because they live in the vicinity of natural resource development interests and may 
destabilise proposed projects. The idea of compensation for social dislocation was 
therefore not framed in terms of landowners' ownership of resources but rather as 
payment for their disturbance. Thus kin groups persistently think their ownership 
rights have been circumvented, as their entitlement as resource owners was not 
considered. This is an important point of contention in forest as well as mineral 
resources because the state retains the rights of ownership. 
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The kin groups could not see how the state could own the natural resources without 
their consent. Since the state has in the past not obtained their consent in the 
environment of free expression, how could the post-independent state persist with this 
policy position towards kin groups? The landowners see the state as an organisation 
that should be created by the people, including kin groups, and not left to create them 
in the image of its own purpose. Sharing kin group resources with the state makes 
sense to kin groups. However, from the point of view of kin groups, the state should 
have only be allowed to share resource benefit given to it by kin groups who own the 
resource in the first place. While the kin groups' situation has improved in terms of 
political voice, and to a large extent they are involved in natural resource 
developments that affect them, the issue of state control remains. 
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resource exploration and development was a history of forms of 
relationships kin groups. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that the relationship 
over gold was predominantly of an instrumental This be demonstrated 
through historical nature of gold as a commodity, and the practices that were 
associated with its exploration and exploitation in interactions with kin groups. 
Kin groups in Solomon Islands had limited knowledge about the value and the use 
gold. Exposure to the activities of gold-seekers by kin groups made them realise that 
Europeans were after gold, which was a highly-valued commodity. Kin groups had 
little idea that gold had a long-established legacy. It was no accident that the Spanish 
explorer Men dana named the islands 'Solomon Islands'. Men dana thought the islands 
were where the biblical King had obtained his famed wealth. The kin groups did not 
know that the explorers were on voyages to discover new wealth for their home state. 
This period of sixteenth century gold and silver discovery in the Americas, and later 
in Australia during the nineteenth century was a significant development. This pattern 
of mineral resources exploitation found its way into Melanesia in the modern time. 
Gold was the driving force behind the state and commerce at the time, and over the 
subsequent years. In other words, gold exploitation, as being experienced in 
Melanesia including Solomon Islands, was simply a tail end of a long historical 
process that has affected many societies, including this region of the world. In this 
sense, gold seeking was an externally driven force. 
Gold as a resource was an integral part of the colonial nation state and capitalist 
development. The mutually re-enforcing nature of state and capitalist activities meant 
137 
state 
resources. 
declared 
owned 
resources, u--·~'-'"'"' to be 
that 
the doctrine 
for world 
of 
state now 
the land 
Solomon Islands is discussed later this (see section 5.4.2). It is sufficient to 
mention here policy state ownership minerals remains a 
fundamental issue resource use Solomon Islands. 
This policy was totally unacceptable to kin groups. The landowners did not see their 
land as having no depth and content Land was seen as inclusive of that can be 
found above, on and below such territorial area. Thus, for kin groups, it follows that 
because land is theirs, everything associated with it also belongs to their community. 
This was a major point of contention that characterised the relationship between kin 
groups and the state, or between groups and gold-seekers. There was a divide 
between landowners who saw mineral resources as a group resource, and the state 
which insisted on its right to control and own the mineral for the nation as a whole. 
Thus, the kin groups and the state were on a collision course over the development of 
natural resources, especially minerals. 
The next section will describe the historical phases of mineral explorations m 
Solomon Islands and reflect on the practice of relationships with kin groups. 
5.2 Early exploration phase 
The historical context of mineral resource development relations in Solomon Islands 
can be categorised into three major phases of mineral resource activities. These three 
phases are the Early Exploration Phase, the Post war Exploration Phase and Post-
Independence Mineral Exploration Phase. The early phase of mineral resource 
exploration in Solomon Islands covered the period between the Spanish arrival in 
1568 and the outbreak of the Second World War in 1942. Exploration for mineral 
resources did not quite encompass the entire period, but was nonetheless significant as 
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descriptions are given of phases of mineral resource explorations leading 
to the development ofthe Gold Ridge Mining Project between 1995 and 1997. 
5.2.1 Mendana to woodford 
The first time that gold as a mineral resource was associated Solomon Islands is 
attributed to the Spanish explorer Mendana in 1568 (Jack-Hinton 1962). The Spanish 
explorer had thought that islands might have been the legendary Isles from which 
the biblical King Solomon obtained his gold wealth for the building of the temple of 
Jerusalem. As to how Mendana came to such conclusion is not clear. The dominant 
idea about why Mendana could have thought so was that in their landing at Metapono 
river mouth Mendana and his crew had found traces of alluvial gold. Metapono River 
is the main river stream at which Chovio stream and the Chariunga stream converged. 
The present Gold Ridge Mine area is located between these two streams. It was 
thought that this alluvial discovery led to the naming of the Islands as "Solomon 
Islands". An alternative view about this was that Mendana could not have named the 
Islands because only a few traces of alluvial gold were found. While such alluvial 
gold may have been necessary, it was Mendana's encounters with the Islanders 
wearing ornaments that closely resembled gold that might have given him the illusion 
of the presence of a massive wealth of gold. According to Daniel de Coppet, 
Mendana's encounters with the natives of the southern tip of Guadalcanal and 
southern region of Malaita was what gave him the impression that the islands may 
have contained a wealth of gold (de Coppet 1977). The warihau was an ornament 
worn by chiefs of Are' Are dialect in Marau sound area (de Coppet 1977). The 
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European explorers. This was particularly the case with the publication of Mendana's 
Voyages in 1771 (Solomon Islands National Library 1970). 
Many more European explorers came to Pacific following Mendana. The 
settlement of Australia was particularly relevant because it became the base for 
early traders, and subsequently miners. settlement Australia and New Zealand 
by Europeans was important factor because it was the same forms of policy 
introduced there found their way into the Pacific Islands nations. That is because of 
miners' interests expanding rapidly in the early nineteenth century (Bartlett 1967: 30; 
Bateson 1974: 31). Gold prospecting and development in Australia became the focal 
point at which mineral resource development expanded into the Pacific Islands. Most 
important was the policy on mineral resources. The major policy declarations were 
first introduced towards the end of 1851, by the Governor of Victoria, La Trobe. He 
declared that the gold belonged to the crown. This policy proclamation was that, 
Whereas .. . certain persons have commenced or are about to commence 
searching for gold ... the property of the Crown ... Without 
authority ... prosecution will be launched against those who do so without 
procuring the necessary License (Bartlett 1967: 44). 
During the settlement of colonies in the region, many Pacific Island countries became 
colonies of the major European powers, including the Solomon Islands. This meant 
the establishment of the colonial state that formed the basis for the subsequent 
relationships established with kin groups. 
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The 1896 Austrian expedition was result explorers passing information about 
potential gold deposit areas they had visited and explored (Grover 1955; Guppy 1887; 
Hackman 1980). In the context of the neighbouring Papua New Guinea, such early 
exploration was carried out during 1878 (see Chapter 3). 
The Austrian expedition was led by Heinrich foullon Von Norbeeck, an expert 
geologist. He arrived with his party at the north coast of Guadalcanal on Tetere Beach 
on the vessel Albatross. The expedition was to climb Mount Tatuve, a mountain held 
sacred by the Manukiki and Manugaravu tribes of central Guadalcanal. A party of 
eighteen Europeans and four coastal natives walked to the mountain up to its foothill, 
some 3,250 feet at a place called Vulolo (Grover 1955:11). The day before the ascent 
of the 5,327 foot mountain, the party was warned by the natives that their climbing of 
the sacred mountain would result in the death of all the natives for its defilement. In 
the morning, the party ignored this warning because the chief geologist decided they 
must climb the mountain anyway. The party was attacked, injuring members of the 
party and resulting in the death of Heinrich F oullon Von N orbeeck that night (Grover 
1955:11). 
This incident was the first conflicts associated with mineral resources in Solomon 
Islands. The natives of central Guadalcanal were of course unaware of the interest in 
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This incident led to a of interest exploration the Solomon 
Islands. At least for the next 24 years, there were no exploration attempts. But 
paradoxically, it was the knowledge about the Austrian expedition that led to other 
attempts of exploration Guadalcanal. In one case, a family in Germany found 
mineral specimens belonging to a deceased relative who was the Austrian 
expedition (Grover 1955: 11). The specimen was found to have a high content of gold 
and copper and it was thought presence of alluvial gold in the nearby streams 
was most likely. An application was made for prospecting, but was refused by the 
colony's administration. 
In another case, Australian miners were found prospecting illegally in the colony. The 
miners, including Dr. Henderson and three other Australians, were found by the 
colony's District Officer at Wanderer Bay, on the Weather Coast of Guadalcanal. He 
explained that he was following a lead from the previous Austrian expedition. Dr. 
Henderson sold his exploration equipment for fuel money to return on his boat (the 
Ketch Bongo). Subsequently unable to obtain finance for his exploration activities he 
committed suicide (Grover 1955:11). 
What some of the attempts at mineral exploration described above show was that 
gold-seekers were acting within the context of colonial expansion, namely, the search 
for alluvial gold discovery in the newly established colonies. There is also the element 
of a shift in attitude towards the locations of gold prospecting by gold-seekers and the 
administration. This attitude was now that gold prospecting was largely a state issue 
and thus kin groups were secondary in the matter. This attitude suggests the shift in 
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reported to have also found traces of gold. There was similar reporting about gold 
nuggets found Massey River the Georgia Island 1929, which was later 
found to be untrue. 
However, as PNG serious mineral prospect was found at 
Edie Creek, in Solomon Islands mineral was found on the Metapono River tributaries. 
In 1931, Kaj ewski, a botanist from Queensland, found traces of gold in the Balas una 
River, including its two tributaries, namely the Sutakama and Sutakiki Rivers (Grover 
1955: 12). Kajewski was credited for finding gold, leading to the Gold Ridge deposit 
investigation, because of gold found in the two tributaries of the Metapono River, 
namely the Sorvohio and Tsarivonga Rivers. These two tributaries are located at the 
head of Metapono River, where alluvial gold was found. This was the same river 
where Mendana and his men found alluvial gold in 1568. It was Kajewski's gold find 
that led to the formation of the Balasuna Syndicate. The Balasuna Syndicate 
continued prospecting on both river systems in 1934. A company called Guadalcanal 
Limited, registered in Fiji, floated 30,000 pounds, but their mining engineer, after 
visiting the Gold Ridge area, decided against its development 
There were other numerous prospecting schemes, such as Guadalcanal planters, 
namely the Clift brothers and Anton Olsen, who found alluvial gold in the Tenaru 
River, west of Gold Ridge in 1933. Later Olsen and his wife found deposits in the 
Betilonga Basin, and B. Dufaur did the same in Kombito River in 1934. However, 
these gold findings were not sufficient to encourage any full venture into mining 
(Grover 1955). 
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Development Ltd to be formed 1937 to finance the Balasuna Syndicate tenements 
of Gold Ridge area. Thus the colony's administration declared the area a mining area, 
and the first mining lease the country was granted 1937. The Company could not 
raise the capital and the lease was terminated September of the same In the 
meantime, gold smuggling to Australia was reported to be prevalent. 
In 1939, more mineral exploration samples were sent to Australia by the Balasuna 
Syndicate. The assay was found to be favourable. The government was happy about 
the result and requested for a mining engineer to report on the field. This was done by 
Mr. Fry, a mining inspector. He arrived in the Solomons from Papua New Guinea. 
However, he reported the Gold Ridge field to be still at an infant stage. He also 
confirmed gold smuggling to be taking place (Grover 1955:12). 
From 1939 to 1942 there were similar prospecting interests, which rose and fell as 
quickly as they started. For instance, this was the case of L. J. Davis and his son 
James who arrived in 1939. Their findings, including gold nuggets, led to renewed 
interest and by 1940 the area was declared a mining area. With new principal interests 
from Australia, the leases were worked through dam-making, fluming, and hydraulic 
sluicing at Tabalusu prospecting. Financial constraint was once again responsible for 
closure and cancellation of leases (Grover 1955:12). 
Balasuna Syndicate further brought what they considered to be a skilled miner from 
New Guinea 1941, namely R.C. Symes. More hydraulic sluicing was carried out, but 
the Second World War forced the closure of the prospecting and mining work. 
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insisted, and Theodore, the owner of Emperor Gold Mines Limited of 
declined and withdrew his company. This treatment companies was perhaps a 
contributing factor to the slow progress prospecting in Solomon Islands in later 
years. 
What is reflective of the above period was the absence of groups in decisions 
made about mineral exploration in the colony. Like the Austrian expedition, which 
was on a mission to find gold at almost any cost, subsequent gold-seekers were 
venturing out in some cases at their own will. The colony's administration, however, 
remained the authority to issue prospecting and mining licences. The first mining 
license to be issued in the colony was in 1937. The way the state approached the 
granting of a license was usually by declaring an area to be containing mining 
potential an area of 'national interest'. Kin groups were soon to realise that any of 
their land territory could be declared an area of 'national interest' and thus 
marginalise their rights in making claims over the minerals found. This form of state 
behaviour characterised an instrumental form of articulation which resembled similar 
relationships over other natural resources as discussed in the previous chapter. In any 
case kin groups developed grievances because of their perception that they were 
getting little from their resources that culminated in the consciousness towards 
resistance movements in the post war period. 
5.3 Post war exploration phase 
The Second World War acted like an enlightenment period for kin groups in their 
interpretation of foreign powers and the way they conduct relationships with kin 
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became a common concern. The issues of concern to groups were fundamentally 
about the relationship over resource use. There was the issue of land tenure 
which represents the identity of groups. Guadalcanal Island, where much of the 
colony's mineral explorations had taken place, became a centre for another 
movement. This was the Moro movement. 
5.3.1 Moro movement 
Like the Maasina Ruru movement in Malaita immediately after the war, Guadalcanal 
leaders were also concerned about their land territory. The loss of land and persistence 
in mineral exploration brought a realisation for resistance. This perception was an 
important factor in the formation of the Moro movement in Guadalcanal. The Moro 
movement was named after the leader of the movement, ChiefMoro himself In 1957, 
Moro from Southeast Guadalcanal had a near death experience, in which he had a 
vision (Davenport and <;;:oker 1967, Hogbin 1939). In the vision, he encountered the 
creator of the island whom he called Tsobotua. The creator explained that the island 
belonged to him and his people. He also explained that the original name of the Island 
is Isatabu instead of Guadalcanal. Research done on the movement suggested that the 
content of the near death experience purported to establish: 
• leadership autonomy over Isatabu by the creator Ironggali in the personhood 
of Tuimauri (the first paramount chief and cultural hero in his own right) 
• the role of local leaders (chiefs) as the centre for economic activities, and 
defender of the area territories and customary law 
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• proclamation of political legitimacy of Moro himself as successor of 
Tuimauri, and 
• the repudiation of Waste and Public Lands concepts (Davenport, et 
al.l967:145). 
The Moro consciousness which developed before political independence from Britain 
reflects the demand for recognition of Isatabu Island, the role of its traditional 
leadership system including its customary laws, and outright rejection of legal 
acquisition of customary land (Davenport, et a1.1967: 145). The important point about 
such a movement was that it was rooted in the culture, people and indigenous notions 
of rights. The demand for political autonomy and the repudiation of 'Waste and 
Public Lands' concepts were direct forms of resistance to state control and the 
doctrine of tenure introduced into the territory. These cases were clearly of perceived 
inequality in terms of the relationship between indigenous communities and others 
over natural resource use. 
The Maasina Rum ideology which had spread after the war also demanded 
improvement in labour conditions. This stand by kin groups meant that there was a 
labour shortage, which affected prospecting work as prospectors were dependent on 
native labourers for digging and carrying their equipment. But the effect of such a 
movement on the mineral exploration in Guadalcanal was sustained only temporarily. 
The colony's emphasis on mineral exploration was further continued. This was 
demonstrated by the geological survey done by the British Solomon Islands 
Protectorate (BSIP) government in 1950. The colonial administration in 1950 carried 
out a geological survey under the leadership of J.C. Grover. It was through this work 
under Grover that potential areas were indicated, including the classification of the 
Gold Ridge area as a silver-rich epithermal deposit (Grover 1955, Reveleigh 1990). 
The government's sustained exploration for minerals soon took hold again after the 
war. Many kin groups in the area became participants, first as labourers who were 
carrying equipment for the gold-seekers, and soon as knowledge about alluvial gold 
was picked up the kin group members were becoming gold-miners too. The 
knowledge about alluvial gold became part of the local community as a result of the 
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The relevance of the Moro movement was its concern for land and traditional 
leadership of their island. The persistence state policy to push on with exploration 
for minerals also showed the reluctance on the of the State to reconsider its policy 
of mineral exploration and development which directly affected kin groups. What 
seems clear during this period was an emerging resistance by the groups to the 
relationship they had over resource use and its control by the state. The state's 
continuation with mineral exploration, despite such local social movements, suggests 
that there was a clear position for the state to remain controlling the right of resource 
use. But equally important was the transformation of kin group perceptions about 
gold, the emergence of a sense of ownership, and the right to value natural resources. 
Knowledge was an important factor in relationships over resources, as shown in the 
change of kin group attitudes towards minerals. As greater knowledge about the 
mineral was acquired, there was greater insistence on the right to own or share the 
resource. Thus, it was the perception that gold-seekers were taking much of the 
wealth of gold from kin groups, who considered themselves as the landowners, that 
was to become the key basis for contention in subsequent years. The state and 
expatriate gold-seekers were seen as using the policy of state ownership as the basis 
for excluding legitimate rights of kin groups in mineral resources. 
5.3.2 Gold Ridge exploration: 1971-1975 
As talks about independence became more open, local landowners were again on the 
move to protect what they considered to be their social right This right was derived 
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the government persisted, and thus Gold Ridge prospect was out to tender. 
CRA Exploration Pty Ltd won the tender and was granted the Special Prospecting 
Licence Cl15 1974. 
Apart from information gathered from the long historical exploration associated with 
the Gold Ridge deposit, it was not until 1971 that R.D. Walshaw's study of Gold 
Ridge concluded that the potential existed for a large open-pit operation (Reveleigh 
1990:5). The exploration work between 1971-75 also provided significant data on the 
Gold Ridge area. During 1971-72, Walshaw, of the Institute of Geological Sciences, 
London, analysed more than 1000 samples from the area for gold, in which he 
identified distinct arsenic anomalies over the Gold Ridge area and two other near-by 
locations (Reveleigh 1990:5). These were the Valehaichichi and Namachamata areas. 
The work on these two locations showed that the mineralisation anomalies had 
extended further into two other areas, namely Dawsons and Kupers. These four 
locations lie in a north-south direction for 2km with Dawsons in the north and 
Namachamata to the south. Drilling to the bedrock also confirmed large quantities of 
gold. Walshaw's study suggested that the gold deposit may have originated from 
mudflows associated with that of a volcanic vent/s, that gold deposit resulted from 
hydrothermal alteration (Walshaw 1974). 
CRA Exploration Pty. Ltd did further samples of previous study areas such as the 
Walshaw's pits. The company analysed 96 samples of Walshaw's and found higher 
gold content (Walshaw 1974). The company also took 620 samples from auger to 
bedrock and confirmed Walshaw's anomalies. Further diamond drilling was done, 
totalling 496m on top of the Gold Ridge area including a detailed map of the 
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exploration Solomon Islands. kin groups were, however, 
for the post-independence was the case to 
regaining roles of the leaders a change in the introduced doctrine 
tenure was responsible for the loss of customary land. These hopes were high, 
because of the loss of control and a sense of asymmetrical relations in natural 
resources use in the history of Solomon Islands. 
During the decade following independence, there was renewed interest mineral 
resources in the Gold Ridge area. Before then, though there was much exploration, 
there was no clear indication about any commercial basis for mineral development in 
the area. 
5.4 Post-independence mineral exploration phase 
Despite local expectations for greater changes after independence in land policy and 
those affecting resources, this did not take place in the case of mineral resources. The 
mineral policy in the Solomon Islands remained as it had been inherited in 1978. 
Historically, the mineral resources policy upheld the notion of state ownership of 
mineral resources. While such policy on land, known then as the land laws, had 
changed, the same did not happen with mineral resource policy. Instead, the state 
remained the legal owner of mineral resources and this therefore remained an existing 
issue of tension in the Solomon Islands' resource policy. 
From the point of view of the state, mineral resources belong to the state. This means 
despite land ownership as recognised by the state as customary, this landownership 
that excludes mineral resources. The state's attitude that minerals belong to the state 
meant that tenders for any prospects and issuance of tenements were largely its 
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In early 1980s, the declining trend in changed. There was more 
interest mineral resource exploration the Solomon Islands. of the reason for 
this change was trends the world market. The increasing world prices of gold and 
the discovery of a world class mining project Papua New Guinea led to more 
interest in gold prospecting along 'Rim of Fire' (Connell 1988) of which the 
Solomon Island is a geographical part. But it took another ten years before potential 
mining companies expressed mining development intentions. 
About ten years later, the rise in the price of gold prompted the government to tender 
the prospect again and this time Licence 130 was issued in 1983 to Amoco Minerals. 
Amoco Minerals changed to Cyprus Minerals Solomon Ltd in July 1985 (SIG 1990: 
14). In 1986, Cyprus Minerals entered a joint venture with Arimco NL In 1989, 
Arirnco acquired the remaining shares of Cyprus. This form of handover of the Gold 
Ridge tenement created much local suspicion in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
It was not until May 1990 that Arimco lodged a Special Mining Lease application. 
This required the company to submit an Environmental Impact Assessment and a 
feasibility study report. The study was submitted to the Solomon Islands Government 
and Rio Tin to Zinc (R TZ) was contracted by the Commonwealth Secretariat to carry 
out the appraisal (SIG 1990). The RTZ appraisal report concluded that the Gold Ridge 
project was marginally viable. In 1992, Green Equity investors bought Arimco. Due 
to the lack of co-investors to share the risk in investing in the project, Green Equity 
withdrew altogether. 
In 1994, the Government again tendered the Special Prospecting Licence (SPL) 185. 
Saracen Minerals Ltd won this tender. Saracen Minerals then sold the SPL to Ross 
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1997. This speculation went as 
far as the Parliament of Australia, when Senator Sanders asked the Labor foreign 
Minister Mr. Gareth Evans whether he of the 'illegal gold smuggling trade to 
Australia from Solomon Islands' (Australian 1987: 22). Such incidents meant 
landowners' trust of the state and its capacity to represent landowners and their 
community's interests declined considerably. There was greater suspicion of foreign 
companies operating in the Solomon Islands. suspicion of foreign companies had 
been around for some time and it was one of the reasons for the political pressure to 
change the mineral policy the 1990s. 
5.4.2 Mines and minerals Act 1990 
Solomon Islands' political composition makes the demand for change of policy 
desirable but perhaps not necessarily achievable. There were intentions for policy 
change which were seen as desirable by some politicians because most of them were 
indigenous landowners themselves. This meant that the policy of state ownership of 
mineral resources was constantly at odds with the state position for universal 
development and the indigenous positions on mineral resources, which were 
concerned with direct benefits to those directly affected and paid the environmental 
and social price for project development. 
One attempt to deal with this issue of mineral rights policy was the parliamentary 
discussion of the 1990 Mines and Minerals Bill (Allan 1990). During the 1990 
parliament sitting, the issue of mineral rights went before the parliament. This was in 
expectation of the future development of the Gold Ridge project. The issue was 
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large capital 
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the state to own 
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large scale investment Solomon Islands. This remained an issue for groups 
because it was the same state that had also recognised kin groups an customary land 
owners. The state's acknowledgment of the customary land ownership was a partial 
recognition of customary ownership of minerals in so far as kin groups were 
concerned. Also, the state did not have to own the mineral resource rights for it to be 
utilised because, like land, it can be processed for its use through negotiations and 
agreements. The current utilisation of forestry resources was also a case of resources 
being harvested while customary land was not registered for its purpose. Secondly, 
the argument that the state can fairly distribute the resource as its main reason for 
retaining mineral resource rights would be difficult to verify where few social services 
were provided to the people in rural areas. At best, the state retaining mineral rights 
gives a sense of security to foreign investors. At worst, where land kin groups 
become more aware of what they perceived as dispossession of their rights would 
mean such projects would never be secure. Clearly, in this context the state may act as 
a coordinator and regulator, but not necessarily as resource owner. 
The Hansard accounts of the 1990 Mines and Mineral Bill give some indications of 
the problems facing the issue of mineral policy development. Hon. Allan Paul, 
Minister of Natural Resources, in his second reading of the 1990 Bill, pointed out a 
number of important issues about mineral policy in the Solomon Islands. The first 
point was that general knowledge about mineral resources is lacking. He 
demonstrated this by explaining how in Vella Lavella, at Paraso River, there was 
much confusion among the community. In one particular instance, people were 
collecting pyrites instead of gold, which led to the conclusion that there was extreme 
lack of knowledge (Allan 1990). 
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confusion. According to them, the minerals should private property and 
each landowner or group of landowners directly own the minerals that 
happen to lie under this particular or their particular piece of land. I cannot 
stress strongly enough the dangers and the problems that such course could 
bring. It could lead to gross inequality in distribution of wealth within the 
Solomon Islands .... only through ... centralised administration can be assured an 
equitable spread of benefits, adequate control of exploitation, containment of 
environmental damage and proper recording of mineral and resource 
assessment (Allan 1990). 
The above statement by the Minister epitomises the logic of the current Mines and 
Minerals Act 1990 (NPSI 1990). The major difference with the 1990 Mines and 
Mineral Act in relation to preceding acts is the distinction made between ownership of 
surface minerals by the people and Government of the Solomon Islands and the 
ownership of surface rights by the landowners, and in addition, the mandating of 
negotiating rights for surface access fees, compensation for damages and the option 
for landowners to receive royalty payments. 
It would be understandable to think that for practical reasons state ownership of 
resources allows for appropriate technical and financial management and 
administration of natural resources development. However, the placing of mineral 
rights under the control of the state, or what the Minister called 'centralised 
administration', was equally not a guarantee for equal distribution of benefits, 
containment of environmental damages, or adequate control of mineral resource 
exploitation. The incapacity of the state to develop the sector in the first place makes 
it no better equipped after rights were given to foreign prospectors. The process of 
negotiating access may be divisive as companies may use a divide and rule technique. 
This kind of technique is not unusual, as shown by a petition claim sent to the 
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Clearly the not resonate 
to consensus to 
achieve 
of state prov1s10n even to areas resources have been 
exploited to financing state show the minister's 
argument. One thing this parliamentary meeting showed was lack of institutional 
development on the part of the state to deal issues of land and rights as 
understood by kinship based communities in the country. The Minister's argument 
reflects the state's attitude to its people when it comes to defining important issues 
such as land and mineral rights. To make things even more complicated, the 1990 Act 
stipulates that ' ... mineral resources belong to the state and people of Solomon Islands' 
(NPSI 1990). This ambiguous statement reflected the state's uncertainty in dealing 
with natural resources development policy. It has become so ambiguous that people 
often ask whether the wording 'people of the Solomon Islands' referred to customary 
landowners. The state easily uses this to mean both people of Solomon Islands 
generally as well as customary landowners. 
The state, however, conceived that despite the ambiguous statement about mineral 
rights, the 1990 Act was seen as an improvement on the 1968 Act. The 1990 Mines 
and Minerals Act made provisions for appropriate compensation for land access and 
displacement (NPSI 1990). 
It remains to be seen whether the state can effectively manage environmental control 
and social impact, especially when the state and the mining company are also 
interested parties in mining development. Hence, the issue of mineral resource policy 
remains contested in Solomon Islands. However, unless satisfactory ways of 
reconciling kin groups' believe that landownership and mineral ownership are one 
and the same, it will remain a central issue for landowners' claims of ownership right 
in mineral resources development in Solomon Islands. 
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In this sense, articulation has no boundary and the hope of kin 
groups further eroded trust in the state. 
5.5 Gold Ridge development: 1994-1998 
The development of the Gold Ridge project was done within the existing mineral 
resources policy. The development of the Gold Ridge project between 1994-98 was 
based on the Mines and Minerals Act 1990 (NPSI 1990). However, one practical 
change was the issue suggested by the 1990 Principal Act for royalty payments to 
kinship based communities. It was found at the time that there was no legal 
framework for administering the payment of royalties. The government in 1996 
amended the Mines and Minerals Act 1990 to allow for the establishment of a 
government account beside the public finance account. This required the amendment 
of section 101 of the Constitution which enabled an account to be established beside 
the Treasury account for the payment of royalties to landowners. The Mines and 
Minerals (Amendment) Act 1996 made this provision (NPSI 1996). 
The Mines and Minerals Act 1990 and the Mines and Minerals (Amendment) Act 
1996 were the major policy basis for the process of development of the Gold Ridge 
project and the negotiation that followed. The Gold Ridge Mining Project 
development took place between the period of 1994-98. It took four years to go from 
the stage of declaring the project as potentially profitable to its commercial operation 
in June 1998. Like any other mining development projects, the Gold Ridge project 
underwent three major phases of development. Godoy divided these phases of mining 
development activities into exploration, development and production (Godoy 1985). 
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A rise in world market prices for gold occurred during 1992. In the meantime, there 
was a large number of special prospecting licenses issued between 1982-87, yet there 
prospecting licenses being renewed, issued or processed (SIG 1987). This increase in 
prospects declined significantly until 1994, when renewed exploration began to 
increase. The government reported 39 prospecting licenses in 1997 (SIG 1997). 
Although this seems fewer than the prospecting interests ten years earlier, it must be 
borne in mind that for a while there were very few mineral-prospecting activities, 
until 1994. The result of Gold Ridge project being declared marginally viable gave 
incentives for increased prospecting. For the state, the increased interest in 
prospecting from 1994 was welcomed, and the Gold Ridge project was supported to 
encourage international interests in prospecting in the country in general. 
For the mining companies, prospecting has become a gamble, in particular where 
tenement access requires securing the support of the customary landowners. This is a 
tricky case because while the state holds the mineral rights, the Mining regulation 
requires that any issue of prospecting license requires the permission of the 
landowners (NPSI 1994). In the case of the Gold Ridge project, when Ross Mining 
NL acquired the Gold Ridge tenement in 1994, it was by then ready to carry out 
actual mining as the prospect had already been indicated as viable. This meant Ross 
Mining NL had to apply for a mining license, which required the development of a 
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company. Under these conditions, Ross Mining NL proceeded with the application for 
the development of the Gold Ridge Mining Project. Any development required the 
issuance of a mining lease, which, 
auxiliary approvals. 
5.5.2 Construction and development 
required a feasibility study and other 
The feasibility study is considered the first step in the development phase of the Gold 
Ridge project. From the technical perspective, this is the most important task to be 
carried out by the mining company. For the state, a feasibility study is a statutory 
requirement for securing a mining lease. Thus, in April 1995, a feasibility study was 
begun by Ross Mining NL A full feasibility study in this sense requires sufficient 
diamond drilling, metallurgical test work, resource calculations and geo-statistical 
studies. It also involves extensive site engineering investigation and environmental 
studies. The Gold Ridge feasibility study commenced in April 1995 and data 
collection was completed in January 1996. The first submission of the feasibility 
study was made on 11 October 1996. 
It was in the consideration of the RTZ review of the Gold Ridge feasibility study 
submitted by Ross Mining that the Solomon Islands government was prepared to issue 
the mining lease. The Culshaw Feasibility Review Report of the Gold Ridge project 
wrote: 
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to Ross Mining the approval study. government relied on the 
technical report in decision to the to recommendations of 
implemented. However, government could not seek a second opinion about the 
validity report because of a financial resources. The 
groups too could not independently evaluate feasibility reports for the purpose 
protecting their own interests. In this respect, technical information was largely a 
foreign domain and the government too was ill-equipped for verifications of the 
accuracy and legitimacy the report. terms of the relationship between kin groups 
and the mining company in the areas of feasibility reports, the lack of skilled 
manpower on the part of kin groups made this area an exclusive domain of the 
company and those technical consulting companies who offer their consultancy 
services at high fees. This remains a risk area for kin groups and in some cases for the 
state where it is ill-prepared. On the 12 ofMarch 1997, the Special Mining Lease was 
granted. This was the second Special Mining Lease issued after the 193 7 Lease for the 
same project area. 
5.5.3 Mining lease and mine operation 
The issuance of the Special Mining Lease (SML) for mining operation was based on 
the viability of the gold deposits. The process for securing this Mining Lease for 
actual mining development was through a Mining Lease application. This process 
involved submission of a financing plan, specifications of any major ancillary 
authorisations needed for project development, and a feasibility study. 
In terms of the financing plan, the government agreed that its statutory approval was 
required if Gold Ridge mining company Ltd was to sell its assets to recover costs to 
lenders as approved under the Project's financing plan. Under the financing plan, 
rights oflenders or developers of the project to recover their costs were subjected, and 
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authorisation, and water reticulation There were rights for movements of 
highly flammable fuels to the mine sites. These and other authorisations were listed 
which made the government approval process much faster than usuaL Apart from the 
financing plan and the listing of types of ancillary authorisations, feasibility study 
was another major requirement for securing a Special Mining Lease. 
The feasibility study was expected to show physical aspects of the mining lease area, 
the nature of mineral deposits, including grade and quantity, technological reports of 
ore treatment, a mining plan, an environmental impact statement, and a de-
commissioning program for the mining project when it is completed. The feasibility 
study was conducted between July 1995 and September 1996. The study showed that 
the Gold Ridge Mining Prospect was distributed over three main shallow pits, 
namely: Valehaichichi, Kupers and Dawsons. These three major deposit areas 
constituted the bulk of the area for mining in the mining lease area. 
In terms of the nature of deposits, the study also revealed that the three areas of the 
deposits held at least one million ounces of gold. The average grade was 1.65g/t gold 
with a waste to ore ration averaging 0.8 during the life of the plant. It was reported 
that at the rate of 100,000 ounces of gold per year, the plant would process two 
million tons of ore. The project life was estimated to have a life often to fifteen years. 
In terms of mining, the method of mining would be open cut, while the extraction 
technology would be the standard carbon leaching process. This would involve, 
crushing, grinding, and leaching with the use of cyanide. The use of this extraction 
technology was believed to have an extraction recovery rate of 87.5% during the life 
of the mine. In terms of operational cost to produce an ounce of gold, it was estimated 
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The Gold Ridge Mining Project not start commercial operations until the middle 
of 1998. Ross Mining NL constructed the mine the last twelve months starting in 
early 1997. The construction work involved road-works, forest clearance, and 
construction of the processing plant and the power station. These works were 
contracted to both local and international contractors. During this period, local 
employment increased sharply, but most local labourers were employed for unskilled 
jobs. 
5.5.4 Operations 
By the end of June 1998, construction was complete and operations began. Thus, the 
Ross Mining Report, for the quarter ending 31st December 1998, showed that the 
project had produced 45,487 fine ounces of gold and 47,143 ounces of silver. This 
was the first quarter report of production and sales. 
The first report of the commercial production released by Ross Mining NL was seen 
as a positive outcome for the project. This was very exciting for the mining company 
as well as for the government as it was the first hard rock mining in the country. This 
was also a time of political change in Solomon Islands politics as a new government 
led by Ulufaalu took over from the Mamaloni government. The Ulufaalu government 
took office in July 1997. The effect of this change of government was two-fold. The 
first was that the change of government at a time of the completion of the Gold Ridge 
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was with a 
dilemma terms of showing appreciation to government. The issue was how 
much the company should be seen as recogmsmg Mamaloni government for 
implementing the project, when now a new government led by Ulufaalu was in 
power. Thus, this political situation had silenced the celebration. There were, in fact, 
no significant statements made by the new government or the landowners as to 
whether the report about the mine's first gold pour should be commented upon or not. 
This caused the company to become more cautious. 
From the point of view of the state, at least the project was generally seen as 
successful. It was a marginal project after all. It was also seen as successful as the 
environmental issues were considered sufficiently catered for, although this depends 
on the monitoring capability of the state. The government was aware, or at least the 
Department of Mines and Minerals was conscious, that a high standard of 
performance expected of the company could only be made possible by a high standard 
of monitoring by the state. But at the time, as the country's forestry resources and the 
Asian market were declining, the opening of the mining project was seen as most 
timely. But not everybody thought this way, as litigation commenced on the day of 
the signing ofthe mining lease on 12 ofMarch 1997. 
5.6 Gold Ridge litigation and benefit sharing 
5.6.1 Litigations 
There were two litigation actions taken against Ross Mining NL after the signing of 
the mining lease. The first litigation by some of the principal landowners was filed 
one day before the mining lease was signed on 12 March 1997. This litigation was 
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Gordon was well known in Solomon Islands its involvement in the 
environmental case against Broken for Ok Tedi 
people PNG May 1994. This was the A$ 4 billion against damages that 
BHP inflicted on the environment as a result of the mining project (Aditjondro 1996: 
191 ). The basis of the first litigation the Gold Ridge case was that the negotiated 
agreement between the mining company and kin groups was not constitutional. In 
other words, they claimed that the granting of the mining lease was illegal. This case 
was thrown out of court immediately because of a lack of legal grounds. 
The second litigation filed on the 22nd 1997 was Civil Case No. 169 of 1997. 
This was filed after two of the litigants withdrew their support for the first litigation. 
These were Isaiah Otto and Nelson Tave. As was reported by the media, the two 
litigants claimed they did not authorise their support for litigation in the first place 
(Howarth 1997: 16). The throwing out of the first litigation meant that the same 
plaintiffs couldn't resubmit the same case, so the second litigation focussed on 
environmental threats. Thus the 'paramount' chief of the Guadalcanal plain tribes 
became the plaintiff filing the case against the mining company. The case was made 
on behalf of the Ghaobata, Thogo, Lathi, Thimbo and Nekama tribes or kinship-based 
communities. This litigation was able to get support from conservation organisations, 
including the Australian Conservation Foundation Executive Director, Jim Downe 
(Earle 1997, Honeysett 1997). But this case too was not able to establish sufficient 
basis to make claims against Ross Mining's actions in meeting its environmental 
obligations, according to current statute. Thus, on Friday 19th December 1997, the 
High Court dismissed the case of Samuel Saki and John Maningelea of the 
Guadalcanal Plains. The High Court of Solomon Islands decided that the litigation 
proceeding was an abuse of process rather than a genuine grievance. 
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In all the complexity of the above litigation processes, a number of points have been 
indicated. For example, in the case of the first litigation attempt, two of the litigants, 
namely Isaiah Otto and Nelson Tave, were members of the Manugaravu moiety, 
under the Chacha descent group. The third litigant, David Thuguvota was not a 
member of any of the Gold Ridge kinship-based communities, although he was 
related at a higher kinship system level. The fourth litigant, Willy Roni, was a 
member of Rausere descent group of the Manukiki moiety. Thuguvota, a former 
member of Parliament, chief among his people, and a downstream community 
member, had distant kinship relationships with Gold Ridge landowners. He was 
influential in arousing discontent amongst members. His ability to convince the other 
three kinship-based community members to take litigation in the first place, especially 
on constitutional grounds, showed a gamble on his behalf as well as demonstrating 
that he should be configured in the benefit distribution from the project. Thuguvoda's 
approach was a gamble in arguing that the agreements and the issue of mining lease 
were unconstitutional. His line of thinking stems from the requirement of the Lands 
and Titles Act, section 74-75 and 77 (NPSI 1981). Under these sections, the procedure 
for land acquisition for public purposes implied compulsory acquisition of land. In the 
case of the Gold Ridge project, this procedure was avoided and the normal 
adjudication process was carried out instead. This was to avoid the perception and 
connotations of 'compulsory acquisition'. This procedural change was used in trying 
to support a litigation of unconstitutionality as a final attempt to find means to claim 
more compensation. It appeared in the Gold Ridge project case that the kin groups 
most engaged in disputes appeared to be those seeking relationships of benefit-sharing 
from the project. 
Benefit-sharing was a second choice for kin groups in a situation where their 
ownership of the resource had been futile. The idea of compensation arguments was 
construed in terms of damages and loss of property, which in their sense included land 
whether improved or not. Given the scale of the project in establishing infrastructure, 
kin groups saw the development as disproportionate even before the project started 
production. The mere scale of equipment used and buildings established was huge and 
never before seen in the area. This was in itself 'development', but all of which was 
under the control of the mining company. Thus benefit sharing was an essential issue 
to resolve. 
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The issue of benefit sharing in natural resource use has been a point of contention 
through most of its history. the 1960s, in the process of the establishment of forest 
estates the colony, this issue surfaced even with first acquisition of Vangunu as 
a forest estate where the government acquired land and leased for a fixed term of 99 
years. The government then used a rate of 6d per acre and an ex-gratia payment as 
10% of royalty the state received from the forestry exploitation company. Landowners 
in V angunu at this time were not all too happy about this arrangement, as reflected in 
a letter on behalf of landowners written by Kinio to the District Commissioner in July 
1964 (Kinio 1964 ). The letter was simply asking why the state was paying their land 
and resource at lower rates if they were there to help them under a protectorate. 
The discontent over benefits from the Vangunu Forest Purchase was not too 
unfounded. As the Secretary to the District Commissioner for Western District, Tony 
Hughes acknowledged in writing to the Commissioner of Lands, on 15 July 1964, that 
the people were not happy with the deaL Hughes argued that the Government should 
not delude itself, that the needs of the people must be reassessed (Hughes 1964: 1-2). 
In the same letter, it was pointed out that although people may not go back on their 
word to give up the land, their demands were silenced because they were told that the 
British Government had only sent two thousand pounds for V angunu and therefore 
there was no need to demand any money other than what was offered. 
It was under these early benefit arrangements that subsequent negotiations m 
Solomon Islands had their basis. Hughes' involvement in these early forestry 
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resources acquisition and development equipped him to come up with a 1976 Green 
Paper called 'sharing the benefits'. According to Larmour, this proposal by Hughes 
was the idea to apply two principles (Larmour 1989: 69). The first was the rate of 
investment return, which means it must be sufficient so that the investor was 
motivated to invest in the project. The second was that benefits to Solomon Islands 
community should be proportionate to the directness of effect of the investment on the 
lives of the people. In this sense the benefits to Solomon Islands communities should 
be in the following order in terms of direct effect: 
• landholding group most directly affected 
• then the immediate group of people living in the area, and 
• then the whole population (Hughes 1976, in Larmour 1989:70) 
In terms of the above formulae for sharing benefits among the Solomon Islands 
community, 'sharing the benefit' proposed that in per capita terms the benefit sharing 
ratio for a particular project was to be a 50:2:1 ratio. The landowners were to receive 
benefit through rent and the purchase of shares in the company. According to 
Larmour (1989: 70) the proposal for benefit sharing was not taken up officially, but it 
had been partially applied in development projects at the time. The cases of benefit 
arrangements proposed for the Rennell Bauxite project had proposed a 5% royalty to 
landowners and compensation for loss of land and crops. There was a disturbance 
allowance of A$ 400 per person (Lamour 1989: 59). The case of Guadalcanal Plains 
benefit sharing in the Oil Palm Plantation was also another case in hand with investor 
share at 71%, the state share at 25%, and landowners' at 4%. 
But clearly, in all these projects, the benefit sharing formulae with kin groups was 
disproportionate. Under such experiences, kin groups' general perception was that of 
marginalisation of their entitlements to a fair share in benefits from natural resources 
that they knew as theirs. The litigation brought against Gold Ridge project at the 
signing of the Special Mining Lease on 12 May 1997 was again about the issue of 
benefits from the project. Kin groups who support this line of thinking clearly 
recognise that despite the government's general claim that their interests were for the 
development of the community as whole, such claims could not stand up to the 
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Solomon Islands. Like other resources, state declaration of sovereignty over 
the territory in 1893, and the establishment of state authority expressed through the 
appointment of the Resident Commissioner 1896, were the bases for the 
instrumental articulation of relations over natural resources, including minerals. The 
State's attitude in seeing natural resources as distinct from the people who depend on 
it was also influential the way natural resources were accessed. In the case of 
mineral resources, the instrument of the state that claimed control over mineral 
resources undermined kin groups claim to landownership under customary land 
tenure. Thus, on the broader level, the issues of kin group identities and rights within 
a new framework of the state was persistently at odds with state objectives that see 
above the 'heads' of kin group rights. 
At a more specific level, whenever projects were carried out, the rights of kin groups 
and the nature of benefits to kin groups were often very unclear. In other words, apart 
from kin groups being perceived as entitled to compensation for being disturbed, their 
rights to development under those natural resources have been largely ignored. 
The next chapters will look more in detail at the development of the Gold Ridge 
project in terms of the nature of the relationship with kin groups in the 
implementation of the project. But historically, the relationship between kin groups 
and the state was not consensual but rather tolerated by kin groups. The nature of 
benefits experienced in previous projects only brought confirmation that kin groups 
were not proportionately receiving their entitlements. What seems clear here was the 
recurrent justification of state and commercial activities for their sustained control of 
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natural resources. This only led to the contrasting effect of increasing distrust on the 
state. 
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Chapter 6 
Institutions and interest groups 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter follows on from the previous historical outline of the context of the Gold 
Ridge project. It shows the nature of the distinctive institutions and individuals that 
were important players in this particular case. These institutions include the state, kin 
groups and Ross Mining NL But, as found in many mine projects, there were also 
other interest groups. These are the secondary interest groups whose interests were 
largely linked to the projects through attaching such interests to the primary players. 
As will be described later in the chapter, some of these interest groups, such as 'island 
hoppers,' play the card of appearing as the supporters of the 'disadvantaged' or 
landowners. In essence, as will be demonstrated in this chapter, key players in the 
Gold Ridge Mining Project had distinctive goals. Despite the intersecting goal of all 
players, who wanted to see the mineral resources converted into tangible benefits for 
themselves, what constitutes this benefit for each player differs. This difference of 
goals between the major players, also referred to as primary players, appears to be 
derived from the self-definition of each player's historical roots. In other words, the 
kinship ideology was the basis for kin group self-definitions of what the projects 
meant for them. In contrast, the state and the mining company derived their self-
definition and goals from the ideology of the centralised state. The development of the 
Gold Ridge project was, in a way, a process of competing articulation processes 
between different goals defined from different positions of interest. Interests, as 
defined in Chapter 2 of this work, refer to what makes a 'difference' to an actor in the 
scheme of things. Again as outlined in Chapter 2, this was where the role of 'sign' in 
actions was important. In other words, what does a mining project, as a complex 
event, mean for each player, and what difference is such an event expected to make 
for each player? 
The next section of this chapter describes each of the primary as well as secondary 
players in the Gold Ridge project in Solomon Islands. It considers both institutions 
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The state Solomon Islands not been considered a 'democratic state'. 
The historical legacy 'democratic state' owed its origin to its past more 
than one hundred years This was when Britain declared some of the islands as a 
Protectorate in 1893 (Allan 1957, Laracy 1983, Naitoro 1993). Since then, a form 
centralised control was developed. This was the beginning of the development of a 
new form of social organisation, that of the state. 
The state was a new concept for most indigenous communities m the Solomon 
Islands. It was new in that it claimed centralised political legitimacy over a sovereign 
territory, much of which was under kin group control. The independent state not only 
inherited a politically declared sovereign territory, but also inherited a legal 
construction defined as the 'National Constitution' of this new sovereign state. This 
Constitution, which was prepared for political independence in 1978, was called the 
Solomon Islands Independence Order (NPSI 1978). This provided for the structure of 
the democratic state in the Solomon Islands. In essence, the democratic state 
envisaged for the Solomon Islands was largely a construction based on a global 
process, which inherited its features from a Western European model developed over 
centuries. Its main features were mass public education and industrialisation (Smith 
1986, Smolicz 1985, Somers 1993, Szacki 1968, Williams 1991). But, as one 
commentator has suggested, the process of imposing the state throughout the world 
did not achieve uniformity, but rather was practised in many diverse forms (Williams 
1991 ). In the case of the Solomon Islands, the model of state followed is supposedly 
that of a democratic state. 
The presumption that the state in Solomon Islands was democratic was based largely 
on the terms of its theoretical provisions. These included the Constitution itself, as 
well as its provisions, which included the inherent features of a democratic state. 
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Among these are the notions of citizenship and the role of administration provided for 
under the Constitution. But the state in the Solomon Islands cannot, in practice, be 
called 'democratic' because the kin groups who constitute a significant part of the 
state had been in persistent disagreement with it since its imposition. This line of 
thinking was most obvious in relation to issues surrounding land tenure and the rights 
of kin groups. The circumvention of kin group rights in the Constitution was one of 
the most important areas of tension between kin groups and the state when concerning 
natural resources use. In other words, the existing state framework is at odds with the 
kin groups' interests it meant to govern. 
6.2.1 Constitution 
The state in Solomon Islands has three important characteristics. These are the 
Constitution, the structure of government, and the process of elections. 
The Constitution laid the foundation for the structure of government in the Solomon 
Islands, including the election process. The institutional establishment of the post-
independence Constitution was carried out in 1978. This Constitution provided for the 
ideals of democratic governance of the new state (NPSI 1978). Although it was 
designed elsewhere, was expected to be accepted as the 'supreme law' of the land. 
This is the case, despite it not being built upon kin group norms, hence the rhetoric 
that the Constitution was imposed rather than evolved. 
The present Solomon Islands' Constitutional framework is outlined in fourteen 
chapters which are the fourteen key areas perceived as significant for the new 
emerging state. 
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The areas were: 
1. the state and the Constitution 
2. protection of fundamental rights and freedom of the individual 
3. citizenship 
4. the Governor-General 
5. the executive 
6. the national legislature 
7. the legal system 
8. the Leadership Code 
9. the Ombudsman 
10. finance 
11. land 
12. provincial government 
13. the public service 
14. miscellaneous topics and schedules. 
(List ofthe main sections of the National Constitution of Solomon Islands. Source: 
NPSI 1978). 
The organisational framework and justifications for the state in the Solomon Islands 
were based on the fourteen sections of the National Constitution. Over the years, this 
Constitutional framework has often been treated as 'sacred' in that it has not been 
significantly modified by the National Parliament since 1978. Part of the reason for 
this lack of innovation has been the apparent lack of understanding by Solomon 
Islanders about the relationship between the Constitution as it has been written and 
the practice within the real world that it has been designed to govern. In other words, 
the Constitution is an imposition rather than a solution to any definite existing 
problems of governance. 
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the right against forced labour and right to 
the protection of fundamental 
right to freedom against slavery; 
the right to liberty, human treatment, 
property protection, expression, freedom of movement and right to compensation 
for contravention of these rights (NPSI 1978). Yet, in the same Constitution, there are 
no detailed specifications of kin groups' rights as social units tied to specific land 
areas according to kin groups and land tenure. Instead of recognising the existence 
kin groups, citizenship was assumed as the universal status for all individuals. The 
idea of citizenship is discussed much later in this chapter, but for now the point is that 
the social rights of kin groups have largely been ignored. The importance of all of 
these was that the state domination of kin groups was already laid down by the 
Constitution. Hence, kin groups persisted in their struggle for group rights in 
development projects. Clearly, a constitutional framework that ignores social groups, 
their associated social rights, and ill-defines their status has only provided avenues for 
future political contestation. In Solomon Islands, land tenure and forms of governance 
remain contentious issues. 
The third section on citizenship simply described who could be a citizen, such as 
those who were citizens at the time of independence, indigenous Solomon Islanders, 
and anyone who successfully applies for citizenship. Also it provided for the 
prohibition of dual nationality in the Solomon Islands. This section will be elaborated 
on later, because of its implication for relationships over natural resources. 
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constituency representatives are elected to the parliament. Voters elect the 
representatives to Parliament every four years through a election process arranged by 
the Electoral Commission. A Prime Minister is then chosen after a national election as 
convened by the Governor-General, according to Schedule 2 of the Constitution 
(NPSI 1978). Thus, the legislature was the second important component of the 
apparatus of the state and was the law-making body of the land. The third component 
of the state apparatus was provided for section seven, which deals with the legal 
system. It involves the application of law, the judiciary, public prosecutions, and the 
Public Solicitor. This component administers the judiciary process, through the 
institution of the court. Law under this section also implies customary laws. In 
association with the function of administration of social justice, there was also the 
office of the Leadership Code Commission in section eight, the Ombudsman's office 
in section nine, and public finance in section ten. These institutional appendices were 
supposed to provide for transparency and compliance to the requirements of the 
Constitution. In effect, the three components of the state apparatus, including 
subsidiary institutions for effective functioning of the state, made up the existing 
framework upon which the state is expected to function and represent the interests of 
the Solomon Islands people. The remaining sections, eleven to fourteen, were largely 
enabling sections for Land, Provincial Government, public service and a 
miscellaneous section dealing with appointment of public officers. 
In summary, while the formal structure of the state contained many of the features 
expected of the democratic state, its effectiveness was undermined by the formal 
structure itself. For instance, the fact that kin groups were not recognised within the 
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framework of the Constitution meant that kin groups were expected to be citizens 
rather than kin groups associated with a specific territory. While the kin groups were 
not against citizenship status, they were also inclined to remain closely identified with 
kin groups where necessary. Thus, in essence, while the state struggled to impose 
citizenship as the basis for defining Solomon Islanders, Solomon Islanders defined 
themselves at different levels for different purposes. In other words, Solomon 
Islanders were as much citizens as they were members of kin groups, depending on 
the circumstance in which they had to define their identity. 
Clearly the relationship between citizenship and kin groups, as a basis for defining the 
use of natural resources in Solomon Islands, remains an issue. At its core, this is a 
question of legitimacy on the part of the state. Does the state have more rights than 
the kin groups who were there before the state or rather should kin groups be left the 
freedom to construct the state and to give it its legitimacy including mineral rights 
ownership? In Solomon Islands, the state has so far not been able to engage social 
groups in effectively participating in governance of the Solomon Islands. This lack of 
effective engagement is vital as it impacts on relationships over natural resources. But 
it was the idea of citizenship that persistently authenticated the state's imposed rights 
over kin group resources and the distribution ofbenefits of resources. 
6.2.2 Citizenship 
The concept of citizenship can be traced historically to early Europe (Bauman 1990: 
42, Brubaker 1989: 54, Brubaker 1992: 55, Mann 1987: 180, Marshall [1949] 1964: 
181, Orloff 1992: 219, Somers 1993: 250, Znaniecki 1952: 286). There has also been 
much sociological study concerning the concept of citizenship. One of the major 
reasons for the concern for the study of citizenship was because of world trends, 
especially in terms of the resurgence of nationalism or ethnic conflicts. Generally, the 
sociology of citizenship agrees that citizenship in its modern sense was defined as a 
personal status consisting of a body of universal rights (i.e. legal claims on the state) 
and duties held equally by all legal members of a nation-state (Brubaker 1992: 55, 
Marshall [1949] 1964: 181 ). According to Somer's study of the history of the notion 
of citizenship in early eighteenth century England, citizenship is defined as an 
instituted process (Somers 1993). This means citizenship was a set of institutionally 
embedded social practices, and such practices were contingent upon and constituted 
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second was that study recognises that while the development of the notion of 
citizenship was a process England, its application in colonised societies was more 
reflective of processes where citizenship was defined as a body of rights granted 
"ready-made" by the state and attached to individuals (Marshall [1949] 1964: 181; 
Brubaker 1989: 54). 
The argument here was that this "ready made" set of rights was accorded greater 
political legitimacy over the social rights of kin groups. In this situation, issues of 
population movement, economic equity and political autonomy create tension 
between the idea of citizenship and kin groups. Thus, understanding of indigenous 
social rights embedded in kin group ideology and their application to customary land 
could have been better recognised, purposely, so that long term adjustments between 
the idea of citizenship and kin groups could be achieved. Further marginalisation of 
kin groups' social rights was achieved by the insistence on citizenship, which 
excludes kin groups' rights which will continue to cause disputes over these issues in 
the Solomon Islands. 
Marshall rejected the initial limited definition of citizenship as a minimum body of 
legal and political rights and duties (Marshall [1949] 1964: 181, Brubaker 1989: 54). 
According to Marshall, modern citizenship involves three kinds of rights: 
e civil rights (right to sell one's labour in a free market, and the right to due 
process of law), 
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• political rights (such as the right to vote), and 
• social rights (such as the right to social justice through institutions like 
unemployment insurance, welfare provisions, education and social security). 
The above three components of rights constitute citizenship status. Thus, the status of 
citizen allowed membership of a polity. However, it was the third component of 
Marshall's definition of citizenship rights namely social rights that was problematic in 
the case of Solomon Islands. This does not mean other component areas of citizenship 
rights were perfectly fulfilled. But for our purpose, it suffices to say that the critical 
issues relate to the marginalisation of social rights relating to kin groups. Thus, in the 
case of the Solomon Islands, the Constitution enshrined the rights of individuals in 
terms of a concept of citizenship which was reflective of the categorical rights of 
civil, political, and social rights. But, definitions of social rights fell short of taking 
into account the social institutions of kin groups reflected in the relationship of 
Solomon Islanders as a social group to their land--including mineral resources. The 
effect of marginalising the social rights of kin groups in the formal structure of the 
institution of state was that it had alienated kin groups in their own country. This is in 
effect an instrumental articulation of kin groups at the structural level. 
Citizenship at the level of the state, and kin groups at the level of social groups, are 
mutual rather than exclusive for Solomon Islands kin group members. This means that 
the state in the Solomon Islands cannot exist in a beneficial way, unless some kind of 
relationship is established between expectations of the notion of citizenship and that 
of kin groups, which involves social rights of land, environment and culture. Here 
tension clearly exists between kin group-based communities and the state. Social 
rights of kin groups were undermined by a universalistic notion of citizenship, which 
justifies control under the instrument of the state. Administration thus constitutes an 
important institutional mechanism through which the state coordinates citizens. 
6.2.3 Administration 
The central government, which coordinates citizens, does so through three major 
structural coordination components: the legislature, executive and the judiciary. The 
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legislature involves 50 Members of Parliament elected every four years. This law-
making body obtains its public legitimacy through the 50-member Parliament. One 
Member of Parliament is elected from each constituency. These constituencies are 
closely related but not necessarily synonymous with the 61 cultural groups in the 
entire country. The use of a multi-party system for general elections means that the 
elected members from any one party may propose to establish the government. 
Normally, coalitions are formed, as has been the case since independence. The party 
with the majority of members elected to Parliament may form the executive or the 
government of the day. Since independence in 1978, the country has had seven Prime 
Ministers. The formation of Cabinet, once the Prime Minister has been elected, forms 
the executive arm of the government for policy formulation and legislation. Each of 
the Cabinet Ministers appointed by the Prime Minister heads one of the government 
departments. The departments make up the administrative machinery of the state. 
Each Minister ensures that his or her portfolio implements Cabinet decisions, which 
are meant to be government policies. The judiciary aspect established under the 
National Constitution operates as independently as possible. 
The central government in this respect is democratic in terms of constituency 
representation. It is also obviously hierarchical and demands adherence to the master-
servant relationship in the daily operation of the state. This creates serious tension 
between individuals who do not see themselves as subordinates. The superior may be 
a cousin, a distant relative, a member of their local church, a friend or friend of 
friends, and therefore the idea of separating the official position of hierarchy to the 
equality of position among kin groups becomes difficult. This superior and inferior 
relationship in central government often translates to other relationships. For example, 
where central government officials sees themselves as superior in the country, this 
leads to less acknowledgment of inferiors, usually village dwellers. This form of 
perception led to demand for further devolution of political authority to the provincial 
government level. In 1981, the central government passed a law to establish the 
provincial government on the understanding that this would allow local leaders to deal 
with the interests of their own respective province. 
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not been very satisfactory. Decentralisation of political power was an idea promoted 
at the eve of political independence and enshrined the preamble of the Solomon 
Islands Constitution (Alasia 1997, NPSI 1978). Hence, there was the establishment 
a provincial government system following the 1981 Provincial Act (NPSI 1981 ). This 
system initially set up six provinces, which have now become nine provinces. Each 
province then was given the authority to administer itself and make ordinances to fit 
the existing social system found in that particular province. provmces turn set 
up Area Councils under their authority. These Councils remained defunct in most 
cases in the Solomon Islands. 
Thus in terms of decision-making in the Solomon Islands, the central government 
commands the leadership, at least as far as this is conceived by the legal statutes that 
define the state (NPSI 1978; NPSI 1981). In this context, unless issues are directly 
related to social groups in the Solomon Islapds, the state appears as a foreign 
institution in terms of its positive impacts on the kin group-based community. Clearly, 
kin group-based community relationships with the state remain in tension in terms of 
defining rights, authority, and ownership of resources. 
The provincial government was further seen as not able to provide services to the 
rural areas, thus leading to the demand for Area Councils. The Provincial 
Governments established Area Councils for political participation, but less thought 
was put into the financial viability of this organisations. 
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act as landowners signing legal contract agreements. This situation can be exploited 
by Area Council politicians especially when it relates to making deals with logging 
companies. Thus, it is clear that while decentralisation of the state may reach the level 
of community through Area Councils, such Councils are perceived as having no 
legitimate rights to discuss resources because the Area Council is seen as simply the 
state at the local level. Resource development must always be considered with the kin 
groups-based community. the Solomon Islands, more than 87% of the land and its 
resources are held under a customary land tenure system but it is not this kinship 
system that formulates policy about resource use. In other words, there remains a 
political gap between the state apparatus and kin groups who see resources as theirs 
and separate from the state. 
The state, as described above, appeared democratic and fulfilled the democratic 
requirements of the National Constitution. But this state structure assumed 
individuality for all citizens, at the cost of kin group communities and their very 
survival as groups of people with a specific territory. This process of individuation of 
social groups is not a problem in itself. What is a problem is its application to 
fragmented social groups and in the process accessing their natural resource assets. 
This has largely been detrimental to the group as whole. The state's policy assumption 
of the indigenous people as individuals rather than groups creates tensions between 
individual rights and social group rights that can only be addressed at the group level. 
The state's persistence in ignoring the rights of social groups is in effect an 
instrumental articulation strategy expressed both implicitly and explicitly. This 
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which state kin groups approach resources development in Solomon 
Islands. It meant the state in terms implementation of development policy 
were usually guided by strategic manipulation techniques rather a clear case 
necessary collaboration. This was noticeable the case of the Gold Ridge project 
development when the state approached landowners concerning issues of 
compensation and financial benefits to kin groups rather than seeking a consensus 
over the importance of the project for the country and landowners as a matter of 
economics and development. 
Political leaders knew, over the years, that the issue of the mineral policy could not 
simply be enforced as contained in the mineral resources policy. The mineral may be 
claimed by the state, but this had never been accepted by the indigenous community. 
While the legal system legitimised by the state reserves the right to use of force 
against the community to maintain control over mineral resources, the recognition of 
kin groups and legitimate customary landowners made projects a real challenge for 
developers. As long as kin groups believe that mineral rights is a component of their 
social rights to land, and the state persists in maintaining control over mineral rights, 
the issue of fairness in project developments will be difficult to establish for kin 
groups. 
The cautious implementation approach by the state to the development of the Gold 
Ridge project recognised this complexity. It began with the establishment of a Gold 
Ridge Task Force in 1994. The idea of the Gold Ridge Task Force was to localise the 
project within the Ministry of Mines and Mineral resources. Stephen Danitofea, then 
the Ministry's secretary, chaired the Task Force. The other relevant departmental 
heads included those from the Central Bank, Trade and Investments, Finance and the 
Prime Minister's Office. The Task Force carried out the implementation of the Gold 
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later in 1995. Denis spokesperson for a consortium interested the 
Lunnga hydro project, was also prepared to support a hydro-project for the Gold 
Ridge project. This approach of trying to tie Gold Ridge with other possible projects 
caused disagreement among the Cabinet and therefore Danitofea was removed as 
Secretary to the Ministry of Mines and Minerals January 1996. 
On 12 February 1996, I was appointed by the Minister's Office as the new 
Secretary to the Ministry of Mines. Now the six months period before this 
appointment I worked as a consultant in carrying out a social identification study of 
the Gold Ridge people. This research was seen as in line with my duty at that time as 
Solomon Islands Consultant for National Heritage. It was therefore seen that working 
in Gold Ridge before February 1996 was to the advantage to the national project. 
As the new appointed secretary to the Ministry, I had to establish working relations 
with Hon. Jacob Vouza. He held the portfolio for this Ministry which was responsible 
for mineral exploration and mining development. The first task was to formalise the 
former Gold Ridge Task Force and to include other department heads. What the 
former Task Force did not do, was include the Attorney General. This revised Task 
Force became the Gold Ridge Advisory Committee. The importance of this 
committee was to be the link between the Cabinet and other relevant Ministries 
including Mines and Minerals. The Secretary to the Prime Minister, Joses Sanga was 
the Chairman of the committee. The other members of the Committee included senior 
representatives from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Trade and Investment, 
Central Bank of Solomon Islands, and Customs and Excise. 
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This was to apply if there were cases of a natural disaster or civil unrest. Thus, the 
importance of this committee lies the between departments dealing with the 
Gold Ridge project and the Cabinet, especially if there were needs for policy changes 
that needed Parliamentary endorsement. The Advisory Committee was the 
coordinating authority representing all the major arms of the implementing ministries 
to ensure the Gold Ridge project was facilitated fully. Apart from this decision-
making role, most of the actual implementation of the Gold Ridge project was done 
by other subsidiary, but necessary, committees. There were two other important 
subsidiary committees that played significant roles in the implementation of the Gold 
Ridge project. These were the Gold Ridge Negotiation Committee (GRNC) and the 
Social and Environmental Impact Committee (SEIC). 
6.2. 7 Gold Ridge negotiation committee 
The first was the Gold Ridge Negotiation Committee (GRNC). The Secretary of the 
Ministry of Mines and Minerals chaired the GRNC. As Secretary, my department was 
responsible for the Ministry of Mines, which was involved directly in the day-to-day 
implementation of the Project. The Division of Geology and Mines had largely put all 
its human and financial resources into the Gold Ridge project. The director of the 
division had a staff of ten, and as half of them were not fully qualified this meant that 
technical issues rested largely with very few qualified staff. The division was also 
expected to carry out facilitation processes for other exploration companies. At that 
time, there were 39 active tenements. A severe shortage of human resources was also 
experienced with the Ministry of Lands and Survey. The need to survey the mining 
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lease area, including the village relocation area, took less time because of the demand 
placed on the staff. Both the Divisions of Mines and Lands were fully engaged in the 
Gold Ridge project at the expense of other business development projects in the 
country. The problem of financial and logistics also meant that, in a significant way, 
the Ross Mining company was providing logistic support for government staff and 
reducing the independence of the government in the information dissemination to 
landowners and the public. 
Other Ministries were also engaged because of the need to secure many other 
auxiliary authorisations needed by the project. For example, the Ministry of Works 
needed to give road access authorisation. The many different roles the various arms of 
the administration had to carry out meant that the Ministry of Mines and Minerals had 
to coordinate meetings with different departments. The Gold Ridge Negotiation 
Committee was the official committee for this, consisting of various relevant 
Ministries. The meetings that were usually held at the Central Bank's boardrooms 
were to update different departmental heads of the progress by the Ministry of Mines 
on the project. The financial aspects of the project were considered by the Central 
Bank and Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance, through the taxation division, 
was responsible for the taxation regimes considered significant to the Government. 
The Central Bank was responsible for the regulation of external financial transactions 
for external repayment of debts. These financial considerations largely constituted the 
governments package for the Gold Ridge project. 
6.2.8 Social and environmental impact committee 
The second committee responsible for the implementation of the Gold Ridge project 
was the Social and Environmental Impact Committee (SEIC). The Director of 
Conservation and Environment, Mr. Biliki chaired this committee. His responsibility 
was to highlight issues of social and environmental concerns that arose as a result of 
the Gold Ridge project. While the Director's divisional duties arose in the category of 
environmental issues, social concerns meant a wider community involvement. Thus, 
the committee had to seek wider participation in the consultation process. There were 
representatives from the local NGOs, such as the Solomon Islands Christian 
Association (SICA), and Solomon Islands Development Trust (SIDT). In addition, 
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development of relocation village was meant to be a response to social concerns 
raised by the committee. Environmental issues were mostly associated with the 
feasibility study, and particular the measures proposed to reduce environmental 
threats. This related largely to the tailings dam and mining site containment. The 
committee was familiarised with the strategy taken by the company to deal with 
environmental concerns. 
The issues which arose from both the Negotiation Committee and the Social and 
Environmental Impact Committee were then taken to the Gold Ridge Advisory 
Committee for endorsement. Both committees were central in information exchange 
and were essential for pointing out issues of relevance to the government, landowners, 
and the mining company. From the point of view of the state, central issues of 
finance, social and environment impact that had been dealt with through the program 
were discussed. For the mining company, once issues had been sorted out in the state-
mining company consultation, then progress had been achieved. But for the 
landowners it was not quite so straightforward. In the first instance, social and cultural 
impacts were of such nature that they could not simply substituted through restitution. 
The environment will, after all, be destroyed and the villagers uprooted and relocated. 
This was a major social and cultural dislocation. The state and the mining company 
down played the issues of defining costs in terms of social and cultural dislocation, 
and instead spent most time justifying financial benefits as an end in itself. Due to the 
problem of not being able to justify ownership of resources by the state and the 
subsequent social dislocation caused by the mining development activities, mining 
would remain a contested area of development in Solomon Islands. So how the 
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landowners perceived this project becomes important if improvements were to be 
made in mining development project relations. 
6.3 Gold Ridge kin groups 
It is commonly known that there exists diversity in language, social, and cultural 
practices in the Solomon Islands. Such diversity is even reflected among groups in 
one island group. However, because ofthe relatively small size of many social groups 
commercial impacts were often similar between groups because they were all 
depended on the land for all their livelihood. Despite the variations, most social 
groups experienced similar impacts as a result of commercial ventures. The Gold 
Ridge kin group-based communities or Matoba people were no exception. 
6.3.1 Villages 
The Gold Ridge kin group-based community refers to a small collection of hamlets or 
villages in the central highlands of Guadalcanal Island. These people were scattered 
over the landscape of an area no less than 500 ha. There were 36 villages or hamlets 
identified during a 1995 impact study (Naitoro 1995:331). Some ofthe hamlets were 
however outside the immediate area required for the mining lease. In a company 
census conducted during 1995, the villages with a population that was to be directly 
affected by the mining lease were identified. The total number of people, initially 855, 
later increased to 1 ,200 as a result of returning community members. Community in 
this sense does not imply a particular specific settlement area but multiple settlement 
groups who share common kin group systems and land ownership. This is one of the 
reasons for using the notion of a kin group-based community to distinguish it from 
community in the sense of shared physical location or village. This does not mean 
these people do not have much in common. In effect, most of the 36 villages 
identified share a common heritage as members of two moieties. 
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Consequently, these people were collectively referred to as not only Gold Ridge kin 
group-based communities but also as the Matoba people or society. Among the 
Matoba population of 1 ,200 people, the sex ratio between women and men was about 
45:55. There are more women than men (see table below). 
1995 Census of Gold Ridge Villages 
1995 Census of Gold Ridge Villages 
Total number of Villages in the Area 23 
Total number of people 855 
Total number ofleafhouses 131 
Total number of permanent houses 7 
Total number of semi-permanent houses 11 
Permanent Schools 1 
Leaf class-rooms 3 
Leaf staff houses 4 
School office buildings 1 
Permanent church (incomplete) 1 
Semi-permanent church house 1 
Leaf church house 1 
Leaf store house 1 
Semi-permanent store house 3 
TABLE 2: Features of Gold Ridge hamlets in 1995 company census. 
Source: Stevenson, (1996); Naitoro, (1995) 
Apart from these demographic features of the Gold Ridge kin group-based 
community, they were also members of the different religious denominations found in 
the Solomon Islands. In particular, there were the South Sea Evangelical (SSEC), 
Roman Catholic, and Anglican Churches. The church has become an important part 
of the Matoba society, as a means of affiliation with the outside world. The church 
plays a significant role as a mediator of social codes between kin group systems of the 
Matoba community and outside values. For example, a lack of compliance to 
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traditional codes is often explained away as being due to the change of status 
necessary to be a Christian. Women were traditionally excluded in the traditional 
religious practices. Modern churches provided a way for women to reclaim the right 
to participate with men in religious activities,_ 
The Matoba people, like many of their tribal neighbours, were frequent travellers. 
They were travellers as individuals as well as in groups, depending on demands of the 
time. This was the case if for example there were needs for gardening or as a response 
to natural disasters such as floods and landslide. There are other factors such as social 
tensions, which account for frequent movements. Since land was 'fixed' as collective 
rights of moieties, individual movements occur in the context of kin group 
relationships established through marriage. It is in this light that most members of the 
Matoba society trace their ancestors back to migration periods of their oral history 
(Naitoro, 1995). 
6.3.2 Village economy 
The Matoba people were subsistence horticulturalists. Before the arrival of the 
Europeans they were mainly engaged in taro and yam planting, especially for special 
occasions. Marriage and rasi feasts are exogamous in nature and in the past 
commanded gardening activities. 
For the Matoba people, early European contact was at first sporadic, but soon became 
more frequent as exploration for minerals in the area increased over the years. This 
exploration pattern has affected the Matoba people since the 1930s. This is 
particularly the case with regard to the subsistence economy since the first mining 
license was granted in 1937 (Grover 1955) The subsequent exploration of the Gold 
Ridge was in the Matoba area, which led to additional people joining them. After 
World War II, exploration continued with Matoba individuals participating in the 
exploration activities. This led to local Matobans learning the skill of gold panning. 
The increased gold panning activities became an alternative to subsistence 
horticultural gardening for survival. The ultimate effect of this practice has been the 
significant decline in gardening activities among the Matoba by 1995 (Naitoro 
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1995: 16) This was one reason why there were very few gardens found among the 
Matoba in the 1995 survey. In effect, the Matoba were dependent on alluvial gold 
pannmg. 
In 1995, during my investigation of Gold Ridge social structure, I was able to observe 
that women did most of the panning. To the detriment of many women, their brothers 
often took off with their earnings for alcohol. But most women were able to earn 
enough from gold panning to buy bags of rice and tinned fish from Honiara's Chinese 
shops. The important role of women in gold panning can be demonstrated through one 
incident. In 1995 a Gold Ridge women lost about $1,500 Solomon dollars from her 
hospital bed in Honiara. When she found that she lost her money, she left the sick 
ward and returned back to Gold Ridge to pan for more gold. Clearly, the Matoba 
people at the time of the Gold Ridge project initiation were heavily dependent on gold 
panning, and women had a significant role in alluvial gold panning as a means of 
subsistence. 
6.3.3 Matoba society 
The Matoba people are a relatively small social unit. The Matoba social unit is typical 
in terms of population size of any social group in Guadalcanal and elsewhere in the 
Solomon Islands. Matoba are typical in another dimension, in that not only are they a 
member of a specific kin grouping, but their social grouping can also be associated 
with other similar groups forming a larger linguistic group. A recent study done by 
Roe (1990) was able to list seven of the major linguistic groups on the Island of 
Guadalcanal as the Marau, Longgu, Lengo, West Guadalcanal, Talise, Malango and 
Mbirao. The Matoba people are sub-groups of the Malango major linguistic group. 
Malango is one of the seven such linguistic groups found on the island of 
Guadalcanal. Each of these major linguistic divisions has, in turn, further social 
divisions reflecting land, cultural and linguistic variations. Hence the Matoba people 
represent one of the categories of social grouping important in the Solomon Islands, 
as sub units of a major linguistic group. Using linguistic criteria, Tryon has identified 
61 major linguistic groups comprising the entire indigenous population of Solomon 
Islands (Tryon, 1983). The population of the Malango linguistic group was estimated 
to be about 6,000 in 1995, by using the 1986 Census. 
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6.3.4 The Matoba kin group system 
As a culturally self-contained group, the Matoba people inherited a traditional social 
organisational system described by anthropologists as moieties (Roe 1990, Allan 
1957, Hogbin 1938). Moieties consist of at least two clan groups that are exogamous 
in relationship to each other. In the case of the Gold Ridge project, the Matoba society 
members are descendents of two moieties, namely Manugaravu and Manukiki. The 
names symbolise, as well as mean, 'big sister' and 'small sister' respectively in the 
system of moiety. 
The importance of the concept of moiety is in its nature as an organisational system. 
This organisation system operates by dividing a society into two halves or moieties. 
On the Island of Guadalcanal, early literatures, such as Hogbin (1938) and Allan's 
report of 1957, reported the existence of moieties. For example, Allan mentioned the 
two moieties, Garavu and Manukiki (Allan 1957). The division of their society into 
halves allows for a reciprocal relationship. This means one half of the society is 
generally mutually obligated to the other half of society. It is the commitment 
accorded to this mutual obligation of reciprocal participation that defines the 
relationship. In other words, how much an individual can contribute matters because it 
shows the degree of importance if one contributes more to a reciprocal event. Such 
contribution signifies to the host the level of commitment to the tradition of mutual 
obligation to participate satisfactorily. A satisfactory participation is usually judged 
by the quantity of money or food one contributes to the reciprocal event in relation to 
others' contributions, and especially in relation to the contributors' recognised wealth. 
This perception is vital as the expectation of the host is based on the knowledge of 
perceived wealth on the part of the other contributing party. A participant's 
contribution is thus measured against that participant's perceived wealth status. Thus, 
if a contributing party contributes proportionately less than the level of wealth they 
are seen to have at their disposal, the consensus would that of an unsatisfactory 
participation. During 1995, the listing of the names of the descent groups constituting 
the two moieties, namely Garavu and Manukiki were identified (Naitoro 2000). These 
are listed in the table below: Garavu and Manukiki. 
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GARA VU (Moiety) 
Chacha 
Chavuchavu 
Kaipalipali 
Koenihao 
Lasi 
Roha 
Salasivo 
Soroboilo 
Vatuviti 
MANUKIKI (Moiety) 
Char ana 
Halisia 
Kaokao 
Kolobisi 
Rausere 
Sabaha 
Sarahi 
Sutahuri 
TABLE 3: List of the descent groups identified as members of the two moieties 
(Source Naitoro 2000: 137). 
Culturally, the importance of the relationship was based on the perpetual reciprocal 
relationship between the Manugaravu moiety and the Manukiki moiety. Each of these 
two moieties, not only symbolise 'big sister' and 'small sister' respectively, but also 
extend to represent 'big bird' and 'small bird' in the traditional cosmology structure. 
The 'big bird', which refers to 'eagle', and 'small bird' referring to the 'hawk,' 
established the distinctive identity of each moiety. The use of symbols of totemic 
representation was not unique to the kin groups-based community at Gold Ridge. This 
was a common cultural practice as found elsewhere in the Solomon Islands. The land 
holding (butubutu) distinction among the Marovo, in the Western Province of 
Solomon Islands, reported by Hviding is an example (Hviding 1996). Similarly, there 
was the arata or landholding unit and its use of common ancestor among the Are' Are 
ofMalaita (Coppet 1982). 
The importance of totemic representation in the case of the moiety in the Gold Ridge 
kin group-based community is the expectations of one moiety group member of the 
other moiety group. For example, a member of a Manugaravu moiety cannot marry 
another of its own members. Instead, they must choose their spouse from the 
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the members of the two moieties. Apart from marriage, this code is also applicable in 
a reciprocity feast (rasi). 
6.3.5 Matoba exchange systems 
These reciprocal practices of Matoba people, such as marriage and the rasi feast are 
also adapted to modern circumstances, such as the application of this moiety 
reciprocity in the context of a mining project. One example is that of the application 
of the traditional reciprocity feast (rasi) to articulate kin groups. Kin groups are 
expected to share in the potential wealth that is expected from the development of the 
Gold Ridge Mining Project. To legitimise the tradition of obligation a rasi feast is 
held to show who remains committed to the tradition of mutual obligation among the 
moiety members. The level of participation in the feast legitimised those that held 
importance to tradition and who would in turn be recognised respectively in sharing 
benefits from the Gold Ridge Mining project. In the Gold Ridge case, Chief Willy 
Rone hosted a reciprocity feast (rasi) in 1991. As a principal member of the Rausere 
descent group, and a member of the Manukiki moiety, he saw it as appropriate to host 
a reciprocity feast to welcome other descent groups. The reason was the discovery of 
minerals on Rausere land. In this situation, for the complementary moiety group to 
share the right to benefit from the gold deposit, the other moiety was obligated to 'buy' 
their share to these rights. This was done through provisions of goods and valuables at 
the rasi feast as an act of reinforcing the traditional link and obligations of the moiety 
where the resources have been found. Here the idea was for the Rausere descent 
group to allow the traditional reciprocity feast to take place so that the entitlements of 
other moiety descent groups (Garavu) to the benefit of the gold deposit could now be 
respected (Dick 1991). 
This rasi feast has in effect established the distribution of benefits from the mine 
because by 1996, when the Gold Ridge Mining Project was negotiated and agreed, 
both moiety groups were taken as collective landowners of the Gold Ridge project. As 
seen in Figure 1, both moieties are landowners to the agreement, although the 
minerals were largely found on the Rausere land. This finding has a number of 
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What this demonstrates at the kin group level show that the relationship among kin 
groups is based on presumed equal reciprocation. Like the marriage system where 
marriage is exogamous, once a marriage takes place then equal reciprocation is 
obligatory for each party. Furthermore, the reciprocity implied is not limited by time 
but rather by the degree of compliance with the norms. While equal reciprocation is 
expected, this does not mean members necessarily exchange goods equally. Instead, 
it is practice of generosity itself when social conditions permit, that is seen as 
significant. In other words, if a moiety member is presented with an opportunity to be 
able to give generously, then they should do so and not expect immediate 
reciprocation. This is because the same favour is expected to be returned in other 
situations that favour the other moiety members. It is in this form of reciprocal 
relations that relationships among kin groups are based. Thus, articulation in the form 
of reciprocation is based on recognition of difference and equality of difference. For 
example, the two moieties are seen as different but also as equals on their own right. 
The two moieties' relationship over material goods is then seen as a long term 
'agreement' or obligation for mutually beneficial exchanges. The negative aspect is 
that equality in good things also means equality in bad things. Therefore, in an 
unfortunate situation of conflict, reciprocal violence is expected. However, the nature 
of the relationship is seen as articulatory where compliance with the rules and values 
of reciprocity is sustained. 
Clearly, cultural codes of exogamous marnage, and the feast (rasi) practice are 
evidence of practices which influence the perception of whether a relationship is 
articulated or not among kin groups in the Gold Ridge project. It is the reciprocal 
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Land in Matoba society must be conceived of in relationship to the moiety system. 
Hence land ownership, as a feature of Matoba society is conceptualised in terms of 
'people's land' rather than individual ownership. Since land is owned and used 
through kin groups, there is usually no particular landowner. This meant that the kin 
group owns land. A kin group defines a particular land holding unit in relationship to 
other kin groups. This system is common throughout the Solomon Islands (Allan 
1957, Larmour 1989, Lasaqa 1968). 
Landownership among the Matoba is far more than just a property ownership. It 
implies obligatory relationships which are central in understanding land rights. As 
mentioned earlier, the division of society into halves by descent (Allan 1957, Hogbin 
1939) meant that concern about one half's obligation to the other, influences decisions 
made about land, marriage, and benefit distribution. Thus, land use has to be seen in 
relation to the moiety system (Naitoro 2000). The two halves, Manugaravu and the 
Manukiki, operate in a relationship based on mutual obligation that is grounded on 
common ancestors, referred to as the 'big sister' and 'small sister' respectively. In this 
respect, the social, economic and political relationship is articulated through 
reciprocity as defined by the moiety. 
Clearly, land and resources are perceived in relational terms among the Matoba 
people of Gold Ridge. For the Matoba people, relationships over land use and now 
benefit sharing are associated with the kin group system as well as other affiliations 
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such as the church. The importance and practice of articulation in Matoba society is 
based around the two moieties. The division of society into two equal halves sought to 
maintain social relationships through the practice of exogamous marriage and the 
practice of the rasi feast. But more significant is the continuing expectations placed on 
relationships in the context of contemporary events like mineral resource 
development. For Matoba people, their cultural practices are important in shaping 
their expectations, as well as being the basis for the formulation of their relationships 
with others. 
The implications of the moiety system of Matoba society in relation to contemporary 
natural resource development are found in their expectations of reciprocation. The 
fundamental principle is that exchanges between Matoba people and others must be 
seen as equal. As people with a language of their own and a particular worldview, 
their effective participation means effective articulation of development with their 
collective goals. The state, in its preoccupation with the notion of 'development', 
should not take things for granted when it begins natural resource developments that 
will transform people's lives. When this occurs kin groups' independence is 
systematically eroded by the state in the name of progress. 
6.3.7 Matoba position 
The implication for the moiety system is that when natural resource development 
occurs within such a society, natural reciprocity relations are assumed to prevail, the 
expectation is that there is a process of mutual reciprocity between parties, whoever 
they might be in a given situation. Thus, project development is seen as a reciprocal 
activity between the state and a kin group-based community on one hand, and 
between a kin group-based community and the mining company on the other. 
Firstly, there was the expectation of reciprocity between kin groups and the mining 
company. The kin groups expect that they will be treated with relative importance and 
not just as if they are an inconvenience to state projects. They see themselves as 
landowners. This implies that the land belongs to their people as a moiety society but 
also that such a society is distinct not only from other related groups on the island but 
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mining company is expected to be 
reciprocal, where the two groups are seen as joint hosts of 'feast' of the mining 
development project. Both the state and the company were seen as strong 'feast-givers' 
with the capacity to demonstrate their ability to distribute greater benefits to the 
Matoba society. However any distribution of benefits must at the same time, like any 
rasi feast, reflect degrees of importance or status society. The significant 
individuals or groups in the rasi feast usually receive a level of benefits that reflect 
their position in society. These central figures were feast-givers themselves. In other 
words, central individuals in the Matoba society who, by their status as feast-givers, 
were 'equals' the state and the mining company understood they were in a 
process of engaging in a 'reciprocal exchange'. The problem was that, to the state and 
the mining companies, landowners were not equals. They were considered as simply 
participants. Therefore, for the state and the mining company, it was matter of 
improving participation. For landowners, they were not simply participants who 
needed greater participation, they were an equal partner in the development. Thus, it 
was not the issue of participation that mattered, but rather the issue of the equality of 
positions within the society that dictated the distribution of benefits. It demanded an 
understanding of what constituted the total benefit of the project and how much of the 
benefits of the project were distributable. From there, who was to get what and why 
needed to be addressed. The uncertainty about this issue meant the landowners 
remained uncertain in terms of their attitude towards the project and therefore their 
exclusive support for the project also remained uncertain. 
In the Gold Ridge project, there were several demonstrations of the landowners' 
perceptions of their relationship with the state and the mining company. The first 
instance was the hosting of several rasi feasts at the Gold Ridge area. One particular 
case was important. The rasi feast held in 1991 was held as the basis for bringing the 
196 
two halves of society together. The idea was sharing the 
benefits. a 
The payment not seem to have any total benefit outcome 
to as 
source benefits. 
The second perception as 
based on reciprocity was the landowners' highlighting of five landowners. 
The mining company's response was to allocate bought company shares 
each of these principal landowners. Such benefits did not show importance of the 
five principal landowners and 
were simply being 'bribed'. 
position as equals. The impression was that they 
would not make public demonstration of the 
importance of these principals. Clearly, even when a handful of landowners were 
given a portfolio of shares in the company it was seen as of little importance to meet 
expectations of the landowners. 
The third demonstration of this perception occurred when one of the principal 
landowners demanded his village house to be of a better standard and quality than 
those the company had build for the rest of the landowners. After almost a year of 
confrontation in the media both locally and overseas, the principal landowner Willy 
Rone was built a house. Although it was raised a few more feet off the ground, the 
standard was not acceptable when compared to people from town who owned no 
mining shares but lived in better housing. Clearly, the principal landowner groups 
among the Matoba society saw themselves as equal to the state and the company due 
to their ownership of land and its associated resources. For them, the mining project 
was an interdependent activity where the landowners were as dependent on the state 
and the mining company as these parties were dependent on kin groups for the 
extraction of resources from their land. Therefore, it was not only the issue of the 
distribution of benefits that was not clear to kin groups, but also their perception that 
kin groups were short-changed in the distribution of benefits to landowners from the 
mining project. In other words, the mining project did not perform to the level of 
reciprocal exchanges expected of such a large-scale activity. 
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Ross Mining NL as a company was founded November 1986 by Lambertus de 
Graaf, an Australian Dutchman. The company was listed on the Sydney Stock 
Exchange in 1987 as a gold exploration company. The company confined most of its 
work to Australia, starting the Belyando Gold Mine, producing its first gold bar 
in March 1989. Ross Mining NL expanded through acquisitions of other mines in the 
Northern Territory, Queensland, and New South Wales. This included Wirralie Gold 
Mine, MT Coolon, Glen Evan and Yandan Queensland, Timbarra in New South 
Wales, and Spring m Northern Territory. The company started gold 
production in Yandan in 1993. These Australian tenements increased the company's 
resource base to over 1,250,000 ounces. The company was debt free and had cash in 
hand of A$11.6 million by the end of the 1994 financial year (Ross Mining NL 1994 ). 
Ross Mining NL would be considered a small mining company in the context of the 
mining industry. But with its clean record, it sought to expand and therefore submitted 
a tender for the Gold Ridge project in 1994 in which it lost the bid to Saracen 
Minerals (Solomon Islands) Pty Ltd. Saracen, which won the bid, was a gas company 
that knew little about gold mining and sold the Gold Ridge project tenement to Ross 
Mining NL at the end of 1994 for over A$6 million. This was one of the fears of the 
landowners, which the government could do little about. 
Ross Mining NL proceeded to facilitate the Gold Ridge project. Through its 
subsidiary, Ross Mining International Pty Ltd, it registered Ross Mining (Solomon 
Islands) Ltd in the Solomon Islands as its locally registered company. The Manager, 
Eugene Illiescu, was the company's field man for the implementation of the Gold 
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Ridge project. The founder of Ross Mining NL, Lambertus de Graaf, was the 
Executive Director based in Brisbane, and he only made trips to the Solomon Islands 
when required. The parent company's interest was implemented and carried out by 
Ross Mining (Solomon Islands) Ltd. 
6.4.1 Ross Mining (Solomon Islands) Ltd 
The Manager, Eugene Illiescu worked closely with landowners and government staff 
in the field. The most demanding issues were the need for exploratory drilling, land 
access, land surveys, and land adjudication in preparation for the demarcation of the 
mining lease area. In terms of diamond drilling, most of the work was carried out 
through the Ministry of Mines drilling division. The Land departments, including land 
valuation and land adjudication, did land surveys. The lack of logistical resources for 
government officers, especially in terms of transport to the mine site, meant that the 
government made two vehicles available. But this was not enough in terms of the 
speed demanded in completing these jobs. Thus, the company also used several of its 
vehicles to move government officials to the mine site. The landowners were also 
engaged in numerous meetings, especially between the landowners and the mining 
company. This high level of company attention to the landowners was seen by some 
as 'better treatment' by the mining company, and it led to landowners suggesting that 
they could reach their agreement with the mining company separately. One instance 
of this was over the issue of housing. For some time, the landowners thought that the 
company would provide good housing for them without requiring any due process 
with the state. It came to the stage where a model house was built for landowners to 
look at, and once they were happy that model would be used for a village relocation 
program. There were complaints about its size and practicality though, and thus the 
issue came back to the government. I went to have a look at the model and suggested 
that it be revised. The revised version never came back to the government as the 
landowners agreed with the company that they were happy with the revised model. 
This was an instance where, when the landowners complained again, the government 
requested information on who agreed on the house and there were indications that the 
landowners agreed with the mining company. 
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6.4.2 Ross Mining landowners 
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landowners. The mining company had always insisted compensation claims of 
any type had to come Association they were to receive company 
consideration. This had created divisions between Association members because the 
Association officials acted as mediators between the people and the company. 
Information could be misconstrued in the process of passing decisions back and forth 
between landowners and the company. For example, there was the instance where 
company manager was said to have insulted the landowners by saying their chiefs 
were stupid because as chiefs they should tell their followers what to do. The insult 
had occurred during one of the heated debates about the issue of compensation. The 
landowners came to the government demanding that the mining company pay 
compensation for its insult since they believed they were not stupid, but rather that the 
company was stupid in trying to 'steal' their resources in front of their face. They 
demanded that without a compensation payment the mining project was off and Ross 
Mining could go home. The government called a meeting and the mining company 
and the state paid SBD $100,000 for the insult. It was considered a serious matter that 
if this issue remained unresolved it would cost the company and the state millions of 
dollars. In effect, the company was not only dealing with establishing mineral 
resources but also with social issues of benefit distribution well before the project's 
geological resources were established. 
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6.4.3 The Gold Ridge resource 
the of Ross Mining, was extremely important to 
ISSUe resource was to Ross 
resources at 
many HHifJAH.<UlA'UHC> need to expand reserves was necessary 
in terms status as a 
revising of Ross Mining NL Pty Ltd from a 
mining company. This was shown through 
mining company to a 
comparative statistics of 
sized 
mineral 
resources and reserves between its previously held tenements Australia the 
inclusion of the Gold Ridge project. 
RESERVES RESOURCES 
(Includes Reserves) 
June 1996 June 1995 June 1996 June 1995 
YANDAN 170,800 235,000 204,700 262,400 
MtCOOLON 11,300 46,600 35 200 68,200 
WIRRALIE Oxide 148,200 148,200 245,500 245,500 
Sulphide ------- ------ 379,500 379,500 
SPRING HILL ------- ------ 328,000 362,300 
GOLD RIDGE 1,035, 000 940,200 1,628,000 1,480,000 
TIMBARRA 248, 700 ------ 453,000 -----
GLEN EVA 57,000 ------ 70,000 -------
TOTAL 1,671,000 1,321,700 3,344,000 2,797,900 
TABLE 4: RESERVES & RESOURCES EXPANSION (CONTAINED OUNCES) 
SOURCE: ROSS MINING, NL, ANNUAL REPORT 1996:13). 
From the table above, it is clear that Gold Ridge accounted for more than 50% of 
Ross Mining NL's gold resources and 60% of gold reserves. The 1,035,000 ounces of 
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6.4.4 Shareholders 
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mining company as a corporate body has more considerations 
the environment in which it operates. This refers to shareholders, who are also a 
diverse group. For example, in case of Ross Mining NL at the time of its 
engagement Solomon Islands there were 4,000 reported shareholders. 
Shareholders were involved within as well as outside of Australia. The most 
important of these investors were corporate and institutional bodies themselves. For 
example, in the case of Ross Mining NL, Todd Corporation of New Zealand owned 
14.6% of Ross Mining NL Shareholding. The top 20 larger shareholders held over 
75% of the shares. The rest were from other smaller institutional and personal shares 
making the market capital of Ross Mining about $200 million in 1997 (SIG 1996). 
The interests of these shareholders were the dividend payments made to them at the 
end of the financial year or any time the Directors of the company saw as necessary. 
In the mining company itself, as in the case of Ross Mining NL the founders of the 
company were also important shareholders, as well as taking important an leadership 
role in the development of the company. In this context, it will always be the primary 
interest of the company to secure profitability. During the life of such a company, 
dividends may not be payable because of the financial standing of the company and 
the Directors may recommend against dividend payments, as made at 31st December 
1999 by Ross Mining NL 
The importance of describing the shareholder component of Ross Mining NL is to 
show that in the local environment in which mining operations took place there was 
little consideration given to shareholders. It was this 'hidden' component that was 
often under-represented in mining development projects to landowners. In Solomon 
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words, shareholders and company were two important and distinct 
players whose interest assumed over and above the state 
landowners. The company-shareholder relationship is so interdependent that they 
often are considered as one player in dealing resource development in a host 
country. The protection of the company-shareholder position formed the basis for the 
company's interest, and therefore as long as this configuration remained, the state and 
landowners would have to in their view settle for second place in resource 
development, unless they were prepared to develop the resource themselves. 
6.5 Other players 
The Gold Ridge Mining Project had also attracted other interest groups in the course 
of its development. These other players were separate from the core stakeholders of 
the state, mining company and the landowners. These other interest groups were 
mostly individuals. 
6.5.1 Individuals 
Individuals, in this case, refers to members of the community who act as though they 
are representing the interest of a wider group, but in the process are found to be acting 
on their own, or on behalf of a narrow interest group. During the development of the 
Gold Ridge project, between 1995 and 1998, there were several individuals who 
became prominent as opponents of the project. Their opposition became public 
knowledge through their appeal to the local media in the Solomon Islands, as well as 
overseas media. These were Willy Rone, David Thuguvoda, and Billy Gatu. Denis 
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Walter Reinhardt, a Brisbane-based entrepreneur was another individual who joined 
the local opponents. The association of these different individuals was central in their 
strong opposition to the Gold Ridge project between 1996 and 1998. Opposition to the 
project persisted through the period of project development and was usually instigated 
by individuals who claimed some leadership role in the community. This section 
outlines the roles of these players and their associates in the Gold Ridge project 
development. 
Willy Rone was one of the principal landowners of the Gold Ridge project. He has 
become a 'paramount chief since the development of the project. Although until 1995 
he had lived in Honiara, he still remained one of the principal landowners. As a 
member of the Rausere sub-clan of the Manukiki ('small sister') moiety of the Matoba 
society, the discovery of one of the major gold deposits on Rausere land had enhanced 
his status as an important principal landowner for the Gold Ridge project. The current 
speaker of the Solomon Islands National Parliament, Mr. Paul Tovua was a member 
of the Rausere land and was therefore closely related to Chief Willy Rone. The 
importance of this deposit made him one of five principal landowners of the Gold 
Ridge mining lease area. It was also the principal reason for which Paul Tovua had 
also been co-opted into the Board of the locally registered subsidiary of Ross Mining 
NL namely Gold Ridge Mining Ltd. In essence, Willy Rone and Paul Tovua had been 
at the forefront in the dealings that involved the state and the mining company. 
In February 1996, the government of Solomon Mamaloni carried out another 
administrative reshuffle, which resulted in the movement of some secretaries from 
their existing line ministry. This included Stephen Danitofea, a qualified geologist in 
the Solomon Islands, and the Permanent Secretary, being removed from the Ministry 
of Mines and Minerals. Stephen Danitofea knew Willy Rone through their 
membership of the South Sea Evangelical Church. The removal of Stephen Danitofea, 
whom I replaced him, was not popular. There was a common knowledge in the 
Ministry that the landowners, meaning Willy Rone, were not happy with the 
replacement. This led to the submission of a drafted letter to the Minister of Mines 
and Minerals, Hon. V ouza, and copied to Prime Minister Mamaloni that stated that 
the five principal landowners of Gold Ridge were not happy with the change of 
Permanent Secretary. This letter was signed by all the principal landowners. The 
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Deputy-Prime Minister Francis Saemala had also sent a letter of concern in reply to 
the Prime Minister. I was called by the Prime Minister's office to give a brief on the 
latest development. None of us, including my senior staff, were certain about this 
issue, but it was learned that there had been discussions between the deposed 
Permanent Secretary and Willy Rone. This relationship continued until late into the 
project. This collaboration came to head after a group of the Gold Ridge landowners 
(who had then excluded Willy Rone) demanded government explanations. The 
government was asked to explain why Stephen Danitofea had used the government 
office to introduce Willy Rone to Slater & Gordon lawyers during official hours to 
take litigation against the government and Ross Mining (Solomon Star 1998). Slater 
and Gordon lawyers were responsible for the high profile lawsuit against Ok Tedi and 
BHP in PNG in 1994 to 1996. 
The other dimension of this relationship was that, in 1995, when Stephen Danitofea 
was Secretary to the Ministry of Mines and Minerals, Barclay Mowlem Ltd was given 
a government mandate to carry out the Lungga Hydro-Scheme. The recurrent power 
failures in Honiara township, as a result of lack of electricity capacity, made such a 
Hydro-Scheme a priority project. By the end of 1995, the mandate had not progressed 
much further. At this time, Denis Reinhardt came to the Ministry to check on the state 
of the mandate and informed the government that his company would now be 
coordinating the mandate. Mr. Reinhardt had come as the Executive for the Brisbane-
based Merthyr Holdings Ltd, as one of the three parties in the Lungga Hydro 
Consortium. At the beginning of 1996, the consortium had assumed that the 1995 
mandate by the government to build a hydro scheme for Honiara had remained 
unchanged. The consortium did not seem to realise that the mandate had expired at 
the end of the year. A conditional clause that they had included suggested that if either 
party had not pursued the progress of the project by the end of the year, neither party 
was responsible for termination. Therefore the mandate would be considered null and 
void. In 1996, this hydro mandate was reviewed by a task force, which was meant to 
overlook the Hydro-Scheme project. What the taskforce found with the 1995 mandate 
was that it had given all indemnity to the consortium, but that there was no protection 
for the government where the consortium was at fault. The revised mandate was then 
sent to the consortium. A request was made that if they were to accept or make 
suggestions to the revised mandate they had to reply as soon as possible. The 
205 
government also stated that if replies were not received, it would be assumed that the 
consortium was no longer interested in the mandate. There was no reply until 13 
December 1996, when it was found through the media that Denis Reinhardt had 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Solomon Islands Electricity 
Authority (SIEA). The Chairman of SIEA, Billy Gatu, had signed the MOU with 
Denis Reinhardt committing the government to purchase three 1.5 MW high speed 
Wilson generators. This had caused conflict between SIEA as statutory body and 
Ministry of Mines and Minerals as its parent Ministry. I took up the issue to the 
Cabinet and this led to the sacking of the SIEA Board chaired by Billy Gatu. An 
attempt to stop the three Wilson generators, which cost more than SBD$ 8.4 million 
dollars, a price twice the value of the second hand generators, was not successful. 
This was because of the intervention of the Minister of Development and Planning, 
Francis Saemala (Solomon Star 1997). The generators were found to be defective and 
have subsequently been widely criticised in the media (Mosia 1998, Ono 1998). 
By October 1996, Denis Reinhardt had met up with another local person. This was 
David Thuguvoda, who had recently lost the national election to Jacob Vouza, the 
then-Minister of Mines and Minerals. David Thuguvoda was well known in the 
Solomon Islands media and also the public. He was one of the early Ministers of the 
first independence government in 1978. He had over the years been struggling to get 
back to the government, but with limited success. One of the major projects he was 
directly involved in was the joint venture between the Solomon Islands government 
and the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) of UK. The joint-venture 
company was the Solomon Islands Plantation Limited (SIPL). This oil palm 
plantation development started in 1972 as a project to prepare the Solomon Islands for 
political independence in 1978. It was implemented on the Guadalcanal plains where 
David Thuguvoda was a tribal landowner. Throughout the years, David Thuguvoda 
had tended to obtain the credit for facilitating the SIPL project. Due to its need for 
manpower, it had created numerous jobs. By the time that Gold Ridge project had 
taken off in late 1996, David Thuguvoda had joined forces with Willy Rone and 
Denis Reinhardt in opposing the project. Their concerns ranged from inadequate 
compensation, rights to provide electricity to the mine, and the downstream 
communities' fear of environmental pollution from the tailings dam. 
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Denis Reinhardt had become the coordinating person for David Thuguvoda, Willy 
Rone and Alfred Maeke to seek legal assistance. There was a heated debate in the 
media on the role of these individuals, and Denis Reinhardt. This led to articles 
published in the local media print demanding Alfred Maeke and the like explain their 
association with Reinhardt. The public became suspicious as demonstrated below in 
the local media. For example, 
.. If he has had no relationship with Denis Reinhardt in Lungga projects or the 
Gold Ridge Court Case, then how does he explain Denis Reinhardt? For 
example (i) Denis organising Slater & Gordon to act as his lawyers in the 
litigation. (2) Organising and paying for visits of litigants to Australia on 
frequent basis. Paramount chiefs Saki and Willie Rone and David Thuguvoda 
were always included. (3) Write press statements and letters to Ross Mining 
shareholders concerning the litigation. ( 4) Personally attending press 
conferences with Maeke and former litigants Thuguvoda and Roni in 
Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne. (5) Arranging legal assistance for Billy 
Gatu and the provision of a full time assistant, Donna Bath, to help Slater & 
Gordon and the litigants (Maneka 1998). 
By this time, there was more information about the Brisbane-based entrepreneur. 
There was information about his role in Papua New Guinea and who he was before 
coming to the Solomon Islands. 
6.5.2 Island hoppers 
Denis Walter Reinhardt would qualify as an 'Island hopper' in the contemporary 
sense. Before coming to the Solomon Islands, Reinhardt had been deported from 
Papua New Guinea in 1994 (Kone 1994, Korimbao 1994, Kulu 1992). The 
government of Papua New Guinea had been trying to deport Denis Reinhardt for 
some time. During 1992 the PNG government had advised all its missions and posts 
that Denis Reinhardt had been instructed to leave the country voluntarily. The reason 
given by the division of Immigration and Citizens was that when Denis Reinhardt 
entered the country he came on a business visa. But it was claimed that he had abused 
his visa conditions when he had involved himself with the Mount Kare landowners 
group. He had caused divisions among the landowners' development company, and 
other landowners (Kulu 1992). Reinhardt was known to have entered the mining 
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business in 1986, when he acquired several companies as personal investments. These 
were Yaramin Pty Ltd, Fortescue Media Pty Ltd and Trendell Nominees Pty Ltd who 
purchased approximately 13% of AuGold NL (Kulu 1992). These projects had all 
failed. 
During the Wingti government in PNG, he was employed as an adviser to Wingti. 
They had been personal friends before Wingti became Prime Minister. At the time, 
CRA, an Australian mining company, was involved in the development of Mount 
Kare. At the same time another Australian mining company, Ramsgate Resources of 
which Denis Reinhardt was a key shareholder, also wanted to control Mount Kare. 
Ramsgate Resources was said to have used $3 million dollars towards a legal battle 
for some of the landowners and thus divided the landowners. The dispute became 
problematic and CRA left. Thus Ramsgate resources took over the project, but 
disputes remained and Reinhardt was said to have negotiated a substantial benefit deal 
for himself if his company took over. This was later exposed, which led to his 
expulsion from PNG (Eremae 1998, Kone 1994, Korimbao 1994, Kulu 1992). 
In the Solomon Islands, after his signing of a MOU with SIEA in December 1996, he 
became a close associate with those opposing the Gold Ridge Mining Project. Later in 
1997, he was also deported from the Solomon Islands. His association with both 
Willy Rone and David Thuguvoda led to two legal suits against Ross Mining, but 
these were not successful (Eremae 1998). Willy Rone and David Thuguvoda became 
frequent flyers to Australia and back to the Solomon Islands in getting Slater & 
Gordon to take their case. After nine months they were disgruntled and Willy Rone 
and Thuguvoda turned their back on Slater & Gordon and Denis Reinhardt. In 
changing their position, they declared they were misled, was sworn in an affidavit 
before a Melbourne Lawyer, John Nicholas Zigouras (Eremae 1998). 
There were two other downstream landowners who had tried to take the litigation 
further but were not successful. These were Samuel Saki and Alfred Maeke, who 
filled the places left by Willy Rone and Thuguvoda. 
Clearly, these diverse individuals and corporate representatives were also significant 
players. In the combination of local landowners, government officials and foreign 
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demonstrate the state, as found Solomon Islands, and role resource 
development, remains contentious groups. The role of the state as representing 
the interests of citizens comes against 1ssue costs to kin groups not m 
terms of material benefits but also the cost in not recognising social rights as 
people. Thus there existed a tension between the state approaching natural resource 
use through the ideology of citizenship and kin group ideology as the basis of many 
kin groups, which define social rights to resources. This tension was well 
recognised by the state. The state's approach to reduce this tension was to approach 
the project through a wider consultation process. In establishing several working 
committees and sub-committees, the idea was for the state to engage as many interest 
groups as possible. The state used these committees to ensure it sought out the most 
contentious issues and found means to rectify them. 
The state, while concerned with the social rights of kin groups, as expressed through 
issues raised by them, gave priority to the concerns of the mining company. This was 
due to the state's need to meet its demands before committing to the project. Ross 
Mining NL was the company that took up the project. But Ross Mining NL, too, had 
to meet the demands of its shareholders whose prime concern was the profitability of 
the project. This meant for the mining company that it not only had to make a profit 
for the shareholders, but also had to demonstrate the capacity to make profits. Thus, 
given the almost 'fixed' goal of the mining company to make profits, the social rights 
of kin groups were further undermined when the state defined resource use within a 
citizenship framework with the company at the cost of kin groups. In other words, 
profitability to the company made sense in the context of a state that was concerned 
with national development, but it made little sense in a kin group context where the 
resource was seen as theirs, as their social rights were undermined by mere 
definitions. For kin groups, their social rights to ownership of resource entitled them 
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Chapter 7 
Interaction processes: the Gold Ridge project 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the nature of interactions at the Gold Ridge Mining Project 
(GRMP), describing and analysing how each of the principal players interacted. There 
were at least three major instances of "articulation" of relationship of interest. The 
first instance was the preparation of the Gold Ridge kinship-based community to 
interact with the Ross Mining NL and the state. The second instance refers to the 
actual process of negotiation, which involved the state, Ross Mining NL, and the Gold 
Ridge landowners. The final instance refers to the agreements and disagreements that 
resulted from the interaction processes. Interaction among major stakeholders in the 
Gold Ridge Mining Project took a particular form. 
During the 1960s, as outlined in Chapter 4 of this thesis, this type of interaction took 
the form of state and missionary facilitation of access for natural resource use. In the 
1990s, in the case of the Gold Ridge project, the state went one step further by 
facilitating some form of kin group institution as a facilitating mechanism for 
interaction with kin groups. This was done by creating a landowners Association. 
7.2 Organising gold ridge landowners 
The need to reorganise the Gold Ridge landowners was partly due to the current state 
system in the Solomon Islands. In the Solomon Islands administrative framework, the 
three-tier system of central, provincial, and local government exists outside the 
jurisdictions of customary land and kinship systems. This means that while the state 
has its own administrative framework, this framework does not have direct 
management procedures over what happens to land and associated resources that 
remain within the customary system of influence. This situation has created problems 
of legitimacy and representation of kin groups when it comes to decision-making over 
resource use. In other words, this is a clear case of institutional divide between the 
state on one hand and the people on the other, who are largely kin group members. 
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This has been the concern of kin groups since political independence. The way the 
state approached the existing institutional divide between state and kin groups was to 
establish an ad hoc institution for landowners. This was the creation of the Gold 
Ridge Landowners' Association, which was used to facilitate the role of 
representation for landowners. 
During June 1995, Ross Mining NL had already acquired rights to the Gold Ridge 
tenement and the associated mineral prospects from the previous license holder, 
Saracen Minerals Ltd. The acquisition cost no less than twenty million Solomon 
Island dollars (equivalent to at least six million Australian Dollars). The completion 
of this purchase allowed Ross Mining to begin the process of preliminary exploration 
to further confirm the deposits and to demarcate the extent of the mineral reserves. 
The new entry of Ross Mining caused problems with landowners' compensation 
claims for access into the prospect area. The problem that became apparent was that 
the compensation claimants were coming from many members of what appeared to be 
the same clans. This situation led to some confusion among the mining company 
management in determining who the mining company was dealing with. The base 
manager of the Gold Ridge project, Eugene Iliescu, wrote in June 1995 that, 
We receive compensation claims every day from landowners, as water 
disturbance rights claims, edible fruit tree claims, land access, sacred sites 
disturbance rights, and noise claims. The company tries to pay some of the 
compensation, but in the next days or weeks another set of landowners returns 
with what appears to be the same claims. The company is not sure about 
legitimacy and whether we have paid the right landowners ( Illiescu 1995). 
The mining company's concern about the legitimacy of compensation claims was one 
of the motives for their consultation with the Solomon Islands government about an 
identification study on the Gold Ridge community. This took place in late June 1995. 
This was at a time when the Solomon Islands government changed leadership and was 
then led by the late Solomon Mamaloni for no more than six months, after taking over 
from the previous government of the National Coalition Party headed by Francis 
Hilly. Permanent secretaries were then changed over as well. I was the Secretary to 
the Ministry of Forestry in the previous government, and because of the strong anti-
logging policy of the previous government Secretaries were removed. There were 
seven of us who were moved to the new subsidiary government portfolio. I was then 
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made the government consultant for National Heritage because of my earlier 
involvement in a World Heritage Project when I was the Secretary for the Ministry of 
Tourism six months earlier. It was at this time, in June 1995, that the government 
offered my services to work with Ross Mining NL in a social mapping study of the 
Gold Ridge project. The idea was to ensure landowner social structures were known 
and also to identify the existing clans and their leaders. This was intended to avoid 
different members of the same clan demanding compensation for claims that had 
already been paid for. This objective was supposed to be met through land 
adjudication, but it was seen as not sufficient to account for the organisational 
structure of the Matoba people. Therefore my role as consultant was for the 
identification of the Gold Ridge landowners (Naitoro 1995). This study contributed to 
the facilitation of the Gold Ridge Landowners' Association as the landowners' 
representing agency to the state and the mining company. 
Clearly, at the beginning of the Gold Ridge project the issues of representation and 
legitimacy were the factors that strongly influenced the state and the company to 
facilitate the formation of the landowners' Association. It was an ad hoc approach, not 
only for the state and the company, but also for the community because the 
Association attracted temporary support only at the critical period of the project. 
7 .2.1 Land trustees 
The formation of the Gold Ridge Landowners' Association was also seen as 
appropriate because the requirements of the Lands and Titles Act (NPSI 1981) 
established the need to appoint land trustees as necessary prerequisites for land 
registration. The state had been engaged in this land adjudication process for several 
years, and had already gathered scattered information about the Matoba people, 
especially in terms of categories of clans. However, the process of land adjudication 
had been on and off over the years as it was a difficult task to be completed quickly 
because of the issue of locating every landowner. There was also the aspect of land 
disputes arising from the declared benefits expected from the project area. 
Furthermore, there was the physical difficulty of the rugged mountainous terrain, 
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which made land adjudication a problem when government officials were given very 
few resources. 
During 1995, the mmmg company's pledge to carry out mining meant land 
adjudication had to be completed in time for government registration. Between 1991 
and 1995, there were 21 blocks of land identified for registration. The Lands and 
Titles Act required five trustees as representatives for each of the blocks identified. 
This legal requirement meant that each block of land required landowners to choose 
five representatives among themselves. This raised the representation issues again, 
because there was the fear that by using registration, and having five individuals listed 
as landowner representatives, others might come to be considered as lesser 
landowners. This fear was sometimes substantiated because when it involved a 
financial payout to landowners from those 21 blocks bank accounts were often made 
in the name of those five trustees. Apart from the landowners' own kinship system, 
the actions of these trustees in distributing benefits to landowners satisfactorily were 
left outside of the domain of the state and the mining company. It was not that the 
state and the mining company should be unnecessarily involved in distribution 
mechanisms of the landowners, but that ineffective or corrupt systems of distribution 
by some landowners created numerous reasons for further disputes and these were 
often taken to the government and the mining company. 
It was during this period of land adjudication that I held several meetings and 
discussions with community groups at the villages of Valebeabea, Valeboli, Tinimeat, 
and Narakasia. During the six weeks' work in the field, a number of issues became 
clear. One of them was that the issue of trustee application for land registration was 
creating a hierarchy that was based on literacy rather than kinship rights. For 
example, 100% of the 21 blocks of land had appointed five trustees each and none of 
them had any female representatives. That is in a traditional society where moieties 
are headed by women. Not all of the men who were trustees were literate, but they 
were outspoken in their community. The other issue that became obvious was that 
there was tension created by this arrangement amongst trustee representatives 
themselves. This tension was shown through the number of leaders that were declared 
as chiefs over time. For example, in 1991, it was reported that there were only two 
leadership chiefs among the Matoba people, one representing the Manugaravu (big 
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bird) moiety and the other the Manukiki (small bird) moiety. This changed later to 
five principal chiefs. The five principal chiefs of Gold Ridge were Willie Rone, Allan 
Chris, Esi Sulunganga, Isaiah Otto, and Simon Tiva. These five chiefs remained 
principal chiefs as individuals but they could not represent the interests of their 
subordinate groups. Instead the subordinate groups were also given the right to 
represent themselves. Thus, a number of subordinate groups in each category of 
moiety had also appointed their own representatives. 
The frequent changing and appearance of new individual leaders among the Matoba 
people, accompanied by numerous compensation claims to the mining companies, 
raised the issue of leadership and reorganisation of Gold Ridge landowners. The goal 
for the state and the mining company was to make sense of these different forms of 
leadership systems found among the landowners. It was decided that to begin to 
consider reorganisation of the landowners as preparation for the project negotiation, 
some understanding of their organisational system was necessary. It was found that 
because there were two main moieties (Manugaravu and Manukiki) there were two 
main genealogical chiefs. When each moiety was subdivided into sub-clans, there was 
a total of five sub-clans. Three of the sub-clans were from the Manukiki moiety and 
the other two were from the Manugaravu. This made up the five principal landowners 
or chiefs. The use of the term principal landowners was quite misleading. This is 
because they were not principal landowners per se, but were principal kinship leaders. 
When the state carried out land adjudication, this meant that each of 21 blocks 
identified was no longer listed as a moiety land area, but as a land area associated 
with the families that were currently using the area. The trustee requirement of the 
Lands and Titles Act had, in effect, legitimised the sub-clan land users as landowners, 
and therefore identified principal kinship leaders as individual leaders of their own 
right. The women in this system of moiety were entirely left out. 
Making sense of this complex moiety system that changed unwittingly through the 
introduction of state policy on land adjudication only helped remove power from 
women and the traditional kinship leadership structure. It was in response to what 
seemed an "unfair" representation system, on one hand, and on the other, the need to 
formalise accountability for actions taken by landowners. As a result another 
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several local and expatriate 
lawyers of drafting a constitution for an association that accommodate the 
system of Matoba social organisation, discussion a 
lawyer, it emerged that the current government laws did not provide for any such 
integration, but that it might still be possible. The other lawyers, representing 
landowner interests, including Francis Waleilia, considered that there was no need for 
any registration of the landowners' Association as long as they were happy to abide 
by a constitution for the administration of a landowners' Association. However, to 
meet the criteria of effective representation, including the involvement of women, it 
was thought that the structure of the landowner organisation should involve an 'Open 
Council'. The idea of an 'Open Council' was to allow maximum village participation. 
The Council would involve at least two people from each interest group in the 
community, including women, church leaders, and youth groups, In addition, as an 
open council, other people of the Gold Ridge area were also invited to participate. 
This Council was to meet at first to elect an Association board and to give the boards 
mandates to represent their interests. 
The Association Board must, however, include the five principal landowners as 
permanent members, The other members would represent each of the eighteen sub-
clans. The Association Board then was to elect their Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson, 
Secretary and a Treasurer. The Association Board was to represent the landowners' 
interests to the state and Ross Mining NL; the first meeting of the Council at 
Narakasia village mandated the new board and subsequently legitimised the role of 
the Gold Ridge Landowners' Association Board (GRLOAB). 
After the formation of GRLOA, the board was ready to make deals. By February 
1996, the landowners' Association formalised their office bearers. By this time, the 
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government had restored my posting not to the Ministry of Forestry, from which I was 
removed the previous year, but as Secretary to the Ministry of Mines and Minerals to 
implement the Gold Ridge Mining Project. 
The first issue that was referred to the Ministry from the newly formed GRLOA was 
finance. The Association's first chairman, Charles Tani, informed the Ministry that 
financial resources constituted the main obstacle for the Association to run 
effectively. This issue was left out deliberately because the government and the 
mining company thought the new organisation would begin to make arrangements of 
its own to source finance, given that they would get royalty payments once the mining 
project was operational. The Association Board insisted that they had to be provided 
with finance before any negotiation could proceed. This issue was then taken to the 
government's advisory committee, recommending that financial arrangements be 
made to support the new organisation. While the Advisory Committee for the Gold 
Ridge project was supportive, the issue of where the money should come from 
became another problem. The issue was taken up with Ross Mining NL, which 
recognised the situation and decided that finance for the Association could be 
provided, as long as the Association was prepared to pay it back when their royalty 
was paid to them. As such, it was a form of loan arrangement. The company then 
made available the payment of more than SI$ 90,000 in instalments to the 
Association. This financial resource was used by the Association to pay for its Board 
members' sitting allowances and the payment oftheir local lawyers. It also helped in 
getting advice from the PNG mining consultant, Mr. Sears. 
Under these conditions, with the landowners' Organisation trying to establish itself, 
and at the same time trying to access financial and human resources, the Gold Ridge 
project negotiation process took place. This was the negotiation between the Gold 
Ridge landowners, the state, and the mining company. At the same time, the 
landowners themselves were expected to deal with their own internal politics. The 
internal politics among landowners was one of the reasons why the formation of an 
Association was strategically useful as a means of reducing claims made against the 
state and the mining company. 
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7.2.3 Local landowner politics 
Landowners, as stakeholders, were considered as one category of beneficiary of the 
Gold Ridge Mining Project. The government itself had popularised the notion of 
landowners without knowing exactly what this meant in terms of organisation. 
Landowners had come to mean people and their land, with limited regard to the 
capacity of landowners as a social group that were part of the larger Solomon Islands 
community. Landowners were therefore left to determine methods and means with 
which they would respond to external forces, including the state and mining 
companies. The diversity of landowners meant that reaching decisions that would be 
considered as representative of the group was difficult. The formation of a 
landowners' association was one means to manage this situation because the project 
required decisions that would be binding over landowners and other stakeholders. 
However, while the formation of an association was a useful mediation strategy, it 
also provided an environment for dissent among potential association leaders. Thus, 
the Association was more adversary in nature, rather than reciprocal, as a means of 
establishing relationships as known in their moiety system. 
The 'new opportunity' of disorganised landowners arose to the advantage of some of 
the landowner members. Prior to the Gold Ridge project, some of the members of the 
landowners were either working as public officers, politicians, teachers, or church 
pastors. These individuals had come to be important not only as landowners but now 
as a result of being exposed to the wider community. In the Gold Ridge case, one of 
the principal landowners had been a church pastor as well as a labourer in town. The 
fact that he had spent most of his time in town did not change his claimed leadership 
as a principal at Gold Ridge. Willy Rone was seen in this manner, because not only 
was he the landowner for Rausere land, where the main Gold Ridge deposit was 
found, but because he was also a church pastor in the South Seas Evangelical Church. 
Below the tailings dam, the Chuva Bible School was established before the mine, and 
he was working as pastor for the wider Guadalcanal community. Willy Rone became 
an important individual in the Gold Ridge project. There were teachers who were 
working as primary teachers in the area who became important as a result of the mine. 
Charles Tani was a case in hand. He was a teacher and became the first Chairman of 
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the Gold Ridge Landowners' Association. The second chairman, Peter Shannel, 
worked as an electronic engineer for the Ministry of Police, and was then a public 
officer. The Association Board member, Paul Tovua, had been the National 
Parliament House Speaker for many years and remained the Speaker of Parliament 
until his replacement at the end of 2001. The important point here is that individuals 
like those described above were significant leaders for landowners and most of them 
shared one thing in common. They were literate or partly so and had exposure to 
introduced organisations based on legal norms or on religious codes from existing 
religions. They were also exposed to other forms of organisational systems such as 
farmers' associations. So clearly, the new landowner leaders were those individuals 
with the most exposure to modern practices. Being exposed meant often that they 
were also part of the structures of the state. Thus the role of these new leaders was 
vital for understanding of the politics of the landowners. Although the new leaders 
were part of Gold Ridge society or the Matoba people, their own versions of what 
they saw as priorities for their people differed. The teachers emphasised the need for 
education and the pastors emphasised church-building. Similarly, public servants 
emphasised financial resources for service delivery, and the politicians stressed 
royalties and compensation. The men decided for the women that they needed a clinic 
and a gardening area. Clearly, the new Association took over the role of traditional 
leaders in dealing with the state and the mining company. However, this did not 
enhance community empowerment but further alienated kin groups because of the 
emphasis placed on the Landowners' Association. Nonetheless, the Association 
provided apparent legitimacy and nominal representation at least for the mining 
project. 
From another perspective, the coming together of these new leaders under the Gold 
Ridge Landowners' Association was a great success in itself. It was realised that what 
held them together as a group during the negotiation period was the idea that 
collective demands were important for the negotiation of their rights. Their 
differences were suspended for the time being. 
There were several areas of tension among the Matoba society that were transferred to 
the newly formed landowner organisation. These included the distinction between 
traditional moiety systems. They also involved distinctions made between those 
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blocks of land found to have the gold deposit and those blocks of land that were close 
by but were used for purposes other than actual extractive mining. One of the 
important areas of tension was the competition for power between the previous 
traditional moiety system and the new role of the Association. This becomes 
important because unlike the moiety system where society was divided into two in 
order to create reciprocal relationship, in the newly established relationship the gold 
finds were mainly in the land of the Manukiki moiety and not in that of the other 
moiety Manugaravu. The Manukiki moiety was not necessarily obligated to 
reciprocate with Manugaravu in this instance, and therefore the Manukiki reciprocity 
expectation was focussed on the state and the mining company. Willy Rone was, in 
this respect, an important Manukiki principal spokesperson. This issue was of 
particular importance because interpreting landownership outside of the traditional 
moiety system meant that Manukiki moiety did not have to share its resources with 
Manugaravu, although under the Matoba traditional moiety system both moieties 
would work out a reciprocal relationship. Instead, the Manukiki promised to share the 
resource with its other moiety, the Manugaravu. This meant they did not have to 
provide an equal share of the royalty payment. This was the basis for royalty 
distribution, although not all the members of Matoba society agreed. 
The interpretation of resource rights outside of the Matoba moiety system also 
extended to the Manukiki moiety itself. This meant that land blocks where gold was 
found were defined as belonging to the sub-clan that had the access prior to the 
process of the exploration for minerals. In the traditional moiety system, there would 
be a greater share in the benefits from such land. In this instance, those who became 
trustees for the blocks of land found to have gold were to receive higher royalties than 
their cousins whose land nearby did not have gold deposits, although they were 
cleared for company building and infrastructure establishment. This meant that people 
like Willy Rone, who were successful claimants for the land where gold deposits were 
found, tended to take a larger share of royalties than others. These differences were 
important not only to the Gold Ridge community as a whole, but also in terms of 
implications for future disputes. These implications were down-played by the state 
and the mining company. The above distinctions between rights of landowners within 
a specific moiety, or between the moieties, formed a substantial basis for internal 
disputes during the project's life. 
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Apart from these clear distinctions within Matoba society, there were also less 
emphasised but equally important bases for dispute generation. One was the case of 
landowners whose land had been used for a tailings dam. The OboObo land 
community, whose land was used for tailings, had negotiated their separate deals 
through the hire of a private lawyer. They negotiated access to the mining company's 
power grid and to be given their share of relocation finance so that they could 
construct their own houses. This community's access to the mining power grid was 
seen as an advantage over those who were relocated without access to the power grid. 
The point of contention for them was the emphasis put on mineral resources land over 
the land value of the land used for tailings. Were these not simply two sides of the 
same coin? You could not have mining without a waste disposal area. 
However, the benefit envisaged from the project held other differences at bay for the 
Gold Ridge landowners. The emphasis on the Gold Ridge Landowners' Association 
as the legitimate body to negotiate with the state and mining company meant that the 
company could only act on or react to claims made by the Association. The state also 
had the same attitude and therefore the Association was legitimised as such on behalf 
of the people. The Association became the only body that could represent the interests 
of the landowners. 
7.3 Negotiation 
The negotiation for the development of the Gold Ridge project was conducted during 
1996 and 1997. The establishment of the Gold Ridge Landowners' Association meant 
that the state and the mining company were ready to cut out deals about the Gold 
Ridge project. The categories of benefit that were negotiated included: negotiating 
fiscal terms; negotiating the social and environmental impact; and negotiating power 
supply. Each of these categories of negotiating issues is outlined in this section. 
221 
7.3.1 Fiscal terms 
The Solomon Islands government was supportive of the Gold Ridge project. The long 
history of exploration in the country without any actual mining development resulting 
had concerned the government over the years. The government policy then was to 
identify the Gold Ridge project as a priority project for the national interest. 
The negotiation took just over a year to complete, between April 1996 and March 
1997. This was seen as a very short period for negotiating a relatively large-scale 
project for Solomon Islands. The major issues for each party varied, and where 
controversy arose compromises were sought. For the state, the fiscal package was the 
major issue of negotiation. This included: 
• Royalties 
• Export Duty 
• Income Tax 
• Additional Profits Tax 
• Withholding Taxes 
• Custom Duty 
• Goods Tax 
In essence, the state was mainly concerned with financial revenues. These taxes and 
royalties were the major basis for negotiation between the government and the mining 
company, and any agreement over these terms would have constituted the Mining 
Agreement. For the landowners, on the other hand, apart from sharing the royalties, 
the indigenous landowners were largely considered as indirect beneficiaries from the 
project, that is, through payment of compensation for their inconvenience. The fact 
that the state was to give them royalties was then seen as a government favour to the 
indigenous community. This perception is clearly a sticking point for the indigenous 
community. 
From the point of view of the state, a number of political and economic conditions 
were used as the basis for negotiating terms and rates of benefit from the Gold Ridge 
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project. The first is that of international competitiveness. The state was aware that the 
Solomon Islands was not a country with mining industry experience. There had been 
much exploration, but there had not yet been any mining development. Therefore, in 
competing for international capital, the state was in the first place not prepared to 
scare a potential investor away. The second factor concerned investor perception of 
the Solomon Islands. Thus, it was seen as essential that the state be seen to be 
promoting foreign investment. The idea was to have policies that were conducive to 
an investment environment. Such conditions should take into account the economic 
and political conditions expected of most investors. This meant that only so much 
could be asked of the project in terms of benefit demands. This point was 
controversial, as there was uncertainty about the value of the project, especially when 
the value of the project was unclear to landowners and reported exclusively by the 
mmmg company. 
The next important factor influencing the state position in the negotiation was the 
history of the Gold Ridge project. The Gold Ridge mineral deposit had been known 
for a very long period of time. Throughout this time, there had been exploration. The 
Metapona River mouth, where Gold Ridge is located, was where the first Spanish 
explorers found alluvial gold leading to subsequent historical exploration in this area. 
In other words, the project should be made to happen or be closed off from any 
further unfruitful speculations. 
During the period of negotiation in 1996, there had been numerous exchanges of 
information about mining in Papua New Guinea, some of which told of substantial 
benefits received by landowners. The principal project referred to in Papua New 
Guinea was Lihir. To avoid unachievable expectations, the state also recognised that 
Papua New Guinea had a mining industry, while acknowledging that this did not 
totally apply in the Solomon Islands situation. Also, in the case of PNG, the mineral 
resources found there were mostly world-class mines, unlike the case of the Gold 
Ridge project. Then it was decided that the state should adopt a strategy and policy of 
consultation and reasonable demands from the project. The Gold Ridge project was to 
be a test case project to pave the way for future projects in the Solomon Islands. 
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Given the factors outlined above, the state had largely tried to support the Gold Ridge 
project, even in cases where the state lost income. For example, in the Gold Ridge 
Agreement, the state decided to waive its right to royalties and awarded the 1.5 % on 
gross revenues to the indigenous community and the provincial government. The 
indigenous landowners received 1.2% while Guadalcanal Province received 0.3 % of 
the royalty. Under the existing mineral policy, royalties remained the property of the 
state. This change in awarding royalties to the indigenous community was largely a 
'guild' action to meet the reality of Solomon Islands customary land tenure where land 
and all that is in it are considered customary property. However, for the state not to 
forego all revenue from the mineral, it placed an export duty of 1.5% on gross 
revenues to be paid to the state. These were basically the direct income benefit from 
the project. In addition the state imposed a fixed income tax rate of 35%, although a 
100% cost adjustment was allowed for exploration and development costs to the 
mining company. There were also withholding taxes of 5% on interest payments. In 
terms of custom duty and goods tax, some essential items were exempted to facilitate 
the project. These revenue conditions were agreed upon. In the event of the company 
making an exceptionally high profit margin, which was calculated as above a 25% 
real threshold rate of return, a government tax on profit of 30% at a fixed rate, was 
imposed. This was called the Additional Profits Tax. The company agreed upon the 
Additional Profits Tax provision, although it was considered unlikely in practice to 
take place. 
The government negotiation team was happy with any deal that would in the long 
term act as a policy incentive for project investment from foreign capital in the future. 
The government was also prepared to avoid unreasonable taxation of economic 'rent'. 
However, if the project became profitable beyond expectation then a 'ring fencing' 
policy was put in place through the Additional Profits Tax. These issues of taxes and 
royalty were the core factors under consideration between the state and Ross Mining 
NL The tax rate regime mentioned above formed the government's fiscal package for 
the Gold Ridge project. 
There were additional issues that involved Gold Ridge landowners. The indigenous 
landowners were largely considered in the light of compensation for their disturbance 
on the part of the state and the mining company. On the part of the state towards the 
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indigenous people, the carrot used was the awarding of the 1.5% royalty rights to 
landowners. The second important state contribution was the awarding of 500 ha of 
state land. This was to be used for a village for the Gold Ridge landowners who had 
been relocated. There were no payments of transfer fees to the state or actual 
payment of the property. This is another example of the state's general support and 
eagerness for the project to be implemented. Apart from those two factors, the state 
could only pledge support for the landowners in terms of general provision of services 
once the state began receiving more revenue as a result of the project. 
7.3.2 Environmental Impacts 
There were two approaches in the negotiation of the social and environmental issues 
surrounding the Gold Ridge project. The first approach was the statutory requirement 
for a feasibility study. The mining company was to produce a technical feasibility 
study that concentrated on the economic and technical viability of the mining project. 
The submission for such technical feasibility was conditional on the approval and 
issuance of the mining lease. It was also part of this mandatory requirement that the 
company was to produce an Environmental Management Plan. These issues were 
considered under the technical feasibility study. In submission of the feasibility study, 
the government was to determine the accuracy of the feasibility study and to ensure 
there were no significant errors that may have led to wastage of resources on the 
project. The government was aware that issues of mineral deposits and the extent of 
such reserves and the economic viability of the project were of significant interest to 
the company. This was especially the case as far as the investors were concerned. The 
knowledge of Ok Tedi and the Bougainville Crisis in neighbouring Papua New 
Guinea reminded the government of the seriousness of this aspect of the project. 
It was the issues of the tailings dam and the use of cyanide for gold extraction that 
concerned the government most, as these had many implications for government 
policy. From a technical perspective, the tailings dam was the most important task to 
be carried out by the mining company. A feasibility study is a statutory requirement 
for securing a mining lease. Thus in April 1995, a feasibility study was commenced 
by Ross Mining NL A full feasibility study in this sense requires a sufficiently large 
diamond drilling program, metallurgical test work, resource calculations and geo-
statistical studies. It also involves extensive site engineering, investigation and 
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environmental studies. 
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Geology and mining concerns were important for the project as a whole. Geological 
consideration involves metallurgical test work, resource calculations, and geo-
statistical studies. In the RTZ review they were satisfied that the original assay 
laboratory results were consistent with those from the external laboratory. They were 
also satisfied with resource estimation because the two methods used (indicator 
kriging and a manual polygonal estimate) were also comparable. In terms of mining 
concerns, only minor adjustments were identified, such as increasing the working 
hours of the truck fleet to allow for moisture content of the ore. 
Apart from geology and mmmg concerns, the issue of the mmmg process itself 
needed to be ascertained. For example, in terms of processing, the RTZ review 
identified issues of further test work to identify the nature of clay-rich material to 
ascertain the size of equipment required. R TZ also concurred with the proposal to 
install an INCO cyanide destruction plant seven years before the mine closure. 
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FIGURE 5: Map of proposed tailings dam management plan with INCO plant 
(Source: Ross Mining NL) 
This was to ensure that cyanide discharge levels were less than O.Smg/1 WAD CN 
from the INCO plant. This cyanide concentration level from the INCO plant was 
expected to further dilute to 0.1 mg/1 in the natural river system. The Solomon Islands 
government, through the Department of Environment and Conservation, was expected 
to verify and certify the acceptance of the diluting effect of the natural river system. A 
final consideration was the tailings catchment, which required geo-technical drilling 
to estimate permeability of the basal sediments, and water balance to assist in the 
technical design for the dam construction structures. 
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Engineering and infrastructure concerns were mainly concerned with haul roads, plant 
foundations, and tailings catchment areas. The concerns here were to do with stability, 
especially with the high rainfall conditions in the Solomon Islands. A further 
consideration was the pipeline connecting the tailings and the main processing plant. 
The design need was to identify the location of chokes, containment of sumps, release 
valves and inspection points. Part of the engineering work would also involve the 
establishment of an 11 megawatt generator power station. 
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FIGURE 6: Map: One of the Gold Ridge pits and plans for roads, a haulage road, 
water infrastructure and the plant site (Source: Ross Mining NL) 
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These environmental issues were important not only for the mining company but also 
for the state to be able to convince the public of the high standard of environmental 
practice demanded for the project. These environmental issues had the characteristic 
of being too technical for most village people and much concerned about their trust in 
the state. On the other hand, more visible environmental concerns, such as the 
changing of the tropical rain forest into a 'moonscape', were seen as an important 
reflection of environmental impact on kin groups and their environment. 
The company's approach to the issue of environmental management was to carry out 
a revegetation program, an evaluation of the suitability of waste rock as a plant 
growth medium, and an assessment of the containment of the tailings material. RTZ, 
however, suggested that an evaluation of the significance of contaminated waters 
from the tailings dam areas was necessary. There was also a need to provide proper 
engineering design to control both ground and surface waters for the ROM stockpile, 
processing plant, and mine workshop areas. There was the need for a detailed 
environmental management program (EMP) that would define the appropriate 
measurement, monitoring and reporting procedures. It was suggested that a 
complementary system of measurements (by Ross Mining) and monitoring (by SIG) 
be established. Thus, the major components of the environmental management 
program included: 
• confirmation of water quality standards for all parameters to be tested 
• procedures for land clearance works 
• method statements to control erosion and soil conservation 
• a plan showing how these procedures would be carried out in different areas 
where civil works were to be carried out 
• procedures for handling and storing of chemicals and fuels, supervision of waste 
disposal in the waste rock dumps and tailings 
• a scientific data collection program and an approach to be used in the event of 
animal poisoning in the tailings, and finally 
• specification of measures to avoid excessive deforestation of the project and 
surrounding areas. 
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7.3.3 Social impacts 
Apart from the technical aspects of the feasibility study, a social impact study was 
approached in two stages. The first stage was the land adjudication process involving 
the collection of vital information about landowners in association with a social 
impact study aimed at identification of the Gold Ridge social structure. I was involved 
in this component in carrying out the social structure identification (Naitoro 1995). 
The second stage in the approach to the social component was a 'wider community 
consultation process'. The Solomon Islands government at the time felt that, instead of 
simply hiring a consultant to report on the social impact, it was preferred that a 
comprehensive consultation approach be carried out. This involved the engagement of 
many indigenous customary landowners, cultural institutions, women's organisations 
and NGOs, such as the Solomon Islands Development Trust (SIDT). The Solomon 
Islands government established a social and environmental impact committee 
designed to facilitate this wider consultation process. The recommendation of this 
committee was to be taken up by the Gold Ridge Advisory Committee. The 
Committee had also been involved in the consultations with the mining company on 
issues involving the village relocation program. The committee's major concern was 
cultural loss and the capacity of the new village to accommodate the impact. Thus, 
with regards to village relocation, the cultural centre, women's centre, church 
building, and a primary school were seen as vital. Further on, the inclusion of a water 
supply system to reduce workload on the part of the women was also discussed. 
The downside of this wider consultation approach was that, although there were many 
genuine issues and concerns identified, there was no way of ensuring that those 
conditions would be appropriately met and sustained through the life of the mining 
project and beyond. Thus it was sometimes argued that the social impact study was 
done in this form but with limited intensity, much like the physical investigations 
required of the main feasibility study. In a sense, the social impact study was not a 
critical factor for the mining project. But clearly this would be one of the important 
areas of lessons to be learned, that social impact assessment was necessary for 
sustaining the security of tenure. The emphasis on the physical aspect of the mining in 
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terms of financial commitment and time was seen as an indication of its relative 
importance. 
One important outcome of this wider consultation process was the sense of ownership 
of the project. Thus, in addition to the technical and social aspects of the feasibility 
study there was also wider consultation with the various stakeholders. This was a 
necessary part of the requirements for issuance of the mining lease to Ross Mining 
NL Hence the negotiation process, which also began simultaneously with the 
feasibility study, progressed in the light of the emerging information obtained through 
consultation and feasibility study verification. 
7.3 .4 Power supply 
Apart from negotiating the environmental and social issues, a commercial dimension 
of the project became important as the project progressed. This was the issue of 
electrical power for the Gold Ridge project. At the start of the project in 1994, there 
had always been the assumption that the Solomon Islands government would supply 
electricity. The establishment of the Solomon Islands Electricity Authority (SIEA) as 
a statutory body responsible for electricity supply in the country sustained this 
assumption. However, it was also known, and a frequent occurrence in the country's 
main town Honiara, that power demand has always been an issue which the statutory 
body of SIEA had been unable to fulfil satisfactorily over the years. This problem 
went back several decades. Honiara township had grown significantly from 1953, 
when there were 1,100 people, to the 1990s, with about 50,000 residents. Subsequent 
governments had simply either loaned a new generator or subsidised it with smaller 
generator sets. Governments over the years had also tried to develop a hydropower 
station, but had been unsuccessful. The latest attempt on this idea of a hydro-dam 
project was the government mandate to Barclay Mowlem in 1995, to source finance 
and develop the project. The project could not get off the ground and was left to die 
naturally. Therefore the power situation in the country remained a critical issue. 
It was under the above conditions in the Solomon Islands that the issue of power 
supply for the Gold Ridge project became critical. The government was obviously 
interested in supplying power to the Gold Ridge project, but this depended on the 
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capacity of its statutory body (SIEA) to be able to meet the demand. The fact that it 
had not been able to meet the existing demand for power in Honiara made the 
government worried about how far it could push to retain this right if the mining 
company decided to ask for the right to generate their power supply on the mine site. 
This was the beginning of the power problem during 1996 and 1997. There were 
several meetings between the Ministry of Mines and Minerals, the Cabinet Office, and 
the SIEA management. The SIEA management remained of the opinion that they 
would be able to meet the deadline for power requirement of the mine. At first, the 
government's position was that perhaps it would be able to provide electricity power 
to the mine through SIEA, if the SIEA was able to meet the deadline for beginning 
operation. But, gradually time was beginning to run out for SIEA to meet such 
commitments. The mining company was also worried, and proceeded to push for the 
alternative of the company providing power supply for the mine. The early 
correspondence over the issue of power supply for Gold Ridge began. The mining 
company wrote to the Statutory Boards of SIEA that the mining company would seek 
exemption on the issue of power. This did not go down well with SIEA Management, 
who replied on the 6th of January 1997 that the Authority remained of the opinion 
that they would supply power reliably and with a competitive cost (K wanairara 1997). 
At the SIEA Board's meeting on the 27th December 1997, the Board rejected the 
mining company's proposal for producing its own power for the mine. However, the 
mining company remained insistent on producing its own power, while SIEA also 
persisted that not only were they legally entitled to produce power but they were also 
capable to do so. This power issue had become a major issue and one that had to be 
negotiated so that a rational consensus could be reached. This became almost 
impossible, as the mining company wanted to control the cost of power supply and 
the SIEA wanted to expand its power supply market. 
The mining company's insistence became known later, based on correspondence from 
the Distribution Engineer of SIEA, Mr. Martin Rasu. This was in response to earlier 
correspondence from the mining company for SIEA to participate in the contract for 
electrical reticulation for the mine. Mr. Rasu rejected the offer due to reasons of 
resource capacity: 
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.. Although we are naturally interested in the electricity reticulation as per the 
details of your fax, we are sorry to inform you that due to workload 
commitments in Honiara, we would not be able to spare the manpower 
resources that would be required for such a project. Our advice to you, would 
be for you to seek the services of an organisation who has had wide experience 
in electricity distribution supply constructions, especially in rough terrain such 
as that likely to be encountered on the Gold Ridge project to undertake the 
sub-contact (Rasu 1996). 
The above correspondence gave away SIEA's position about their capacity to be able 
to supply power for the mine in time. This position was already commonly known and 
had made the government wonder why the SIEA Board remained persistent that they 
would be able to supply power for the mine. What the government did not know at the 
time, especially during late 1996, was that SIEA had made contact with Denis 
Reinhardt as representative of a new syndicate called the Lungga Hydro-power 
Consortium. The Ministry of Mines and Minerals usually deals with the issue of 
power development, and there was no knowledge that there was development towards 
this line of thinking. Any consortium that was to enter into a power development 
contract with SIEA must have the concurrence of the parent Ministry. But instead, 
SIEA and the consortium had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding. This 
committed the SIEA to pay for sets of generators that were supposedly to ease 
Honiara's electricity needs and committed the project to deal with the Consortium 
through SIEA to supply power to Gold Ridge. This situation caused significant 
embarrassment to the Central Government by showing that the statutory body had 
become a commercial renegade. The Ministry responsible for SIEA was not aware 
that the government had not endorsed this new deal. Also, this development made the 
central government appear to have no control over its agencies, as evinced by the 
recent initialling of the Mining Agreement on 4 October 1996 (Sanga 1996). In 
relation to the issue of power, the government had agreed that in the condition that the 
government through SIEA was not able to provide power supply reliably and on time, 
the government would relinquish this right to the mining company. The government 
knew that unless the SIEA Management performed "magic", they would not be able 
to deal with the needs of the mine, especially where indemnity against under-
performance was required. 
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The new development between SIEA and Reinhart's Consortium prompted the 
government to react instantly. An emergency meeting of the Gold Ridge Advisory 
Committee was held in which the Secretary to the Prime Minister, Joses Sanga, was 
the Chairman. Among those Committee members present were: the Attorney, Primo 
Afeau; Chairman of Public Service Commission, Waeta Ben; myself as Secretary to 
the Ministry of Mines; and the Chairman of the Gold Ridge Negotiating Committee 
and the Director of Mines, Don Tolia. The other ministerial secretaries were also 
represented at the meeting, including that of the Ministry of Commerce and Trade, 
Allan Arafoa and Deputy Secretary to the Ministry of Finance, George Kiriau. The 
Committee discussed the recent SIEA power development with unanimous concern 
for the government's reputation and the need for SIEA to comply with the initialled 
Agreement. Hence the Advisory Committee recommended to the Cabinet, that in the 
case of the SIEA Board behaving contrary to the recent government agreement, then 
the Board would be terminated immediately as a matter of national interest. But 
before that happened, the Ministry responsible for SIEA would give them another 
opportunity to take heed of the government position towards the Gold Ridge project 
and discontinue any rushed commercial arrangement that may cost the project or the 
country more than was necessary. In response to this demand from the Advisory 
Committee, the author as Secretary to Ministry of Mines and Minerals wrote a letter 
to the SIEA Board that they should consider granting the power exemption under the 
current circumstances (N aitoro 1996). 
By this time Billy Gatu, the Chairman of SIEA, went to the local media, making 
allegations against me as Secretary of the Ministry of Mines stating that I had no 
regard for the interests of the nation. This media blow-out hit both local and 
international media in Australia (Syvret 1996). This power issue led the Prime 
Minister, Solomon Mamaloni, to make a press statement on the position of the 
government to avoid confusion (Mamaloni 1997). The SIEA Board was then 
subsequently terminated and was replaced with a new Board that was to ensure the 
statutory authority worked in concert with the government. Denis Reinhardt was 
declared an undesirable immigrant, as reported in the media (McCullough 1997). The 
government then issued the ministerial directive that Ross Mining would be exempted 
from the requirements of SIEA, as a result of the incapacity at the time to provide 
cheap and reliable power. The right for SIEA to supply power would remam, 
234 
depending on their successful completion of the Lungga hydro project, including 
meeting Honiara's demand for power. 
While the government was aware of the opportunity to be able to supply power to the 
Gold Ridge project, the long years of filed planning on the part of the government, 
through SIEA, had made it impossible for the power supply contract to be clawed 
back by the government. Negotiating power had also demonstrated the diverse 
interests involved in the machinery of the state. Clearly the problem of not being able 
to meet power needs was due largely to lack of planning. 
7.4 Agreements 
An agreement is a form of contract that implies a degree of understanding between the 
parties involved. As outlined in the previous section, agreements are usually reached 
after negotiation. Apart from the power supply issue, in which the government gave 
away its right to supply power, most other agreements reached involved Gold Ridge 
landowners. There were three categories of issues involving agreements. The issues 
included benefits, costs of environmental impacts, and compensation for social 
dislocation. 
The most important aspect of the Mining Agreement dealt with benefits from the 
project. That is the idea of how much each player should receive and whether such 
entitlements were agreeable to other players. For the state, a mineral resource is by 
law a state property. The state has exclusive rights over mineral resources. The Mines 
and Minerals Act 1990 clearly specified that mineral operations in the country could 
only be conducted under a government license. This would be the mining lease. 
Under this mining lease, the state may grant exclusive rights to any party for the 
purpose of mining development. The process of reaching agreement over mineral 
resources development in the Solomon Islands began with the Mining Law. Under the 
Mining Law, mining leases may be granted when its conditions were met. Some of 
these conditions were the need to fulfil the requirements of commercial viability, 
environmental considerations, and minimisation of social impact. These requirements 
would usually be met through a feasibility study, usually done by the mining 
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company. Thus, the mining lease and mining agreements were done simultaneously. 
That is, the negotiation of benefits from the mining project were conducted along with 
the negotiation of the feasibility study. These two documents were central to any 
mining project. While the document containing the agreement over the technical and 
environmental consideration of the project was executed through a letter of approval 
of the feasibility, benefits were negotiated and executed through a Mining Agreement. 
A Mining Agreement therefore gives the exclusive right of the state to the mining 
company by assuring that no one else will be given this right while there is an existing 
license or mining lease. 
It was within the context of these state policy positions that agreements over benefits, 
environmental considerations, and social dislocation of Gold Ridge landowners were 
framed. 
7 .4.1 Benefits 
The Gold Ridge Mining Agreement was reached on the understanding that the project 
must be a 'win-win' situation for all stakeholders. Therefore the economic and 
financial package had to be fair to all parties. Similarly, the law should also provide 
for an equal protection for all stakeholders. On the financial and economic side, the 
government agreed to a royalty formula of 1.5% gross revenue before tax, payable to 
land owners. The government also agreed with the mining company on taxation 
regimes that were considered fair. These regimes were covered earlier in the chapter. 
For the government, it had expected that the level of financial benefit through the 
various taxation regimes amounted to 45% of project total value. The government 
also agreed with the mining company that it be allowed a real rent refund of 20%. 
This means that the mining company could take 20% net profit return without 
attracting any further state tax. However, where there is an economic "rent" defined as 
super profit beyond the 20% real rent of refund, this would attract an additional fixed 
rate Profit Tax of 30%. The government was pleased with the financial aspect of the 
agreement. Given that the government wanted to create an attractive environment for 
mineral resource capital investment, it was prepared to make concessions in the 
context of government intake of 45% of the value of the project. 
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Landowners were seen as victims of the project, and therefore their rights were 
expressed in terms of compensation and minimisation of social impacts. This was 
generally referred to as the cost for social dislocation of the landowners. 
7.4.2 Social dislocation 
There were two sets of agreement made with Gold Ridge landowners known as 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOU). These two MOU were made apart from the 
main Gold Ridge Mining Agreement, which covered issues and benefits described 
earlier. The MOUs were made on the one hand between the state and the landowners 
and on the other hand between the mining company (Ross Mining NL) and the Gold 
Ridge landowners. 
The first MOU between the state and landowners was simple. The MOU between the 
state and the landowners contained government pledges. These included statements of 
principles of support for equitable benefits, provisions for primary school teachers and 
clinic services. These services were normal government responsibilities, though the 
state used them as bargaining items in negotiations. One reason for this was that the 
state could not afford any more beyond its current responsibility. The pledge was, 
however, to help when it could as a result of the income generation from the project 
Yet from another point of view, the government commitment under the MOU was a 
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generous gesture, even if it was clearly unlikely to be met in the immediate future, 
given the resource constraints. 
The second MOU between the mining company and the landowners involved two 
components, the compensation component and the minimisation of dislocation 
component. The compensation component involved direct financial payments and 
pledges for future financial support. The second component involved village 
relocation adequate enough to lessen the impact of the 'necessary' relocation impact. 
This involved compensation for sacred sites, payment for land leases and other minor 
costs (see Table 5 below) 
1. The payment of SI $3 Million dollars for disturbance and damages included: loss 
of income, Tambu sites, access and disturbances. These payments were in total, 
the payment for vacating of the area. 
2. There was to be payment for 10 new High School Scholarships and 5 College 
Scholarships per academic year. 
3. There was to be provision of 20% free carried equity, in cleaning, catering and 
security sub-contract which would be payable from the profits 
4. The issue of 270,000 fully paid shares in the parent company, Ross Mining NL 
Limited 
5. The payment of SI$0.5 Million dollars premium for the tailings dam 
TABLE 5: Summary of Compensation Package for the Gold Ridge Land landowners. 
The five categories of compensation payment seen above constituted a major part of 
the package for the indigenous community of Gold Ridge. 
The other component, which involved the minimisation of the impact of dislocation of 
the landowners, was carried out through the village relocation program. The 
relocation villages had an aggregate cost of SI$ 6 Million dollars. The four main 
villages were built in a 10 ha land area, a portion of the 500 ha freehold land 
transferred by the government to the landowners. The relocation cost for building the 
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The speedy processing of the project was one factor that caused much confusion 
among the indigenous community. The fact that the company was able to bring all the 
machinery, build the relocation village, and pay for compensation at the same time 
gave the impression that the project must be worth more than the claim of the 
company of SI$1 billion. One thing that was clear during this time was the desire of 
the state and the mining company to make the project work. This may have been 
useful for the speedy processing of the project, but it did not allow much adjustment 
time for the indigenous community to determine the nature of their demands and 
interests. The fact that the state and the mining company were not only paying 
compensation but also supporting them to collaborate did not give independence to 
the indigenous community to be able to negotiate objectively with the state and 
mmmg company. 
In the process of negotiation, and through the type of agreement reached, it became 
clear that the state and the mining company had their interests catered for. The state 
had the law in which mineral resources are defined as a state property, and the mining 
company possessed the capital and technical know-how about mining development. 
The indigenous community on the other hand was perceived as a victim of 
development and not as a true partner or contributor. Indigenous communities were 
seen simply as a stakeholder that must be compensated for the inconvenience of the 
project. They were not one of the development goals of the project. The indigenous 
community was also not institutionally prepared to represent their interests and 
definitions of development to the state and the mining company. For the above 
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the case 
state 
be used as reserve 500ha was g1ven as a 
substitute for the 500ha of land issued under lease to the mining company 
for the mining project. mining lease was a period of 36 years, which the 
indigenous landowners would reclaim their land. However, it was expected that such 
land would be returned to its original landowners. The relocation village was 
established east of Honiara, about kilometres inland from Henderson 
International Airport. This was also considered an advantage for the villagers to have 
their villages close to town to allow access to the Honiara market. 
The Gold Ridge Mining Project proposal was for an open pit gold mme and 
processing plant. The thirty villages or hamlets located on the proposed mine were to 
be relocated before any infrastructure development could take place. The thirty 
villages were largely the result of immigrant local population from the Weather Coast 
in the West and Suta area in the central parts of Guadalcanal Island, since prospecting 
started in the area in the 1950s. There were indigenous communities before the 1950s, 
but there were only a very few settlements. Most of the villages were developed as a 
result of panning culture, which came to be known as the Gold Ridge villages. The 
total population identified in the 1995 village census was 1,200 individuals. This 
included women and children, both indigenous landowners, and their extended 
families. 
The identification of the eighteen genealogical groups in the social impact study of 
the Gold Ridge report that I carried out in 1995 advised that the design of the 
relocation villages should be more sensitive to the kinship divisions. In this sense the 
design allowed for five categories of kinship groupings, corresponding to the five 
principal landowners. The principal landowners were like principal maternal uncles 
for the significant social groups. The relocation design divided the relocation area into 
four distinct sections that were to accommodate four distinct village or hamlet areas. 
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FIGURE 6: Picture showing the primary school building constructed for Gold Ridge 
community at the relocation village. 
Water was seen as an important contribution to services to the village and the general 
well-being of the population. The villagers were also church-goers and although they 
were not from the same denomination, it was agreed that a church be built for them to 
become a general worship building. The South Sea Evangelical Church took over 
much of the use of the building because they held the majority of the members of the 
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indigenous community. There were also the women's centre, primary School building, 
clinic, cultural centre, and the Gold Ridge Association headquarters building. 
The villagers were happy with their new homes until one of the principal landowners, 
Willy Roni, defected and joined Thuguvoda in their campaign against the Gold Ridge 
Mining Project. This defection was already discussed in Chapter 6 under section 6.5. 
His idea was that the compensation was not enough, housing standards were not 
adequate, and that they could have a better offer from another mining company. This 
might well have been so, but considering the position the state took in considering the 
project as marginal and one that should be used to attract foreign investment, the 
implementation was seen as quite satisfactory. In other words, Ross Mining 
performed to state expectations, given the political and economic scenario described 
earlier. 
The problem as far as the relocation village was concerned was the issue of 
institutional function. The state expected the Gold Ridge Landowners' Association to 
take charge of their future through their organisation. An indication of this motive was 
the establishment of the Gold Ridge Association headquarters at the relocation village 
area. As an administrative centre for the indigenous community, the effective 
functioning of this organisation was seen as most significant. The Gold Ridge 
Association organisation did function during the negotiation and for the purpose of 
the relocation village, but later the organisation seemed to have become reduced to a 
few decision-makers and therefore as an indigenous leadership it failed to meet its 
role. This institutional failure was decisive in the way the indigenous groups would 
deal with the state and the mining company. 
7.5 Disagreements 
There were significant areas of disagreement during the course of the development of 
the Gold Ridge Mining Project. These sets of disagreements did not include 
disagreements over the course of negotiation, where later some compromise was 
reached, but involved disagreements over which there was no easy solution. Among 
these major areas of disagreement, there were four main areas that stood out during 
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the project. They involved: ratification, compensation, monitoring, and supply of 
power. 
7. 5.1 Ratification 
The idea of ratification of the Gold Ridge Mining Project was strongly supported by 
Ross Mining NL, initially, but the negotiation committee rejected the proposal. The 
mining company felt that if a Ratification Act was provided, it would allow the 
project to operate independently of other laws in the country. This sounded similar to 
the approach in the early arrangements for the Panguna mine in Bougainville. The 
government rejected the proposal because it tended to operate in isolation to the 
country's economic development activities, especially other governing laws that 
administer taxation regimes for revenue rising in the country. The mining company 
subsequently dropped this proposal. 
7.5.2 Compensation 
Compensation became an issue for Gold Ridge landowners. Although compensation 
for sacred sites and other payments, as described earlier, was seen by the company as 
sufficient, the landowners were not very clear about the extent to which such 
compensation was appropriate. The company paid SI$ 3,580,710 as compensation, 
which included the premium for the tailings dam area known as Lots 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
The above value was considered to be compensation for all matters involving: 
• land premium payment 
• destruction of tambu sites 
• loss of access to tambu sites 
• loss of income 
• loss of access and rights to the area 
• social inconvenience 
• physical disturbance, and 
• destruction and loss of burial sites 
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Therefore, although the landowners were temporarily pacified through persuasions of 
future development, it remained an unfinished business. Clearly, the issue of value 
remains an important area for future research. 
7.5.3 Monitoring 
Monitoring of the project was the third area of uncertainty in the Gold Ridge project. 
The government acknowledged that for the Gold Ridge Mining Agreement to live up 
to its expectation, compliance with the agreement had to be monitored. There was 
need for the establishment of control mechanisms to ensure that the mining project 
complied with the agreement. On the part of the government, apart from improvement 
of human and technological resources at the Tax Department, there was also the 
pressing need to put a tax compliance regime in place. In addition, there was the need 
for the inspection of the Gold Ridge project by the government. This was not taken 
easily, as the mining company was concerned with confidentiality. On the part of the 
government there was the need to inspect the project to ensure that government 
requirements were met. This included inspection of mine work to ensure it complied 
with the proposed best practice suggested in the feasibility study. These issues were 
not satisfactorily resolved, although it was assumed that government would carry 
them out as provided for under government statutes. The above areas of disagreement 
or uncertainty were the major areas in Gold Ridge that had not seemed to be 
transparent. The issue of power supply was seen as settled under the condition the 
government saw as unavoidable. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
The central focus of Chapter 7 has been on the nature of interaction. Interaction with 
kin groups was a significant obstacle because kin groups are not recognised as an 
organised unit. Kin groups were seen simply as people that did not have any 
legitimate and legally recognised systems of organisation, although they were at the 
same time legally recognised as customary landowners. This institutional gap was one 
of the reasons for forming an ad hoc organisation for landowners such as the Gold 
Ridge Landowners' Association. It was only following the establishment of this ad 
hoc organisation that interaction with kin groups for land access was seen as possible 
and legitimate. 
The problem with the use of ad hoc institutions for interaction with kin groups is that 
a large number of kin group members had been further removed from direct contact 
with the state and the company. The new Association executives acted as mediators 
between their people and the state or the company. The new executives of the 
Association were a new community elite because of their exposure to the world 
outside of their immediate kin groups. The elites were either former school teachers, 
church pastors, or even government officials. In other words, while an Association is 
a useful mechanism to facilitate project development for the mining company and the 
state, it is not a panacea for securing kin group rights in mineral resource 
development. 
The instrumental position of the state allows the state to enforce measures that would 
support development of a mining project and thus the company and state are 
structurally better placed to achieve their goals in a mining development project. The 
legal position of ownership of mineral resources by the state and the capital and 
technological monopoly possessed by the company made both players better placed to 
argue for their rights. This could not be said for the landowners in their current 
position, where mineral resources are appropriated from kin groups, undermining 
their bargaining position. Thus interaction becomes fairer where positions of 
influence are of relative equivalence. In other words, the landowners' position could 
be improved if mineral rights ownership was returned to kin groups and thus gave 
them a position to influence mineral resource development contracts. This will help 
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kin groups with a stronger position to take ownership of resource development, while 
the state has the right to make laws and the mining company has access to capital and 
technology. 
At present, kin groups are dependent on the charity of the state and the mmmg 
company. Therefore, the interaction process is strategically biased against kin groups. 
Thus issues of social, cultural and environmental concern are sometimes marginalised 
because they are largely dealt with directly between the state and the company. Direct 
involvement in the management of these issues by landowners is essential if an 
improvement in the position of kin groups in mines is to be expected. 
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8.1 
purpose thesis to nature resource 
development relations between groups, the state and development companies 
Solomon Islands. The focus was on forms 
affected kin groups in mineral resource development. 
of relationships 
other words, the focus was 
on the structure of relationships that determine mineral resource development for kin 
groups. Therefore, trying to understand the structure of relations, the concept of 
articulation was used to understand the position of kin groups natural resource 
development. The Gold Ridge Mining Project in the Solomon Islands was selected as 
the main study case for this research on articulation between kin groups and the 
mining project. 
The central argument of this thesis is that the articulation of kin groups in natural 
resource development has been instrumentally biased against kin groups. This 
instrumentally biased form of articulation of relationships has its roots in the history 
of contact with colonial powers and has persisted until the present. Therefore, while 
the relationship between kin groups and natural resource development has improved 
over the years, such improvements were characteristic of processes rather than the 
structures that govern those processes. Improvement of kin group relations with 
natural resource development will require shifting beyond processes to structural 
changes that accommodate kin groups' collective goals. It has not been learned to this 
day that Melanesian customary land tenure will not accept, although tolerate, the idea 
of state ownership of natural resources. 
The grounds for this argument derive from three areas of investigations into the nature 
of relationships. The first area is that of the historical context of contact in Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) and the Solomon Islands. The next area is that of the relationship 
during the early plantation economy in both countries, and finally that of the recent 
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approached by an at two levels. The first used secondary documents to 
ascertain historical forms and practices periods of the plantation 
economy in PNG and Solomon Islands. The second level described and analysed 
specific natural resource development projects to identify the forms and practices of 
articulation at a more specific level. The cases of mineral resource development 
considered were four mining projects in PNG and the Gold Ridge Mine in Solomon 
Islands. These two levels of analysis of the problem of kin group articulation m 
natural resource development are outlined in Chapters 3 to 7 of the thesis. 
In trying to understand the nature of the relationship between kin groups and natural 
resource development, an anthropological concept of articulation was used as the 
theoretical framework for analysing the structure of relations. The concept of 
articulation is rooted in the philosophical works of Vico and Saussure and applied in 
contemporary structural anthropology by Sahlins. The use of the concept of 
articulation was useful for this study because the issue of natural resource 
development is not only about economics but also about social change among kin 
groups. Kin groups have been subjected to social transformation since contact with 
the outside world. Social groups have been struggling to re-establish their role in the 
modern world with much difficulty. One way to understand this difficulty is in 
examining structures that dominate and persist in society. Thus the literature on 
articulation and its dimensions were helpful as guides in identifying the forms of 
articulations and practices that influenced relations in natural resource development, 
both in PNG and Solomon Islands. The review of four major mining cases in PNG 
helped to establish the forms and practices of articulation that influenced mineral 
resource development in that country until the present. The subsequent review of 
natural resource development in Solomon Islands also sought to show the forms and 
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practices of articulation of relations with kin groups in Solomon Islands before the 
development of the Gold Ridge project. 
Before outlining the major conclusions of this study, it is worth noting that there have 
been some limitations to the conduct of the study itself. The first important limitation 
that needs to be considered has to do with the recent 'ethnic conflict' in Solomon 
Islands. This conflict, which has involved the forceful removal of immigrant 
populations from neighbouring Malaita Island, has lasted for almost three years. This 
made my return to the Gold Ridge Mining Project impossible. Apart from the Gold 
Ridge Mine being in an active area of conflict, the fact that I am a Malaitan researcher 
has made the environment personally unsafe. The result of this situation is that 
information used about the Gold Ridge project was limited to an earlier visit in 1998 
and the analysis of experiences from my previous three years' involvement in the 
development of the project between 1995 to 1997. This factor also accounts for the 
importance of the further desk review case studies ofPNG experiences for this thesis. 
8.2 Background and research findings 
This research was aimed at understanding the structure of relations inherent in natural 
resource development between kin groups and natural resource development projects 
with particular emphasis on mineral resources. Since the study focus was on the 
structure of relations, literature that was relevant for understanding the structure of 
relations was consulted. Relevant structuralist literature involved the concept of 
articulation which was useful in ascertaining dimensions of social relations. Vico and 
Saussure's work accounts for the origin and the definitions of the dimensions of 
articulation, and Sahlins' work defines the application of the concept of articulation in 
social change and continuity. What emerges from this literature is that understanding 
the structure of relations requires understanding of social systems. But there can not 
be a social system without social actors, and therefore the structure of relations is 
about social actors and how such social actors could create meaningful relations. But, 
at the same time, what is meaningful to one actor may not be so meaningful to 
another. This is particularly relevant in situations of cultural contact, as in the case of 
Solomon Islands. But as the literature on articulation suggests, in the context of 
cultural contact social actors behave in the ways they know, and this may result in 
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situations of conflict and thus create social fractures when one set of actors assumes a 
position of dominance. Thus the dominated actors' social systems undergo social 
transformation. The subsequent social relations that are established after cultural 
contact may serve the interests of the dominant actor, resulting in a perpetuation of a 
form of articulation that is instrumentally biased against the other actor. 
In usmg the above framework, this thesis argues that the structure of relations 
between kin groups and natural resource development has been instrumentally biased. 
In other words, kin groups have been instrumentally articulated since contact, and this 
has persisted until the present day in Solomon Islands. Therefore, despite some 
improvements in the process of establishing relationships over natural resource use, 
the bias exists in the structures that govern the relationships between kin groups and 
projects. 
In presenting the findings of this research, the thesis is organised into four categories 
of findings. The first category is that of the historical origins of the present day 
instrumental articulation of kin groups in natural resources. This was mostly created 
during the plantation economy period in PNG and the Solomon Islands. The second 
category of findings is in the earlier natural project development in Solomon Islands, 
in other words, these are findings about the nature of articulation over natural resource 
use prior to the Gold Ridge project. The third category of findings is in the review of 
mineral resource development ofPNG experiences. The review of four mining project 
cases in PNG provided some indications of this form of instrumental relationships 
between kin groups and mines. The fourth category of findings is in the case of the 
Gold Ridge Mining Project in Solomon Islands. These findings are presented to 
demonstrate that despite kin group improvement of relations over natural resources 
over the years, the structures that influence such relations remain instrumentally 
biased against kin groups. Each of these categories of research findings is presented as 
follows. 
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8.2.1 Origin of form and practices 
This thesis has followed the above argument by tracing the nature of historical contact 
both in PNG and Solomon Islands by trying to ascertain the forms and the practices of 
relationships with kin groups that were most dominant at the time. Since the 
colonisation of Melanesia occurred at about the same time in the nineteenth century, 
kin groups in both Melanesian states were subjected to similar political and economic 
forces. The tracing of the forms and practice of relationships during the contact period 
and subsequent years in terms of natural resource use formed the basis of evidence 
found for this work. 
In the context of PNG and Solomon Islands, the imposing subject was the state. In 
both PNG and Solomon Islands, the early nineteenth century saw the beginning of this 
practice of articulation through the trade of material goods that had not previously 
been available to these kin groups. The colonies that followed used legal structures to 
lay the foundations of instrumental articulation. The process of declaration of areas as 
sovereign territory of a colonial power resembled the colonial power's value system. 
In the case of PNG and Solomon Islands, the imposition of the state was in 
conjunction with the imposition of doctrines of tenure. In the context of the British 
colony, the roots of the doctrine of tenure imposed owed their history to a feudal 
system (Sackville & Neave 1988:148), which could be traced to William the 
Conqueror, who confiscated the property of English landowners and redistributed 
them to his Norman supporters and some English men for their loyalty. In the case of 
William, he retained the interests in land that sustained ties between the king and the 
tenants (Sackville & Neave1988:149). While there have been modifications to this 
doctrine of tenure, the imposed state interest in land as crown land has remained. In 
Solomon Islands, this doctrine of tenure was reflected in the early land reforms 
enforced in the early twentieth century. Under these land reforms, the doctrine of 
estate was introduced. Estates are classified in two categories. The first is that of 
estates as freehold; and the second as less than freehold (Sackville & Neave 1988: 
169). The practice of leasehold interests in land comes under the category of less than 
freehold ( Sackville & Neave 1988:169).That is the idea that estates were to be given 
a specific period of time. Thus, much of the land alienated in the Solomon Islands was 
given on leasehold interests for a period of 999 years. In the Solomon Islands, both 
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forms of estates were used, although leasehold was more common. Most of these 
leaseholds or freeholds were given to planters for the coconut plantation economy in 
Solomon Islands prior to the Second World War. 
In the early period of land reform, it was mostly coastal land in Solomon Islands that 
was alienated. This period of land reform, commencing in 1901 and practised in 
subsequent decades, established the basis for a relationship over natural resources, but 
also the basis for disputes. This land reform policy circumvented landowners' rights 
as the result of the use of the idea of 'waste' land policy (Lasaga 1972, Allan, 1957). 
From the point of view of the state, this policy was to facilitate plantation economy, 
which dominated this part of Solomon Islands' history. Thus major plantation 
companies like Levers Pacific Plantation Ltd controlled a large proportion of 
alienated land (Lasaga 1972). While the Second World War temporarily suspended 
much of the plantation activity from 1940-48, most of the fertile land had already 
been appropriated for plantation activities. Guadalcanal Island was one of those 
heavily affected by this policy (Lasaga 1972:29). This issue of land was a dominant 
factor in terms of the relationship between landowners and the state even after the 
Second World War. After the war, the relationship between the state and the 
landowners remained tense. This is reflected in the post-war attempts to carry out 
natural resource development projects. This is particularly the case in observing the 
nature of the relationship in the context of both forestry and mining development. 
The result of the effects of land reform on kin groups left a sense of distrust of the 
state and foreign companies. The social movements that developed after the Second 
World War, such as the Maasina Ruru movement in Malaita and the subsequent Moro 
movement on Guadalcanal, were indications of kin groups' distrust and attempts at 
resistance to what they saw as forms of subordination. The account by Davenport of 
the Moro movement, discussed earlier in the thesis, indicated that the sentiment of kin 
groups centred on their displacement, especially in terms of land policy and 
leadership control of their community. 
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8.2.2 Articulation of kin groups in the Solomon Islands 
Apart from situating the roots of marginalisation of kin groups in historical context, 
there were subsequent national development activities in Solomon Islands that also 
illustrated the instrumental forms of articulation of kin groups. In Solomon Islands, it 
was the process of establishing the state and the introduction of doctrines of tenure 
that were significant factors influencing the structure of relations with kin groups over 
natural resources. 
The importance of the nature of relationships with kin groups in natural resource use 
is manifested in the application of the practice of estates during the post-Second 
World War period for forestry resource development in Solomon Islands. This 
process is described in Chapter 4 of the thesis. The state began the idea of establishing 
state forest estates throughout the Solomon Islands in 1962. Much ofthe forest estates 
acquired since 1962 were administered in a form that forced kin groups to consent 
under conditions of duress. The duress was the potential threat of the state using 
compulsory acquisition, and not paying any compensation at all. In forestry, the 
government's notion of developing 'forest estates' was seen as necessary for the long 
term sustainable development of the resource (Trenaman 1962: 7). The first forest 
government estate to be established under this acquisition process, was that of 
converting Vangunu Island into a forest estate. The state's dealing with landowners 
was to declare an area of forest as a 'state interest' and then inform landowners that 
they must give their consent in retrospect. As in the case of the V angunu forest estate, 
there was resistance, but it was futile because the state had the ultimate right to 
acquire it compulsorily. This form of relationship was likened to a situation of 
'duress' and therefore landowner discontent was often kept to themselves. For kin 
groups, this post-war attitude of the state to kin groups resembles attitudes about land 
reform during the pre-war period where the state appropriated land for plantation 
economy. 
The state's long term goal for the sustainable economic development of forestry was 
suggested in 1944. The idea was to harvest and not 'mine' the forest. This policy 
approach led to the establishment of the Forestry Department in 1957 (Trenaman 
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landowners was established. The government acquisition land for forestry use was 
based on compulsory acquisition, where landowners were asked to give their consent 
for the area defined since government had the ultimate right to acquire it with or 
without their consent. Given landowner consent under such a situation of 'duress', 
landowners were to be given 10% royalties, and compensation for any improved land 
was 6d per acre. The landowners disputed such arrangements, as in the case of 
Vangunu by a landowner spokesperson known as Kinio. It appeared that even then, 
the landowners were not so sure of the arrangement, because they were suspicious 
that they were not getting the proportionate economic value of their forest resource. 
Clearly, in this forest example, the relationship between landowners and the state was 
instrumental in favour of the state. While the state may argue for national interests, 
the landowner argument for their right to receive appropriate and proportionate 
benefit from their natural resources was already a major concern for them at this time. 
In other words, the state had used its position of power to influence natural resource 
use where landowners' conscious and fair demands were subordinated. This indicates 
a subordinate position for kin groups when decisions for forestry use were negotiated 
at the time. Kin groups were reluctant participants in government impositions, 
because of their perception that relationships over these decisions were not reciprocal. 
However, forestry use was sustained by the state until the years just prior to 
independence in 1978. 
It was the expectation of political independence that led to the change in attitude that 
perhaps people's interests should be better represented than had been the case in 
forestry development. Thus, when it came for the development of fisheries, the idea 
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was to implement a joint venture approach to the project. A joint venture with the 
people would take the form of the state representing the people and the investing 
company representing itself. The joint-venture idea was seen as an improvement since 
the new state would be ruled by Solomon Islanders, who while representing the state 
continued to associate themselves as landowners as well. Thus the joint-venture was 
between the Solomon Islands government and the Japanese company (Maruha Ltd of 
Japan). Under this arrangement Maruha had an ownership of 49% share in the joint-
venture company (Solomon Taiyo Ltd) while the Solomon Islands government 
through its investment arm (Investment Corporation of Solomon Islands (ICSI) held 
51% on behalf of the government). The project was to employ Solomon Islanders 
with Okinawan fishermen. The joint-venture project had for almost twelve years made 
no profits for the state. It was becoming a common perception in government circles 
that it was amazing that a company can operate with losses for a decade and remain 
operating as a normal business. The government was taking revenue from taxes but 
not from its shareholding in the company. One important factor in this new form of 
relationship under the joint-venture was that like the landowners, the state too was not 
getting profits from the project. This situation contradicted one of the expectations of 
Solomon Islands leaders that joint-venture projects were a better form of relationship 
to previous arrangements in forestry. The common knowledge that the state was not 
making any money for the people through joint-ventures was an important factor 
influencing kin groups to consider other alternative forms of forming relations for 
natural resource use. This opportunity came when an agricultural plantation was 
planned for the Guadalcanal plains. 
The issue of the share ratio in this project between the state, company, and the 
landowners had been a point of contention with landowners for almost the whole 
period until project closure in June 2000. What this project experience suggests is 
that landowners' goals had not been met even when a previously successful project as 
SIPL was functional. 
The experiences of land alienation since the early twentieth century, and subsequent 
estate developments in the post-war period, have created a sense of distrust and 
suspicion between kin groups and the state. The fact that there are no examples in 
Solomon Islands that might illustrate the extensive use of natural resources spanning 
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several decades, or even centuries, over 
resource use a Islands. 
s resource 
showed gradual changes terms of groups 
development were indications that kin groups' positions resource 
development relations gradually improved terms of process. other words, 
there were gradual shifts the balance of flows towards kin groups. For 
instance, terms of attitude towards kin groups, the of actions taken and the 
forms of interactions practised showed kin group engagement in natural resource 
development However, while such improvement was due largely to landowners' 
persistence in demanding recognition of kin group rights, the study also showed that 
the structures that influence these improved processes were sustained in each of the 
projects examined. 
In PNG's experience, the first form of relationship over natural resources identified 
between kin-groups and the mine project was described by Burton as a 'discovery 
paradigm'. This was the first form of relationship identified in PNG resource 
development relations with kin groups. The major feature of this form was reflected in 
the attitude of miners towards kin group societies. As shown in the case of the Ok 
Tedi mine, miners treat kin group society as 'isolated', 'uninhabitable', and often 
referred to it as a 'discovered' area. This was the 'discovery paradigm' dominant in 
early relationships with kin groups in PNG. This attitude turned a 'blind eye' to the 
people and society existing in that environment, which had resulted in establishing an 
instrumental form of articulation between the miners and the existing local society. 
This was a structure in which the existing Ok Tedi society was valued as lower in 
status in relation to the miners and the institutions that such miners represent It 
created a sense of legitimate dependency of kin group society on miners. This 
'discovery paradigm' was also characterised through the attitude towards land and the 
resources within it This was particularly the case where land was considered a state 
property under the notion of terra nugus. This was the idea that since this land was not 
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legitimised group dependence on miners and the state, rather than seeing them as 
equals the development of resources. The state, through its agents, instituted 
this new form over natural resources PNG and justified it on the 
basis of 'discovery'. Following the Second World War, this attitude of 'discovery' 
began to change with the introduction of the idea of decolonisation or self-
determination within colonies. Thus the 'discovery' form of relationship was 
modified or expressed rather differently in the form of 'ratification'. The attitude that 
kin group society and the resources it were 'discovered' laid the bases of the 
attitude towards kin groups and therefore sustained this form of relationship over 
time. 
In PNG, this study showed that the Panguna and Ok Tedi Mining cases demonstrated 
the 'ratification' form of relationship over natural resource use. The study showed that 
ratification is also a form of instrumental articulation. The Panguna Mining project 
adopted this model as the basis for the development of that project. The major feature 
of 'ratification' was the use of legal instruments to 'isolate' the project outside of the 
environment in which the project was located. This legal isolation was important 
because, like the 'discovery' paradigm before it, the project was seen as necessary for 
the state rather than the indigenous people directly affected. Ratification was also 
important in another way, in that it acted as a legal 'fence' against other legal changes 
that may haven arisen as a result of the emerging independent state of PNG. Both the 
Ok Tedi and the Panguna cases were mines developed on the basis of ratification. 
Ratification as a form of relationship was different to the former 'discovery paradigm' 
model in that the notion of 'self-determination' that was promoted worldwide was in 
direct contradiction to any form of complete 'isolation' of indigenous landowners 
from the project. Ratification was therefore marginalising towards landowners. 
257 
The study also showed the subsequent over resource use 
led to changes 
established The opportunity came 
was 
was equated consultation'. consultation process later became 
as 'Development process was to engage landowners m 
dealing their issues. This was the case with regard to landowners' 
1ssues terms of benefits, compensation, relocation, and business opportunities as a 
result of the project development. Consultation as a basis for the relationship the 
Porgera and later Lihir project has been seen as success in terms of project stability. 
But 'consultation alone' no matter how extensive, was no guarantee for kin group 
success in these projects. One of the major limits of 'consultation process' as a form 
of relationship model was the position of power. other words, the worth of 
consultation for each party processes is testable by outcome derived as a result 
of that consultation. In this context social and economic consequences for landowners 
that resulted from the development from Porgera and Lihir suggested that 
development goals of landowners have not been fulfilled. While the state may have 
achieved economic growth, and the mining company achieved profit from the project, 
landowners' goals for development remain elusive. Clearly, this work argues that the 
forms of relationships experienced in PNG involving the 'discovery paradigm', 
ratification and Development Forums were forms of instrumental articulation. In all 
these forms, the position of kin groups was subordinated to the state and company. 
Thus, the study showed that PNG experiences in kin group relations in mines 
remained an area for further improvement. 
Clearly, in PNG, the experience in the relationship between landowners and mines 
had taken an instrumental form of articulation, where the structure of the relationship 
remained problematic. Starting from the 'discovery paradigm' and ratification on one 
hand, and 'consultation' on the other, it can be argued that relationships had improved 
in terms of the process of interactions. However, it had remained distant in terms of 
the structural basis on which such processes take place. 
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8.2.4 Articulation of kin groups in the Gold Ridge project 
The Gold Ridge Mining Project case study showed that the relationship between kin 
groups and mines remained a contested issue. This was in spite of the fact that the 
state, the kin groups, and the mining company were all in support of the development 
of the project. The state saw the Gold Ridge project as a means to promote economic 
growth in the Solomon Islands. The Project came at a time when forestry exploitation 
in the country was nearing its peak, and the expectation was that the forestry windfall 
would not last. Thus the state saw the Gold Ridge project as an alternative income-
generating project to that of forestry. The state had also regarded the project as a way 
of promoting the mineral resources potential of the country, especially at the time 
when there was encouraging mineral project development in the region. This was 
during the period when Lihir Mining project in PNG was also being developed. The 
world market price for gold was also high, at the rate of US$500 per ounce of gold. 
This situation strongly influenced the way the state perceived the role of the Gold 
Ridge project in Solomon Islands. 
However, while the state was enthusiastic about the Gold Ridge Mining Project there 
was also apprehension about its future in terms of the outcome for kin groups. In the 
light of the knowledge of the Bougainville crisis and the Ok Tedi environmental 
disaster, the government's intention was to find the best means to accommodate 
landowners' concerns. Thus, the state took what it saw as a realistic approach to the 
issues affecting the project in terms of the conflicting demands of major stakeholders. 
The Gold Ridge project, when seen in the light of other projects in the region, was a 
marginal project. There was no comparison with other mining projects in PNG. The 
Panguna mine, Ok Tedi, Porgera and Lihir projects from PNG were large-scale 
mining projects. The scale of the Gold Ridge project with an estimated 1 million 
ounces of gold was relatively marginal. Given this marginality, in the context of 
global competition for capital investments, the Gold Ridge project was not in a good 
position to dictate too many conditions. The fact that Solomon Islands was also 
considered an investment risk country for major projects requiring World Bank 
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indemnity from risks of political instability, the room for more demands was 
constrained on the part of the state and the landowners. The instability of gold prices, 
which at the time was US$500 per ounce of gold, was seen as having potential to 
remain at that price for sometime. However, a decline was always possible. By 
considering both the local factors and the international factors described above, the 
government was only too pleased to see that Ross Mining NL was committed to 
carrying out the project. In a situation of limited choices in bargaining for more 
benefits, the decision of the company to pay for the relocation of landowners, 
compensation for disturbances, and a 100% of 1.5% gross value of exported gold and 
silver to be paid to the landowners and their province, was considered satisfactory. In 
other words, the province obtained 20% and the landowners obtained 80% of the 
royalties. On part of the central government, it imposed a 1.5% gross sale value of 
gold sold as export duty. These arrangements were seen as satisfactory by the state. 
Ross Mining NL on the other hand, was pleased with the arrangement for the 
development of the Gold Ridge Mine. As a mining company, Ross Mining had a one 
hundred percent ownership of the project. It was allowed no less than a 22% 
investment return from the mine and given tax concessions for equipment necessary 
for continued mineral resource explorations. The state was not concerned about the 
ownership issue in the mine because of previous experiences in joint-venture projects 
where the state was often liable to share losses from company performance. The 
complexity in monitoring joint-venture accounts made the state opt for the mining 
company to take full ownership and responsibility for the project. 
However, despite the confident position of the government over the Gold Ridge 
project land owners saw the deal as inequitable. The landowners had litigation lodged 
at the High Court of Solomon Islands on their behalf by the Melbourne law firm, 
Slater and Gordon, to pursue their case. They lodged their case on the same day of the 
signing of the special mining lease on 12 March 1997. The argument for the litigation 
was based on the alleged environmental threats from the tailings dam, although at the 
time the dam was not yet constructed. After the first hearing of their case, it was 
withdrawn from court on the basis of lack of evidence. Thus the court considered the 
case as not having legitimate basis for proceeding, and therefore if pursued it could 
have been construed as an act of abuse of court. While this litigation did not go 
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through the court, the land owners' sense of marginalisation in the project was 
evident. 
The Gold Ridge case showed that landowners' expectations from a mining project 
went far beyond royalty payments and compensation payments made to them for the 
project. The landowners expected a higher standard of housing, equal to those owned 
by wealthier businessmen in town. This was reflected in the demand by Willy Rone, a 
principal landowner, who lodged a high court claim against the company. Although 
he did not get the type of housing he was expecting, the company rebuilt his house on 
a location higher in elevation than others and made a few more adjustments to make 
his house a few square metres wider. On the surface this seemed as if the issue was 
only about housing standard. But the motive was based on the landowners' thinking 
that, as landowners, they deserved a higher and a wealthy status because the mining 
project is on their land. In other words, the landowners deserved a higher standard of 
living that should be expressed through the type of housing they live in, and other 
associated modem facilities equated with modem development. They were not 
expecting simple compensation for inconvenience caused to them, but rather were 
expecting the value of the mineral resources. 
The government was aware of the kin group expectations about the mining project. 
The way the state attempted to address expectations was to establish local 
institutional structures to enable the process of negotiation. The institutional changes 
involved the amendment of the Mines and Minerals Act to provide for an account 
held by government to allow royalties to be paid. In this way royalties were given to 
the landowners, because under the existing law, mineral resources belong to the state, 
and this included royalties. The state also assisted the landowners in the establishment 
of their local organisation (the Gold Ridge Landowners Association). Funds were 
made available under government arrangements so that landowners could have seed 
money to run their organisation. These actions were seen by the state as moves 
towards improving landowner conditions in the mining project. The state was also 
able to set up inter-departmental committees to assist in the facilitation of the project. 
The state's technical advice was sourced through a legal advisor and an economic 
advisor from the Commonwealth Secretariat before the negotiation was set in motion. 
The feasibility report by the company, cross-examined by the government's 
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environmental and engineering consultants, was the basis for negotiating the terms the 
government could agree to. However, the study showed that it was not sufficient that 
technical information be confined to the state. The community's knowledge about the 
technical and practical reality of the mine would have been useful if sufficient 
emphasis would be placed on providing greater information about financial 
limitations of mining. Lack of knowledge about the technical feasibility and the 
financial viability of the Mining Project on the part of kin groups was a major basis 
for suspicions about the Gold Ridge Mine. In other words, there was a problem of 
definition of kin group entitlements in mineral resource development in the Gold 
Ridge project. Clearly, while the state assumes legal ownership of mineral resources, 
kin groups assume customary ownership of minerals. While the state considers 
compensation and royalty payments as sufficient entitlements from mineral resources 
for kin groups, kin groups consider themselves as equals in the distribution of benefits 
derived from mineral resources, and therefore their expectation was to share the value 
ofthe worth of the mineral resources. Thus the problem of reconciling kin groups and 
mineral resources development is also a problem of defining kin group roles in 
contemporary Solomon Islands society. 
The Gold Ridge project in Solomon Islands, and the four additional mining cases in 
PNG, were used as case studies to demonstrate the principal arguments of this thesis. 
This thesis has shown that the nature of the relationship between kin groups 
(landowners) and natural resource projects was instrumental. This was a form of 
articulation rooted in the historical structures from which modern states derive their 
origin and that have persisted into the present. Therefore, despite some significant 
changes in the processes through which relationships were established over natural 
resource development, the persistence of the historical structures that influence these 
relations remains and is the major basis for contradictions that give rise to landowner 
disillusionment and rent seeking attitudes. This form of articulation contributes 
significantly to the way in which kin groups behave towards projects. 
In Solomon Islands, the establishment of the Protectorate Administration in 1896 and 
subsequent land law reforms were the basis for the early introduction of instrumental 
articulation. The concept of the state as having a legitimate right over natural 
resources fundamentally challenged the indigenous conception that 'all things' making 
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8.3 What is Learned from this Study? 
This study confirms the suspicion that the relationship between kin groups and natural 
resource development projects is a significant problem. This problem is related to 
several factors. The first factor is that of land. Land ownership and mineral resource 
ownership must make sense to landowners. This is important because land ownership 
and mineral resource rights constitute one and the same thing for the landowners. 
Land in Solomon Islands is largely processed a customary manner and it is an 
inherent feature of Solomon Islands traditional society to expect that mineral resource 
rights are also part of this customary right. As at present, landowners do not accept 
state ownership of the resource because state ownership of mineral resources is 
associated with colonial dispossession of kin group rights. This is, in essence, the 
structural basis for instrumental articulation of relations over mineral resources in 
Solomon Islands. This situation can be rectified when the state renounces its position 
of direct control of mineral rights resources and places this right within the already 
accepted premises based on customary land. The importance of this in terms of 
change in existing policy by the state is based on the principle that 'there are many 
ways to skin a cat'. The existing distrust of the state on the part of the landowners lies 
in the distinction that the state has imposed on differentiating customary 
landownership from mineral resource rights ownerships. Recognition of the perceived 
rights of kin groups to minerals will allow the landowners to establish their position in 
terms of ownership and give them the responsibility to make decisions that involve 
natural resource use. The idea of responsibility is important here, because landowners 
could no longer blame the state for expropriating their rights but must now be 
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such a project to landowners, terms the 'development' contrasted 
successful members of the community at large. What level would 
such a project be expected to bring about to the kin groups affected? Solomon 
Islands, a major project located a particular social group is not just a project, 
but signifies the potential relative affluence in relations to others the community at 
large. This might seem to have little economic relevance, but where social stability is 
vital it may well be the key towards stabilising project developments in the future. 
During the Gold Ridge development, this implicit expectation was shown when 
landowners were unhappy about the design of the relocation houses, which to them 
looked similar to the temporary plantation quarters common to labourers working 
plantations in Solomon Islands. When I went with my staff to see the design model, I 
told them that this would be a problematic design. This was the last time the company 
came back for the government position on the design. With some minor adjustment, 
such as adding a few more feet to the veranda of the two-room houses, the design was 
pronounced satisfactory. But later this very design made some of the landowners 
think they were living in inferior housing, especially compared to people in towns 
who do not even have a mine in their back yard. This issue remained a disappointment 
for the landowners. Similar sentiments were raised by Willy Rone who was one of the 
principal landowners that litigated against the project. The company built him a house 
much larger than the rest, on a hill overlooking the others. But this house made him 
look like a chief that only looked out for himself, while his followers lived in lower 
quality housing. 
The point in all this is that where major mining projects take place, engaging the 
Melanesian psyche is an important factor in project development. In other words 'the 
mine must also be their mine' in that it must be part of their material position. 
Compensation as a notion itself seems counterproductive. Any resources that result 
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from the project should not be framed in terms of compensation and disturbances but 
rather in terms of achieving relative affluence expressed at the community level and 
also at the personal level. The importance of community affluence in this context is 
vital. Thus the issues of village planning, housing development, water reticulation and 
even electricity and other modern necessities, are significant implicit and explicit 
goals of the landowners. The use of compensation gives the impression that these are 
temporary costs and that the actual value of benefit is yet to come from the project. 
When landowners eventually realise not only that their villages are not of a good 
standard, but that compensation money was really part of their benefit, causes 
resentment against the project to begin. This is especially the case once there is 
nothing else to show. 
It seems that while the company thinks about profit and the government thinks about 
economic growth, the landowners expect important changes to their social, economic 
and political position in the community. In summary, the expectations of kin groups 
was that major natural resources development should lead to significant improvement 
of their lives. Landowners expect a comparatively high standards of progress from 
resource use. Here the operation of the project means a lot more than the simple 
production process, but rather the parallel development of the community as the 
project progresses. 
The third factor is the widely held view that landowners do not want to be disturbed. 
If this is true, then the landowners should not be disturbed at all by any mining 
activity. But this is not the case with mining projects. When the landowners are accept 
mining development, it is not the fact that they should now be left alone, which is 
important, but rather, now that the project has commenced what are the significant 
changes to improve their previous lives as a result of this major destabilising project? 
Often the state and mining company used the logic of minimising the impact of 
mining on the community as the basis for not considering other significant changes 
that might come the landowners' way. The whole notion of compensation and 
disturbance payment is based on this assumption. 
On the contrary, as in the case of the Gold Ridge project, it was not the issue of 
sheltering landowners that now became important, but rather what there was to show 
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for these major changes in the condition of their lives. In other words, for the 
landowners, after project approval it was merely the positive changes that followed 
that mattered. Thus it is vital that the planning of mining also includes planning for 
and by the community directly affected by the project. 
8.4 Improving mining relations in the future 
Six months after the Gold Ridge Mining Development, Guadalcanal youth formed a 
resistance group calling itself the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA.). This 
came to be known as the 'Guadalcanal Ethnic Tension' by both local and international 
media. This emphasis on 'ethnicity' overshadowed some of the fundamental 
motivations of the conflict. For example, there were the issues of land, resource 
control and benefits from resource development. The major cause of the Guadalcanal 
conflict was the perception of being marginalised. This was demonstrated by the 
Guadalcanal militants' demand for reforms including: 
• Constitutional Reform 
• Restitution of past wrongs, and 
• Equity in new economic opportunities. 
The desire for constitutional reform is expressed in the demands for an adoption of a 
state government system. The motive behind this perception is that, by the adoption of 
a state government system, the newly established states, especially Guadalcanal, 
would be able to control resource development and receive a fairer share of benefits. 
A newly-established state would also be able to control and regulate customary land 
tenure. It was also envisaged that this would ensure that government representation in 
the new state would come from the people of Guadalcanal, and not someone from 
elsewhere using finance to buy their way into government. The movement of inter-
island migration would also be regulated. In this respect, the Guadalcanal conflict that 
arose on December 1998, which almost destroyed the country's economy, was a 
resource motivated conflict rather than one based on ethnicity, as was largely 
presented in the media. 
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While there were normative demands for restitution for past wrongs, involving 
compensation for wrongful deaths, the demands were largely economic and political, 
and not necessarily ethnic. The nature of demands included: 
• demand for 50% of revenue collected on Guadalcanal to be paid to the 
Province 
• demand for 25% of SIPL ownership equity to Guadalcanal Province 
• government to pay for Honiara capital city as it is located on customary land 
• demand for the national capital to be relocated elsewhere 
Clearly, resources have a significant bearing on the recent conflict in Solomon 
Islands. Paradoxically, this demand for more economic development resulted in the 
closure of all major economic development projects on the island, including the Gold 
Ridge project. This has yet not been resolved, and it remains to be seen when the 
project will reopen. But to date, there are suggestions for further reviewed negotiation 
of the project. 
What the current state of affairs in the Solomon Islands shows is that the development 
of natural resources cannot be separated from the social institutions inherent among 
kin groups. Customary land and institutions of kinship are an integral part of Solomon 
Islands society, and therefore any development at the state level must at the same time 
improve institutional development at the kin group level. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 :Terms of reference for the Gold Ridge project tender screening 
• To ensure all genuinely interested parties are given equal opportunities to tender 
for Gold Ridge project 
• To check and ensure tender proposals are received within the time specified and 
conditions required under the Tender Notice are fulfilled. 
• To assess the quality and adequacy of the company proposed exploration program 
including drilling. 
• To assess the company's technical ability to grasp the geological concepts and use 
of available geological information. 
• To assess the geological and mining competence within the company or joint 
venture. 
• To assess the company's experience and previous performance in exploration and 
mining in Solomon Islands and overseas. 
• To assess the financial resources of the company. 
• To assess and evaluate the company's terms and conditions, and financial package 
offered in the tender proposal. 
• To assess the company's expenditure commitments. 
• To assess the marketing competence within the company. 
• To assess the proposal's conceptual content, innovation and detailed planning. 
• To assess the time frame proposed for exploration and mine development 
• To assess the company's attitude to training and participation of Solomon 
Islanders at all levels of company activities. 
• To assess the company's attitude to local and landowner participation. 
• To assess the company's attitude towards environmental protection measures 
required in Solomon Islands. 
• To make recommendations for the acceptance of the successful Tenderer. 
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The above terms of reference were used by the Solomon Islands government in the 
choosing of Saracen Minerals Ltd over other applicants to win the Gold Ridge 
deposit. Saracen then resold the Gold Ridge project to Ross Mining NL • 
• Source from SIG Report of findings of the Gold Ridge Tender Screening Committee 17 June 1994. 
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Appendix 2: Surface access rights agreement for mineral prospecting. 
Dated ............................................................................... 1997 
PARTIES 
THE LANDOWNERS OF THE PROSPECTING LICENCE AREA KNOWN AS 
PILOPILO LAND 
SOLOMON TRY HARD MINING LIMITED 
ISLAND HOPPERS & ASSOCIATES 
ANNONVON 
OUR ref: JK Houstan 
NDBSRIDES5:37468374678 
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AGREEMENT made 
PARTIES 
AND 
26 July 
PILOPILO LANDOWNERS 
Of 
("landowners") 
1997 
SOLOMON TRY HARD MINING LIMITED 
Care of Loopers & Lybras, City centre Building, 
Honiara, Solomon Islands. 
INTRODUCTION 
A. SML ( an approved mineral prospecting company since 23 October 1989) has 
applied for the Prospecting Licences on behalf of SOLOMON TRY HARD 
MINING LIMITED( an approved mineral prospecting company since 23 
August 1996) and presently holds the Letter of Intent in regard to the Area. 
B. The landowners are the groups of people that own the areas of land within the 
Area traditionally given the name in item 2 of the Schedule within the island 
named in item 3 of the Schedule. 
C. The Access Agreement sets out the terms and conditions under which the 
Company has the right to enter and carry out mineral prospecting within the 
Area. 
IT IS AGREED 
1. Definitions and Interpretation 
1.1 Definitions 
In this Agreement: 
( 1) "Access Agreement" means this agreement, including any 
Schedule or Annexure to it; 
(2) "Access Fee" means the access fee described in clause 3; 
(3) "Act" means the Mines and Minerals Act 1990; 
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"Agreed Activities" means work activities to be 
clause 
means SML MINING 
LIMITED 
employees, agents, contractors nommees; 
(7) "Compensation means compensation fee 
clause 
(8) "Dollars" means Solomon Islands dollars; 
(9) "Environmental Accident" means any unplanned or unexpected 
event causing significant damage or adverse impact to the physical 
environment; 
( 1 O)"environmental Management 
in accordance with clause 14; 
means the plan to be prepared 
(11)" Landowner Trust Account" means the trust account to be 
established in accordance with the Act into which Access Fees and 
compensation payments are paid; 
(12) "landowners" 
(a) has the meaning set out in the Act which the date of this 
Agreement: 
" in relation to a registered interest means the person whose 
name the interests is for the time being registered and in 
relation to customary land, means the person or persons who 
is or are according to current customary usage, regarded as 
the owner or owners of the land"; and 
(b) at the date of this Agreement includes the landowners named 
in this Agreement; 
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(13) "Letter oflntent" means the letter of intent from the Ministry of Mineral 
Resources to the Company the date of which is shown in item 5 of the 
Schedule; 
(14) "Parties" means both the Company and the landowners as original parties 
to this Agreement; 
(15) "Prospecting Licences" means the prospecting licences held by the 
Company at the commencement of this agreement particulars of which are 
described in item 4 of the Schedule; and 
( 16) "Quarter" means each 3 month period commencing from the 
commencement of this Agreement. 
1.2 Interpretation 
Reference to: 
(1) the singular includes the plural and the plural includes the singular; 
(2) a person includes a body corporate; 
(3) a party includes the party's executors, administrators, successors 
and permitted assigns; and 
( 4) a statute, regulation or provision of a statute or regulation ( " 
Statutory Provision") includes: 
(a) that Statutory Provision as amended or re-enacted from 
time to time; and 
(b) a statue, regulation or provision enacted in replacement of 
that Statutory Provision. 
2. Commencement, Duration and Restraint 
2.1 This Agreement commences on the date of Issue of the Prospecting 
Licences and continues, subject to early termination under clause 10, 
until the termination of the Prospecting Licence under the Act 
including any period renewal. 
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2.2 On termination ofthis Agreement under clauses 2.1 or 10, the parties 
agree that they must not seek to obtain, whether directly or indirectly, 
a prospecting licence or mining licence over the Area for a period of 
10 years from the date of termination. 
3. Access Fees 
3.1 The Company must pay the landowners access Fees per Quarter set out in 
item 6 of the Schedule for the right to enter and carry out mineral exploration 
activities within the Areas. 
4. Method of Payment 
4.1 The Company must pay the Access Fee at the start of each Quarter. 
The Access Fee must be paid into the Landowner Trust Account. 
5. Use of Access Fee 
5.1 The landowners may use the Access Fee only for their agreed community 
investment and projects. 
6. Agreed Work Activities During Access 
6.1 The Company may carry out in the Area general mineral prospecting 
activities which may include the following: 
(a) collecting soil, rock and water samples for geochemical 
analysis; 
(b) hand trenching, being the digging of drains and/or slit 
trenches by hand; 
(c) mechanical or hand augering, being the drilling of small 
diameter holes to shallow depths by machine or hand; 
(d) electrical resistivity/IP survey (land and/or aerial); 
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(e) Excavated Trenching, being the mechanical dif:fing of drains 
and/or slit trenches and costeaning via bulldozer and/or 
excavator; 
(f) The mechanical drilling of holes by either diamond or reverse 
circulation methods; or 
(g) Surveying and mapping on ground and /or aerial. 
6.2 The Company may carry out in the Area various road making, camp 
construction and related logistical support activities. 
7. Agreed Compensation Fee 
7.1 The Company must pay to the landowners the compensation fee per 
Quarter set out in item 7 of the Schedule as compensation for the Agreed 
Work Activities including: 
(1) grid lines, being the clearing of vegetation by hand 
along narrow width survey lines; 
(2) timber and I or commercial trees and general 
vegetation; 
(3) rental for campsites being an area of land cleared of 
vegetation for the purpose of erecting semi-permanent 
dwellings for Company employees; 
(4) helicopter pads, being an area ofland cleared of 
vegetation for the purpose landing a helicopter; 
(5) drill sites, being an area of land cleared of vegetation 
and the ground levelled to allow the erection of a drill 
rig; and 
(6) bulldozed access roads and tracks. 
8. Methods ofPayment of Compensation Fees 
8.1 The company must pay the Compensation Fee at the start of each Quarter. The 
Compensation Fee must be paid into the landowners Trust Account. 
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9.Use of Compensation Fee 
9.1 The Compensation Fee must be distributed by the Landowner Trust Account 
operators as nominated by the various bona fide clans and /or families upon whose 
land the Agreed Work Activities and/or activities detailed in clause 7.1 are carried 
out. 
10. Termination ofthis Agreement 
10.1 Both the Company and the landowners have full and equal right to terminate 
this Agreement by giving 90 days notice in writing. 
10.2 The Company may only give notice of termination of this Agreement by 
unanimous decision of the board of directors of the Company . 
10.3 The landowners may only give notice of termination of this Agreement: 
(1) by unanimous decision of the landowners; and 
(2) where the termination is not part of any scheme to grant similar access rights 
to any person within 5 years of the termination of this Agreement. 
11. Meetings to Report Work Progress 
11.1 The Company and the landowners representatives must meet once per Quarter to 
discuss progress results and problems relating to the Agree Work Activities. 
11.2 Notice of the time and place for quarterly meetings must be given to the 
Landowner representatives 2 weeks in advance. 
11.3 The Company will provide transport from home villages to the agreed meeting 
place for the landowners representatives to attend the quarterly meetings. 
11.4 Where any Landowner representative cannot attend the quarterly meeting that 
Landowner is to provide a suitable substitute representative who is empowered to act 
on behalf of the absent Landowner. 
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12. Progress Reports 
12.1 The Company shall provide a written report at each quarterly meeting to report 
work progress and results to landowners. 
12.2 The quarterly progress reports must be based on the Company's statutory report 
to the Government and must be written in a manner to facilitate local understanding of 
technical information. Quarterly progress reports must be presented within 1 month of 
the lodgement by the Company of its statutory report with the Government. 
13. Historic Places 
13.1 The landowners, with the assistance of the Company, must identify and map all 
historic places, graves sacrificial sites and any sites of cultural interest within the Area 
of Agree Work Activities. These must be certified to the Company by the landowners 
and the Ministry of Culture before the commencement of any Agreed Work 
Activities. 
14. Environmental Management Plan 
14.1 The Company will negotiate an appropriate Environmental Management Plan 
with the landowners and the Solomon Islands Department of Minerals. 
14.2 The Environmental Management Plan and its implementation in respect of the 
Agreed Work Activities must comply with any reguirments of the Act and/or realted 
Provincial Government Ordinances. 
14.3 As part of the Environmental Management Plan to be negotiated under clause 
14.1, the Company must initiate an environmental data collection carried out in their 
headwaters. The environmental data collection program must be initiated at the 
commencement of the Agree Work Activities even if agreement on an Environmental 
Management Plan has not been reached. 
14.4.The Environmental Management Plan will also stipulate that if an Environmental 
Accident is caused by the Agreed Work Activities the company must make every 
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reasonable effort to restore the environment and where necessary pay an agreed 
amount of compensation to the Landowner Trust Account for damages. 
15. Subsequent Development 
15.1 If the Agreed Work Activities lead to the commercial discovery of mineral 
deposits in the Area, the parties must use their best endeavours to reach agreement on 
the terms for surface rights for mining of the deposits. 
15.2 If the parties cannot reach agreement under clause 15.1, the parties must not in 
any manner seek to be involved, whether directly or indirectly, in any effort or action 
to obtain a mining licences or mineral right in the Area. 
16. Assignment 
16.1 IfSML transfers the Prospecting Licences to SOLOMON TRY HARD MINING 
LIMITED, the landowners agree that this Agreement continues between the 
Landowners and SOLOMON TRY HARD MINING LIMITED and with 
SOLOMON TRY HARD MINING LIMITED as the owner of the Prospecting 
Licences. 
17. Dispute Resolution 
17.1 Where a dispute arises between the parties in relation to the interpretation or 
operation of this Agreement the parties agree to submit the dispute for 
determination by the Ministry responsible for administration of the Act. 
18. Change of Agreement 
18.1 The Company and the landowners may vary and /or change any aspects ofthis 
Agreement where all parties are in full agreement with the variation/or change. 
19. Review of Agreement 
19.1 It is understood by all Parties that this Agreement is being made with the 
intention that geologic results and environmental management will be 
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reviewed on an ongoing yearly basis and where necessary, agreed changes will 
be made under clause 18 .1. 
20. Agreed Work Programmes 
20.1 All agreed work activities are to be carried out in stages via agreed work 
programmes that require landowner approval in advance before such activities 
can commence. 
20.2 Where landowners of a particular area of land do not agree to a work programme 
then the Company shall attempt to carry out the work programme in any such 
particular area of land. 
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Item 1 
Item2 
Item 3 
Item4 
I Item 5 
Item6 
Item 
The Schedule 
Area of Land known as 
Traditional District 
Name within Area 
Island Name 
Prospecting Licence 
Details 
Pilopilo Land 
OBMIS 
Obmis Island, Western 
Province 
Starting at a point to the 
north-west of Obmis 
Island at UTM grid 
coordinate of 9089000 
North and 227000 East 
thence, eastwards along 
the 9089000 North grid 
line to the point 908900 
and 230000 East thence, 
southwards along the 23 
0000 east thence, 
westwards along the 
9084000 North grid line to 
the point 9084000 North 
and 2290000East thence, 
southwards along the grid 
line 229000 East to the 
point 9081000 North and 
226000 East thence, 
northwards along the 
226000 East grid line to 
the point 9084000 North 
grid line to the point 
9084000 North and 
227000 East thence, 
northwards along the grid 
line 227000 East to the 
starting point at 9089000 
North and 227000 East. 
I Date of Letter of Intent I 13 December 1996 
Access Fee Per Quarter 
(Solomon Island dollar) 
Compensation Fee per 
Quarter 
(Solomon Island dollars) 
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$7, 500.00( Seven 
thousand five dollars only) 
To be negotiated with 
secondary and tribal 
landowners. 
EXECUTED as an agreement, 
Signed by the Landowners: 
Signed for and on behalf of SOLOMON TRY HARD MINING LIMITED 
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Appendix 3: The Gold Ridge Mining agreement, Solomon Islands 
THE GOLD RIDGE MINING AGREEMENT 
SOLOMON ISLANDS 
BETWEEN 
THE GOVERNMENT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS 
AND 
ROSS MINING (SOLOMON ISLANDS) LIMITED 
AND 
GOLD RIDGE LIMITED 
AND 
ROSS MINING N.L. 
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IV 
GOLD RIDGE MINING AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is made on the day of M~ 199J BETWEEN THE 
GOVERNMENT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS (the "Government") represented by the Minister for Energy, 
Water and Mineral Resources; and ROSS MINING (SOLOMON ISLANDS) LIMITED (formerly Saracen 
Minerals (Solomon Islands) Limited), a company incorporated under the law of Solomon Islands and 
having its principal place of business at Coopers and Lybrand, 1st Floor City Centre Building, 
Mendana Avenue, Honiara, Solomon Islands ("Ross Solomon Islands"); and GOlD RIDGE MINING C>\!Jj 
LIMITED , a company incorporated under the law of Solomon Islands and having its principal place~ 
of business at Pakoe Road, East Gold Ridge, Kola Ridge, Honiara, Solomon Islands ("Mining 
Company") and ROSS MINING N.l., a company incorporated under the law of the State of 
Queensland, Australia, and having its principal place of business at Level 3, 189 Coronation Drive, 
Milton, Queensland, 4064, Australia ("Ross Mining"). 
WHEREAS: 
_r~j'c. 
A. Ross Solomon Islands, then known as Saracen Minerals (Solomon Islands) Limited, tendJr~d 
for and was issued Special Prospecting Licence No. 1 85 by the Government dated 4 August 
1994 ("the Gold Ridge SPL"), and presently holds the Gold Ridge SPL; 
B. Ross Mining is the parent company of Ross Solomon Islands; 
C. Gold Ridge Mining Limited is a wholly owned subsidiary of Ross Solomon Islands and will 
undertake Project Operations under this Agreement as the Mining Company; 
D. Ross Solomon Islands wishes to be assured by the Government of all terms and conditions 
for mining and marketing minerals if, after evaluating the existing gold and other 
mineralisation in the Prospecting Area and further exploring the Prospecting Area, Ross 
Solomon Islands discovers a deposit of gold or other valuable minerals, and, after due 
consultation with the Government, decides this deposit to be commercially viable for 
development as a mine; and 
E. The Government wishes to co-operate with Ross Solomon Islands and Ross Mining to 
encourage: 
(a) the efficient and economic development of <1ny such deposit in accordance with 
good international mining industry practice; and 
(b) the operation of a mine and minerals processing facility on terms and conditions 
that will secure significant financial and other benefits for the Government and the 
people of Solomon Islands and appropriate benefits for Ross Solomon Islands, Ross 
Mining and the Mining Company commensurate with their risks; 
NOW, THEREFORE in consideration of the above and of the mutual rights, obligations and 
covenants contained in this Agreement, and for other good and valuable consideration, the parties 
agree as follows: 
1. INTERPRETATION AND DEFINITIONS 
1 . 1 Interpretation 
In this Agreement, unless the context otherwise requires: 
(a) words importing the singular include the plural and vice versa; 
(b) words importing any gender include the other; 
(c) the headings do not affect the interpretation or construction of this 
Agreement; 
(d) reference to a party to this Agreement includes that party's successors an'--
permitted assigns; 
(e) reference to a statute includes all amendments to that statute for the time 
being in force and also to any statute consolidating or replacing the statute; 
(f) reference to a statute includes all regulations, and other subordinate 
legislation including proclamations and legal notices made under that 
statute; 
(g) reference to a clause is to a clause of this Agreement; and 
(h) the schedules and annexures form part of this Agreement. 
1 .2 Definitions 
In this Agreement the following words and terms shall have the following meanings, unle~v 
the context otherwise requires or otherwise specified herein: 
(1) "Affiliated Company" means any person, firm or company, directly or indirectly, 
controlling, controlled by or under common control with Ross Mining, Ross Solomon 
Islands or the Mining Company; 
(2) "Agreement Area" means the area covered by the Gold Ridge SPL; 
(3) "Ancillary Authorisation" means all other licences, permits, rights or approvals of 
the Government or Provincial Government or Local Government that are necessary 
for the carrying out of the Project other than the Gold Ridge SPL and the Mining 
Lease and does not, in any case, include a prospecting licence or a mining lease 
issued pursuant to the New Mining Act; 
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(4) "Applicable Law" means the law of Solomon Islands including the statutory law, 
regulations and all other instruments having the force of law, from time to time in 
force; 
(5) "Date of Commencement of Commercial Production" means the first day of the 
calendar quarter following the quarter in which the cumulative gold production 
equals fifteen per cent (15-%) of the Project's constructed initial annual design 
capacity; 
(6) "Development Expenditure" means expenditure incurred, whether directly or 
indirectly, in or in connection with the carrying out of Development Operations in 
or in connection with the Agreement Area, including General and Administrative 
Expenditure directly connected with Development Operations, and expenditure 
relating to such operations incurred in respect of: 
(i) the acquisition of machinery, implements, utensils and other articles and the 
leasing of fixed and mobile plant, buildings and structures used for the 
?~. \ 
purposes of production, treatment and processing and furniture, toolil~~nd 
equipment used in offices and export terminals, vehicles, motorised rolling 
equipment, aircraft, fire control, security stations, helicopter pads, tailings 
dams, haulage and access roads, pipeworks, electrical and fluid reticulation 
and water and sewage plants and power plants and all civil earth works in 
connection with such operations; 
(ii) landowner relocation and resettlement and related infrastructure services 
and facilities; 
(iii) wharves and landing facilities and quarantine, customs, fuel storage, port 
facilitie::: and dredging, water-based earth works, barging and transport 
facilities; 
(iv) labour, fuel, haulage, supplies, materials and repairs and food, 
accommodation, travel and related costs in connection with the drilling, 
laying, installation and construction of mine facilities; 
(v) the advancement of training and education of Solomon Islands citizens at 
institutions approved by the Minister and the provision of educational and 
scientific materials and equipment by virtue of any term or condition of the 
Mining Lease issued in respect of such area; 
(vi) charges, fees or rent for, or in respect of, land or buildings occupied for the 
purposes of carrying out Development Operations; 
(vii) preparation of feasibiiity studies, applications for requisite approvals and 
consents. travelling, accommodation and consultants' fees (not otherwise 
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included under any other head of expenditure hereunder) in relation to 
Development Operations; 
(viii) the restoration of the Agreement Area, or any part thereof, after cessatiorl 
of Development Operations in such area to the extent to which such 
expenditure has been incurred by virtue of any term or condition of the 
Mining Lease relating to safety or the prevention of pollution; and 
(ix) customs duty and goods tax in respect of the rmportation for use in or in 
connection with Development Operations in the Agreement Area of plant, 
machinery, equipment, spare parts, materials, supplies or consumable items 
to be used in or in connection with such Development Operations; 
(7) "Development Operations" means operations relating to the development and 
construction of the mine under this Agreement and includes Development Operations 
in relation to Project Expansion; 
(8) "Exploration Expenditure" means expenditure incurred, whether directly or indirectly( 
in or in connection with the carrying out of Prospecting Operations in the Agreement 
Area, including General and Administrative Expenditure directly connected with 
Prospecting Operations, and expenditure relating to such operations incurred 1n 
respect of: 
(i) remote sensing including aeromagnetics and sampling in the Agreement Area, 
geochemistry, trenching, drill site access and preparation, drilling of all types 
of boreholes including diamond, rotary and reverse circulation and assaying; 
(ii) the acquisition of machinery, implements, utensils and other articles employed 
for purposes of such operations; 
(iii) labour, fuel, haulage, supplies, materials and repairs and food, accommodation, 
travel and related costs in relation to such operations; 
(iv) the advancement of training and education of Solomon Islands citizens at 
institutions approved by the Minister and the provision of educational and 
scientific materials and equipment by virtue of any term or condition of the Gold 
Ridge SPL; 
(v) charges, fees or rent tor, or in respect of, land or buildings occupied for the 
purposes of carrying out Prospecting Operatrons; 
(vi) tenement fees, access compensation and legal fees (not otherwise included 
under any other head of expenditure hereunder), in relation to such operations; 
(vii) the restoration of the Agreement Area, or any part thereof, after cessation of 
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Prospectmg Ooerat1ons in the area to the extent to which sucr1 has 
been incurred by virtue of any term or condition of the Gold Ridge SPL relat1ng 
to safety or the prevention of pollution, and 
(vi1i) customs duty and goods tax in respect of the importation for use in or in 
connection with Prospecting Operations in the Agreement Area, of plant, 
machinery, equipment, spare parts, materials, supplies or consumable items 
used in or in connection with such Prospecting Operations; 
(9) "Feasibility Study" means the Feasibility Study referred to in Clause 3.1; 
( 1 0) "General and Administrative Expenditure" means expenditure incurred on general 
administration and management primarily and principally related to the Project 
Operations in or in connection with the Agreement Area, comprising and limited to: 
(1) expenditure relating to office, field office and general administration in Solomon 
Islands, including supervisory, accounting and employee relations services 
(excluding commissions paid to intermediaries by Ross Solomon Islands 
Mining Company); 
(ii) an annual overhead charge for services rendered outside Solomon Islands and 
not otherwise included under any other head of expenditure hereunder, for 
managing the Project Operations and for staff advice and assistance including 
financial, legal, accounting and employee relations services, provided that: 
(a) for the period from the date on which this Agreement is signed until 
the Date of Commencement of Commercial Production the annual 
charge shall be the Mining Company's verifiable reasonable 
expenditure as approved by the Commissioner of Inland Reven• ·e 
and such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld; and 
(b) for the period commencing from the Date of Commencement of 
Commercial Production, the annual charge shall be at an amount or 
rate to be agreed on between the parties and stated in the 
Feasibility Study approved with the grant of the Mining Lease; 
( 11) "Gold Ridge SPL" means Spec1al Prospecting Licence No. 185 dated 4 August 1994 
held by Ross Solomon Islands; 
( 12) "Government" means the Government of Solomon Islands and includes its Ministers, 
instrumentalities and any agency of the Government; 
( 13) "Gross Income" shall mean total income as defined in the Income Tax Act and shall, 
in relation to the Mining Company, include any amount received or receivable in the 
year of assessment by the Mining Company, including proceeds under a policy of 
insurance or otherwise, in respect of the loss or destruction of any of the Minin~ 
Company's minerals and any interest or amount in the nature of interest or any othe1 
amount received or receivable by the Mining Company in the year of assessment frorr 
or in connection with mining operations in the Mining Area; 
(14) "Gross Value of Gold and Silver Produced" shall have the meaning assigned to it ir 
Clause 5.3 (a); 
( 1 5) "Licence Year" means a year ending on an anniversary of the date of the Gold RidgE 
SPL; 
( 16) "Mining Area" means the area covered by the Mining Lease plus any addition the rete 
as may be approved by the Government to include any areas of proven reserve: 
contained in the Prospecting Area; 
(17) "Mining Company" means Gold Ridge Mining Limited; 
. ~·'·~ ( 1 8) "Mining Lease" means the Mining Lease referred to in Clause 3 and" n'lcludes an· 
renewal of that Lease under the New Mining Act; 
(19) "Net Cash Receipts" for the Tax Year in respect of which an assessment is being mad 
means the result denominated in Australian dollars, which may be a negative amoun1 
obtained by aggregating: 
(i) the Gross Income for that Tax Year; 
and subtracting therefrom the sum of: 
(ii) income tax paid in that Tax Year; and 
(iii) all Exploration, Development and Production Expenditures as defined in Cl 
1.2 and allowed in that Tax Year in accordance with the Applicable Law rei ... 
to Additional Profits Tax including royalty paid but excluding amounts in respe1 
of interest and other financing charges on loans raised for the Project; 
(20) "New Mining Act" means the Mines and Minerals Act 1990 as amended from time· 
time and includes all regulations made or in force thereunder; 
(21) "Old Mining Act" means the Mining Act - Cap 91 as amended from time to time ar 
includes all regulations made thereunder; 
(22) "Present Value of Net Cash Receipts" means the Present Value of Net Cash Receir: 
ascertained in accordance with Clause 6.3 (c); 
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(23) "Production Expenditure" means expenditure incurred in Production Operations and 
which, subject to the Applicable Law relating to Additional Profits Tax, is allowed as 
a deduction in the determination of chargeable income under the Income Tax Act; 
(24) "Production Operations" means operations carried out under the Mining Lease other 
than Development Operations and, in the case of Project Expansion, operations 
carried out under the Mining Lease other than Prospecting and Development 
Operations; 
(25) "Project" means the exploration operations carried out under the Gold Ridge SPL and 
the construction, development, mining, de-commissioning and rehabilitation operations 
carried out under the Mining Lease according to this Agreement. It includes all 
facilities, including ancillary facilities and infrastructure, constructed and developed 
that are reasonable and necessary for the Project according to good international 
mining industry practice. It also includes (but is not limited to) facilities for 
concentrating, transporting, shipping and selling minerals and transporting plant and 
equipment to and from the Mining Area from and to local or overseas destination~, ~nd 
includes Project Expansion; {~f 
(26) "Project Expansion" means an expansion of the Project undertaken by the Mining 
Company in the Mining Area, including the construction of additional tailings dams and 
haulage roads, to improve the efficiency of Project Operations or to increase the 
throughput of Project Operations ; 
(27) "Project Operations" means the operations for and in connection with the Project 
carried out under this Agreement; 
(28) "Prospecting Area" means the area in Solomon Islands as described in Annex 'A' or 
as varied upon application by Ross Solomon Islands to renew the Gold Ridge SPL 
but shall not include the Mining Area; 
(29) "Prospecting Operations" means prospecting operations carried out under the Gold 
Ridge SPL other than Development Operations; 
(30) "Provincial Government" means the government of Guadalcanal Province of Solomon 
Islands, and includes its Ministers, instrumentalities and agencies; 
(31) "Tax Year" means a year commencing on 1 July in a year and ending on 30 June the 
following year; and 
(32) "the Minister" means the Minister of the Government for the time being responsible 
for mineral resources. 
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20 GOLD RIDGE SPECIAL PROSPECTING LICENCE 
2.1 Exploration Operations 
Ross Solomon Islands shall continue to carry out exploration, prospecting and other Project 
Operations in accordance with the requirements of the Gold Ridge SPL, this Agreement and 
the Applicable Law. 
2 2 Changes in the Prospectrng Prograrnme 
Ross Solomon Islands may, after due consultation with the Government, make such 
changes in the details of the approved prospecting programme during the term of the Gold 
Ridge SPL which are necessary and prudent in accordance with good internatronal mining 
industry practice. 
2.3 Credit for Over-Expenditure 
In the event that Ross Solomon Islands spends more than the amount of the minimum 
expenditure commitment in any Licence Year, the amount of over-expenditure shall be 
carried forward and credited against the minimum expenditure commitment for th'~ next 
1l ', ~ 
following Licence Year, so as to reduce the minimum expenditure commitment for that 
Licence Year. 
2.4 Surrender 
Ross Solomon Islands may, at its option, surrender the Gold Ridge SPL during a Licence 
Year provided it has fulfilled the minimum work and expenditure commitment as required 
by the Gold Ridge SPL relating to the L1cence Year in which such election to surrender is 
made and previous Licence Years. Any amount required to be expended on exploration 
operations pursuant to Clause 2.1 by Ross Solomon Islands and not so expended shall be 
a debt due to the Government and payable by Ross Solomon Islands prior to surrender of 
the Gold Ridge SPL. 
2.5 Force Majeure Extension 
Where Ross Solomon Islands or the Mining Company is prevented from carrying on its 
operations under the Gold Ridge SPL because of force majeure, the term of the Gold Ridge 
SPL shall, subject to Clause 16, be extended by a period equal to the period for which the 
force majeure event in question subsisted. 
3. MINING LEASE 
3.1 Application for Mining Lease 
In the event that Ross Solomon Islands discovers 111 the Prospecting Area a mineral deposit 
which Ross Solomon Islands believes capable of being economically mined and the m1nerals 
therefrom marketed, Ross Solomon Islands rnay, not later than three (3) months before the 
expiry of the mitial term, or (where, subject to the New Mining Act ar1d the minimum work 
and expenditure obligations acceptable to the Government in respect of such rene Nal, upon 
application duly made by Ross Solomon Islands for a renewal of the Gold Ridge SPL, the 
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renewal is granted under the New Mining Act) the renewal period of the Gold Rrdge SPL, 
make ar1 application for a Mining Lease The application shall set out the key Ancillary 
Authorisations required for the implementation of the Project and the proposed financing 
plan. The application shall be accompanied by a Feasibility Study which shall include the 
following: 
(a) a description and a plan of the area over which the Mining Lease is sought; 
(b) a description of the mineral deposit with a comprehensive report thereon including 
details of the grade and quantity of the proven and probable ore reserves and the 
antrcipated mining conditions, with comments on possible ore reserves; 
(c) a technological report on mining and ore treatment possibilities and proposals thereon; 
(d) a proposed mining plan, which shall include: 
(i) the proposed Date of Commencement of Commercial Production; 
(ii) the proposed facilities, scale of operations and production capacity; 
(iii) the proposed processing plan and estimated overall recovery of ore and mineral 
products; and 
(iv) the proposed marketing arrangements for the sale of the mineral products 
including the proposed transport arrangements and the proposed arrangements 
for the sale of gold; 
(e) an environmental impact statement based on a scope of work previously agreed upon 
with the Minister; 
(f) a detailed programme for the reclamation and rehabilitation of lands disturbed by the 
Project and for the minimisation, control and joint monitoring of the effects of mining 
on air, land, and water, based upon previously agreed environmental standards. Such 
programme and standards shall: 
(i) be rn accordance with good international mining industry practice; 
(ii) reasonably anticipate damage to air, land, water, persons, vegetation, and 
marine and animal life; 
(iii) appropriately recognise the costs and benefits of environmental protection in 
relation to the benefits of the Project; and 
(iv) reasonably recognise the effect the Project must necessarily have on the 
er1vrronment; 
9 
(g) a reasonably detailed forecast of capital investment, costs and sales 
revenues; 
(h) a report on the anticipated employment requirements for the Project and a programme 
for the employment and training of Solomon Islands citizens, specifying for each year: 
(t) the anticipated number of citizens to be in the programme; 
(ii) the scope and content of the training courses; and 
(iii) the anticipated costs thereof; 
(t) a report of the Project's anticipated requirements for goods produced in Solomon 
Islands and for servir;es which may be obtained within Solomon Islands, and Ross 
Solomon Islands' intention in relation thereto; 
(j) the details of the proposed infrastructure plan; and 
(k) the details of the proposed resettlement programme for the owners and occupiers of 
land in the Mining Area. 
3.2 Grant of Mining Lease 
Not later than six (6) months after the date of the submission of the application, the Mining 
Lease shall be granted by the Minister to the Mining Company if the application proposes 
plans and programmes in accordance with good international mining industry practice 
which: 
(a) provide for the reasonable development of the mineral deposit or deposits in a manner 
consistent with the reasonable interests of the peopln of Solomon Islands in relation 
to the Project; 
(b) reasonably protect the environment taking into account the effect the Project must 
necessarily have on i.he environment; 
(c) recognise the importance of the programme for the employment and training of 
Solomon Islands citizens; 
(d) recognise the Government's desire for the Project to proceed and to be economically 
viable, consistent with securing a reasonable return on investment to Ross Solomon 
Islands, Ross Mining and the Mining Company, commensurate with their risks, and 
significant financial and other benefits for the Government and the people of Solomon 
Islands; and 
(e) complies with the New Mining Act. 
1CJ 
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3.3 Form of Mining Lease 
Once approved, the plans and programmes referred to in Clause 3.1 shall be incorporated 
in and form part of the Mining Lease. The Mining Lease shall not contain terms or 
conditions inconsistent with this Agreement. The environmental, reclamation and 
rehabilitation programme and the programme for the employment and training of Solomon 
Islands citizens shall be incorporated in the Mining Lease as annexes thereto. 
3.4 Rights Under the Mining Lease 
The Mining Lease shall grant to the Mining Company the exclusive right to mine the mineral 
deposit or deposits in the Mining Area and sell or otherwise dispose of and market the 
minerals so mined therein for a term of twenty-five (25) years. The Mining Lease shall be 
subject to renewal for an additional term or terms not exceeding ten ( 1 0) years each on 
such terms and conditions as the parties may agree at the time of such renewal. The 
Mining Lease shall also grant to the Mining Company the following rights: 
(a) to make all necessary excavations to mine the mineral deposit or deposits in the 
Mining Area and to re-work mine tailings and dumped materials; 
(b) to erect, construct and maintain in the Mining Area such plant, machinery" and 
buildings, workshops, pipeline and other production facilities as are necessary or 
convenient for mining and milling operations; 
(c) to stack products or dump any waste products of mmmg or mineral processing 
operations, including tailings; 
(d) to erect, construct and maintain houses, buildings, amenities and incidental facilities 
for the use of the Mining Company, its contractors, agents and their employees and 
their immediate families; 
(e) Subject to the Rivers Water Act 1969, to take and use water from waterways and 
bores, and to lay water pipes and make water races and ponds, dams and reservoirs 
and divert and use any water necessary for the Project, provided that, if economical 
and practical, any water so diverted shall be returned to its natural channel; 
(f) Subject to the Telecommunication Act, to construct and maintain all transportation and 
telecommunication facilities and conveniences in the Mining Area and such other areas 
as specified in the approved Feasibility Study as may be necessary or convenient to 
carry out the Project; 
(g) to take and use quarry stone, gravel and other materials from the Mining Area for the 
construction and operation of the Project; 
(h) after due consultation with the Government, to adjust production schedules and 
operating rates and, in the case of manpower levels, make changes thereto (it being 
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understood that minor es to manpower levels will not require consultation 
vv1th the Government) as necessary and prudent to to temporary 
conditions ir1 accordance with good international mming industry practice; 
(1) to have such road access, as approved by the Minister, to the Prospecting Area and 
the Mining Area and to the port from the nearest public road for the purposes ot the 
Project; and 
(J) to engaoe 1n all stwh other activities as are reasonably necessary or convenient to 
carry out the ProjecL 
All rights granted under the Mining Lease shall be exercised in accordance with the 
approved plans and programmes in the Mining Lease, good international mining industry 
practice and Applicable Law. 
3.5 Adjustments To Plans and Programmes and Project Expansion 
(a} It is recognised that changes in the plans and programmes in the Mining Lease 
will be necessary during its term, including changes in production schedules, 
operating rates and manpower levels in connection therewith to respond'~~o 
operational or international market conditions. Therefore, the Mining Company, 
after due consultation with the Government, may make such changes in the 
details of such plans and programmes as are necessary and prudent -in 
accordance with good international mining industry practice. 
(b) Where the Mining Company proposes to carry out a Project Expansion in respect of 
Project Operations not adequately covered in the approved Feasibility Study , the 
Mining Company shall make an application for the approval of the Government to the 
proposed Project Expansion submitting its detailed proposals for the Project Expansion, 
updating of the approved Feasibility Study and variation of the plans and programmes 
to incorporate the proposed Project Expansion. Not later than four (4) months after 
the date of the submission of the application, the approval to the Project Expansion 
shall be granted by the Minister to the Mining Company if the application proposes 
plans and programmes in accordance with good international mining industry practice 
which: 
(i) provide for the reasonable development of the mineral deposit or deposits in a 
manner consistent with the reasonable interests of the people of Solomon 
Islands in relation to the Project; 
(ii) reasonably protect the environment taking into account the effect the Project 
must necessarily have on the environment; 
(iii) recogn1se the importance of the programme for the employment and training of 
Solomon Islands citizens; and 
(iv) comply with the New Mining Act. 
3.6 Grant of Ancillary Authorisations 
(a} Once proper application has been made in accordance with Applicable Law, the 
Government shall expeditiously and, in any case, within three months of the date of 
the application therefor expeditiously authorise or grant to the Mining Company such 
other licences, permits, rights or approvals as are necessary for the purpose of 
carrying out the Project. The rights under such authorisations shall be exercised in 
accordance with Applicable Law. 
(b) The Government shall establish a coordinating committee of all relevant Ministries and 
Departments under the chairmanship of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of 
Energy, Water and Mineral Resources or his designate to coordinate the expeditious 
grant in accordance with Applicable Law, upon proper application therefor, of the 
Ancillary Authorisations required by the Mining Company for the Project Operations. 
(c) The parties shall periodically meet to discuss and review the progress and 
implementation of the Project and to deal with any issues arising therefrom. 
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(d) Any issue or disagreement between the parties as to whether an A~fiary 
Authorisation is, in fact, necessary or required for the implementation of the Project 
or any technical matter arising out of the terms and conditions of an Ancillary 
Authorisation granted pursuant to Clause 3.6(a) shall be referred to an independent 
sole expert competent on the subject matter to be appointed by agreement between 
the parties and, failing such agreemen~, by the President of the International Chamber 
of Commerce in Paris and the decision of such expert shall be binding upon the 
parties. 
3. 7 Provision of Land 
(a} The Government shall, on such terms and conditions as it may determine, allocate 
appropriate land to the Gold Ridge landowners and grant such title therein to the 
landowners as is satisfactory to the landowners to enable the Mining Company to 
construct and establish the resettlement village with appropriate facilities and 
amenities to resettle the landowners in accordance with the approved resettlement 
programme. 
(b) The Government shall, on such terms and conditions as are generally applicable in 
Solomon Islands and at reasonable rent, grant to the Mining Company appropriate land 
under a land lease for the duration of the Project to enable the Mining Company to 
construct a company jetty and backup storage and customs facilities at a location 
approved by the Government to service the Project in accordance with the approved 
Feasibility Study. 
3.8 Existing Services and Facilities 
The Mining Company shall, for the purposes of the Project, reasonably use existing 
Government services and facilities such as ports, airports, roads and other facilities which 
are publicly owned, subject to reasonable and appropriate user charges, which use shall be 
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in accordance with Applicable Law. Where any existing facility can after upgrading be 
used as aforesaid, the Mining Company shall assist the Government in upgrading such 
facilities on such terms as approved by the Government. 
3.9 Additional Infrastructure and Services 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement. the Mining Company shall fund and 
construct all additional infrastructure facilities necessary to carry out the Project as 
specified in the approved Feasibility Study. The Mining Company shall maintain any 
such additional facility for so long as such facility may be necessary to carry out the 
Project. Such construction and maintenance shall be in accordance with good 
international mining industry practice and Applicable Law. 
(b) The Government shall during the term of this Agreement provide appropriate police, 
postal and telecommunication services at a standard reasonably required to serve the 
Mining Company, its contractors and agents and their employees and their immediate 
families. 
(c) The Mining Company shall provide at its expense such additional medical facilitiel?Jlnd 
services in the Mining Area as are necessary for its employees and persons end~~ed 
in Project Operations as specified in the approved Feasibility Study. Such facilities 
shall be constructed and such services shall be provided in accordance with Applicable 
Law. The Mining Company shall make such facilities reasonably available to other 
persons resident in or who have their place of business in the Mining Area, if any. 
(d) If the approved Feasibility Study provides for the construction of a township within the 
Mining Area , the Mining Company, in constructing the township, shall provide at its 
expense according to Applicable Law additional educational and other facilities and 
services including schools and social amenities that are necessary for its employees, 
contractors, agents, and their immediate families. The Mining Company shall also make 
the facilities and services reasonably available to any other persons residing in, or with 
their place of business in, the Mining Area or the township area. 
(e) The additional infrastructure facilities referred to in Clause 3.9(a} include but are not 
limited to: 
(i) conveying and transportation systems in the Mining Area and on public and 
private roads that are necessary or desirable for transporting people, plant, 
equipment, materials and mineral products both within the Mining Area and to 
and from the Mining Area, including roads and port facilities; 
(ii) a port or wharf facility to enable the Mining Company to land in Guadalcanal 
and deliver to the Mining Area all plant, equipment and materials required for 
the construction and operation of the Project. to re-export construction plant 
and equipment once their use in the construction of the Project has ceased, and 
to ship and transport ores, concentrates and other mineral products to overseas 
ports; 
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(iii) an and one or more and associated 
(iv) all dredged channels, cleared landing paths, tugs, pilotage and navigational aid 
facilities required in the operation of any port, wharf facility, helicopter pad or 
air strip. 
3. 1 0 Power and Water 
(a) The Government may propose to the Mining Company to provide a reliable electric 
power source in a timely manner to the Project on a basis acceptable to the Mining 
Company with regard to cost, timeliness, reliability, security and performance. In the 
event the Government cannot meet the Project's requirements on a timely basis the 
Mining Company may, subject to Clause 3.1 O(c) and according to Applicable Law, 
generate, transmit, use for its own purposes, and supply electric power to any of 1ts 
facilities and those of its contractors and agents and their employees and may 
reasonably charge therefor. 
(b) If the Mining Company supplies electric power in terms of Clause 3.1 O(a), it shall 
subject to obtaining a licence to supply under Section 31 of the Electricity Act, ,Gap. 
1 6, make available any excess power which the Mining Company considers is not 
required for the Project on an interruptible basis, at reasonable charges, to persons 
other than its contractors, agents and employees who reside or have their place of 
business at the same locations as the Mining Company uses such power. 
(c) Subject to not less than 1 2 months notice by the Government, the Mining Company 
shall switch from its own power generation source to the Lungga hydropower 
generation source as soon as the Lungga Hydropower Scheme is established and 
operational and is able to provide reliable electric power supply in a timely manner to 
the Project at competitive cost and meet the Project's delivery requirements. The 
Government shall not, in any manner, be subject to any penalty for this switch. 
(d) Any issue or disagreement as to the reliability of the Lungga power supply for the 
purposes of the Project that may arise between the parties shall be referred to an 
independent sole expert competent on the subject matter to be appointed by 
agreement between the parties and, failing such agreement, by the President of the 
International Chamber of Commerce in Paris and the decision of such expert shall be 
binding on the parties. 
(e) The Mining Company may, subject to Applicable i..aw, take and use water for the 
purposes of the Project and supply water to persons other than its contractors, agents 
and employees who reside or have their place of business at the same locations as the 
Mining Company uses such water and may reasonably charge therefor. 
3.11 Roads and Bridges 
The Gover'lment shall grant the Mining Company road access licences to construct roads 
and bridges for the safe, efficient and economical operation of the Project. Such roads and 
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bridges shall be constructed, maintained and used in accordance with Applicable Law. The 
Mining Company for safety reasons, after due consultation with the Government, may 
reasonably designate any such road for restricted use. Where not so designated, such 
roads and bridges may be used by third parties to the extent that they do not unreasonably 
interfere with the operation of the Project. Where any person uses such a road or bridge 
in such a manner as to do damage thereto or to increase the cost of the upkeep thereof, the 
Mining Company may make a reasonable charge for the cost of such repairs or upkeep. 
3.1 2 Rentals or Other Charges 
The Mining Company shall not without the consent of the Government use land for a 
purpose other than for the Project. Rentals or other charges payable by the Mining 
Company to the Government or to any other persons under any lease, licence, permit, right 
or approval granted in accordance with this Agreement shall be in accordance with 
ApplicablE Law and shall be fair and reasonable, without consideration for any mineral 
known or supposed to be known on or under such land. All such leases, licences, permits, 
rights and approvals shall be extended as necessary until the expiration, surrender or 
termination of the Mining Lease. 
3.13 Development Obligations 
{a) Following the grant of the Mining Lease and the requisite Ancillary Authorisations to 
the Mining Company set out in the application for the Mining Lease and the obtaining 
by the Mining Company of the necessary access to areas in the Mining Area required 
to enable the construction of the mine, Ross Mining shall cause the Mining Company, 
in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Mining Lease, the approved 
Feasibility Study and this Agreement, to {and the Mining Company shall) construct 
and provide the required facilities and to carry out the Project with due diligence, 
efficiency and economy, in accordance with good international mining industry 
practice. The Project shall cost not less than A$40,000,000 up to the Date of 
Commencement of Commercial Production. 
{b) If the Mining Company has not carried out substantial development of the mine within 
a period of two years from the date of the issuance of the Mining Lease and all 
requisite Ancillary Authorisations specified in the application for the Mining Lease 
whichever date is the latest, without prejudice to any other remedy available to the 
Government, the Mining Company shall be liable to pay to the Government 
Sl$200,000 indexed to the Solomon Islands Consumer Price Index from the base year 
of 1996, for each month of such delay and Ross Mining shall ensure that the aforesaid 
amounts are duly paid; provided that if the Date of Commencement of Commercial 
Production does not occur, subject to the provisions of Clause 16, on or before the 
end of the sixth month following the sixth anniversary of the date of issuance of the 
Mining Lease and the requisite Ancillary Authorisations, the Government may 
terminate this Agreement pursuant to Clause 19.2 and, provided further that, where 
the Date of Comm<;ncement of Commercial Production has not occurred ClS aforesaid 
solely and entirely because of significantly adverse international market conditions 
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and the Mining Company is not in default, then the Government, prior to such 
termination, shall meet with the parties to agree on measures acceptable to the 
Government to satisfactorily deal with the situation and expedite the Date of 
Commencement of Commercial Production. 
4. EXCLUSIVITY 
4.1 The rights of Ross Solomon Islands to prospect in the Prospecting Area and of the Mining 
Company to mine in the Mining Area and to dispose of and market minerals therefrom are 
exclusive. The Government shall not grant any rights to any third party to prospect for 
minerals in the Prospecting Area during the term of the Gold Ridge SPL, or to mine minerals 
in the Mining Area or, to market minerals therefrom, during the term of the Mining Lease. 
5. ROYALTY AND EXPORT DUTY 
,-: 
5.1 Royalty ~ (;: 
(a) The Mining Company shall pay to the Government a royalty equal to one and a half 
percent ( 1 1/2 %) of the Gross Value of all Gold and Silver produced from the Mining 
Area under the Mining Lease. 
(b) The Government shall establish special funds under Section 1 00(2) of the Constitution 
of Solomon Islands to receive payments of royalty for the benefit of the Gold Ridge 
landowners and the Provincial Government. 
(c) The Mining Company shall, in full satisfaction of its obligation to pay royalty under 
the New Mining Act as set out in Clause 5.1 (a), pay : 
(i) 1 .2% of the Gross Value of all Gold and Silver produced from the Mining Area 
into the prescribed special fund for the benefit of the Gold Ridge landowners; 
and 
(ii) 0.3% of the Gross Value of all Gold and Silver produced from the Mining Area 
into the prescribed special fund for the benefit of the Provincial Government. 
5. 2 Export Duty 
The M1ning Company sh;:JI! pay to the Government an export duty of one and a half percent 
(1 1/2%) of the Gross Value of all Gold and Silver produced from the Mining Areas under 
the Mining Lease in full discharge of its obligation to pay export duty under the Applicable 
Law. 
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5.3 Calculation and Payment of Royalty and Export Duty 
(a) The Gross Value of all Gold and Silver produced from the Mining Areas under the 
Mining Lease for the purposes of royalty, duty and taxation shall be the London pm 
price fix in United States dollars as determined by members of the London Bullion 
Market Association for refined gold and silver as at the date of the refinery receipt, 
multiplied by the certified quantity of gold and silver as issued by the relevant refinery. 
(b) All gold and silver produced from the Mining Area under the Mining Lease shall be 
exported from Solomon Islands within sixty (60) days or shall be deemed to have been 
exported on the sixtieth day after production. 
(c) Royalty and export duty shall be paid not later than sixty (60) days after the last day 
of the month in which minerals are exported from Solomon Islands, based on actual 
or reasonably estimated receipts. 
(d) If minerals other than gold and silver are produced frorn the Mining Area under tt 
Mining Lease and are sold separately, royalty and export duty shall be. paid to tht: 
Government at the same percentage rates applicable to gold and silver ~-ised on the 
international fair market value of such minerals, determined, in the absence of 
published international market prices for such minerals, in such manner as agreed by 
the parties. Any issue or disagreement on the international fair market value of such 
minerals that may arise between the parties shall be referred to an independent sole 
expert competent on the subject matter appointed by agreement between the parties 
and, failing such agreement by the President of the International Chamber of 
Commerce in Paris and the decision of such expert shall be binding on the parties. 
5.4 Production Statement 
(a) The Mining Company shall, not later than seven rlays after the end of the first 
calendar quarter during which minerals are produced from the Agreement Area, and 
thereafter not later then seven days after the end of each subsequent calendar qua· 
during the term of this Agreement. submit to the Minister a production statem 
containing the following particulars in respect of the Agreement Area :-
(i) the quantity of gold and other minerals produced; 
(ii) the size of mineral stocks held at the beginning of the calendar quarter in 
question; and 
(iii) the size of mineral stocks held at the end of the calendar quarter in question. 
(b) The Minister may by notice in writing addressed and delivered to the Mining Company 
direct that such other particulars relating to Project Operations as specified in thE 
notice and reasonable in the circumstances be included in the production statemen1 
and the Mining Company shall comply with such request. 
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. TAXATION 
6.1 Income Tax 
(a) The Mining Company shall pay company income tax at the rate of 35% and according 
to the Income Tax Act, Cap 61 of Solomon Islands and all its subsidiary legislation 
from time to time applicable to resident companies provided that: 
(i) the company income tax rate applied to the Mining Company's taxable income 
shall not exceed 35%; 
(ii) the rate of withholding tax on dividends paid by the Mining Company and on 
dividends, in respect of income derived from Project Operations, paid by Ross 
Solomon Islands to non-resident companies shall be nil; and 
(iii) the additional deductions specified in Clause 6.2 shall be deductible in 
computing income chargeable to tax. 
(b) Income derived from monies retained outside Solomon Islands pursuant to Clausea;2.5 
shall be deemed to be Solomon Islands source income and taxable under the Income 
Tax AcL No tax paid on such income in a foreign jurisdiction shall be creditable in 
Solomon Islands but such tax shall be allowed as a deduction in computing taxable 
income under the Income Tax Act. 
6.2 Deductions in the Computation of Company Income Tax 
The Mining Company shall be entitled to deduct in the computation of income chargeable 
to Income Tax the following costs and expenses to the extent reasonably incurred and 
necessary to carry out the Project in accordance with good international mining industry 
practice: 
(a) Interest incurred by the Mining Company on loans and other approved financing 
arrangements in ac,cordance with the financing plan set out in the application for the 
Mining Lease to finance the Project, to the extent that the rate of interest on any loan 
does not exceed a rate based upon an arm's length competitive third party transaction 
at the time the loan was made and to the extent that the loan to capital ratio does not 
exceed that specified in Clause 7.1; 
(b) Exploration and Development Expenditures incurred by Ross Solomon Islands and Ross 
Mining prior to the incorporation of the Mining Company, and Development 
Expenditures incurred by the Mining Company, including de-commissioning expenses, 
prior to the Date of Commencement of Commercial Production shall be deductible at 
the rate of one hundred percent ( 1 00%) in accordance with the provisions of the 
Income Tax Act in the Tax Year incurred with unlimited loss carry forward; 
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(c) Depreciation of nt, equipment and de-
commissioning expenses, incurred after the Date of Commencement of Commercial 
Production shall be at the rates set forth in the Income Tax Act; 
(d) Exploration and Development Expenditures incurred by the Mining Company in respect 
of Project Expansion shall be deductible at the rate of one hundred percent ( 1 00%) 
in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act in the Tax Year incurred with 
unlimited loss carry forward; 
(e) Royalty pursuant to Clause 5.1 and export duty pursuant to Clause 5.2; 
(f) Import duties payable to the Government; 
(g) the costs and charges of operating leases of plant, equipment and Project facilities 
based upon arm's length competitive third party transactions; 
(h) reclamation and rehabilitation costs incurred in the Tax Year pursuant to the 
rehabilitation plan approved by the Government. The Mining Company sha~~~ake 
annual provision for such rehabilitation costs in accordance with the approved 
rehabilitation plan. Reclamation and rehabilitation costs shall be debited .to the 
accumulated provision for rehabilitation in the Tax Year in which the reclamation and 
rehabilitation cost is incurred. Any losses or shortfall due to the accumulated 
provision for rehabilitation and the income of the Mining Company being insufficient 
to meet the total costs of reclamation and rehabilitation at the end of the life of the 
mine may be carried back for a period of not more than 5 years; and 
(i) Operating and other costs and expenses of the Mining Company to carry out the 
Project including any other tax, charge, duty or other levy (excluding income tax and 
Additional Profits Tax) payable under the Applicable Law; 
provided that the costs of acquisition of shares by Ross Mining in Ross Solomon Islands and 
the Mining Company and any expenditure incurred by Ross Mining and Ross Solomon 
Islands in connection therewith shall not be deductible for Income Tax, Additional Profits 
Tax purposes or for any other purpose under this Agreement. 
6.3 Additional Profits Tax 
(a) An Additional Profits Tax shall, pursuant to the Applicable Law, be assessed, and 
levied on and be due and payable by the Mining Company. 
(b) An Additional Profits Tax shall be payable in any Tax Year when the accumulated 
present value of Net Cash Receipts, at the end of that Tax Year, calculated in 
accordance with the formula set out below, is a positive amount, at the rate of thirty 
percent (30%) of that positive amount: 
A = B (1.25) + C where; 
20 
A = accumulated present value of Net Cash 
Year for which the calculation is made; 
at the end of the Tax 
B = accumulated present value of Net Cash Receipts at the end of the 
preceding Tax Year; and 
C = Net Cash Receipts for the Tax Year in respect of which the assessment 
of Additional Profits Tax is made; 
provided that where in any Tax Year the accumulated present value of Net 
Cash Receipts is a positive amount, such accumulated present value of Net 
Cash Receipts shall, for the purposes of determining the accumulated present 
value of Net Cash Receipts in respect of the immediately succeeding Tax Year, 
be deemed to be zero. 
Annex C illustrates how the aforesaid Additional Profits Tax formula is worked 
and computed by reference to an illustrated working example. 
{c) The present value of Net Cash Receipts for each Tax Year shall be ascertained by 
multiplying the respective portion of the nominal amount of Net Cash Receipts 
comprising expenditures incurred on goods and services in Solomon Islands and the 
portion comprising expenditures so incurred outside Solomon Islands at the end of the 
Tax Year by a fraction X!Y where: 
X= the Solomon Islands Consumer Price Index or, as the case may be, 
the Australian Consumer Price Index published from time to time by 
the Solomon Islands Government and the Australian Federal 
Government respectively as at the end of the Tax Year for which the 
calculation is made; and 
Y = the Solomon Islands Consumer Price Index or, as the case may be, the 
Australian Consumer Price Index published from time to time by the 
Solomon Islands Government and the Australian Federal Government 
respectively as at the middle of the Tax Year in which the respective 
portion of Net Cash Receipts were received or expended; and 
X/Y is not less than 1; 
provided that where the Solomon Islands Consumer Price Index or the Australian 
Consumer Price Index is not published, an alternative index shall be agreed by the 
parties and, in the absence of such agreement, shall be determined by an independent 
sole expert competent on the subject matter to be appointed by agreement between 
the parties and, failing such agreement, by the President of the International Chamber 
of Commerce in Paris and the decision of such expert shall be binding on the parties. 
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(d) The Additional Profits Tax shall be within 90 of the end of the Tax Year 
concerned. Interest on the amount of Additional Profits Tax 1n any Tax Year 
shall accrue as of the due date at the rate of ten ( 1 0) per cent or such other :ate as 
provided for in the Income Tax Act as penalty for late payment of income tax 
(hereinafter called" Accrued Interest") and shall forthwith be payable by the Mining 
Company within 30 days of the notification issued by the Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue pursuant to Clause 6.3(e). 
(e) The Commissioner of Inland Revenue shall notify the Mining Company of his 
assessment of Additional Profits Tax and Accrued Interest for each Tax Year. The 
Mining Company shiill within 30 days of each quarter of each Tax Year make advance 
quarterly payments of Additional Profits Tax due in respect of the Tax Year based on 
the assessment of Additional Profits Tax for the previous Tax Year. If the amount of 
Additional Profits Tax paid to the Government is less or, as the case may be, more 
than the amount of the Commissioner's assessment, the shortfall together with 
Accrued Interest thereon shall be promptly paid by the Mining Company to the 
Government, or, the excess, if any after taking into account any other sums due from 
the Mining Company, by the Government to the Mining Company. This CI~I.JSe shall 
apply, mutatis mutandis, to all payments due by the Mining Company ,Jr.j'der the 
Income Tax AcL 
(f) The Mining Company shall prepare with respect to each Tax Year an Additional 
Profits Tax statement containing the following information:-
(i) the nominal amount of Net Cash Receipts for the Tax Year, identifying 
separately each of the categories of gross income and the allowable 
deductions provided in the Applicable Law relating to Additional Profits Tax; 
(ii) the appropriate value of the Solomon Islands Consumer Price Index and 
Australian Consumer Price Index and the weighted average of the two indices 
used in ascertaining the present value of Net Cash Receipts for the Tax Year; 
(iii) the accumulated present value of Net Cash Receipts for the Tax Year; and 
(iv) the amount of Additional Profits Tax payable for the Tax Year. 
(g) The information required in terms of Clause 6.3(e) shall be presented in sufficient 
detail, vvtth supporting documents, so as to enable the Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue to verify the timing and amount of Additional Profits Tax payments. The 
Commissioner may require the submission of Additional Profits Tax statements more 
frequently than annually but not more than twice annually in order to satisfy the 
aforesaid objective. 
(h) The Additional Profits Tax statement for each Tax Year shall be submitted to the 
Commissioner no later than 60 days after the end of such Tax Year. 
6.4 Taxes 
Ross Solomon Islands and the M1ning shall be subject to such taxes on real property 
as are generally in effect on a non-discriminatory basis. Real property shall be valued without 
taking into account minerals or improvements on or under land. 
6. 5 Customs Duties 
(a) Prior to the Date of Commencement of Commercial Production, customs duties and 
levies shall not be levied or imposed on the following items to the extent that such 
items are reasonable and necessary in accordance with good international mining 
industry practice to carry out the Project: 
(i) all capital items exclusively and necessarily required for the Project; 
(ii) explosives, milling, smelting, refining and welding supplies, mining and milling 
machinery and equipment and all other items including fuel exclusively and 
necessarily required for the Project; 
provided that, notwithstanding the aforesaid provision, customs duties and taxes shall 
be payable in accordance with the Applicable Law on all food items, alcoho(~hd 
spirits, cigarettes, clothing (other than special protective clothing), shoes (other than 
special protective shoes), toiletries, household items such as video sets and tapes, 
washing machines, refrigerators, kitchen utensils and commercial articles, personal 
vehicles, sailboat or pleasure boats, outboard engines and arms and ammunitions; and 
(b) after the Date of Commencement of Commercial Production, all imported items shall 
be subject to customs duties and levies of general application on a non-discriminatory 
basis provided that industrial gases, industrial chemicals and reagents, grinding balls, 
spare parts for grinding mill, mill liners, explosives, carbon and heavy duty tyres (four 
wheel drive and above) exclusively and necessarily required for the Project shall be 
exempt from customs duties and no customs duties and taxes shall be payable on 
fuel exclusively and necessarily required for the Project. 
(c) In the event that items on which no duties or levies, or reduced duties or levies, are 
paid, are thereafter sold, exchanged or transferred in Solomon Islands and not re-
exported (other than to the Government), (within the period of the first two years after 
the relevant date of importation) Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company shall 
be liable for the pc;yillent of customs duties, and levies, to the extent not previously 
paid, on the then fair market value of such items. 
(d) The Mining Company shall pay goods tax on all fuel imports and all other items 
required for the Project provided that imported capital items (other than fuel) and 
industrial gases, industrial chemicals and reagents, grinding balls, spare parts for 
grinding mill, mill liners, explosives, carbon and heavy duty tyres (four wheel drive 
and above) exclusively and necessarily required for the Project shall, during the period 
prio' to the Date of Commencement of Commercial Production, be exempt from goods 
tax. 
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6 6 Taxes on Expatriate Employees 
All employees of Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands, the Mining Company, and 
their contractors and agents, engaged in operations under this Agreement shall be su[)ject to 
such taxes as are generally in effect in Solomon Islands,, only on their Solomon Islands source 
income derived from such operations, on a non-discriminatory basis, whether or not paid in 
Solomon Islands provided that, without prejudice to Clause 6. 7, during the period prior to the 
date of commencement of production,, such e_xp_atr1ate contractors shall be exempt from 
income tax on their fees derived from Project Operations under this Agreement and they shall 
not, during such period, be entitled to any allowances under the Income Tax Act. 
6.7 Withholding Taxes on Non-Solomon Islands Contractors 
Ross Solomon lslarlds and the Mrning Company shall withhold taxes on behalf of the 
Government, from the gross payments made to non-Solomon Islands contractors, for services 
performed by such contractors and their subcontractors in Solomon Islands at the fixed rate 
of seven percent (7%). 
6.8 Withholding Tax on Interest 
Interest paid to a non-Solomon Islands lender or non-resident company by Ross Solc{i;ijon 
Islands or the Mining Company with respect to their borrowings relating to the Project shall 
be subject to withholding tax at the fixed rate of five percent (5%) of such interest without 
prejudice, however, to any specific exemption available to any entity currently under-the 
Income Tax Act. 
6.9 Other Taxes and Levies 
Without prejudice to Clauses 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8, no tax, duty, fee or other impost shall be 
imposed on Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands or the Mining Company in respect of income 
derived from Project Operations under this Agreement or in respect of any property held or 
thing done for any purpose authorised or contemplated hereunder other than -
(a) Royalty payable under Clause 5.1; 
(b) Export duty payable under Clause 5.2; 
(c) Income Tax in accordance with the provisions of Clause 6.1; 
(d) Additional Profits Tax at the rates and calculated in the manner provided in Clause 
6.3; 
(e) Property taxes as provrded in Clause 6.4; 
(f) Subject to the provisior1s of Clause 6.5, customs duties and levies at the applicable 
rates pursuant to the Applicable Law; 
(g) Sales tax and capital ga1ns tax under the Applicable Law; 
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{h) Subject to Clause 6.5(d), goods tax under the ble Law; 
{i) Taxes, duties, fees or other imposts for specific services rendered on request or to the 
public or commercial enterprises generally, registration fees, licence fees and any 
other tax, duty, fee or other impost of a minor nature and generally applicable to 
businesses in Solomon Islands and the generally applicable rent due in respect of any 
land rights granted or assigned to the Mining Company; 
{j) Local Government and Provincial Government rates or taxes not in excess of those 
generally applicable in Solomon Islands; 
(k) an annual fee of Sl $ 50,000 {indexed to the Solomon Islands Consumer Price Index 
from the base year of 1996) payable to the Bolomona Area Council; and 
{I) Stamp duties. 
6.10 Approved Infrastructure Development Tax Credits 
(a) Where the Mining Company has, in any Tax Year, incurred expenditure in ~· 
construction of an approved Infrastructure Development Scheme approved pursuant 
to Clause 6.10 (b), the amount of such expenditure not exceeding Sl $ 200,000 P-2r 
annum (indexed to the Solomon Islands Consumer Price Index from the base year of 
1996) shall be allowed to the Mining Company as a tax credit against the income tax 
due and payable under the Income Tax Act by the Mining Company in respect of that 
Tax Year provided that: 
(i) no other allowance, deduction or tax credit under this Agreement or the 
Applicable Law shall be given to the Mining Company in respect of such 
expenditure in that or any other Tax Year; and 
(ii) the tax credit for any Tax Year shall not exceed the amount of income tax 
payable for that Tax Year; and 
provided further that, in relation to any Tax Year during the period beginning from the 
date of commencement of production to the Tax Year when the Mining Company 
begins to pay income tax, such expenditure not exceeding Sl$ 50,000 per annum 
(indexed to the Solomon Islands Consumer Price Index from the base year of 1 996) 
shall be allowed to the Mining Company as a tax credit against the income tax due 
and payable under the Income Tax Act by the Mining Company in respect of that Tax 
Year and the tax credit in respect of such Tax Year may be carried forward to the 
immediately succeeding Tax Year: 
(b) The Mining Company shall not less than four months prior to a Tax Year submit its 
proposals for any lnfrastructut'e Development Scheme to the Government with such 
detailed particulars as required by the Government and apply for the prior written 
approval of the Government and the Provincial Government to such scheme. The 
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Government and the Provincial Government shall not1fy the Mining 
decision on the application within s1xty days of the date of the application. 
of its 
(c) For the purposes of this Clause "Infrastructure Development Scheme" means a 
scheme for the development of such infrastructure (other than infrastructure relatmg 
to or required the Project) and in such locality or area in Solomon Islands as 
approved by the Government. 
6.11 Undertaking 
(a) The Minister shall use his best efforts to cause to be introduced into, and passed by 
the Parliament as soon as practicable the appropriate legislation, necessary to enable 
the implementation of this Agreement. 
(b) The Government undertakes that it will not declare any part of the Prospecting Area 
or the Mining Area a national park under the National Parks Act Cap. 34 or a State 
forest reserve under the Forests and Timber Utilisation Act Cap. 90. 
6.1 2 Certification of Laws 
Upon request by the Mining Company and, subject to payment of the appropriate 
administrative fee for such service, the Government shall, if it is appropriate to do so, certify 
a copy of a statute submitted by the Mining Company to be a true copy of the relevant statute 
of Solomon Islands. 
7. DEBT-EQUITY RATIO, RECORDS, STATEMENTS AND AUDIT 
7.1 Debt-Equity Ratio 
The ratio of loan capital to paid-up equity capital shall be at all times not more than 9:1. All 
loan capital shall be procured by Ross Solomon Islands on L~half of the Mining Company on 
such terms and conditions as approved by the Central Bank of Solomon Islands, which 
approval shall not be unreasonably withheld, and in accordance with Applicable Law relating 
to the borrowing of foreign exchange by companies resident in Solomon Islands. The 
definitions of loan capital and equity capital shall be as specified in the approved financing 
plan set out in the application for the Mining Lease. 
7. 2 Books, Records and lnformc;tion 
(a) Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company shall keep in Solomon Islands 
complete financial and technical books and records of all their Project Operations 
under the Gold Ridge SPL, the Mining Lease and this Agreement, including those 
relating to all revenues, expenditures, mineral production, shipment, sales or use of 
mineral production and products connected with and arising from such operations. 
The Government, its inspectors, officers, consultants and agents at any reasonable 
time and upon reasonable notice shall have access to examine, take extracts from, 
and make copies of, ail such books and records and all documents relating to such 
operations. 
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(b) Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company shall supply such information, reports, 
returns and statements at such times and in such forms as may be reasonably 
required by the Government or as required by the Applicable Law. 
7.3 Responsibility for Maintaining Accounts 
(a) The Mining Company shall be responsible for maintaining all accounting records in 
order to comply with all legal requirements and to support all fiscal returns or any 
other accounting reports required by any governmental authority in relation to the 
Project. 
(b) The Mining Company shall maintain the accounts of the Project Operations in such a 
manner so as to fulfil its obligations under this Agreement. 
7.4 Units of account and exchange rates 
(a) Accounts shall be maintained in the currency of Solomon Islands and Australia. 
(b) It is the intention of the parties that neither the Government nor the Mining Co~ny 
should experience an exchange gain or loss at the expense of or to the benefit of the 
other. However, should there be any gain or loss from exchange of currency, it will 
be credited or charged to the accounts. 
(c) Amounts received and expenditures made in Solomon Islands Dollars or in Australian 
Dollars shall be converted from Solomon Islands Dollars into Australian Dollars or from 
Australian Dollars into Solomon Islands Dollars on the basis of the monthly average 
of the mean of the daily official buying and selling exchange rates between the 
currencies in question as published by the Central Bank of Solomon Islands for the 
month in which the relevant transaction occurred. 
(d) Amounts received and expenditures made in currencies other than Australian or 
Solomon Islands Dollars shall be converted into Australian or Solomon Islands Dollars 
on the basis of the monthly average of the mean of the daily buying and selling 
exchange rates between the currencies in question as published by the Central Bank 
of Solomon Islands or, failing such publication, as published in the Financial Times 
(London edition) for the month in which the relevant transaction occurred. 
(e) The average monthly exchange rates calculated in accordance with paragraphs (c) 
and (d) shall be identified in the relevant accounting records or statements. 
7.5 Payments 
(a) Except as otherwi,;e provided in this Agreement all sums due under this Agreement 
by a party thereto to another party shall be paid within 30 days following the end of 
the month in which the obliOation to make such payment occurs and shall be paid 
through a bank designated by the respective party in any convertible currency 
acceptable to the other party. 
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(b) All sums due by the Mining Company to the Government under this Agreement during 
any quarter shall for each day during which such sums are overdue during such 
quarter, bear interest compounded daily at an annual rate equal to ten ( 1 0) per cent 
or such other rate as provided for in the Income Tax Act as penalty for late payment 
of income tax. 
7.6 Audit and Inspection Rights of Government 
(a) The Government shall have the right-
(i) to audit the Mining Company's accounts and records maintained under this 
Agreement with respect to each calendar year within two years (or such 
longer period as may be required in exceptional circumstances) from the end 
of each such year; and 
(ii) to retain an auditor to undertake or assist with the audit. 
Notice of any exception to the Mining Company's accounts for any calendar yeJt..$hall be 
submitted to the Mining Company within six months of the receipt by the Minister of the 
report of its auditors. For the purposes of auditing, the Minister may examine and verify at 
reasonable times all charges and credits relating to the Project Operations and all books of 
account, accounting entries, material records and inventories, vouchers, payrolls, invoices and 
any other documents, correspondence and records considered by the Minister to be necessary 
to audit and verify the charges and credits. Furthermore, the auditors shall have the right in 
connection with such audit to visit and inspect at reasonable times all sites, plants, facilities, 
warehouses and offices of the Mining Company directly or indirectly serving its activities 
under this Agreement and to visit personnel associated with those activities. 
(b) The Mining Company shall answer any notice of exception under par~graph (a) within 
sixty days of the receipt of such notice. Where the Mining Company has after the 
said sixty day period failed to answer a notice of exception made by the Minister, thf 
Minister's exception shall prevail, until such time as the Minister's exception . 
resolved. 
(c) Without prejudice to the finality of matters as described in paragraph (a), all 
documents referred to in that paragraph shall be maintained and made available for 
inspection by the Minister for seven years following their date of issue. 
7. 7 Records and Valuation of Assets 
(a) The Mining Company shall keep and maintain detailed records of assets in use for or 
in connection with Project Operations in accordance with normal accounting practices 
in exploration and mining activities of the international mining industry. 
(b) The Mining Company shall, by notice in writing addressed and delivered to the 
Minister at six monthly intervals, submit particulars to the Minister of all assets 
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acquired by the Mining Company to be used for or in connection with Project 
Operations during the period immediately preceding the delivery of such notice. 
(c) The Mining Company shall: 
(i) not less than once every twelve months with respect to movable assets; and 
(ii) not less than once every three years with respect to fixed assets, take an 
inventory of the assets used for or in connection with Project Operations and 
submit such inventory to the Minister together with a written statement of the 
principles upon which valuation of the assets mentioned in such inventory has 
been based. 
(d) The Mining Company shall give the Minister at least 30 days notice m wntmg 
addressed and delivered to the Minister of its intention to take the inventory referred 
to in paragraph (c) and the Minister shall have the right to be represented when such 
inventory is taken. 
(e) The Mining Company shall provide the Government with a comprehensive list of.all 
relevant assets when requested by the Minister to do so. It is envisaged by tt·{e 
parties that, in the absence of special circumstances so warranting, the Mining 
Company will not be required to provide such list more than twice annually. 
8. GOODS AND SERVICES 
8.1 Local Preference 
In the conduct of its operations under this Agreement, Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining 
Company shall give preference to materials and products produced in Solomon Islands, if .such 
materials and products are not less favourable to Ross Solomon Islands or the Mining 
Company in terms of price, quality and availability at the time and in the quantities required. 
Price comparisons shall be made on a delivered and installed basis, and customs and other 
duties, taxes and charges on imports shall be taken into account, notwithstanding any 
exemptions or reductions with respect thereto pursuant to this Agreement. 
8.2 Importation 
Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, Ross Solomon Islands, the Mining Company and 
their contractors may acquire, import into, move within the country, export from the country, 
and use materials, plant, machinery, equipment, vehicles, explosives, fuels, reagents and 
supplies required for the Project. In acquiring, importing into, moving within the country, 
exporting from the country and using such items, Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining 
Company shall comply with Applicable ~aw. 
~-
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9. EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING OF SOLOMON ISLANDS CITIZENS 
9.1 Subject to Clause 3.5, the Mining Company shall employ and train citizens of Solomon 
Islands in the Project in accordance with the program for the employment and training of 
Solomon Islands citizens approved by Government in the Feasibility Study and annexed to the 
Mining Lease. The Mining Company shall submit an annual report to the Government on the 
program. The terms and conditions of employment shall be in accordance with Applicable 
Law. The Mining Compa;ly shall employ and train the agreed number of landowners in 
accordance with the agreement between the Mining Company and the landowners. 
10. ENVIRONMENT AND COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE 
10.1 Environmental Programme 
Subject to Clause 3.5, the Mining Company shall construct and operate the Project and carry 
out operations hereunder in accordance with the environmental, reclamation and rehabilitatinr 
programme annexed to the Mining Lease. The Mining Company shall promptly takE. 
measures required by the aforesaid environmental programme, Applicable La'!Y. and good 
international mining practice to minimise and control and take all necessary ffl~asures to 
prevent any damage to air, land, water, persons, vegetation, marine or animal life from Project 
Operations in accordance with the environmental programme and clean up any_ damaging 
discharge and pay compensation as required by Applicable Law. 
10.2 Environmental Bond 
The Mining Company shall enter into a bond, satisfactory to and, with the Government for the 
due performance of its obligations under Clause 1 0.1 . The amount of the bond shall as 
specified in the approved Feasibility Study. 
1 ~ . FINANCING THE PROJECT 
11 .1 Financing Plan 
Ross Mining on behalf of the Mining Company shall arrange for the financing of the PrOJ~ . 
and submit the proposed financing plan for the Minister's approval. Approval by the Minister 
of the proposed financing plan shall not be unreasonably withheld or delayed. Any issue or 
disagreement between the parties relating to or arising from the proposed financing plan or, 
refusal of the Minister's approval thereto, shall be referred to an independent sole expert 
competent on the subject matter to be appointed by agreement between the parties and, 
failing such agreement by the President of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris 
and the decision of such expert shall be binding on the parties. 
11 .2 No obligation of Government 
The Government shall not be obligated to provide any funds or credits, issue guarantees or 
otherwise become liable dire-ctly or indirectly for any fina1 .~ing of the Project. 
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11.3 Lenders' Requirements 
The financing plan may include proposals, satisfactory to Government, to meet the 
reasonable requirements of lenders of the Project for securing loans for the Project by: 
(a) a first fixed charge over the Mining Lease and other fixed Project assets and 
equipment and a floating charge over all other assets of the Mining Company; 
(b) a registered mortgage of the Mining Lease and of the Mining Company's shares; 
(c) establishment of offshore foreign currency accounts, including a debt service reserve 
account charged in favour of the lenders; 
{d) an assignment by way of charge in favour of the lenders of the Project contracts, 
including the mine construction contract and the refining and sales agreement, and an 
assignment of the proceeds of an offshore mineral sales proceeds account or of future 
mineral production from the Project, as appropriate; 
t-.t 
(e) giving the lenders step-in rights to acquire or take an assignment of the Mining Lease~~r 
on breach by the Mining Company; and 
{f) other security arrangements reasonably required by the lenders; 
provided that the aforesaid charges, encumbrances and arrangements shall not in any manner 
adversely affect any payments due by the Mining Company to the Government under this 
Agreement or the Applicable Law. 
11 .4 Facilitation by Government 
The Government shall facilitate the financing arrangements set out in the approved 
financing plan by the grant of requisite approvals to the creation, registration and 
assignment of the securities referred to in Clause 11 .3. 
12. FAIR AND ECONOMICAL PROJECT OPERATION 
12.1 Non-Discrimination 
(a) The Government shall not discriminate against Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands, 
the Mining Company, their contractors and agents, directors, officers, employees or 
their dependents, in the application and administration of Applicable Law including, 
without limitation, the regulation of foreign currency exchange. 
(b) The Government shall expeditiously process applications for required permits, if any, 
for contractors and agents, direct.ors, officers or employees of Ross Solomon Islands 
and the Mining Company and thel~ dependents to enter, reside and work in and depart 
from Solomon Islands, where such personnel are required in the interests of the 
efficient and economic development and operation of the Project. Ross Solomon 
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islands and the Mining Company shall periodically submit lists of personnel for whom 
such permits are r8quired and the Government shall expeditiously grant the requisite 
permits enabling the persons concerned to enter and reside and work in Solomon 
Islands for periods of six months under each permit in accordance with the procedures 
agreed with the Government and reflected in a memorandum of understanding to be 
entered into by the parties. 
12.2 Non-Cancellation 
(a) The Government shall not cancel or terminate this Agreement, the Special Prospecting 
Licence or the Mining Lease, except in accordance with the provisions of Clause 19.2. 
(b) The Government shall not cancel any other licence, lease, consent or approval 
necessary for the Project except in accordance with its terms or in accordance with 
Applicable Law. In the event of any cancellation contrary to Clause 12.2(b), Ross 
Solomon Islands and the Mining Company shall have the right to immediately re-apply 
for any such necessary licence, lease, consent or approval, which shall be authorisec' 
or granted if proper application is made in accordance with Applicable Law. 
;t\1 
12.3 Non-Interference 
The Government shall not involve itself in the management of the Mining Company or the 
day-to-day operation of Ross Solomon Islands or the Mining Company except as fequired 
by Applicable Law or as may be in accordance with this Agreement. 
12.4 Non-Expropriation 
The Government shall not expropriate, or commit an act in the nature of an expropriation 
of, any assets used by Ross Solomon Islands, the Mining Company, or an Affiliated 
Company, or their contractors, in their operations under this Agreement, the products 
resulting from such operations, the licences of the Mining Company, or any shares or 
interests of Ross Solomon Islands or the Mining Company, unless payment is made to such 
companies and contractors of reasonable compensation, within a reasonable period of time, 
having due regard to all the relevant circumstances. The amount of compensation shall b£ 
computed on the basis of the market value of the asset immediately before the impendin~ 
expropriation became public knowledge. The compensation must be determined in 
accordance with internationally recognised principles of valuation and equitable principles 
and paid under section 8( 1 )(c)(i) of the Constitution of Solomon Islands. Such 
compensation shall be freely convertible and remittable. 
12.5 Transfer of Funds and Maintenance of Foreign Bank Accounts 
The Mining Company may retain, in a foreign currency account with a bank in Solomon 
Islands or in any offshore bank previously approved by the Central Bank of Solomon Islands, 
proceeds of its exports and any foreign loan or equity capital raising to meet its next six-
months foreign currency requirements for supplies and services reasonably necessary for 
the Project in accordance with'good international mining industry practice, and, subject to 
this Agreement, loan service charges, interest payments, loan repayments, dividends and 
amounts payable under other approved financing arrangements in accordance with the 
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approved financing plan. A schedule of such requirements shall be provided quarterly to 
the Central Bank. The balance of such proceeds shall be repatriated to Solomon Islands and 
converted into Solomon Islands currency at the then ruling rate of exchange. 
12.6 Marketing 
Subject to Clause 5.3, and the procedures for export and verification of gold production set 
out in or determined pursuant to the approved Feasibility Study, the Mining Company may 
freely sell and export dore, gold, silver and other minerals produced from the Mining Area 
in accordance with this Agreement. 
12.7 Affiliated Company Transactions 
Any transactions hereunder between the Mining Company and Ross Mining, Ross Solomon 
Islands or any other Affiliated Company, shall be on the basis of arm's length competitive 
third party international prices and such other terms and conditions as would be fair and 
reasonable had such transaction taken place between unaffiliated parties. Ross Solomon 
Islands and the Mining Company shall report to the Government in reasonable detail its 
transactions with Affiliated Companies within ninety (90) days after the end of each T~x 
~®' Year. 
12.8 Services, Know-how and Materials 
Any services including provision of know-how and use of patents or licences, provided to 
the Mining Company by Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands or any other Affiliated 
Company, which is normally provided by a contractor in accordance with good international 
mining industry practice, shall be provided only on an actual cost reimbursable basis, which 
cost shall be fair and reasonable. Any material supplied by Ross Mining, Ross Solomon 
Islands or an Affiliated Company to the Project from its own stocks shall be priced at cost, 
but shall not in any event be higher than the then prevailing arm's length competitive 
international price for material of similar quality. 
12.9 Currency of Accounts and Payments 
All financial accounts of Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company shall be maintained 
in Solomon Islands dollars. All amounts due to the Government shall be calculated and be 
payable in Australian dollars or other freely convertible currency. 
12.10 Indemnity 
The Mining Company, Ross Solomon Islands and Ross Mining shall indemnify and keep 
indemnified the Government and the Government's officers, employees, agents and 
contractors, against all claims, actions, rights or demands for any loss, damage, cost, death 
or injury of any third party to the extent it arises out of or is in connection with any act or 
omission of Ross Solomon Islands, Ross Mining or the Mining Company, or their employees, 
agents and contractors, in the conduct of operations under this Agreement provided that 
the indemnity of Ross Mining shall not apply after the date when the Mining Company has 
repaid all its loans and other debt·anct has met all its obligations to the lenders under the 
financing arrangements referred to or set out in the approved financing plan relating to the 
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Project entered into by the Mining Company or on behalf of the Mining Company by Ross 
Mining, Ross Solomon Islands or any other person. 
12.11 TaxStability 
(a) In the event of changes in the Tax Law, or the fiscal impositions provided for in 
Clause 6.9 or new fiscal impositions in the nature of a tax on Ross Solomon Islands 
or the Mining Company, made by the Government, the Provincial Government or the 
Bolomona Area Council after the date of this Agreement, other than the changes 
provided for in this Agreement or, fiscal impositions that are applicable to the Mining 
Company at generally prevailing rates in force from time to time as provided for in this 
Agreement, significantly and adversely affect the financial benefits accruing to Ross 
Solomon Islands or the Mining Company, or to the Government, the parties shall 
promptly agree upon the appropriate adjustment in favour of the party so affected and 
a fair and reasonable method to make the adjustment in respect of such changes or 
new fiscal impositions. In the event the parties do not promptly agree, Ross Solom' 
Islands and the Mining Company may apply to the High Court of Solomons Islands fv. 
permission to offset and pay into an escrow account in Solomons Islands, monies 
~.r 
otherwise payable to the Government, in amounts reasonably q~':imated to 
compensate for such changes until the parties do agree upon such adjustment and 
method. Any party may refer the matter in dispute to arbitration under. Clause 20. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Clause 12.11 (a), where, after the date of this 
Agreement, in respect of any fiscal imposition that is applicable to the Mining 
Company at generally prevailing rates in force from time to time as provided for in this 
Agreement, there is a Major Change as defined in Clause 12.11 (c) to the generally 
prevailing rate thereof as at the date of this Agreement which significantly and 
adversely affects the financial benefits accruing to Ross Solomon Islands or the Mining 
Company, or to the Government, the parties shall promptly agree upon the appropriate 
adjustment in favour of the party so affected and a fair and reasonable method to 
make the adjustment in respect of such change. In the event the parties do not 
promptly agree, Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company may apply to the 1-
Court of Solomons Islands for permission to offset and pay into an escrow account 
in Solomons Islands, monies otherwise payable to the Government, in amounts 
reasonably estima~ed to compensate for such change until the parties do agree upon 
such adjustment and method. Any party may refer the matter in dispute to arbitration 
under Clause 20. 
(c) For the purposes of Clause 12.11 (b) "Major Change" in relation to the fiscal imposition 
means a change in the rate of the fiscal imposition as measured from the level of the 
rate prevailing on the date of this Agreement which exceeds the rate of change in thE 
Solomon Islands Consumer Price Index from the year preceding the year in which thE 
Major Change occurs to the year in which the Major Change occurs. 
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12.12 Ross M1n1ng Guarantee 
Ross Mining binds itself to procure fulfilment of all the financial and other obligations of 
Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company under this Agreement; and Ross Solomon 
Islands binds itself to procure the fulfilment of all the financial and other obligations of the 
Mining Company under this Agreement. Ross Mining shall provide a guarantee in the form 
set out in Annex B. The aforesaid guarantee by Ross Mining shall apply until the date when 
the Mining Company has repaid all its loans and other debt and has met all its obligations 
to the lenders under the financing arrangements referred to or set out in the approved 
financing plan relating to the Project entered into by the Mining Company or on behalf of 
the Mining Company by Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands or any other person, and the 
Government shall return the guarantee to Ross Mining within ninety (90) days after the date 
aforesaid provided all Ross Mining's obligations as guarantor have been duly discharged 
under the guarantee. Thereafter the performance of the obligations of the Mining Company 
under this Agreement shall be secured by a bond or bank guarantee acceptable to the 
Government entered into or obtained by the Mining Company for such amount as specified 
in the approved Feasibility Study. 
12.13 Facilitation of Implementation of Agreement 
(a) The Government will endeavour to do all things necessary and practical to ensure that 
the Government and its public authorities facilitate the implementation of this 
Agreement. 
(b) The parties shall take the necessary measures and carry out the necessary actions to 
implement this Agreement. 
12.14 Insurance 
Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company shall effect and, at all times during the term 
of this Agreement, maintain for Project Operations hereunder insurance of such type and 
m such amount as is customary in the international gold industry in accordance with good 
international mining industry practice. The said insurance shall, without prejudice to the 
generality of the foregoing, cover loss or damage to all assets used in the Project 
Operations; pollution caused in the course of the Project Operations for which the Mining 
Company may be held responsible to the extent to which insurance cover for such risk is 
available to the Mining Company at reasonable cost; property loss or damage or bodily 
injury suffered by any third party in the course of Project Operations for which the Mining 
Company may be liable or the Mining Company may be liable to indemnify Government and 
the Mining Company's liability to its employees engaged in the Project Operations. The 
Mining Company shall require its sub-contractors to carry insurance of such type and in 
such amount as is customary in the international gold industry in accordance with good 
international mining indL!Si.ry practice. 
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13, ASSIGNMENT 
1301 Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands or the Mining Company may assign all or any pan of 
their interests under this A.greement and related rights under any lease, licence, consent 
or Government approval issued hereunder, (hereinafter called the "Related Rights") to any 
Affiliated Company" No such assignment to an Affiliated Company shall relieve the original 
assignor of its obligations under this Agreement or under the Related Rights, Ross Mining, 
Ross Solomon Islands, the Mining Company or any other Affiliated Company may assign 
all or any part of their interests under this A.greement and the Related Rights to any 
financially responsible third party which has adequate technical and financial resources to 
undertake operations under this Agreement with the prior consent of the Government, 
which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, provided that no assignment under this 
Clause shall take place until the Date of Commencement of Commercial Production other 
than as required by the lenders pursuant to the financing arrangements under the financing 
plan relating to the Project as approved by the Government pursuant to Clause 11 .1 . Ross 
Mining, Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company shall be released from their liaJ:)ilities 
. ;1::_:.}'"-' 
to the extent that they are assumed by such party. Any assignment or transferi~ the 
Special Prospecting Licence or the Mining Lease, shall not be subject to any tax or charge 
by the Government. 
14, MODIFICATION 
1401 The Special Prospecting Licence, the Mining Lease and this Agreement may not be modified 
except as provided in this Agreement, or in writing signed by all the parties. 
15. CONFIDENTIALITY 
1 5.1 Information 
Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands, the Mining Company, and the Government shall treat 
all technical and financial information concerning operations hereunder as confidential, with 
the exception of reports and studies relating to the environment and such other matters as 
the parties may jointly agree to publish. Subject to Clause 15.2, no party shall reveal such 
information to third parties, other than to its officers, employees, agents, consultants and 
contractors, except with the consent of the other parties, which consent shall not be 
unreasonably withheld, for a period of four (4) years from the date of transmission of such 
technical information, and in the case of financial information, until the expiration of this 
obligation as provided in Clause 15.30 Technical information concerning the Prospecting 
Area may only be revealed three (3) months after the expiry of the Special Prospecting 
Licence if no application i,s made for a Mining Lease. If the application is made, such 
_, 
information may only be revealed eighteen ( 18) months after the date of the application. The 
Government may nevertheless use and publish any such information in general oand official 
statistical reports on minerals and mining in Solomon Islands and for or in connection with 
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the administration of the Mining Law, any legal proceedings, investigation or inquiry 
conducted thereunder or for any other purpose required under the Applicable Law. 
15.2 Disclosure 
Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands or the Mining Company may disclose any such 
information to an Affiliated Company, provided that such information shall be accorded 
similar confidential treatment by the Affiliated Company. Ross Mining, Ross Solomon 
Islands or the Mining Company may also disclose such information in connection with a 
bona fide proposed assignment. In no event shall the Government reveal any proprietary 
information owned by Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands or the Mining Company except 
to the extent such information enters the public domain or is revealed by a third party not 
under an obligation of confidentiality. A party hereto may reveal any confidential technical 
and financial information to the same extent. A party, or an Affiliated Company, may also 
reveal information when necessary in connection with any arbitration or legal proceedings, 
or as may otherwise be required by this Agreement, Applicable Law, the applicable law and . 
J 
regulations of any country having jurisdiction over such party, or the rules of any stoc~ 
exchange on which the party's or an Affiliated Company's shares are traded or to any,;, 
professional advisers for the purpose of advising a party on any matter concerning th~ 'l~ 
Project. 
15.3 Press Release 
Subject to Clause 15, no party may quote the other party's or parties' views in any press 
release without prior written consent of the other party or per-ties concerned. 
15.4 Expiration of Obligations 
The parties' obligations under this Clause shall expire at the final completion of Project 
Operations or the termination of this Agreement, whichever first occurs. 
16. FORCE MAJEURE 
16.1 Events and Conditions 
The parties hereto shall not be liable under this Agreement for a delay or failure to perform 
an obligation due to any event or condition of force majeure. A party shall be excused by 
force majeure only to the extent the party claiming force majeure ~ould not reasonably have 
been expected to foresee and prevent or control the same, and, where the party claiming 
force majeure is the Mining Company, Ross Solomon Island or Fbss Mining provided that 
the event or condition was not caused by the failure by the MiningCompany, Ross Solomon 
Islands or Ross Mining respectively to observe good international 'llining industry practice. 
For the purposes of this Agreement force majeure means war, insurection, civil disturbance, 
blockade, riot, embargo, strike or other labour dispute, land dspute including dispute 
concerning compensation for access to land, epidemic, earthqual<a, volcano, storm, flood 
or other severe adverse weather cahdition, explosion, fire, liJhtning, breakdown of 
machinery or facilities, shortage of labour, transportation, fuel, p)wer or essential plant, 
equipment or materials, or any other unforeseeable, unpreventableor uncontrollable event 
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or condition. An unreasonable delay or failure exceed three months or such 
as may be reasonable in the circumstances by Government or, as the case may 
Provincial Government or Local Government in the issuance or grant of an Ancil 
Authorisation required fer the implementation of the Project, shall, to the extent that it 
pre·Jents Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company from lawfully carrying out the 
Project activity concerned, in relation to that Project activity constitute force majeure to 
Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company provided a timely application in accordance 
and compliance with Applicable Law is properly made. A delay in the payment of money 
shall not be excused by force majeure. 
16.2 Time Extensions 
The party affected by force majeure shall be granted a time extension equal to the period 
for which performance was delayed by force majeure. 
16.3 Reasonable Measures 
The party claiming force majeure shall take all reasonable measures to remove its inabilit'' 
to perform and comply with the terms and conditions of this Agreement with a minim 
of delay. No party shall be required to settle a labour dispute or a land dispute on terms 
which are not in good faith satisfactory to it. :,""~:$ 
16.4 Notice of Force Majeure 
The affected party shall give notice to the other party of an event of force majeure as soon 
as possible, and similarly give notice of the restoration of normal conditions. 
17. NOTICE 
17.1 Notices 
Any notice, ap"lication, request, consent, approval, direction or instruction, must be given 
1n writing. 
17.2 Service 
It must be se:ved on the party's authorised representatives as follows: 
(a) by hanj between parties resident in the Solomon Islands; or 
(b) sent br facsimile transmission; or 
(c) if eithjr method in (a) or (b) is not possible, sent by registered mail. 
17.3 Delivery 
The followng addresses are the addresses for service and the following persons are H 
authorised representati\!e of a party for the purposes of this Agreement. A party m< 
change its address for service and its authorised representative by giving notice to ear 
other partt. 
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The Govemment: 
Ross Solomon Islands: 
Ross Mining: 
Gold Ridge Mining: 
M of Mines and Minerals 
P~ 0. Box G37 
Langakiki Ridge 
Honiara, Solomon Islands 
Facsimile: 677 25811 
Authorised Representative: Permanent Secretary 
Ross Mining (Solomon Islands) Limited 
Coopers & Lybrand 
1st Floor, City Centre Building 
Mendana Avenue 
Honiara, Solomon Islands 
Facsimile: 677 25872 
Authorised Representative: Project Manager 
Level 3, 1 89 Coronation Drive 
Milton, Queensland, 4064 
Australia 
Facsimile: 617 33691119 
Authorised Representative: Managing Director 
Pakoe Road, East Gold Ridge 
Kola Ridge 
Honiara, Solomon Islands 
Facsimile: 25872 
Authorised Representative: Manager 
18. NON-WAIVER 
3.1 In the event a party shall waive any breach of this Agreement, such waiver shall be limited 
to the specific breach waived and shall not adversely affect or prejudice that party's right 
as to another breach, whether or not of the same nature. 
19. SURRENDER AND TERMINATION 
19.1 Surrender 
Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company may surrender their rights by 
written notice signed by their respective chairmen: 
~.). 
(a) undc; this Agreement and the Prospecting Licence, upon ninety (90) days notice; 
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(b) under this and the M Lease, before the Date of 
Commencement of Commerc1al Production upon four (4) months 
(c) under this Agreement and the Mining Lease, after the Date of Commencement of 
Commercial Production upon six (6) months notice. 
In the event of such surrender, Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company 
shall be relieved of their obligations and liabilities under this Agreement, the Mining Lease 
or the Special Prospecting Licence, and such other leases, licences, permits, rights or 
approvals issued by the Government in connection therewith from the date of expiry of the 
notice, provided, however, that Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining 
Company shall be and remain liable for all obligations accrued prior to the effective date of 
such surrender as provided in this Clause and those obligations which persist or are required 
to be fulfilled after termination, except for the Project completion and cost obligations 
specified in Clause 3.13(a). 
19.2 Termination by the Gov·?rnment "'' 
The Government may, without prejudice to any other rights that the Government may·have, 
terminate this Agreement, if any of the following events should occur: 
(a) Subject to the provisions of Clause 16 and the second proviso to Clause 3.13(b), the 
Date of Commencement of Commercial Production does not occur on or before the 
end of the sixth month following the sixth anniversary of the date of issuance of the 
Mining Lease and the requisite Ancillary Authorisations specified in the application for 
the Mining Lease whichever is the later; 
(b) Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands or the Mining Company commits a material breach 
of, or fails to comply with or observe, a fundamental provision of this Agreement, the 
Special Prospecting Licence, or the Mining Lease, and fails or neglects to remedy that 
breach or comply with or observe that provision within ninety (90) days, or such 
longer period as may be reasonable in the circumstances, after a notice from the 
Minister requiring that the breach be remedied or the provision be complied with or 
observed; 
(c) Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands or the Mining Company shall dissolve, liquidate, 
become insolvent, commit an act of bankruptcy, make an assignment for the benefit 
of creditors, petition or apply to any tribunal for the appointment of a trustee or 
receiver for itself, or commence any proceedings relating to itself under any law 
pertaining to bankruptcy, reorganisation, arrangement, insolvency or readjustment of 
debt, whether now or hereafter in effect, otherwise than for the purposes of 
corporate reorganisation of which the Mining Company has given a reasonable prior 
written notice to the Government; 
.\ 
(d) Ross Mining shall become unable to perform its obligations under Clause 12.12 and 
does not (with the consent of the Government, which consent shall not be 
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unreasonably withheld) provide a financially responsible third party, acceptable to 
Government, which has adequate financial resources to assume such obligations, or 
(e) Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands or the Mining Company shall assign any interest 
under this Agreement prior to the Date of Commencement of Commercial Production 
other than as required by the lenders pursuant to the financing arrangements under 
the financing plan relating to the Project as approved by the Government pursuant to 
Clause 11 . 1 . 
19.3 Termination by Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company 
Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company may terminate this Agreement, without 
prejudice to any other rights they may have, if the Government commits a material breach 
of a fundamental provision of this Agreement and fails or neglects to remedy that breach 
within ninety (90) days or such longer period as may be reasonable in the circumstances, 
after a notice from Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company requiring that the breach 
be remedied. 
19.4 Assets on Surrender, Expiration or Termination 
Upon the expiration or termination of this Agreement by the Government or the surrender 
of this Agreement by Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company, the 
Government shall have the option to acquire any or all immovable property of the Mining 
Company without charge, and to acquire any or all movable property of the Mining 
Company, not otherwise required by the Mining Company for mining operations, at net 
depreciated book value for income tax purposes, or at fair market value, whichever is less. 
The Government shall have a period of sixty (60) days to exercise such option, after which 
the Mining Company shall be entitled to sell to third parties any property which the 
Government shall not have exercised its option to acquire. Any property not removed 
within a period of twelve ( 12) months from the date of expiration, surrender or termination, 
may then be acquired by the Government without charge. The Government may require the 
Mining Company, Ross Solomon Islands or Ross Mining to remove any property not 
acquired by the Government or otherwise comply with the programme referred to in Clause 
19.7{b). 
19.5 Books and Records 
None of the books and records of the Mining Company may be removed from Solomon 
Islands upon the expiration, surrender or termination of this Agreement without the prior 
consent of the Minister. Ross Solomon Islands and Ross Mining shall have the right to 
obtain copies of the books and records of the Mining Company and to hold them outside 
Solomon Islands. 
19.6 Effect of Surrender, Expiration or Termination 
(a) The expiration, surrender or termination of this Agreement shall automatically 
terminate the Special Prospecting' Licence or the Mining Lease, whichever is then m 
force, and all Ancillary Authorisations and all rights arising thereunder. 
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(b) The expiration, surrender or termination of this Agreement shall be without prejudice 
to any rights accruing to any party against any other party under this Agreement prior 
to such expiration, surrender or termination of this Agreement. 
19.7 Post Surrender, Expiration or Termination Obligations 
Upon the expiration, surrender or termination of this Agreement pursuant to Clause 19.2, 
Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company shall: 
(a) make the Prospecting Area or the Mining Area safe to the reasonable satisfaction of 
the Minister so as to prevent injury to persons, livestock or other property; 
(b) comply with the environmental programme for the reclamation and rehabilitation of the 
Mining Area {annexed to the Mining Lease), subject to Clause 3.5; and 
(c) otherwise comply with Applicable Law; 
provided that if the Government intends to carry out mining operations thereafter, it shall 
so notify the Mining Company, and the Mining Company shall not take any acAAn 
inconsistent with such notice or adversely affecting such mining operations. 
20. COOPERATION AND ARBITRATION 
20.1 Cooperation 
The parties intend to be bound to this Agreement and to comply therewith in good faith. 
The parties shall regularly inform and consult with each other on matters pertaining to the 
Project and shall cooperate and regularly meet to facilitate the progress of the Project and 
to resolve any disputes which may arise between them. 
20.2 Arbitration 
The parties shall use their best endeavours to settle amicably among themselves any dispute 
arising between them in connection with this Agreement. If any such dispute cannot be 
resolved by the parties, the parties consent to submit to the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (hereinafter 
called "ICSID") in accordance with this Clause. The arbitration shall be conducted by an 
arbitration board composed of three (3) arbitrators appointed in accordance with this Clause 
and the ICSID Rules. Each party shall appoint an arbitrator and so advise the other party 
and these two arbitrators shall designata the third neutral arbitrator who shall chair the 
arbitration board. If the arbitrators nominated by the parties fail to agree on the third neutral 
arbitrator within thirty (30) days following the appointment of the latter of the two 
arbitrators, or if a party fails to appoint an arbitrator within thirty (30) days after the other 
party has duly designated its nominated arbitrator, such arbitrator shall, if the parties do not 
otherwise agree, be appoint':!d iri· accordance with the ICSID Rules. The parties may 
mutually agree to arbitration by a single neutral arbitrator who shall be chosen in accordance 
with the ICSID Rules. If for any reason an arbitrator is unable to perform his functions, a 
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substitute shall be chosen in the same manner as the original arbitrator. Any arbitrator 
appointed pursuant to this Clause shall be a national of a country other than that of the 
parties and shall have no professional or business connection with the parties, or any 
Affiliate of the parties. Arbitration hearings shall be held in Honiara, or such other country 
other than Australia agreed by the parties and, failing agreement, the seat of the ICSID 
Centre. Other rules of procedure to be applied shall be agreed upon by the parties and 
where the parties are unable to agree, by the arbitrator(s). The rules of procedure including 
the evidential rules shall be designed to permit the comprehensive, fair, accurate and 
expeditious presentation and adjudication of the issues. 
20.3 Dispute 
The parties hereto hereby agree that, for the purpose of Clause 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention, any dispute in relation to or arising out of this Agreement is a legal dispute 
arising directly out of an investment. 
20.4 Nationality 
For the purposes of Clause 25(2) of the ICSID Convention, it is hereby agreed that, although 
Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company are or will be nationals of Solomon lsland~(1{ 
they are controlled by a national or nationals of Australia and shall be treated as nationals· 
of Australia for the purposes of the Convention. 
20.5 Right Not Affected 
It is hereby agreed that the rights of Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands or the Mining 
Company to refer a dispute to arbitration shall not be affected by the fact that Ross Mining, 
Ross Solomon Islands or the Mining Company has received full or partial compensation from 
any third party with respect to any loss or injury which is the object of the dispute; provided 
that the Government may require evidence that such third party agrees to the exercise of 
~uch right by Ross Mining, Ross Solomon Islands or the Mining Company. 
20.6 Enforcement 
The Government hereby irrevocably waives any claim to immunity in regard to any 
proceedings to enforce any arbitral award rendered by a tribunal constituted pursuant to this 
Agreement, including, without limitation, immunity from service of process, immunity from 
jurisdiction of any court, and immunity of any of its property from execution. 
20.7 Costs 
The costs of the sole expert appointed pursuant to this Agreement or, as the case may be, 
of the arbitration proceedings under Clause 20, shall be borne by the unsuccessful party. 
20.8 Appointment of Sole Expert 
Where any dispute or matter is referred to a sole expert for determination under this 
Agreement, the sole expert shall be agreed upon within thirty (30) days of notification of 
the dispute or matter and, failing agreement, shall be appointed by the President of 
International Chamber of Commerce in Paris as provided in the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement. 
43 
20.9 Survival 
The right to arbitrate or determine disputes under this Clause 20 shall survive the 
termination or cancellation of this Agreement. 
21. GOVERNING LAW 
21 .1 Governing Law 
This Agreement shall be governed, construed and interpreted only in accordance with the 
law of Solomon Islands, including the statutory law, regulations and other instruments 
having the force of law, from time to time in force and such rules of international law as 
may be applicable. 
21 .2 Compensation 
22.1 
23.1 
If any such law coming into force after the date of this Agreement would invalidate this 
Agreement, the Mining Company, Ross Mining and Ross Solomon Islands shall, 
notwithstanding the coming into force of such law, have the right to claim compensation 
pursuant to Clause 12.4 and Clause 20 as if the coming into force of such law were 
act in the nature of an expropriation. 
22. SEVERABILITY 
If any of the provisions of this Agreement, including the annexes, is held invalid or 
unenforceable, such invalidity or unenforceability shall not affect the validity or 
enforceability of any other provisions of the Agreement, except those of which the 
invalidated or unenforceable provision comprises an integral part or is otherwise clearly 
inseparable therefrom. In the event any provision is held invalid or une'lforceable, the 
parties shall agree on a valid or enforceabie provision which shall be a reasonable substitute 
for such invalid or unenforceable provision in light of the tenor of this Agreement and, on 
so agreeing, shall incorporate such substitute provision in this Agreement. 
23. ENTIRE AGREEMENT 
This Agreement including the Gold Ridge SPL and the Mining Lease (when issued) and the 
annexes attached hereto and thereto shall constitute the entire Agreement between the 
parties. 
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IN WITt\lESS WHEREOF the parties hereto cause this Agreement to be entered into the 
signatures of their duly authorised 
For the Government of Solomon Islands 
Minister fo~r ~ergy, Mines and Minerals 
Witness 
------~~4-~-----------
For Ross Mining (Solomon Islands) Limited 
with the rior approval of its Board of Directors 
by 
Authori 
For Ross Mining N .L. 
with the prior approval of its Board of Directors 
:anagMct== 
Witnc» __ ~--eJ-~ __________________ _ 
For Gold Ridge Mining Limited with the 
prior appro a/ of its Board of Directors by 
in Honiara, Solomon isiandso 
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Annex B 
PARENT FINANCIAL AND PERFORMANCE GUARANTEE 
(to be furnished pursuant to Clause 12.12 of the Ag;eement) 
WHEREAS Ross Mining NL a company duly organised and existing under the law of State of 
Queensland, Australia having its registered office at Level 3, 189 Coronation Drive, Milton, 
Queensland 4064, Australia (hereinafter referred to as 'the Guarantor' which expression shall 
include its successors and assigns) is the direct owner of 100% of the capital stock of Ross Mining 
(Solomon Islands) Limited, a company incorporated under the laws of Solomon Islands and having 
its principal place of business at Coopers and Lybrand, 1st Floor, City Centre Building, Mendana 
Avenue, Honiara, Solomon Islands (hereinafter Ross Solomon Islands) and WHEREAS Gold Ridge 
Mining Limited will, pursuant to the Gold Ridge Mining Agreement of even date of this guarantee 
entered into between the Government of Solomon Islands, Ross Mining (Solomon Islands) Limited, 
Ross Mining NL and Gold Ridge Mining Limited (referred to in this Annex as "the Agreement") be 
the Mining Company; and 
f·'· 
WHEREAS the Guarantor wishes to guarantee the performance of Ross Solomon Islands and t~~ 
Mining Company and their Affiliate Assignee under the Agreement as required by Clause 12.12 of 
the Agreement; 
NOW, THEREFORE this Deed hereby provides as follows: 
1. The Guarantor hereby unconditionally and irrevocably guarantees to the Government that 
it will up to the Relevant Date make available, or cause to be made available, to Ross 
Solomon Islands and the Mining Company and, any other directly or indirectly owned 
Affiliate of Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company to which any part or all of their 
rights and interests under the Agreement may subsequently be assigned (referred to in this 
Annex as Affiliate Assignee), financial, technical, managerial and other resources required 
to ensure that Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company and any Affiliate Assignee 
can carry out their obligations under the Agreement. 
2. The Guarantor further unconditionally and irrevocably guarantees up to the Relevant Date 
to the Government the due and punctual compliance by Ross Solomon Islands and the 
Mining Company and any Affiliate Assignee, of any obligations of Ross Solomon Islands and 
the Mining Company and any Affiliate Assignee under the Agreement. 
3. The Guarantor hereby undertakes up to the Relevant Date to the Government that if Ross 
Solomon Islands, the Mining Company, or any Affiliate Assignee up to the Relevant Date, 
shall, in any respect, fail to perform its obligations under the Agreement or commit any 
breach of such obligations, then the Guarantor shall fulfil or cause to be fulfilled the said 
obligations in place of Ross Solomon Islands, Mining Company or any Affiliate Assignee, 
and will indemnify the Government;' against all losses, damages, costs, expenses or 
otherwise which may result directly from such failure to perform or breach up to the 
Relevant Date on the part of Ross Solomon Islands, the Mining Company or any Affiliate 
Assignee. 
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4. Th1s guarantee shall take effect from the date of signature of 1he Agreement and shall 
rema1n in full force and effect up to the Relevant Date under the and thereafter 
until no sum remains payable by Ross Solomon Islands and the Mining Company, or any 
Affiliate Assignee under the Agreement or, as a result of any decision or award made by 
any arb1tral tribunal or sole expert thereunder in respect of any matter arising under the 
Agreement, in relat1on to the period up to the Relevant Date. The Government shall return 
this guarantee to Ross Mining within ninety (90) days after the Relevant Date provided all 
the obligations of the Guarantor have been duly discharged hereunder. 
5. This guarantee shall not be affected by any change in the Articles of Association and bye-
laws of Ross Solomon Islands, the Mining Company, any Affiliate Assignee or the 
Guarantor. 
6. The liabilities of the Guarantor shall not be discharged or affected by (a) any time 
indulgence, waiver or consent given to Ross Solomon Islands, the Mining Company or anv 
Affiliate Assignee; (b) any amendment to the Agreement or to any security or ott> 
guarantee or indemnity to which Ross Solomon Islands, the Mining Company or an,Y Affiliatv 
Assignee has agreed; (c) the enforcement or waiver of any terms of the AgreEf~nt or of 
any security, other guarantee or indemnity; or (d) the dissolution, amalgamation, 
reconstruction or reorganisation of Ross Solomon Islands, the Mining Company or any 
Affiliate Assignee. 
7. In this guarantee, "Relevant Date" means the date when the Mining Company has repaid 
all its loans and other debt and has met all its obligations to the lenders under the financing 
arrangements referred to or set out in the approved financing plan relating to the Project 
entered into by the Mining Company or on behalf of the Mining Company by Ross Mining, 
Ross Solomon Islands or any other person. 
8. This guarantee shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of Solomon 
Islands. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Guarantor, through its duly authorised representatives, has caused 
seal to be duly affixed hereto and this guarantee to be duly executed the ~---~-day 
of 1996. 
The COMMON SEAL of ROSS MINING NL was hereto duly 
affixed with the prior approval of its Board of Directors this~----~~~- day of 
1996 
1n the presence of: 
Director 
Secretary 
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Annex 
Illustrative of Additional Profits Tax 
1. Under the Additional Prof1ts Tax (APT) arrangements stipulated in Clause 6.3 of the 
Agreement, Gold Ridge Min1ng Limited (the Mining Company) is allowed to earn a twenty 
f1ve percent (25%) rate of return (the"threshold" or "required" rate of return) before APT 
is levied at the rate of thirty percent (30%). As soon as the Mining Company has earned 
th1s threshold rate of return 1t will be charged APT on all further cash flow profits. 
2. The po1nt at which the Mining Company has earned this rate of return is calculated by 
taking the annual net cash rece1pts of the investor adjusting it for inflation as provided in 
Clause 6.3(c) of the Agreement and compounding this and cont1nuing to do so as long as 
the cumulative cash receipts is negative. 
3. For illustrative purposes only, an example of how APT is calculated without the inflation 
adjustment is given in the Table below. The numbers are not meant to represent tJJ.·~ e
cashflow of the Mining Company, but are chosen to illustrate how APT works. In ~ 
example one tier of APT is paid at the rate of 30% on cashflow profits in excess of a 
twenty five percent ( 2 5%) rate of return. 
4. The cumulative cash flow for the year in column (5) is simply the cumulative total from the 
previous year, multiplied by 1.25 in this example { = 1 + 25%), and added to the net cash 
receipts figure in the current year from column {4). So, in year (2) the figure of -231 is 
arrived at by taking -105 from the previous year, multiplying it by 1 .25, to give -131, and 
adding this to -100 in the current year to give -231. 
5. The net profits, from year 4 onwards, finally outweigh the earlier negatives and in year 7, 
the cumulative cash flow becomes positive. This means that a twenty five percent (25%) 
rate of return has been earned by the Mining Company. APT is now paid on any further 
profits in the year in which they are earned. No further cumulative totalling for latter years 
is necessary unless the cash flow turns negative again (for example, because of further 
investment later in the mine's life); the negative cash flow would then be compounded by 
25%, to allow that rate to be earned before APT is again paid. 
Year 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
NB 
US $ MILLION 
( 1 ) (2) (3] (4) (5) 
Capital Tax, Cumulative Accumul-
and Royalty Net Cash Cash Receipts -muiated 
op and other Mine Gross Receipts compounded NetCash APT 
costs payments Revenue (3H2H1 l at 25% p.a. Position at 30% 
["C"l ["8"] ["A"] 
100 5 -1 05 -105 
100 -1 00 -231 
50 -50 -339 
20 20 50 +10 -414 
20 50 200 +130 -387 
,_.,,. 
20 100 300 + 180 -304 
20 100 400 +280 +100 100 30 
20 100 350 +230 230 69 
20 80 300 +200 200 60 
20 60 250 +170 170 51 
1 . Some numbers are rounded. 
2. The above cashflows will be adjusted by the inflation index specified in Clause 
6.3 (c) of the Agreement. 
3. The columns above marked "C", "B" and "A" illustrate the computation ot "C", "B" 
and "A" spec1f1ed 1n Clause 6.3(b) of the Agreement. 
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